TOP SECRET/
NOTORN
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Report on Russian
Active Measures
March 22, 2018
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Beri v e d ffm r Mu ltipl e ' Sources
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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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Table of Contents
(U) Abbreviations ii
(U) Referenced Persons iii
(U) Preface viii
(UJ Introduction and Overview 1
(U) Summary Table of Findings 4
(U) Summary Table of Recommendations 8
(U) Chapter 1 - Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe 11
(U) Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States 22
(U) Chapter 3 —America Reacts 38
(U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia 60
(U) Chapter 5 - Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks 99
(U) Chapter 6 - Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts 111
(U) Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations 114
{U) Appendices 131
(U) Appendix A: Scope and Methodology
(U) Appendix B: Russia Investigation Parameters
(U) Appendix C: Russia's Media Propaganda Apparatus
(If) Appendix 0; Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 107.1
(U) Appendix E: HPSCi Majority Memo About FISA Abuses
(U) Appendix F: HPSCI Minority Memo About FISA Abuses
(U) Appendix G: Senate Judiciary Memo About Christopher Steele Referral
(U) Appendix H: Committee Correspondence with DOJ and FBI
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Abbreviations
AP
APT
CIA
CSP
DAG
DCCC
DHS
DIA
DNC
ONI
DOJ
EAC
£U
FARA
FBI
FEC
FISA
FISC
FSB
FY
GRU
HPSCI
HUMINT
IAA
1C
tCA
ICD
ICPG
IRA
Associated Press
Advanced Persistent Threat
Central Intelligence Agency
Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph
Deputy Attorney General
Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee
Department of Homeland Security
Defense Intelligence Agency
Democratic Nations) Committee
Director of National Intelligence
Department of Justice
U.S, Election Assistance Commission
European Union
Foreign Agents Registration Act
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Election Commission
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Foreign intelligence Surveillance
Court
Russian Federal Security Bureau
Fiscal Year
Russian General Staff Main
Intelligence Directorate
House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence (the Committee)
Human intelligence
Intelligence Authorization Act
Intelligence Community
I nteil i g enc e Com in u nity Ass e ssm e nt
Intelligence Community Directive
Intelligence Community Policy
Guidance
Internet Research Agency
NASS
NATO
NCCIC
NGO
NIST
NSA
NSAC
NSC
ODNl
PIT
RNC
RT
SCI
SIGINT
SIS
SSA
SVR
UK
VOIP
VPN
National Association of Secretaries
of State
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center
Non-governmental Organization
National Institute for Standards and
Technology
National Security Agency
Candidate Trump's National Security
Advisory Committee
National Security Council
Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Presidential Transition Team
Republican National Committee
Formerly known as Russia Today
Sensitive Compartmented
Information
Signals intelligence
Moldovan Intelligence Service
Supervisory Special Agent
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
United Kingdom
Voice Over Internet Protocol
Virtual Private Network
SCCnCT;
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II
PROPERTY or THE U.S, I lOUSt Of BEPFili CENTATlVEf'
(U) Referenced Persons
* Assange
Barm on
Clovis
I
Julian
! Steve
1
Brennan
John
Cameron
David
Chaika
Yuri
Dapper
James
Clinton
Hillary
Sam
]Cohen
Comcy
Conway
Dearborn
Divcykin
Michael
James
iCellyanne
Rick
—h
I Igor
Fou nde r of Wi k 3 lea ks
Former Senior Counselor to :he President anti White House Chief
Strategist {January-August 2Q17); former Chief Executive Officer of {
Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign; former Executive Chair- !
h
man of Breitbart News
Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom {2010*2016)
i Prosecutor ©onoral of Un Russian Fedor.ilian {2006-prnsen:)
| Former Director of National Intelligence (2010 2017)
Nomina*ed ;i.n the Democratic candidate ior Presidenl in 2016, for¬
mer Secretary of State (2009-2013); former First Lady of the United
States
*M — * - t 4 -A 1
Senior White House Advisor to the United States Department of Ag¬
riculture (2017-presnnt), National Co-chair of Donald Frump's 2016
presidential campaign
Executive Vice President of the Trump Organization and special
Counsel to Donald Trump
■ ■hA* ■■■ - j^l -g r - - — ~ —
Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation {20J.3-2Q17)
Counselor to the President {2G17-p r esent); Campaign Manager of
Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign [August 17, 2016
November 5,2016)
| White House Deputy Chief of Staff for legislative, Intergovernmental 1
Allatri (2017~present); Executive Director of the 2016 Presidential
Transition Team
Deputy Chief for Internal Policy of the Russian federation
Djukanovic
i Dmitriev
! Downer
■ -
1 Dvorkovich
Fatah ol-Sisi
■ Milo
Former President of Momnnop/o from 1998-2002; former Prime
Minister from 2003 2006, 200 S- 2010 , find 2Q12 2016
Kiltll
a.
Alexander
}--
Arkady
Chief Executive Officer of the Russian DJieci Investment fund
Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Russian Railways
PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OF RcPREStN l ATTVES
(U) Referenced Persons (cont)
Flynn
Gates
Michael
National Security Advisor (January 2017 February 2017)
Rick
Deputy to Paul Manafort (June-August 201G)
Gordon
Graham
Grsssley
i
Hicks
J-D.
Lindsay
Chuck
Director of National Security of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential
campaign
United States Senator from South Carolina (2C03-present}; former
member of the United States House of Representatives from South
Carbine (1993^2003)
Hope
1 - * —
Johnson
m
Kellogg
k -r -■ ►
United States Senator from fowa {1981-presem}; former member of
the United States House of Representatives from Iowa (1973-1981)
White House Director of Communications (20lV-present}; former
White House Director of Strategic Communications (January 2017-
September 2017); National Press Secretory of the Presidential Tran¬
sition Team; Communications Director of Donald Trump's 2016
presidential campaign; former employee of thi j Trump Organtodtion
Former Secretory of Homeland Security {2013-2017)
Keith
Kemp
Brian
Executive Secretary and Chief of Stoff of the National Security Coun¬
cil [February 2017-present); Acting National Secur ity Advisor
4 -
(February 2017); foreign policy advisor of Donald Trump's 2016 pres-
idonhal campaign
Secretary of State ol the State of Georgia [2010*present)
Kushner
Jared
| Senior Advisor to the President; sondn-law of the President {married
! Ivanka Trump in 2009); real-estate developer
Lavrov
Sergey
Minister of foreign AH airs of the Russian Federation (200^-present)
Lynch
Macron
Loretta
Emmanuel
Former Attorney General of ihe United Slates (2015-2017!
, President of France (20IV-present)
Manofort
IVtoshburn
McCabe
Paul
; John
j* 4 1
Andrew
Chairman of Donald trump's 20L6 presidential campaign (Junu-
August 2016)
'■P - P — ™ * -- —* " --* ■ »-► » ■-««
Co-leu, with Senator Sessions, the foreign policy advisory panel of
Donald Trump's 2016 pm identic camp aign
Former Deputy Director of the Federal Quroau of investigation {2016
-2013}
PROPER fY Oh THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IV
(U) Referenced Persons (cont)
McCord
Senate Majority Leader (2GlS-presenl); United Slates Senior from
1 Kentucky [1985-prosit)
^ Former Ac tin 6 Assistant Attorney General of the United States (2016
| -2017); former Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Wa-
i tianal Security (2014-2016)
MeGalin
I Don
White House Counsel (January 2017-presenO; General Counsel of
the Presidential Transition Team (November 2016-January 2017);
Counsel to the Trump campaign during Donald Trump's 2016 presi¬
dential campaign
Merkel
Angels
Chancellor of Germany (2005-present)
. rvtiiekei
I Robert
Special Counsel for the United States Department of Justice (May
2017-present); farmer Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga¬
tion (2001-2013)
Obama
Papiidopoulos
Bn/nek
Farmer Prcslttant of the United Status (200U 2017|
fa <>41
George
Former member of the foreign polity advisory panel to Donald
I Trump's 2016 presidential campaign
Polos!
Nancy
Minority leader of the United States House of Representatives
(2Dll present); former Speaker ot the United States House of Rep¬
resentatives (2007 2011); member of the United States House of
Representatives from California (19^7-present)
Pence
Mike
Vice President of the United States (2017* present); former Governor
of Indiana (2013-2017); former member of the United States House
of Representatives from Indiana (2001-2013)
Podcsto
John
_ i
Chairman of Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign; former
i White House Chief of Staff; former Counselor to me President
Pompuo
Mike
Secretary of Slate nominee (March 201S); DJr*?clo r oF the Central
Intelligence Agency (January 2017-present); former member of the
United stmes House of Representatives from Kansas (2012-2017)
-ptv
uc
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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
v
(U) Referenced Persons (cont)
Putin
Vladimir
1 ' ^I - T - , — IF — — I — «i
President of the Russian Federation (2012-present)
Reid
Harry Former Minority Leader of the United States Senate {2015 2017);
former United States Senator from Nevada {198V-2017)
Rice
Romney
Ryan
Schiller
Schmitz
Susan
Mitt
Pam
Former National Security Advisor (2013-1017}; former United
States Ambassador to Lhe United Notions {2009-2U13]
Former Republican nominee for President (2012): former Governor
of Massachusetts (2003-2007)
Speaker of the United States House of Representative.*; (2015-
present); member of the United States House of Representatives
from Wisconsin (13!)9-present)
Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Gvel
Office Operations (January 2017-September 2017); forme/ Director
of Security for the Trump Organization (2004-2017}
' Former foreign policy advisor to Donald Trump; former inspector
General of the United Stales Department of Defense {2002-2005}
Attorney General of the United States {2017-present); member of
the 2016 Presidential Transition ream nnd Donald trump's 2016
presidential campaign; former Unuoo States Senator from Alabama
(1097-2017)
Steele
Christopher
Founder of British research firm Orb Is Business intelligence; former
British intelligence professional
Former advisor of Donate! Trump's 2016 president's I campaign
Senior Policy Advisor of Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential cam¬
paign; former National Security Advisor to the Vico President {2013
2014)
Trump
Donald J.
T UL
Trump, Jr.
Donald
President of The United States (2017-present); career real estaTe
developer and television host and producer
President Trump's son; Trump Organization executive
PROPERTY OF THC U S I lOUSEOF REPR^SPNfAUVIiS
(U) Referenced Persons (cont)
Yanufcouich
1 Yates
former President of Ukr&rne (2010-2014)
Former Acting Attorney General of the United States (Jan 2017);
former Deputy Attorney General of che United States (2015 2017)
PROPERTY OF THE UHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TOP - SCCRE - f
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(U) Preface
(U) In 2015, Russia began engaging in a
covert influence campaign aimed at the U.S.
presidential election. The Russian govern-
ment, at the direction of President Vladimir
Putin, sought to sow discord in American
society and undermine our faith in the dem¬
ocratic process. Now, more than a year
after the election, the American people
rightfully want to know what the Russians
did; how they did it; with whose support, if
anyone's; and what can be done to counter
any election tampering by foreign adver¬
saries In the future.
(U) With this charge, the House Perma¬
nent Select Committee on Intelligence (the
Committee) initiated an investigation in Jan¬
uary 2017 with the mandate to examine (1)
what Russian cyber activity and other active
measures (covert influence activities run by
the Russian intelligence services) were di¬
rected against the United States and its al¬
lies; (2) whether the Russian active
measures include links between Russia and
individuals associated with presidential
campaigns; (3) what was the U.S. govern¬
ment response to these Russian active
measures and what do we need to do to
protect ourselves and our allies in the fu¬
ture; and (4) what possible leaks of classi¬
fied information took place related to the
Intelligence Community's assessment of
these matters. Our goal was to provide, to
the greatest extent practicable, a full ac¬
counting of what happened, how it hap¬
pened, and recommendations for protecting
our democratic processes and Institutions in
the future.
(U) From the investigation's inception,
we were determined to follow the facts
wherever they might lead within the agreed
-upon scope and refer any criminality (if
found) to the appropriate authorities. Dur¬
ing the investigation we identified numer¬
ous shortcomings, including counterintelli¬
gence concerns, classified leaks, puzzling
legal processes, and inappropriate or ques¬
tionable behavior. All of these are enumer¬
ated in this report through findings, recom¬
mendations, and conclusions.
(U) We reviewed every piece of rele¬
vant evidence provided to us and inter¬
viewed every witness we assessed would
substantively contribute to the agreed-upon
bipartisan scope of the investigation. We
acknowledge that Investigations by other
committees, the Special Counsel, the media,
or interest groups will continue and may
find facts that were not readily accessible to
the Committee or outside the scope of our
investigation. We will ensure any new dis¬
coveries are considered in the due course of
the Committee's continuing oversight re¬
sponsibilities.
(U) We would like to recognize the tire¬
less work of the Committee's staff, which
remained professional and dedicated
throughout this inquiry. They deserve our
nation's gratitude. We would also like to
thank the thousands of men and women
who serve in the 1C. They will wake up to-
PROPERTY 01-H IE U.S HOUSE OF RiiPRl-SUN I'AUVLS
via
morrow and continue their watch to protect
the American people against further threats
from Russia and other adversaries*
(U) Nevertheless, the Committee re¬
mains concerned that Russia will continue
to undermine western democracies by stok¬
ing social strife, political unrest, and divi¬
sion, As a country, it is time for us to re¬
flect, understand what happened, fix the
discovered problems, and unify around the
common purpose of countering any future
influence campaigns by Russia or any other
nation*
PROPERTY OF THE U.S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ix
(U) Introduction and Overview
(U) Russia's interference in the 2016
U.S. presidential election was nothing novel
for the Kremlin. The Kremlin aspires to sow
chaos and discord and advance its agenda in
targeted nations, particularly in Europe and
former Soviet republics such as the Baltics
and Ukraine. To do this, Russia effectively
combines decades of experience in propa¬
ganda and psychological warfare techniques
with its vast media apparatus, a strata of
well-educated and proficient technicians,
and a robust intelligence and security corps.
(U) In the United States, Russian
cyberattacks related to the 2016 elections
starkly highlighted technical vulnerabilities
in U.S. digital infrastructure and bureau¬
cratic shortcomings that were exploited by
the Kremlin. Russia's active measures cam¬
paign achieved its primary goal of inciting
division and discord among Americans. For
more than a year, U.S. politics have been
consumed by bitter recriminations, charges,
and counter-charges about the attacks. The
reliability of the democratic vote—the bed¬
rock of the U.S. republic—was widely and
repeatedly questioned.
(U) Atthe time of the 2016 U.S. presi¬
dential election cycle, the Committee was
already concerned with Russian malfea¬
sance and aggression in levels that had not
been seen since the Cold War. In fact, the
IAA for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included
multiple provisions to improve the United
States' ability to counter Russian aggression.
However, the Kremlin's malicious activities
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election
triggered the Committee to announce a spe¬
cific inquiry into Russia's campaign (see Ap¬
pendix B). The bipartisan parameters fo¬
cused the investigation and this report—this
Committee examined: (1) Russian cyber ac¬
tivity and other active measures that were
directed against the United States and its
allies; (2) whether the Russian active
measures include links between Russia and
individuals associated with presidential
campaigns; (3) the U.S. government re¬
sponse to these Russian active measures
and what we need to do to protect our¬
selves and our allies in the future; and (4)
what possible leaks of classified information
took place related to the Intelligence Com¬
munity's assessment of these matters. 1 The
Committee interviewed 73 witnesses, con¬
ducted 9 hearings and briefings, reviewed
approximately 307,900 documents, and is¬
sued 20 subpoenas. This allowed the Com¬
mittee to find answers crucial for identifying
and addressing institutional weaknesses to
assist the United States with identifying and
responding to inevitable hostile acts in the
future.
(U) While the 2016 U.S. presidential
election helped focus American attention on
Russian cyber and information operations,
the Russian government has conducted ac¬
tive measure campaigns In Europe for years.
Believing it is engaged in an information war
with the West, Russia's influence activities
employ an array of tactics—usually tailored
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
to the target country's population and envi¬
ronment—in an effort to accomplish the
Kremlin's goals. These goals generally in¬
clude influencing an opponent's leadership
and population, advancing a narrative, or
inducing a behavior change. The factors
that make these campaigns successful also
make them hard to counter. However, gov¬
ernments, non-governmental organizations,
and media organizations in Europe have be¬
gun taking actions to address and mitigate
the threat that Russian influence campaigns
pose.
threat and defend their systems. State and
local governments were slow to grasp the
seriousness of the threat and when notified
of breaches continued to resist any action
that implied federal direction or con¬
trol. Some states opted not to cooperate
with important defensive measures offered
by the DHS. While no tabulation systems, or
systems that count votes, were impacted,
the overall security posture of the U.S. fed¬
eral, state, and local governments was
demonstrated to be inadequate and vulner¬
able.
(U) The Russian active measures cam¬
paign against the United States was multi¬
faceted. it leveraged cyberattacks, covert
platforms, social media, third-party interme¬
diaries, and state-run media. Hacked mate¬
rial was disseminated through this myriad
network of actors with the objective of un¬
dermining the effectiveness of the future
administration. This dissemination worked
in conjunction with derisive messages post¬
ed on social media to undermine confidence
in the election and sow fear and division in
American society.
(U) The U.S. government's subsequent
response to the Russian active measures
campaign during the 2016 election was slow
evolved, the FBI's notification to victims and
oversight committees was inconsistent in
timeliness and quality, which contributed to
the victims' failure to both recognize the
(U) The Committee's investigation also
reviewed the opening, in summer 2016, of a
FBI enterprise counterintelligence investiga¬
tion intoTrump campaign associ-
i | Because of "the sensitivity of the
matter," the FBI did not notify congressional
leadership about this investigation during
the FBI's regular counterintelligence
briefings. 2 Three original sub¬
jects of the FBI investigation have been
charged with crimes and the Committee's
review of these cases covers the period pri¬
or to the appointment of Special Counsel in
May 2017.
(U) While the Committee found no evi¬
dence that the Trump campaign colluded,
coordinated, or conspired with the Russian
government, the investigation did find poor
judgment and ill-considered actions by the
Trump and Clinton campaigns. For exam¬
ple, the June 2016 meeting at Trump Tower
between members of the Trump campaign
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TOP SECRET/
and a Russian lawyer who falsely purported
to have damaging information on the Clin¬
ton campaign demonstrated poor judge¬
ment. The Committee also found the
Trump campaign's periodic praise for and
communications with Wikileaks—a hostile
foreign organization—to be highly objec¬
tionable and inconsistent with U.S. national
security interests. The Committee also
found that the Clinton campaign and the
DNC, using a series of cutouts and interme¬
diaries to obscure their roles, paid for oppo¬
sition research on Trump obtained from
Russian sources, including a litany of claims
by high-ranking current and former Russian
government officials. Some of this opposi¬
tion research was used to produce sixteen
memos, which comprise what has become
known as the Steele dossier.
(U) The effectiveness and relatively low
cost of information operations, such as the
dissemination of propaganda, make it an
attractive tool for foreign adversaries. Un¬
less the cost-benefit equation of such oper¬
ations changes significantly, the Putin re¬
gime and other hostile governments will
continue to pursue these attacks against the
United States and its allies. Based on the
investigation, the Committee recommends
several solutions to help safeguard U.S. and
allies' political processes from nefarious ac¬
tors, such as the Russians.
1, HFSG Press Release, Intelligence Committee Chairman , Ranking Member Establish Parameters for Russia investigation,
Mar, X, 2017.
2, HPSCl, "RussiaAcHve Measures investigation Open Hearing/ 1 2 Mar t 20, 2017.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Summary Table of Findings
(U) Finding #1: The Kremlin exploits free or independent media spaces and open democra
ores to conduct active measures in Europe.
(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations
in Europe to further the Kremlin's agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians
and groups seen as hostile to Moscow.
(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European
governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat.
(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected European populations and exploits social, politi¬
cal, and racial divisions in an effort to sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite protests.
(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business and economic ties in Europe to achieve the Krem¬
lin's goals, message displeasure, or inflict punishment.
(U) Finding #6: European governments and media outlets are conducting a variety of activi¬
ties to combat Russian influence campaigns.
11
V I * u r
SM
(U] Finding #7: Russia conducted cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 2015-2016.
(U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and third-party intermediaries were responsible for the
dissemination of documents and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations.
(U) Finding #9: The Russian government used RT to advance its malign influence campaign
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
(U) Finding #10: Russian intelligence leveraged social media in an attempt to sow social dis¬
cord and to undermine the U.S. electoral process.
(U) Finding #11: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's notification to numerous Russian
hacking victims was largely inadequate.
(U) Finding #12: Communication between the Department of Homeland Security and state
election officials was impeded by state officials' mistrust of federal government overreach
coupled with a unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions._
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Summary Table of Findings {cont)
CHAPTER 3: AMERICA REACTS (CONT)
(U) Finding #13: The joint Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of
Homeland Security public statement attributing election interference to Russia was ineffec¬
tive.
(U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's post-election response was Insufficient,
(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on
Russia's election activities employed proper analytic tradecraft.
(U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Putin's strategic
intentions did not employ proper analytic tradecraft
(U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelli¬
gence investigation into the Trump campaign after receiving information related to Trump
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(U) Finding #18: As part of the enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump
campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an individual counterintelligence
investigation into Carter Page.
(U) Finding #19: The dossier compiled by Christopher Steele formed an essential part of an
application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain electronic surveillance
on Carter Page,
(U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several charges,
none of which relate to allegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the
Trump campaign and the Russian government.
(U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation regarding his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Ki$-
lyak, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not detect any deception
during Flynn's interview.
(U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials did not notify the Trump campaign that mem¬
bers of the campaign were assessed to be potential counterintelligence concerns.
(U) Finding #24: The February 201E indictment of the Internet Research Agency and Rus¬
sian nationals exposes Russian actors and their intent to spread distrust towards the candi¬
dates and the political system in general.
iUr JELMII
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVF.S
(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.)
CHAPTER 4: CAMPAIGN LINKS WITH RUSSIA
{U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none of the interviewed witnesses provided evi¬
dence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Rus¬
sian government.
(U) Finding #26: The Committee found no evidence that President Trump's pre-campaign
business dealings formed the basis for collusion during the campaign.
(U) Finding #27: The Republican national security establishment's opposition to candidate
Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced individuals with pro-Russia views to
serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopouios and Carter Page.
(U| Finding #28: The change in the Republican Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in
a stronger position against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evidence that Paul
Manafort was involved.
(U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that Trump associates were involved in the theft or
publication of Clinton campaign-related emails, although Trump associates had numerous
ill-advised contacts with WikiLeaks.
(U) Finding #30: Carter Page did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump
campaign, but the Committee is concerned about his seemingly incomplete accounts of his
activity in Moscow.
(U) Finding #31: George Papadopouios' attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facili¬
tate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians was unsuccessful.
(U) Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9,
2016, meeting at Trump Tower where they expected to receive—but did not ultimately ob¬
tain—derogatory information on candidate Clinton from Russian sources.
(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly met with a Russian government official at the
2016 National Rifle Association annual meeting, but the Committee found no evidence that
the two discussed the U.S. presidential election.
(U) Finding #34: The Committee found no evidence that meetings between Trump associ¬
ates—including Jeff Sessions—and official representatives of the Russian government-
including Ambassador Kislyak—reflected collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the
Russian government.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
{U Summary Table of Findings (cont.l
CHAPTER 4:. CAMPAIGN LINKS WITH RUSSIA (CO NT.'),
1 ' + , , ,
* . .
(U) Finding #35: Possible Russian efforts to set up a "back channel" with Trump associates
after the election suggest the absence of collusion during the campaign, since the commu¬
nication associated with collusion would have rendered such a "back channel" unneces¬
sary.
(U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting opposition research targeting candidate Trump's busi¬
ness dealings, Fusion GPS conducted research benefiting Russian interests.
(U) Finding #37; The law firm Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton cam¬
paign and the Democratic National Committee to research candidate Trump's Russia ties.
(U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims to have obtained his dossier information second-
and third-hand from purported high-placed Russian sources, such as government officials
with links to the Kremlin and intelligence services.
(U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's information from Russian sources was provided di¬
rectly to Fusion GPS and Perkins Coie and indirectly to the Clinton campaign.
'CHAPTER-Si-JNTELLl^ENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT LEAKS
i J . jf* m • . ‘ 4. jl 1 - L r ■ • i
* * * * *■] - ■ i "
(U) Finding #40: Leaks of classified information regarding Russian intentions to sow discord
in the U.S. presidential election began prior to the election day—November 8, 2016.
'i (U) Finding #41; Leaks of classified information alleging Russian intentions to help elect
candidate Trump increased dramatically after the election day—November 8, 2016.
(U) Finding #42: The leaks prior to the classified Intelligence Community Assessment's pub¬
lication, particularly leaks occurring after the U.S. presidential election, correlate to specific
language found in the Intelligence Community Assessment.
(U> Finding #43: Continued leaks of classified information have damaged national security
and potentially endangered lives.
(U} Finding #44: Former Director of National intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN nation¬
al security analyst, provided inconsistent testimony to the Committee about his contacts
with the media, including CNN.
PROPERTY or THE U S HOUSE Of REPRESENTATIVES
{U) Summary Table of Recommendations
-- 11 in ■ i -
CHAPTER If RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS IIM EUROPE
(U). Recommendation #3: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi¬
nesses, think tanks, and academia should strengthen legal and regulatory environments,
promote media pluralism, build professional media associations, and improve the financial
sustainability of legitimate news outlets.
**■ ~ ~ --- ™
fu) Recommendation #2: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi¬
nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement and encourage multi-pronged, coun¬
try-wide efforts by both public and private entities to combat Russian propaganda, tech¬
nical, and cyber operations.
(U) Recommendation #3* European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi¬
nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement more stringent cyber security practic¬
es, such as multifactor authentication and encryption of sensitive data, as well as educating
workforces on basic cyber security topics and best practices.
(U) Recommendation JM: European governments should look to long-term solutions to
lessen economic dependence on Russia,
■ . -J?- ■ ! ll ' - -r ? ■- -—-—*-- -
CHAPTER 2 & 3*.iRUSSIA ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICA REACTS
(U) Recommendation it 5: Congress should identify options available to the private sector
and federal government that would address the social media vulnerabilities exploited by
the Russian government.
(U) Recommendation #6: Congress should consider updating the Foreign Intelligence Sur¬
veillance Act to cover malicious international cyber actors.
fU) Recommendation ff7: The Federal Bureau of Investigation should improve cyberattack
victim notification.
(U) Recommendation 118: Threats identified by the Intelligence Community to state and lo¬
cal elections infrastructure should be immediately briefed to appropriate state and local
officials. When threats are Identified, the federal government should conduct an expedit¬
ed declassification review to ensure that the threat information can reach all necessary
state and local officials In a timely manner.
(U) Recommendation 89: The Secretary of Homeland Security should provide certain desig¬
nated state and local election officials appropriate security clearances to enable those offi¬
cials to respond to election-related threats.
PROPERTY OF THE U S HOUSE 0? RFPHESFNT^TiVtS
(U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cortt.}
rw.
CHAPTER 2 & 3: RUSSIA ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICA REACTS
(CONT.)
1 ■'
(U) Recommendation #10: Significant threats to U,S. elections identified by the Intelligence
Community, including cyberattacks directed at political organizations, should be immedi¬
ately reported to the Congressional intelligence committees.
(UJ Recommendation #11: Congress should encourage the adoption of National Institute of
Standards and Technology cyber security standards, such as those adopted by the Elections
Assistance Commission, by providing federal resources to state and local governments to
facilitate such adoption. Funds should be tied to the adoption and certification of elections
systems to appropriate standards.
(UJ Recommendation #12: Congress should consider additional funding for the National
Institute of Standards and Technology to enable better outreach to state and local govern¬
ments.
{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should consider a one-time grant to state and local
election agencies to conduct a risk assessment of those agencies' computer systems.
(U) Recommendation #14: Congress should consider strengthening the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 to ensure that both statewide voter registration and tabulation systems are
better protected from foreign cyber threats.
(UJ Recommendation #15: The Department of Homeland Security should provide the own¬
er or operator of any electronic election infrastructure affected by any significant foreign
cyber intrusion with a briefing and include steps that may be taken to mitigate such intru¬
sions.
- IT—^ ^ 1 **
(U) Recommendation #16: State and local governments should be encouraged to establish
redundancies that are not dependent on current elections infrastructure, such as a mecha¬
nism that retains individual vote records, ensuring the integrity of the vote in the event of
a compromise of voting infrastructure due to a foreign cyberattack. An example of such a
redundancy is a contemporaneously created paper record reflecting the voter's selections.
(UJ Recommendation #17: While it is important to implement lessons learned from the Ex¬
ecutive Branch's response, Congress should not hamper the Executive Branch's ability to
use discretion in responding to a particular foreign threat.
<U) Recommendation #18: Congress should consider repealing the Logan Act.
PROetRTV OF THE U S MOUSE OF RfcWtEBEN TATIVES
(U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.)
CHAPTER 2 & 3: RUSSIA ATTACKS THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICA REACTS
(CONTI)
(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassified coun¬
terintelligence briefings at an appropriate time prior to a nomination convention.
(U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Com¬
munity should immediately inform U.S. presidential candidates when it discovers a legiti¬
mate counterintelligence threat to the campaign, and promptly notify Congress.
(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of Congress should consider requiring all staff to
receive an annual counterintelligence awareness briefing.
CHAPTER 4 : CAMPAIGN LINKS TO RUSSIA
(U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforcement should ensure that
their counterintelligence defenses appropriately account for the role of cut-outs and inter
mediaries.
(U) Recommendation #23: Congress should consider amending current campaign finance
laws to further increase transparency regarding services provided by foreign persons or
entities.
CHAPTER S: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT LEAKS
(U) Recommendation #24: Each component of the Intelligence Community should update
its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee,
including senior officials.
(U) Recommendation #25: Congress should consider legislation to increase the penalties
for unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
(U) Recommendation #26; The Executive Branch should consider Instituting mandatory pol¬
ygraphs for all nan-confirmed political appointees that have top secret clearances.
■ . >-»- T *-
PROPERTY OF THE US. HQ LISE QF, REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Chapter 1—Russian influence Campaigns in Europe
Key Question til: What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed
against the United States and its aliies ?
(U) While Americans became acutely
aware of Russian cyber and information op¬
erations after the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, these activities were not new to
UNCLASSIFIED
SOVIET PROPAGANDA TARGETING THE
WEST AFTER WORLD WAR II
Vj'v/ir.w irv yj.* rt£< A No.*h. »•»
M,mv s -4( M Alfa.*
UNCLASSIFIED
{U) Russia conducts information war
fare in an effort to manipulate the populace
and leadership of the nations it targets. To
these ends, Russia employs an array of tac¬
tics for its influence activities in an effort to
advance the Russian government's inter¬
ests. When successful, these activities can
influence an opponent's leadership and
population to advance a narrative and in¬
duce a behavior change, concurrently serv¬
ing multiple Russian objectives.
(U) Russia’s goals for these campaigns
include: to advance the Kremlin's interests;
discredit the West; confuse or distort events
that threaten Russia's image; break Western
political cohesion; and defend Russia's role
as a vital global power. More specific and
country-tailored goals also include to: weak"
en, divide, and halt further expansion of
consensus-driven institutions like NATO and
the HU; sow confusion and amplify divisions
among segments of Western populations;
challenge establishment politics; damage
U S. foreign policy goals; advance Russia's
version of world events; distract from con¬
troversial Russian policies and activities; re¬
verse perceived anti-Russian policies; im¬
prove bilateral relations; and strengthen
economic ties.
PROPERTY OF THE U S, HOUSE OT REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Aiding in Russia's influence aclivi-
lives, the modern world's widespread use of
the internet and social media for news and
communications has allowed Russia to:
quickly and easily weapontae data stolen in
cyber breaches; disseminate propaganda,
misinformation, and disinformation; and
aggravate social, racial, and political divi¬
sions.
(U) Finding Jfl: The Kremlin exploits free or
independent media spaces and open de¬
mocracies to conduct active measures in
Europe.
(U) Russia also exploits free media
spaces and open democracies through a
network of Russian state-owned news out-
fets and media platforms, such as Sputnik
and HT, which promote Russia's image
abroad and show foreigners world events
from a Russian perspective (see Appendix
C).
(U)The Kremlin's active measures, or
information warfare, strategy includes sev¬
eral tactics:
• (U) After alleged Russian interfer¬
ence in the Brexltvote, in October
2013, the U.K. Electoral Commission
announced a probe into this activity.
According to open source reporting,
Russian-based Twitter accounts post¬
ed more than 45,000 messages
about Brexit in 48 hours during the
2016 referendum vote/
eROPFR^Y OF THF U.S HOIJSF OF rAHVbS
to Moscow.
(U) Plant and propagate false news sto¬
ries: Russia uses "troll" armies to set up fake
social media accounts and blogs, including
through an organization known as the Inter¬
net Research Agency (IRA). 11 A study by the
European Endowment for Democracy de¬
scribed large numbers of paid Russian
(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe po¬
litical parties and non-governmental organ
izations in Europe to further the Kremlin's
agenda while also disparaging or discred¬
iting politicians and groups seen as hostile
UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS OF RUSSIA’S
.INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY
PROPERTY OF THF U S HOUSE OF RFRRKSEN TAT IVES
(U) In a tactic dating back to the Soviet
era, Moscow also denigrates and discredits
people and groups seen as hostile to its in-
(U) Kremlin-linked journalists and media
outlets also will engage in misinformation:
weaving truth and falsehoods together to
create misleading reports intended to im-
UNCLASSIFIED
ANTI-MERKEL PROTESTS FOLLOWING A
RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN
13 *
Acucc:
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) In another example during the re¬
cent French Presidential elections, Russian-
controlled media highlighted defamatory
stories about the private life and campaign
funding of the more Russia skeptic candi¬
date Emmanuel Macron. Two days before
the final presidential election, data hacked
from Macron's En Marche party was posted
on a data sharing website. Cybersecurity
researchers attributed the hack to the same
GRU group that hacked the DNC/'
(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasing¬
ly aggressive cyber operations against Eu¬
ropean governments; a tactic that will con¬
tinue to present a profound threat.
PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
14
% -*
sh ®" i
r
* a
(U) Finding #4; Russia targets disaffected
European populations and exploits social,
political, and racial divisions in an effort to
sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite
protests.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
15
(U) Finding ffS: Russia leverages business
and economic ties in Europe to achieve the
Kremlin's goals, message displeasure, or
inflict punishment.
(U1 Russia is adept at utilizing economic
ties to its advantage* Moscow aims ic
deepen business ties with individuals that
i— t \ E i /
PROPERTY OF J»fc U.S. HOUSE Of RERRESENTATEVES
16
‘ wororir.
can be used as agents of influence, and
countries whose dependence on trade with
Russia create vulnerabilities to Russian influ¬
ence. Economic vulnerability—such as reli¬
ance on Russia for trade or energy—can be
leveraged to change behavior, message dis¬
pleasure, or inflict punishment. For exam¬
ple, Germany imports about 40 percent of
its natural gas from Russia. Because of this,
many business leaders are lobbying for the
removal of sanctions against Russia. J/
(U) Finding #6: European governments and
media outlets are conducting a variety of
activities to combat Russian influence cam¬
paigns.
(U) According to a 2016 study by the
RAND Corporation, Russia's various tactics
for conducting information operations,
combined with its lack of a consistent, ideo¬
logical goal, make countering these activi¬
ties difficult. This study found that the fac¬
tors that make Russian disinformation effec¬
tive—the high volume of stories, its rapid,
continuous nature, and lack of consisten¬
cy—are the same factors that make it diffi-
cult to counter. ''
UNCLASSIFIED
2017 EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON
BOLSTERING RESILIENCE TO ACTIVE
MEASURES CAMPAIGNS
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Many European governments are
taking proactive steps to counter Russian
propaganda and disinformation efforts.
NATO has prioritized efforts to counter
"hybrid threats" by developing a strategy
that includes strengthened coordination
with the European Union, as well as training
and exercises through its new Intelligence
Division. The Strategic Communications
Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia and the
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excel¬
lence in Tallinn, Estonia also contribute to
these efforts. In addition, several MATO al-
TBf JggRW
I’HOPhRlY OF Tt II. US. HOUSE OF Rr I’RPSFNTATIVliS
lies and European Union members signed a
Memorandum of Understanding to estab¬
lish a European Center of Excellence for
Countering Hybrid Threats in April 2017. 43
(U) In France, the French newspaper Le
Monde launched a web platform to allow
readers to check the reliability of French
and international websites with an Internet
browser extension that will alert readers
when they come across false or unverified
stories. 46
{U} In 2017, Ukraine banned Russian
social media platforms, as well as RT and
Sputnik—though the latter two can still be
accessed online. Additionally, media
platforms such as StopFake are used to
identify false news stories. 60
(U) in November 2016, the European
Parliament adopted a resolution to counter¬
act a nti-EU propaganda by third parties. 51
PROPERTY OF THE U,S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Russia's active measures campaign
in Europe is nothing new, but the growing
frequency and intensity of Russian influence
efforts pose an increasingly significant
threat to the United States and its allies.
The Committee has taken significant
measures to highlight this growing threat to
the American people since at least 2015.
Specifically, the Intelligence Authorization
Act (IAA) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in¬
cluded multiple provisions to improve the
United States' ability to counter Russian ag¬
gression:
• (U) FY 2016 IAA, Section 502. As¬
sessment on funding of political par¬
ties and nongovernmental organiza¬
tions by the Russian Federation.
o (U} FY 2016 IAA, Section 503. As¬
sessment on the use of political as¬
sassinations as a form of statecraft
by the Russian Federation.
♦ (U) FY 2017 IAA, Section 501. Com¬
mittee to Counter Active Measures
by the Russian Federation to Exert
Covert Influence Over Peoples and
Governments.
• (U) FY 2017 IAA, Section 502. Travel
of Accredited Diplomatic and Consu¬
lar Personnel of the Russian Federa¬
tion in the United States.
• (U) FY 2017 IAA, Section 503. Study
and Report on Enhanced Intelligence
and Information Sharing with Open
Skies Treaty Member States.
(U) Additionally, in 2016 the Committee
held two hearings and seven briefings for
Committee Members on Russia and related
issues, and the Chairman and Members of
the Committee sent, six letters to the Admin¬
istration urging stronger action against Rus¬
sia. For example, Committee Members
urged the Obama administration to hold
Russia accountable for multiple violations of
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, and expressed concern over likely
Russian attempts to utilize the Open Skies
Treaty for intelligence collection purposes.
Additionally, in spring 2016, Chairman
Nunes declared the inability to predict the
plans and intentions of the Putin regime
"the biggest intelligence failure since
PROPERTY or THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
19
■ . ■ "Ha, t 4 * 1 , J-mM i*JI , ' i ■ n t
9/11." 55
7. Atexi Mostrous, Mark Bridge, Katie Gibbons, "Russia Used Twitter Dots and Trolls "To Disrupt" Brexit Vote/ 1 The Times
UK, Nov. 15, 2017.
11. Son am 3 both, "Our Task Was to Set Americans Against Thek Own Government": New Details Emerge About Russia's
Trolling Operation, Business Insider, Oct 17, 2017,
12. European Endowment for Democracy, Bringing Plurality ond Balance to the Russian Language Medio Space, June 25,
2015.
13.
14.
15 .
16.
17.
IB.
19,
20 .
21 .
22 .
23.
24.
25.
26,
27.
HPSCt, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017.
I IPSO, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017; XE Currency Converter, EUR to USD, .vww. xe.com /
C u r t c n eye o n va rter/conv e r t / ?Am o u n 1=2£Fi a n\r £ U R &T o - USD .
HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept 16, 2017,
TrendMicro, "From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm's Activities over the Past Two Years," Apr. 2S, 2017.
HPSG, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 1G, 2017; LcxIsNexls, Discovery Services fact Sheet: "How Many
Pages in a Gigabyte?," Dec. 23, 2017.
37. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017,
38.
39 .
40.
PROPERTY OF THE U S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
20
33* NATQ, "NATO Welcomes Opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats," Apr 11 H 2017.
49. HPSCI, HP5CI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017.
50. HPSCI, H PS Cl Staff Delegation to Kiev, Ukraine, Sept* 21 r 2017.
51 European Parliament, "European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communications to coun¬
teract propaganda against it by third parties," Nov* 23, 2016.
52 t
53.
54*
GAO, Russia: U,S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas , May 2017,
55.
56. Bridget Johnson, "Chairman: Biggest Post 9/11 Intelligence Failure was Misreading Putin," PJ Medio , Apr. 13, 2016; Saa^
gar Enjeti, "US Response to Rusian Spying is 'Biggest Intelligence Failure Since 9/11," Sept, 15, 2016; Susan Jones, "Rep.
Devin Nunes: We've Been Warning Administration About Russian Hacking 'And They Did Nothing/" CNS News, Jan. 9,
2017.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S* HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States
Key Question HI: What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed
against the United States and its allies?
(U) The Russian government's multifac¬
eted malign influence campaign was the
subject of extensive public reporting in the
months before the January 5, 2017, publica¬
tion of the classified ICA titled Assessing
Russian Activities ond intentions in Recent
US Elections. While many of the facts con¬
cerning the attack have been widely dissem¬
inated, there are important elements of the
Russian campaign that remain classified.
{U) The purpose of the Committee's re¬
view of the Russian information operations
was to establish the facts, as well as the fed¬
eral government's understanding of those
facts. This chapter specifically examines (1)
the cyberattacks that targeted U.S. political
organizations (including the method of the
attack and its attribution}; (2) the dissemina-
a
tion of hacked material; and (3} the role of
Russian state media and social media in
Russia's malign influence campaign,
(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted
cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in
2015-2016.
(U) The Committee agrees with this
statement and finds the ICA assessment of
Russian responsibility to be based on com¬
pelling facts and well-reasoned analysis.
' TOP CDGn i CT//
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
UNCLASSIFIED
SPEAR PHISHING is a Cybernet a ck that uses email
to lure a victim into open mg attachments, following
links or disclosing their credentials, Theso messag¬
es are highly specific nnd seem authentic to tne
recipient.
CREDENTIAL HARVESTING is the process of idemi
fying the usernames, passwords, and hashes of tar
Rets which can then bn used to (join unauthorized
access to d user's system.
1 m ■*■+■
PROPERTY OP THE US, f 10 USE Of REPRESENTATIVES
TO t 1 3ECAET/J
*W WOKf
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
24
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
25
(U) Attribution is a Bear
PROPERTY OF THE U,S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
{U) While the intelligence case for
attribution to Russia is significant, alterna¬
tive scenarios have been examined to in¬
clude an insider threat or another cyber ac¬
tor. No credible evidence was found sup¬
porting either alternative, including a review
of information contained in classified intelli¬
gence reports.
(U) Finding ti 8: Russian-state actors and
third-party intermediaries were responsi¬
ble for the dissemination of documents
and communications stolen from U.S. po¬
litical organizations.
4 *
(U) Russian-state actors and third party
intermediaries were responsible for the se¬
lective dissemination of information from
hacked U.S. political systems. This repre¬
sents a "significant escalation in directness,
level of activity, and scope of effort" in Rus¬
sia's "longstanding desire to undermine the
US-led liberal democratic order." It is there¬
fore likely that high-level Russian govern¬
ment approval was required in both plan¬
ning and execution of the operation. 10
(U) Russian-state Actors
(U) Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks
UNCLASSIFIED
GUCCIFER 2.0 TAKES CREDIT FOR
DNC HACK ON WORDPRESS.COM
GUCCIFER
12.0
• -
• • •
I'M g
GUCCIFER 2.0 DNC’S
SERVERS HACKED BY A
■
LONE HACKER
4,
A |t»-» »«' « ■»«^*| «•»»<• '/ . »' V « 1' /I.
— - ■ - »•
A
V
9 k «*-
• ** u •
*
* — 1 V M • , %
• ,* ...1. • .. . ... r
-
- *< . •«
• -w. 1 .. • >HMtl .Mil M » - ••
|T«C»HC V*
• •
- •
• - • « #« •
-- - It ' <l» - 11*- - .V. A* -y y ■
*. • • .
• •— • •-*
- * - • 1 1 • . *IH . .1** .
* *y . .
• •*» > * 1 ■-* i -_
Source: WoFiJpress.com (gucdferi, wcrdpress.corn)
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
28
(U) From their first appearances, both
Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks sought to conceal
their identities. During a media interview
on June 21,2017, Guccifer 2.0 identified
himself as a Romanian "hacker, manager,
philosopher, women lover," and a "freedom
fighter." He further explained in broken
English his desire to follow in Marcel Lazar's
(the original Guccifer) footsteps to "fight for
freedom of minds <snd for a world without
illuminati." 19
(U) Meanwhile, DC Leaks identified it¬
self as a group of American hacktivists en¬
gaged in "a new level project aimed to ana¬
lyze and publish a large amount of emails
from top-ranking officials and their influ¬
ence agents all over the world." The self-
described premise of the DC Leaks effort
was that "politicians have forgotten that in a
democracy the people are the highest form
of political authority."^
* (U) Both Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks
worked to conceal their true identi¬
ties, physical locations, and motiva¬
tions;
♦ (U) Guccifer 2.0's first appearance
online and claim of responsibility for
the DNC hack occurred within 24
hours of the public announcement
that the DNC had
been hacked by actors affiliated with
the Russian government; 22
PROPERTY OF THE U S. MOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
29
*> (U) Multiple cybersecurity firms
have evaluated Guccifer 2.0's activi¬
ty and have published evidence that
the online persona used a Russian-
based VPN service to transmit files
and communicate. Additionally,
posted documents were processed
on a computer using Russian lan¬
guage settings; 2 ' 1
• (U) During interactions with the me¬
dia, Guccifer 2.0 denied any relation¬
ship with the Russian government
and claimed to be Romanian. How¬
ever, when pressed to explain how
he hacked into the DNC in his native
Romanian language, he failed to
demonstrate fluency, Guccifer 2.0
terminated the interview when chal¬
lenged on this point; 21 *
(U) WikiLeaks
{U) WikiLeaks played a key role in Rus¬
sia's malign influence campaign and served
as a third party intermediary for Russian in¬
telligence during the period leading up to
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
(U) The global reach of WikiLeaks and
its established ties to the media makes it an
attractive outlet for the dissemination of
stolen documents intended to undermine
the United States and its electoral process.
In addition, WikiLeaks' historic actions,
which have undermined U.S. interests and
been beneficial to Russia, make the organi¬
zation an ideal intermediary for Russian in¬
telligence. 7
UNCLASSIFIED
GUCCIFER 2.0 & WIKILEAKS
r ,> ni • \
Source: Twitlcr
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) WikiLeaks relies on hackers, leak¬
ers, and other criminal agents to acquire
personal, confidential, and classified materi-
dissemination, WikiLeaks sent 118 tweets
promoting the hacked material. WikiLeaks
messaging was then magnified by 426,000
other users' tweets. According to Twitter,
as much as 25% of these tweets could have
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA'llVES
30
been the result of automated activity asso¬
ciated with Russia's malign influence cam-
-
paign.
UNCLASSIFIED
WIKILEAKS DISSEMINATES HACKED
MATERIAL
CaCtinillAaMn
T *+ r^H wni u>
xdJSVFs
r*» *ua» w<a CJarc;
Scarce VtfaLeatewscdte
UNCLASSIFIED
« *
Finding #9: The Russian government used
RT to advance its malign influence cam¬
paign during the 2016 U.S. presidential
election.
7h*?cdwi* f trulls
{U) The Committee finds ample evi¬
dence that RT is not only a state-enterprise,
but is subject to the editorial control of the
Russian government. This control allowed
the Kremlin to use RT to advance its malign
influence efforts during the 2016 U.S. presi¬
dential election.
(U) RT, formerly Russia Today, became
an international news channel in 2005.. It is
available in more than 100 countries and
has its iargest viewer base in Europe. RT's
stated goal is to "create news with an edge
for viewers who want to question more"
and produces content which appeals to
skeptics of both the mainstream media and
the establishment. 30
(U) RT is subject to the control of the
Russian government. The State Department
describes it as a "State-owned international
satellite news network broadcasting in mul¬
tiple languages," which "spreads Russian,
propaganda tailored to international mar¬
kets." The 1C has identified RT as "the Krem¬
lin's principal international propaganda out¬
let" 31
profer nr of the lls. house of r epresemtattves
31
(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential
elections, RT ran stories consistent with its
past editorial bias against the West and sug¬
gested that the U.S. electoral process had
been corrupted. RT was critical of presiden-
*
tial candidates from both major parties but
was consistently critical of candidate Clinton
through the election.
(U) RT's attacks against candidate Clin¬
ton were wide-ranging, including the Insinu¬
ation that the Clinton family were criminals.
RT also used advertising to promote materi¬
al leaked by Russian intelligence, which tar¬
geted candidate Clinton and the Democratic
Party. 32 -
(U) Finding #10: Russian Intelligence lever¬
aged social media in an attempt to sow so¬
cial discord and to undermine the U.S. elec¬
toral process.
(U) The Internet Research Agency (IRA),
a Russia-based "troll farm" with ties to the
Kremlin, was responsible for placing ads and
maintaining both human operated and au¬
tomated social media accounts for the ma-
lign influence campaign,
(U) Twitter
UNCLASSIFIED
RT SPONSORED TWEETS
in)
S times when the Clintons escaped federal
charges
t**m ImttXK to «rO
i i
^ ftr * '•».
WikiLeaks reloads latest batch
of entails from Clinton campaign chair
fm/ uciOV rotX4«lt lB»*C BtWw.
Vilii *i> » «S 1 *in5 rsrr t* tf v=5»-‘i rvt
» «
• «• s» & (ft 0 © Er 6
i * •»
Source: Twilfer
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)The 2016 Russian Twitter operation
was coordinated with the use of other social
media platforms to undermine the U.S. po¬
litical process and divide Americans. Both
presidential candidates ((©HNlaryClintan
and @>realDonaldTrump) were directly en¬
gaged through "retweets" and "likes," as
were various politically active and divisive
PROPERTY OF THF U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
T e p ' OccncT/
factions of American society.
(U) In total, Twitter identified 36,746
automated Russian accounts which were
responsible for producing 1.4 million unique
tweets. In addition, Twitter identified 2,7S2
human-operated accounts. Some of these
accounts masqueraded as the news media,
activists, and political organizations. One
Russian account, @TEN_GOI\ successfully
Impersonated the Tennessee Republican
Party and grew to have significantly more
followers than the legitimate Twitter ac¬
count. After tweeting "We Love You, Mr.
President" to Donald Trump, @ten_GOP
received a thank you from the presidential
candidate. 35
(U) @TEN_GOP and other Russian-
linked accounts incited racial divisions, anti-
Muslim, and anti-immigrant messages.
They also promoted the dissemination of
material stolen from U.S. political organiza¬
tions by the GRU. The Russian cyber per¬
sonas DC Leaks and Guccifer 2.0 used
Twitter to promote stolen material, as did
UNCLASSIFIED
RUSSIAN TWEETS USING
@HillaryClinton and
@realDonaldTrump
WikiLeaks.
{U)Facebook
(U) Russian operators also used Face-
book Pages and advertising to advance their
malign influence campaign. The company's
4 *
internal review found the creation and pro¬
motion of 120 unique Facebook Pages by
the IRA. These pages generated approxi¬
mately 80,000 posts over the two year peri¬
od preceding the election. These posts ap¬
peared in 29 million users' Facebook "News
Feeds," When Facebook calculated the cu¬
mulative impact of "Shares" "Likes" and
"Follows," the company estimated that 129
million people may have been served Rus¬
sia's malign Influence content. 30
(U) According to Facebook, much of the
Russian activity was designed to promote
divisive social and political messages across
the ideological spectrum and that advertis¬
ing was intended to drive followership of
divisive Pages. Four of the top Impression-
generating (or number of times an ad was
on screen) advertisements were from ficti¬
tious personas claiming to represent organi¬
zations Including "Back the Badge,"
"Blacktivist" "Being Patriotic," and "Woke
Blacks." 17
32.25-1 M
6
111,326
L*bs
to 416,632
Twtioic
A
400,316
Russian
Twitter
Account©
TdJ’Qctlng ^HillaryCUrrtcn
followers
Cc'.utc: Tvjss;
Targeting ^ealOonnWTrurr.p
toll Givers
(U) Russian malign influence activities
on Facebook were significant but they were
not well-funded or large-scale operations
relative to the overall scope of election-
related activity on these platforms:
•
• Prior to the election, Russian opera¬
tors used paid advertising on Face-
book to reach 5 million Americans
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
33
Mworonp
UNCLASSIFIED
RUSSIAN ADS ON FACEBOOK
fAfUViirl&i
p i tva rp! £/m]
Blacktivist
*trt e-^lr:r*»* iW*
UA 4 M ti»;A W
Jffr L^iJ
EH** GSf/ti
SVfl/lf*) y** ^pL,V»J-V"JJ CW CA^' TA J C*J pwSl^ ^
&4**n
fV™** A
«4*3 CWVM ite* Ha
f l^5
^ PV K J^Tt* t*
fp|(6££*0a
WUBH* WJ t/T Ckttff 4 |VpO
Ltm tsr& >sr*r/
’j ^ i ivtT '■'»> i—v* • krtwiwi
iin- Pf -««
PJE^j toor
WM fcvuii il! r DiTbWE 01 lG 6 “ <s>!Tr^/nj^ vTjttcs toa Jiaast
UianMM
C^Anlnm
!+' maim rw
®ri Ufc*
Source: Facebook
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(based on impressions). At the same
time, 33 trillion stories were served
on Facebook Pages and users aver¬
aged 220 per day;
« 56% of the 11.4 million impressions
associated with Russian Facebook
advertising occurred after the elec¬
tion;
• 99% of Russian Facebook ads were
funded with less than $1,000 and
25% were never seen.
(U) Google
(U) Google also was used as a media
platform for Russia's malign influence cam¬
paign. The company's investigation re¬
vealed that $4,700 was spent promoting 18
channels and 1,100 YouTube videos (43
hours of content).
(U) Google describes this as a limited
investment compared to overall election-
related spending on Google. In total,
0.0002 percent of 2016 U.S. election adver¬
tising was found to be associated with Rus¬
sian malign actors. In addition, Google not¬
ed that this Russian-funded media had very
low view counts with only 3% reaching
views of 5,000 or more.
(U) However, it should be noted that
Google and its services have been and con¬
tinue to be used by Russia for the dissemi¬
nation of propaganda through RT. This is
partly evidenced by RT's 2.2 million sub¬
scribers on YouTube, but also by the fact
that RT propaganda is served to Americans
by Google in the same manner as legitimate
news sources.
(U) The Committee's Investigation
found that.Twitter, Facebook, Google, and
other social media platforms face significant
challenges In their effort to identify and act
on malign Influence campaigns. Some of
those challenges include:
• Sophisticated actors adapt to auto¬
mated defenses;
• Social media does not require true
name usage;
» Users can easily conceal their physi¬
cal location with virtual private net¬
work connections;
• Social media seeks authentic ex¬
changes and does not want to cen¬
sor speech; and
• Social media platforms do not have
access to intelligence reporting.
ocxkic
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OK REPRESENTATIVES
13. HPSO, Full CcmrrJtfee Briefing cj* Russia Cyber ACiiviiy [Dosed Sess ion), Sept 6, 2016: HF5G, fulS Cc^mitt^e Briefing on
Eussra Cyber Activity (Closed Session)., Jan. 10,2016; HP£Q h Fuli Ccmm'iiies Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity [Closed Ses¬
sion), D&t. % 2026;^|^m ^Oroft incident investigation Report for the Demacnypc Notional CQTTttittee, Aug. 2A f
2 016; incident Investigation Report for the Democratic CongressionalCompcSgo Committee^ Aug. S,
2016. _
14. Incident investigationt Report for the Democratic Nattonaf Committee* Aug. 24,2016;
Draft fneitfen f investigation Report far thz Demaarctic Congress atj&I Caropgsgzr CommH^e^i Aug. 3_. 2016.
13. Draft incident UjvBsfigoTfon Report for the Semccrctfc NattunoJ CcmmJtteej Au^ 24, 2£>J S';
Draft Incident Invssfigatfon Report for The Demoantfc Ccngres&cnaS Co&pafgn GotnmitZEC, Aug. 8 r 2G1&; LcdsNads, Dti-
covety Services foci Sheet: ^Jovv HaoyPoges in a (ffgcbyie?" D^. 23,2017.
PROPERTY OF THE U $. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
36
16. ODNt, intelligence Community Assessment; Assessing Russian Activities and intentions in Recent US Elections , Jan, 5,
2017; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed Session), Dec, 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee
Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed), Jan. 10, 2016;
; GDNl, intelligence Community Assessment. Cyber Threats to the 7016 US Presi¬
dential Election (ICA 2016-37HC) t Sept. 12, 2016.
17.
IS, HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Rus¬
sia Cyber Activity [Closed Session), Jam 10, "The definitive Trump-Russio Timeline of Events "
Politico, Dec, 1, "'Hacking Democracy: The Post's new
findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the 11,5. election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017;
prise in Cyberspace Operations (NlCM 2017-06), Jan* 30, 2017.
19* "interview with Guccifer 2*0/' VICE , June 21, 2017.
20, Twitter, @DCLeaks_
21 *
ODNI, Growing Risk of Strategic Sur-
"Bears in the Midst: intrusion into the Democratic Notional Committee" CrowdStrfke Blog, June 15,
2016; ^ Inside Story ; Now Russians Hacked the Democrats' Emails, Associated
Press, Nov. 4, 2017; "AN Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack ," VICE, July 25, 2016;
"interview with Guccifer 2.0" VICE, June 21, 2017.
24. "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro , Apr* 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, " Guccifer 2.0: Alt Roods Lead
Each to Russia July 26, 2016;
25, "Interview with Guccifer 2.0/' VICE, June 21, 2017.
26. ThreatConnect, "Does a BEAR teak in the Woods? ThreatConnect Identifies DCLeaks as Another Russian-Backed Influ¬
ence Outlet/" Aug, 12,2016
7. ^° e
Becker, Steven Erianger, and Eric Schmitt, "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets,"
The New York Times , Aug. 31, 2016.
2B, WildLeaks.org, About WikiLeaks (www.wlkifeaks.org), Dec* 22, 2017; Feike Hacqtiebord, "Two Years of Pawn Storm,"
Trend Micro , Apr, 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Guccifer 2.0; All Roads lead Back to Russia," July 26,2016;
; HPSQ, Full
Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan, 10,2016*
29* HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on
Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; Matthew Nussbaum, "The definitive Trump-Russta Timeline of
Events," Politico, Dec. 1, "Hacking Democracy: The Post's
new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U*S, election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017;
30. RT.com, About, Dec. 23, 2017;
31* LIS. Department of State, Media organizations controlled and funded by the Government of the Russia Federation
(Report 0025801 Nov* 7,2017.
32*
33*
34, Written testimony Acting Genera! Counsel of Twitter, Jnc., Nov. 1, 2017; HPSG, "Russia investigation
Task Force Hearing on Social Media,"" Nov, 1,2017,
35. Written testimony Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc*, Nov* 1, 2017.
36. Written testimony ofGeneral Counsel, Facebook, Nov* 1, 2017*
37, HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Nearing on Social Media," Nov. 1, 2017,
PROPERTY OF THE U S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Chapter 3 - America Reacts
Key Question 113: What was the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures
and what da we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future?
(U) As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1C
was at the tip of the spear of the U.S. gov¬
ernment's response to Russia's nefarious
cyber activities. While the NBA focused on
detection and attribution, the FBI took the
lead on victim notification, and the DHS was
the primary agency responsible for provid¬
ing assistance to victims and coordinating
with state and local election officials.
(U) The federal government's ability to
effectively respond to cyber threats de¬
pends on the IC's ability to pass information
efficiently to the FBI at the lowest classifica¬
tion level possible. It is also dependent on
the sufficiency of the interactions between
the federal government and victim, whether
that victim is a private organization such as
the DNC, or a state or local government en¬
tity. Given the response to Russia's malign
influence campaign, the Committee believes
that FBI and DHS need to Improve the pro¬
cesses used to engage with victims and
stakeholders, who independently control
their respective systems.
(U) The Executive Branch's policy re¬
sponse to Russia's active measures cam¬
paign included extensive deliberation, but
not significant pre-election action. This is
explained by two factors. First, the Execu¬
tive Branch was justifiably concerned about
raising an alarm so close to the election.
Second, elections are not run by the federal
government. State and local governments
are under no obligation to cooperate with
federal officials, nor are political organiza¬
tions that operate their own networks. In
short, the developing Intelligence on Rus¬
sian active measures throughout 2016, the
complexity of the political situation, and the
lack of federal authority to act limited the
V
options for aggressive pre-election actions.
The Executive Branch took some actions, to
include a joint DHS and ODNI public state¬
ment issued on October 7, 2016.
the CIA created a fu¬
sion cell on Russian election interference,
which was comprised of analysts from the
CIA, FBI, and NSA. This fusion cell produced
a series of papers for the White House, di¬
rectors of each of the three agencies, and
the DNI. The cell operated through the
election, standing down in mid-November.
(U) On December 6, 2016, President
Obama directed CIA Director John Brennan
to conduct a review of all intelligence re¬
lating to Russian involvement in the 2016
elections, and produce a single, comprehen¬
sive assessment. The result, an ICA titled
Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions
in Recent US Elections, was drafted by^|
analysts
was coordinated with
the NSA and the FBI. While most of the
analysis contained in the ICA held up to
scrutiny, the Committee investigation Found
that ICA judgments on Putin's strategic ob-
/NOfCm
PROPERTY Oh THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Jectives failed to meet most of the analytic
standards set forth In the primary guiding
document for 1C analysis, Intelligence Com¬
munity Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Stand¬
ards.
(U) Another component of the Execu¬
tive Branch's response to the Russian gov¬
ernment's efforts to interfere in the 2016
presidential campaign was FBI's opening of
a counterintelligence investigation into "the
nature of any links between individuals as¬
sociated with the Trump campaign and the
Russian government and whether there was
any coordination between the campaign
and Russia's efforts." 1
(U) The Committee collected facts relat¬
ed to the FBI's investigation through May
2017, until the appointment of Special
Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee
did not examine events that occurred there¬
after in order to avoid interfering with Spe¬
cial Counsel Mueller's ongoing investigation.
While this chapter addresses the FBI's inves¬
tigation, facts identified by the Committee
relating to Russia contacts with Trump cam¬
paign associates, including the individuals
under FBI investigation, are addressed in
Chapter 4.
(U) Finding All: The Federal Bureau of In¬
vestigation's notification to numerous Rus¬
sian hacking victims was largely inade
quate.
(U)The Committee is also concerned
that many, perhaps even a majority, of Rus¬
sia's known victims were never contacted
by the FBI. In November 2017, the Associat¬
ed Press (AP) reported that it contacted ap¬
proximately 80 people out of a list of ap¬
proximately 500 victims. Only two who
were contacted by the AP "learned of the
hacking attempts of their personal Gmail
accounts from the FBI." 8 Although the Com-
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
39
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
mitiee cannot verify the accuracy of the
A P's reporting, Clinton campaign senior pol¬
icy advisor Jake Sullivan testified to the
Committee that, consistent with the ftp's
analysis, his personal Gmail account was the
subject of numerous hacking attempts, but
that he never received any sort of notifica¬
tion from FBI 5
(U) interaction with the DNC illustrated
that even when the FBI expeditiously made
contact with a victim, and conveyed rela¬
tively detailed information, the engagement
failed to elicit the desired response—
namely, the DMC's swift and serious atten¬
tion. Director Co me y testified that, in retro¬
spect, "[w}e would have sent up a much
larger flare. Yeah, we would have just kept
banging and banging on the door, knowing
what l know now. We made extensive
efforts to notify. I might have walked over
there myself, knowing what I know now." JU
Similarly, former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson
reflected that, '‘You know, in retrospect, it
would be easy for me to say that 1 should
have brought a sleeping bag and camped
out in front of the DNC in late summer, with
the benefit of hindsight."' 1
(U) finding #12: Communication between
the Department of Homeland Security and
state election officials was impeded by
state officials' mistrust of federal govern¬
ment overreach coupled with an unprece¬
dented level of Russian cyber intrusions.
(U) DHS was the first agency to raise
awareness lo state election officials and the
general public regarding cybersecurity con¬
cents with the 2016 election infrastructure.
In August 2016, Secretary Johnson hosted a
conference call with the National .Associa¬
tion of Secretaries of State (NASS) and other
Chief Election Officials. This call was fol¬
lowed in Septemoer and October 2016 by
four statements encouraging state and local
elections officials to request DHS's cyberse-
curity assistance. 12
(U) During the August 2016 phone call.
Secretary Johnson offered assistance to
state officials in managing risks to voting
systems in each state's jurisdiction. He also
encouraged state officials to implement rec¬
ommendations from the Department of
Commerce's NIST and the U.S. EAC on se¬
curing election infrastructure. At that time,
DHS was "not aware of any specific or credi¬
ble cybersecurity threats relating to the up¬
coming genera) election systems," and, on
the call with state officials, "Secretary John¬
son reiterated that DHS, the Election Assis¬
tance Commission, NiST, and DOJ are availa¬
ble to offer support and assistance in pro¬
tecting against cyber attacks." 13
(U) On August 18, 2015, the FBI Cyber
Division, in an effort to aid cyber security
professionals and system administrators to
guard against the persistent malicious ac¬
tions of cyber criminals, issued an alert to
states entitled, ''Targeting Activity Against
State Board of Election Systems.""’The bul¬
letin warned that in late June 2016, an
"unknown actor scanned a state's Board of
Election website for vulnerabilities." 15 The
FBI recommended that all states search ac¬
tivity logs for any escalation attempts and
suggested three recommendations as pre-
-
• jrcr.rr/j
property of me u.s. house of representatives
41
t
TOP SCCRET/
w e - ronix
cautionary measures.^
UNCLASSIFIED
FBI WARNS STATES OF
MALICIOUS CYBER ATTEMPTS
SknllCC Y^fi*
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) (n a September 16, 2016 statement,
Secretary Johnson announced "we have
seen cyber intrusions involving political in¬
stitutions and personal communications.
We have also seen some efforts at cyber
intrusions of voter registration data main¬
tained in state election systems " w Secre¬
tary Johnson encouraged election officials
to reach out to DHS and also offered a varie¬
ty of cybersecurity services to state and
election officials, Including:
• Scans on internet-facing systems,
including reporting of vulnerabilities
and mitigation recommendations;
• Risk and vulnerability assessments;
• Support from the National Cyberse-
curlty and Communications Integra¬
tion Center (NCCIC) to provide on¬
site assistance in identifying and re¬
mediating a cyber incident;
« Information sharing of relevant
cyber incidents, threats, and vulner¬
ability Information;
* Best practices for securing voter reg¬
istration databases and addressing
potential threats; and
* Field-based cybersecurity advisors to
assist with planning and incident
management . 18
(U) Also on September 28, 2016, Speak¬
er Ryan and Leaders McConnell, Pelosi, and
Reid sent a letter to the National Associa¬
tion of State Election Directors, "urg[ingj
states to take full advantage of the robust
public and private sector resources available
to them..." and informing them that "fijn
addition, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity stands ready to provide cybersecurity
assistance to those states that choose to
request it," 13
(U) On October 1,2016, Secretary John¬
son expressed gratitude for the letter from
congressional leadership, and noted that
there were a few cases in which malicious
actors gained access to state voting-related
systems. He also encouraged state and lo¬
cal election officials to seek DHS' cybersecu¬
rity assistance. "So far, 21 states have con¬
tacted us about our services. We hope to
see more/'Mohnson said at the time/ 11
■4
(U) DHS and ODNI released a joint pub¬
lic statement on October 7, 2016. DHS con-
tinued to urge state and local election offi¬
cials to remain vigilant and seek its assis¬
tance with cybersecurity.' M On October 10,
2016, Secretary Johnson provided an up¬
date on DHS election cybersecurity services
TOP SECRET/
fo O P OftN
PROPEKlY or I ME U.S. MOUSE OF REPRESbNIAHVJrS
that "to date, 33 states... election agen¬
cies have approached the Department of
Homeland Security about our Cybersecurity
services." Johnson stressed that time was
an important factor, with only 29 days until
election; it could take up to two weeks for
DHS to run scans and identify vulnerabili-
ties, and an additional week for election
officials to mitigate any vulnerabilities. This
was the Secretary's final public attempt to
encourage state and local election officials
to reach out to DHS for assistance. 22
UNCLASSIFIED
r
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ilnitWilki Itfj ctJi li lYtru'IrM• •lpn>k>iVuk t«ikI ■ «Wi| itlun t.n ir u-j
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Jl'j.stid-Vc ’k^iaf > bp^iX'kVmMfGi **ww U>j»i iLsifn *« tj a S. j
at) Wrsl tJiVJu /»rhl i<<»mir*f*kl!dl.'r, < vruisli <i) <9iiu
it-fll.n*{•»<-» ** ci»tktiwX-iMvVtfrt*fe.vnlpio»v/^ik' 4 ir.-a.<.Vini. r vi-klAnl|
< uirru uflldi urjniki*
WiVfJ®;»«j<IU«fciM (Wlr't; U.n^j.». iiiilatV'ff *V
IIVM 14 yn.allovrw a,v#< i**vyr*>o*U'» U U‘< -rt»*l>/<Mf K'Mk Ajt
•/» Af># tp M tyX'f.Ui I.
h r-,Td|.
(U) Challenges encountered by DHS in¬
cluded the unprecedented sl2e and scope of
Russian active measures, lack of public-
attention, and mistrust from state and local
election officials—many of whom lacked
access to classified information. Ultimately,
36 states took advantage of DHS's assis¬
tance, but many election officials were re¬
sistant to the idea of designating election
infrastructure as critical infrastructure. 23 As
former Secretary Johnson explained to the
Committee, "one thing I discovered in this
conversation. State election officials are
very sensitive about what they perceived to
! be Federal intrusion into their process. I
heard that firsthand over and over: This is
our process. It's our sovereign responsibil¬
ity. We're not interested in the Federal
•j •
takeover." ‘ A clear example of mistrust was
a letter sent from Georgia’s Secretary of
State Brian Kemp to Secretary Johnson on
December 8, 2016, which accused DHS of
attempting to breach the Georgia Secretary
of State’s firewall. "I am writing to ask you
I whether DHS was aware of this attempt
j and, if so, why DHS was attempting to
| breach our firewall," Mr. Kemp stated. 2S
Nevertheless, on January 6,2017, DHS des¬
ignated election infrastructure as a subsec¬
tor of the existing Government Facilities
critical Infrastructure sector. 26
(U) Finding »13: The joint Office of the Di¬
rector of National Intelligence and Depart¬
ment of Homeland Security public state¬
ment attributing election interference to
Russia was ineffective.
(U) No major public actions were taken
rm- %9 • i»mii
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
between October 7, 2016 and election day.
It is unclear exactly when policymakers be¬
gan focusing on Russian efforts to influence
the election. As further discussed below.
Attorney General Loretta Lynch recalls being
briefed by FBI senior leadership^^^H
the Counterintelligence Division had essen-
tially uncovered some information or re¬
ceived information involving Russian intelli¬
gence operatives." 27
(U) On May 18, 2016, speaking at the
Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington,
D.C., DNI Clapper stated, "we've [the 1C] al¬
ready had some indications of that
[attempts of cyberattacks on presidential
campaign websites] and the combination of
DHS and FBI are doing what they can to ed¬
ucate both campaigns against potential
cyber threats." 28
(U) By summer 2016, CIA Director Bren¬
nan had become aware of information
about "specific Russian efforts to influence
the election," 7 -' and the National Security
Council (NSC) Principals Committee began
discussing actions to take in response to
what the Russians had been doing. 30 As Di¬
rector Brennan continued to brief the Prin¬
cipals Committee on Russia, the CIA—as
discussed previously in this report—"pulled
together experts from the Central Intelli¬
gence Agency (CIA), NS A, and
|^H| to focus on the issue, drawing in mul¬
ti pie perspectives and subject matter ex¬
perts with broad expertise to assess Russian
attempts to interfere in the U.S. Presidential
e lection
While DHS was providing assistance to
states to conduct cyber reviews of their
electoral mechanisms, the Principals Com¬
mittee was awaiting "with urgency whatev¬
er the Intelligence Community could pro¬
vide" that "would illuminate [their] under¬
standing of [Russian interest in the elec¬
tion]." 33
UNCLASSIFIED
IC CONFIDENT OF RUSSIAN PRE¬
ELECTION HACKING
Joint Statement from rbe Department Of
Homeland Srcurip/and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on Election Security
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UNCLASSIFIED
(U) On August 4, 2016, Director Bren¬
nan, in a scheduled call with Alexander Bort-
«
nikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security
Bureau (FSB), became the first U.S. official
to raise the issue of Moscow's meddling. 34
Brennan told Bortnikov that a campaign
against the United States would certainly
"backfire" and that all Americans "cherished
their ability to elect their own leaders with¬
out outside Interference or disruption." 35
Additionally, former Attorney General
PROPER rv OF THE U.S HOUSE OF REPRESEN I AT IVES
44
W ' SGOnCT/
Loretta Lynch testified that the decision was
made to have "the President of the United
States speak directly to President Putin,
confront him with knowledge that we were
aware of his efforts on a variety of fronts
and that it was unacceptable, and that that
discussion took place during a pull-aside ...
at one of the G- either 7 or 20 meetings in
the early fall." 36 Former National Security
Advisor Susan Rice corroborated in testimo¬
ny before the Committee that President
Obama and President Putin discussed Rus¬
sian meddling in the 2016 election at the
end of bilateral discussions during the G20
Summit in China in early September 2016. 37
(U) The most significant pre-election
public action was the October 7, 2016, joint
DHS and ODNI statement, indicating in part
that the 1C "is confident that the Russian
Government directed the recent compro¬
mises of e-mails from US persons and insti¬
tutions, including from the US political or¬
ganizations," ,fl The 1C assessed that the dis¬
closures of alleged hacks on websites such
as DCLeaks.com, WikiLeaks, and byGuccifer
2.0 were consistent with Russian methods
and motivations. According to Secretary
Johnson, the statement "did not get the
public attention that it should have, frankly,
because the same day the press was fo¬
cused on the release of the 'Access Holly¬
wood' video. That's what made our news
below-the-fold news that day." 39 Addition¬
ally, the public dissemination of Podesta's
emails commenced on October 7. 40
(U) In considering a public response,
the Executive Branch was in a unique posi¬
tion—It was dealing with extremely sensi¬
tive intelligence and had to consider the Im¬
pacts of jeopardizing sources and methods
when declassifying Intelligence.” Further¬
more, In the midst of an ongoing campaign,
it had to carefully consider any public state¬
ments or actions, as it did not want to be
perceived as taking sides and politicizing the
election—or, according to former Secretary
Johnson fueling claims that the election was
"rigged." 47
(U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's
post-election response was insufficient.
(U) In the weeks following candidate
Trump's victory over candidate Clinton.in
the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Execu¬
tive Branch officials began brainstorming
options for punitive actions against Russian
activities. On Decembers, 2016, President
Obama ordered Director Brennan to con¬
duct a review of all intelligence relating to
Russia and the 2016 elections, including a
comprehensive assessment that would
eventually be made public.'”
(U) On December 29, 2016, among oth¬
er measures. President Obama announced
the expulsion of 35 Russian intelligence op¬
eratives under diplomatic cover, the closure
of Russian compounds in Maryland and New
York, sanctions against nine entities and in¬
dividuals associated with Russian intelli-
t
gence services, and the Treasury Depart¬
ment's designation of two Russian individu¬
als for "using cyber-enabled means to cause
misappropriation of funds and personal
identifying information." 4 ' 1 Also on Decem¬
ber 29, the FBI and DHS released a Joint
TOP SC GO FT
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
45
Analysis Report of declassified technical In¬
formation on Russian cyber activity to help
network defenders identify and disrupt Rus¬
sian malicious cyber activity.
(U) On January 6, 201,7, DHS designated
election infrastructure as a subsector of the
existing government facilities critical Infra¬
structure sector." 6 The same day, a declassi¬
fied version of the ICA was released to the
public.' 16
(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelli¬
gence Community Assessment judgments
on Russia's election activities employed
proper analytic tradecraft.
(U) The 1C produced three versions of
the ICA: (1) a highly compartmented docu¬
ment, which included all sources and refer¬
ences to the underlying intelligence, (2) a
Top Secret version that omitted details from
compartmented reports, and (3) an unclas¬
sified version, The full ICA was briefed to
President Obama on January 5, 2017 and
President-elect Trump on January 6,2017.
• M( y . t
The unclassified version of the ICA was also
released to the public on January 6,2017.
While the level of detail varies greatly
among the three versions, the final conclu¬
sions and key judgments of each are the
same.
(U) The Committee determined that the
majority of the ICA judgments on Russia's
election activities employed proper analytic
tradecraft. These were mostly well rea¬
soned, consistent with observed Russian
actions, properly documented, and—
particularly on the cyber intrusion sec¬
tions—employed appropriate caveats on
sources and identified assumptions. Some
of the key ICA judgments that the Com¬
mittee found credible because they were
based on proper analytic tradecraft are
summarized below:
• (U) Russian efforts to influence the
2016 U.S. presidential election rep¬
resent the most recent expression of
Moscow's longstanding desire to un¬
dermine the U.S.-led liberal demo¬
cratic order.
* (U) Russian intelligence services,
acting on the orders of Russian Presi¬
dent Vladimir Putin, launched cyber
and conventional influence opera¬
tions—notably by leaking politically
sensitive emails obtained from com¬
puter intrusions—during the 2016
election.
(U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Communi¬
ty Assessment judgments on Putin's strate¬
gic intentions did not employ proper ana¬
lytic tradecraft.
(U) While the Committee found that
most ICA analysis held-up to scrutiny, the
investigation also identified significant intel¬
ligence tradecraft failings that undermine
confidence in the ICA judgments regarding
Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategic
objectives for disrupting the U.S. election.
Those judgments failed to meet longstand-
■ Tor * flccuDr/
MOrOHH
PROPERTY OF THE U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ing standards set forth in the primary guid¬
ing document for 1C analysis, ICD 203, Ana¬
lytic Standards including:
• {U) ' Properly describe quality and
credibility o? underlying sources.”
• (U) "Properly express and explain
uncertainties associated with major
analytic judgments."
• (U) "incorporate analysis of alterna¬
tives [particularly] when major
judgments must contend with sig¬
nificant uncertainties or... high-
impact results."
• (U) Base confidence assessments on
"the quantity and quality of source
material."
• (U) "Be informed by all relevant in¬
formation available."
« (U) "Be independent of political
co nsi deratio n s
{U) The Committee emphasizes that the
tradecraft failures identified in this investi¬
gation should not be broadly ascribed to
CIA, MSA or FBI analysis, as the shortcom- •
ings were confined to select judgments—
specifically, a key assessmenton Putin's
strategic intentions—and not to the entire
ICA product. Moreover, the ICA was
writteCIA analysts and their
draft was subjected to an unusually con¬
strained review and coordination process,
which deviated from established CiA prac¬
tice, The Committee is not aware of these
problems being prevalent in other CIA, FBI,
or N5A products.
(C/NF)
10) The Committee's findings on iCA
tradecraft focused on the use of sensitive,
10 intelligence cited by the ICA.
This presented a significant challenge for
classification downgrade. The Committee
worked with intelligence officers from the
agencies who own the raw reporting cited
in the ICA to downgrade the classification of
(U) The Committee is planning addition¬
al action regarding this information in early
spring 2018.
(U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of In¬
vestigation opened an enterprise counter¬
intelligence investigation into the Trump
campaign after receiving information relat¬
ed to Trump campaign foreign policy advi¬
sor George Papadopoulos.
(U) in addition to the other Executive
Branch responses described above, in late
July 2016, the FBI opened an enterprise Cl
investigation into the Trump campaign fol¬
lowing the receipt of derogatory infor¬
mation about foreign policy advisor George
Papadopoulos. The purpose of an enter-
prise Cl investigation is to obtain infor¬
mation of intelligence value, "most times ..
. not with any kind of intent or objective of
reaching a criminal charge/' 43 FBI's enter¬
prise Ci investigation into the Trump cam¬
paign was led by a small team at FBI head¬
quarters. 41 ' The timeline of this investiga¬
tion can be found on the next page.
PROPERTY OF 71 £E Li.S. HOUSE OF aEPRESEHTATIVES
47
(U) The derogatory information result¬
ed from the relationship between Papado-
anonymized In Papadopoulos' charging doc¬
ument as "the Professor").' 10 Based on the
charging documents, the two first met in
Italy on or about March 14, 2016, and
"Papadopoulos was interested in I
because ... [he] claimed to have substantial
connections with Russian government offi¬
cials, which Papadopoulos thought could
increase his importance as a policy advisor.
"Si was j ntereste( j j n p a p ac jopou-
los because of his role in the Trump cam¬
paign. 52 The first meeting with|^^H 0C '
curred approximately one week prior to
candidate Trump publicly naming Papado¬
poulos as a foreign policy advisor. 5 * 3
(U) In late March, Papadopoulos had a
follow-on meeting withH^m London,
where ^H^ntroduced Papadopoulos to
a woman who claimed to bo a relative of
President Putin "with connections to senior
Russian government officials." 5 '* Papado¬
poulos informed the campaign about this
meeting, with a campaign supervisor pro¬
claiming that Papadopoulos conducted
"great work." 55 Papadopoulos continued to
correspond with who connected
Papadopoulos with an individual
m claiming to. have connections with the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 56 Papa-
dopoulos communicated with this Russian
♦
contact throughout the summer of 2016,
attempting to arrange meetings between
the Russian government and campaign offi¬
cials. 57
(U) On April 26, 2016, over breakfast at
a London hotel,m told Papadopoulos
"that he had just returned from a trip to
Moscow where he had met with high-level
i
Russian government officials."' 6 fur-
ther indicated he had learned that the Rus¬
sians had obtained 'dirt' on candidate Clin¬
ton. Specifically that "'the Russians had
emails of Clinton,' 'they have thousands of
emails.'" 55 However, the Committee was
unable to discern if the referenced emails
were the missing emails from candidate
Clinton's server while she was Secretary of
State or the emails that were stolen from
the DNC.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S HOUSE OF Rt-l’KESENTATlVLS
48
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF KEPRESFOTATIVES
rj
counterintelligence investigation into the
Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation opened an individual coun¬
terintelligence investigation into Carter
Page.
(U) By the time Page was announced as
a Trump campaign foreign policy advisor on
March 21, 2016, he was already a subject of
interest for the FBI. Page previously lived
and worked in Russia and maintained con-
tact with known Russian intelligence offic¬
ers, inciuding|^^^^^|^^|—who was
described in a 2015 court filing as an SVR
officer posted to the Russian Mission to the
United Nations. Page previously worked
with the FBI in the prosecution of_
and other Russian intelligence officials. 08
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OP REHKE3EN I'ATIVES
50
(U} Finding #19: The dossier compiled by
Christopher Steeie formed an essential part
of an application to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court to obtain electronic sur¬
veillance on Carter Page.
(U) In late October 2016, OOJ sought
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
mittee did not find—any evidence of any
cooperation or conspiracy between Page
and Papadopouios. Additionally, the so-
called "dossier" compiled by Christopher
Steeie formed a substantial and essential
(For ad
ditional information about the Steele dossi¬
er, see Chapter 4.)
(U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert
Mueller indicted Paul Manaforton several
charges, none of which relate to allega¬
tions of collusion, coordination, or conspir¬
acy between the Trump campaign and the
Russian government.
(U) Paul Manafort joined the Trump
campaign on March 29, 2016, and was ele¬
vated to campaign chairman on May 19,
2016. Manafort became campaign manager
after the campaign removed
on June 20,2016. The Committee
agreed to avoid, to the greatest extent prac¬
tical, any potential interference with Special
Counsel Mueller's investigation. Given the
ongoing litigation concerns associated with
Manafort, the Committee, will only discuss
information in this report that has been
publicly disseminated by the Special Coun¬
sel's office. Although the Committee would
have appreciated the opportunity to inter¬
view Manafort regarding his role on the
Trump campaign, the Committee is limited
in this regard due to Special Counsel
Mueller's investigation and indictments.
{LI} On October 27, 2017, a grand jury
indicted Manafort and his associate, fellow
lobbyist and deputy Trump campaign man¬
ager Rick Gates, for various financial crimes,
as well as making false statements.' 1 All of
the financial crimes took place prior to Man¬
afort serving as Trump campaign manager,
and nothing in the indictment relates to any
potential collusion, conspiracy, or conspira¬
cy between the Trump campaign and the
Russian government.
(U} On February 22, 2017, a grand jury
issued a superseding indictment for Mana¬
fort and Rick Gates, which included addi¬
tional allegations of financial crimes, indud-
i
‘I - j ^ |r*^ V
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OH REPRESENTATIVES
51
to p occftny
f rcoronM
ing bank fraud. Similar to the October 27,
2017, indictment, the superseding Indict¬
ment does not include any reference to the
Trump campaign, including no mention of
collusion, coordination, or conspiracy be¬
tween the Trump campaign and the Russian
government.
(U) While the Committee will not go
into further detail on the charges against
Manafort due to ongoing litigation con¬
cerns, Special Counsel Mueller's indictment
of Manafort illustrates the necessity for U.S.
presidential campaigns to better investigate
individuals who serve in senior positions
within the campaign. If the accusations
against Manafort are true, he should have
never served as a senior official with a cam¬
paign for the U.S. presidency, much less
campaign chairman or manager.
(U) General Flynn began advising the
Trump campaign on or before February
2016 and subsequently became a central
figure on the campaign trail. He was the
former Director of DIA and was one of can¬
didate Trump's closest advisors on national
security issues. Following the election, and
during the transition period, he was desig¬
nated as the future National Security Advi¬
sor to the President. General Flynn served
as PresidentTrump's National Security Advi¬
sor for less than a month, resigning on Feb¬
ruary 13,2017. According to FBI Director
Comey, General Flynn's resignation oc¬
curred after it came to light that he had mis¬
led Vice President-Elect Pence about his
contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergey
Kislyak during the transition period. /s
(U) Prior to his trip to Moscow, General
Flynn and his son met with Russian Ambas¬
sador Kislyak at the ambassador’s private
residence in Washington, D.C. on December
2, 2015. The meeting was later described
by General's Flynn's son in an email to the
Russian embassy as "very productive." 75
The email indicates that the meeting was
arranged at the request of General Flynn or
his son. 30 The Committee was unable to in¬
terview General Flynn and his son because
of their written intent to assert their Fifth
Amendment rights against self¬
incrimination.
iumshuci;
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
52
(U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded
guilty to making a false statement to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding
his December 2016 conversations with Am¬
bassador Kislyak, even though the Federal
Bureau of Investigation agents did not de¬
tect any deception during Flynn's inter¬
view.
{U) According to the charging docu¬
ments, on or about December 22,2016, "a
very senior member of the Presidential
Transition Team" (PTT) directed General
Flynn to contact representatives of foreign
governments. 64 This request concerned a
resolution about Israeli settlements sub¬
mitted by Egypt to the U.N. Security Council
around Oecember 21, 2016.^ Later, on De¬
cember 22, General Flynn contacted Ambas¬
sador Kislvak and "requested that Russia
vote against or delay the resolution." 60 The
next day. Ambassador Kisiyak informed
General Flynn that Russia would not comply
with the request. 8 '
(U) On December 29, 2016, President
Obama 'authorized a number of actions"—
including new sanctions—"in response to
the Russian government's aggressive har¬
assment of U.S. officials and cyber opera¬
tions aimed at the U.S. election in 2016." 35
Following this announcement, the charging
documents state that General Flynn dis¬
cussed "what, if anything, to communicate
to the Russian Ambassador about the U.S.
sanctions," with a senior PTT official. 2 '
1W
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE CF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials
did not notify the Trump campaign that
members of the campaign were assessed
to be potential counterintelligence con¬
cerns.
(U) The Committee found that the
Trump campaign was not notified that
members of the campaign were potential
counterintelligence concerns. This lack of
notification meant that the campaign was
unable to address the problems with each
campaign member and was ignorant about
the potential national security concerns. AG
Lynch recalled that, during her first meeting
with Director Comey and McCabe about
Page, "one of the possibilities the three of
us discussed was whether or not to provide
what is called a defensive briefing to the
campaign, wherein there would bo a
meeting with a senior person with the
Trump campaign to alert them to the fact
that... there may be efforts to compromise
someone with their campaign." 102
(U) Such a defensive briefing would not
have been unusual. According to Lynch,
"[i]t is not an uncommon thing to do ... in
intelligence matters." 103 However, the FBI
did not provide any such warning about
Page, although it was again discussed by the
administration's most senior policymakers
after Director Comey briefed the National
Security Council Principals about the Page
information in "late spring" 2016, 104
PROPERTY Ol-THE U S. HOUSE OK KEPREStiNl A riVES
54
(U) The Trump campaign did not re¬
ceive a general counterintelligence briefing
until August 2016, and even then, it was
never specifically notified 3bout Papado-
poulos, Page, Manafort, or General Flynn’s
Russia ties. ‘ Further, the counterintelli¬
gence briefing provided to Trump and his
top advisors did not identify any individuals
by name, but rather focused on the general
threat posed by adversaries, including Rus¬
sia and China.
(U) Finding #24: The February 2Q18 indict¬
ment of the Internet Research Agency and
Russian nationals exposes Russian actors
and their intent to spread distrust towards
the candidates and the political system in
general,
(U) In mid-February 2018, the Depart¬
ment of Justice charged 12 Russians and the
Russia-based Internet Research Agency LLC
with interference operations targeting the
United States political and electoral process¬
es. The indictment claims that the stated
goal of the Russian actors was to "spread
distrust towards the candidates and the po¬
litical system in general" and provides in¬
sight into the methods used by the IRA,
such as the use of stolen identities, travel to
the U.S. for the purpose of collecting intelli¬
gence, and the procurement of computer
infrastructure to hide the Russian origin of
activities,' ,:to The indictment by Special
Counsel Mueller contains assertions that are
• consistent with information examined by
the Committee during its investigation. Spe¬
cifically, according to an accompanying DOJ
announcement, "There is no allegation in
the indictment that any American was a
knowing participant in the alleged unlawful
activity. There is no allegation in the indict¬
ment that the charged conduct altered the
outcome of the 2016 election." 107
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
55
T OT 3 FCT
9. H PSC i, E xecu live Se ssi o n In t erview of to fce Su3I1vh i% D e c 21, 2017 .
10. BPSCL ''Russian Active Measures investigation/ Mar, 20, 3D17,
11. NPSO, ^Russia investigative Task Force Meeting with Former Secretary of Homela no Securiiy Jeh Johnson/ June 2 3,
2017.
12, KPSCtj, "Russia Investigative Task Force Hearing with Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson/ June 21,
2017.
13, OHS, Handout of Secretary Johnson r s Cati ivfrfc S tote Section Officials About Cybersecurity, htt ps:.; .■ >wjw d i> s -go l . /
n c ws/2 016 /QS J IS/ r q.^d u u t- $ ec r eta tv -1 ah n s o i > s-c a II -si a t e- elec lion * o frc! a Is- cvbe r s ecu ri t v. Aug. IS, 2016.
14, FBI, Ffl/ f/osh: AcfrVJfy State ftoa/rf o/ £tec ttori Systems, Aug. 13, 2016.
15, FBI, hBI fins h: Targeting Activity Againsi State Board of F/echoir Systems, Au g, 1. R, 2016.
16, F BI, f Bl fiosh: Taring Activity Against 5 fote Snaftl of election Systems, Aug. Ift, 2C16,
17, OHS, Stnteme/u by Secretary Johnson Concerning die Cybersccarliy of the Nation's Election Sysrems, h ttp://
Wv/W <\ h v./j 1 v /i \t*w ,%/ V U.U U Q?/1n h t n I - m * r:rn l *i *\ - ■ a h n a fii t ^ f r n n r t m tiff- CV t’Kifijet U11 tv n a honV e le r I ton - W S t
Sop L 16, 2016,
1H . DH5, .5 f o teme a t by Set re J at y m hman Cat it*? n tin g the Cyb <. v security of i he nqi ton's £ (e alon Systems, h u \yJ£
w w w ,i l h ?. mvfn e w s/ 2 016/0*1/1.6/ a ten; o n i - s e c re t^rv^ hn<o iyconco ml nil- cv her**?*.* .Jity ^uitrip^ -nlgcli ofMvMems.
Sopl. IG, 2016,
10. Paul 0, Ryan, Nancy Pole A MHtfi McConm?ii ( Marry JUila, letter to Todd i/afenttm ,Scph 28,2016.
20, DhlS h Stcrfrmcnf &y Setrmry About Election Systems’ Cyhersecurtty, hitn:liln n t>//nt^v> 5 / ? t o 16/1 /
. r 1‘!-ermary >ohi>s on a bmil ■ mtocia v < ylwr*>n qifUv. Oct. 1, 2 0 1 6
21, DHS P Jain 1 5 rof cm un r from the Deponme nt of I iom eta; 1 6 S ecurti y at»(f Off cc of ti\ c Dire c tor of N a non of in tdti ge n re on
Election Security, h it u %-Jj www, d I is, m wft ^ ws j 2 p 16/ U>yo 7/1 i>i n i ntome j 1 1- dana t tme n\ ■ f i omo [ a n d*secuht v* a nd- officg-
dire cior-rtat - fina l. Oct, 7.2016.
22, OHS, Update by Secretary Johnson On 0HS Eiectfon Cybene c urity Services, )ntt os :/,Av ww, dhs. ^u vMe w^/2,1)1 6/ 10/10/
LJ P £ ^tar y» loImf o n♦ dhv eIectIc ■ t■ cvht*rs<*curi 1 v-s afvieg s . Qtt. 20, 7.016
23, HPSO/'flaiila InvtoBpattveTakforce Hearing with Former SeCretan/ of Homeland SecuntyJeh Johnson/June 21,
2017.
24, HPSCI. * Russia i nvestigatwe Task Force Hearing with Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jcb Johnson/' June 21*
2037,
25, The Office of SEcretery oi State of Georgia, Letter to Secretary Jeh Johnson, Dec. S, 2016.
26, DHS, Staternent by Secretsr/ Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Flection Infrastructure as a Critical trifra stru rtu r^ Su b^ec-
Lor. h ttr s;// w: dhs. eov /Vj e v/s/2017/0 1 / 06/s ta Laments e c r e ta tv -1 ob r>s o n-d es it* rra L* on- el ec ti on ^ t <if r^s t r ua ur ■* cri r ca i .
J^n, 6, 2017*
27, HPSCI. ExpcotA^ Session Interview of Loretta Lynch ( Oct. 3D, 201/,
2ft. "The Global Digital Challenge Initiative - Keynote Address/ 1 Bipartisan Policy Center video, 36:29, h«p://brove,mt*/
zff9r4qq, May lit, 2016
29. HPSCI, Executive Session trvteivk^A' of Loretta tynr.h, Oct, 20, 2017,
30, I IPSO, £x«cuhve Session Interview of Lorvtta lyndi, Oct. 70,2017; The Principals Committee, convened nnrj chaired Ijy
the National Seeuflty Advisor, Is a Cabinet level inier agency forum for considering policy Issues that oitotx the national
security interests of the United States, Regular attendees of the Principals Committee include: ihe Secretary of Stole, the
SecroLary of the Treasury* the Soemuity of Oofom:^ the Attgf nuy GorvcrnL thu SimrHnry of Hncjrgy, the Chhti of Staff lo
the president, the Director of Notional lolelllgonco* the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central
intnlllgencL* Afi^ncy, the Natlonnt Securliy Advisor, tho Homeland Security Advisor, and the ReprisenloWvo of hie United
StaUifl to the United Noiiom,
31. HPSCI, 'Russian Active Measures During the 2016 Efecnon Campaign/ May 33, 2017.
32, Thu Gari^ of ft is comprised of the Speaker of (he House of RopnesantatWes, the Minority i eatier of the House of Hepre-
sen^ntlves, the Chairman ard Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the Hnujjeof Rep*
i
PROPEPr/ OP THE U.S. House UF REPRESENTATP/tS
33 *
34.
35 .
36 .
37.
35.
39*
40,
41 .
42 .
43.
44.
45.
46*
47*
4 S*
49 .
5a
51*
52.
55,
54,
55.
m- ■**-
v3-
57*
5 S.
59.
50.
61.
62.
63 .
rescntapv-as, ifoe frlafai^iy and Minority tenders or the LLS* Sonata, s^a the Chairmen and Vice Chairman of die Select
Committee on ^rtteHlgcncd of the U.5. Serrate,
HFSCJ, Cxscutive Session Interviewof Susan Pice, Sep* 2. 2017.
rJPSCl, rf Puis:an Active Measures During the 2016 Electron Campaign/' May 23,2017*
HrSCi, "Russian Active Measures During ihe 2016 Elesiitn Campaign/ May 23.2017.
HPSCI, Executive Session interview of Icretta lynch, Ccl 20. 2017,
HPSO, Fxecuiiue Session interview of Susan Rice, Sep* 3, 2017.
Ohs, Joint StiKemem frcm f he Deportment ofttametand Security one Office of the Director of Naticrnol fa teUtgencs on
Election Security, i* U oi- foflvywv.drs .gay/ng ws 7 2 Ci 9/10 / 37 /*i 'nt-sta tent enl- de pa am <L^hcrrrdans - secu nr* an c- or 1 c e
rir gcror-natipr a3, Oct. 7,201b.
HPiCI/Fussia Ircvestigadve Task Force hearing vAth Former Secret*^/ of Homeland Security >eh Johnson, June 21* 2017*
WPSG* Executive Session Interview of John Pctjesta, Juno 27^ 2017.
HP5CI. "Russia ^nvesrtgatrve Task Force hearing wrh former Secretary of HomelandSecurity Jeh Johnson; June 2 1, 2017,
HPSa ’''Russia Investigative Task Force Hearing wkh Fcrriie r Secret ary of Kometand Security Joh Johnson/ June 21 2017,
in September 2018^^^^ sharad similar infoimation in a orie-oivcsie meBtmg
with FBI General Counsel James Baler* HP$Q, Executive Session Dec, 13, 2017* Around the same
time as his meeting wren shared the information with journalists, lad uc iSlate, who pub-
lishsd an article ac xh& end of Ode her. HP 50, Executive Sassbn of Dec, IS, 2017;
a Trump Service Com mumcatmg Wfch Russia?/ Slate* Oct 31,2D16. Candidate Clinton promoted the| J article to tier
social media followers the same day it was published. Twitter, @HilbryClInton, Od* 31, 2016, 4;3 2 PM,
White House. Sioremenf &y tee Pnes/stesrori Ttafons in Response to Russiatt J Malicious Cyber Activity and Hnfcssfnent,
0^29,201$.
QHs, SfoJemeot fry Secretory ted Johnson on ih-e Designation of ft?even Infrastructure os a Criticci irfwswcxure Subsec
tor, flltoWAiVwv*. tit'S. ?>C v/ne ws,'20l7 i ; C.l/06/st^- B P^BT[-SgCretBfv-tC.- t -r*Sf3ri-^^>i ~ n ^lg jsH ucui rO-CriScal.
Jan. 6, 2017*
00*11, Assessing Russian Activities and intentions n Recent US Elections, Jan. 6, 2017. ■
00HI, intelligence Community Directive 203: Analytic Srnndcrds, Jan. 2, 2015,
HPSO. Executive Session Interview of Mary McCord, Nov. 1, 2017.
I IPSOj Executive Passion tritutYrew of Andrew McCabe, Dec. 201/.
u*£* v. George Fznzdo peuios (3:L7*cr-i82, District of Cclumbfe],
U*S. v. George ^apedopoulos (lJ.7'Cr-l32 / District ofCdumb^}
U_S. v* G&cr^e P apedOpc-ulas (1 17-cr-l62, District of Columofe).
Post Opinions Staff, *A transcript of Donald Trump's meeting with Ihe WasftinfftOO Pest editorial board/ '.VosbJji^Gjr
Post, Mar. 23, 2016.
U5. v* George Papadopouros (l;17-cr'lS2, District of Coluintiaj.
U,5. v* George PapadopoL i !tM (Iir/-Cr-1B2, District of Columbia}; pineil from George: Papaccpciilos tc |m>
"Ra: Meeting with Russian leadership —mdLsd;ngPticr^ M Mar* 24,2QiS [DJTFPOODlGllli*
y*S- v* George Papadopaufos (lJ-T-cr-lS?/District of Coiu^claJ; Email from George Papadopuulos tc]
r jFv/ci: (Jtas&tan Outreach)/ May 4 r 201G [DJ75FU0-TH4O5T
U.S. v. George Papadopoulos (l:l?-cr-IE2, District of Cclup^a).
U^. v. Gscrge P^pedopoulos (l^l7-cr-152, District' of CclumbldL
T3.1 jlCRIT/,
jjorenre
PROPERTY OF Th£ OS. MOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
57
n w »
i— I IIL ■
U.S. v. Evgen y Buryakov, a/k/a "Zhenya," ^^■■1, and^l^^l U.S. Southern District of New York, Janu¬
ary 23, 2015; "Russian Spies Tried to Recruit Carter Page Before He Advised Trump," The New York
Times , Apr. 4, 2017; DOJ, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, Oct. 21, 2016, which was made available for
review by HPSCI members and staff on March 17, October 31, November 2, December 14, December 15, and December
i r imi
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74. U.S. v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III (l:17-cr-201, District of Columbia).
75. HPSCI, "FBI Coun terintelligence Investigations," Mar. 2, 2017.
76.
77.
78.
79. Michael G. Flynn, Email messages to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production,
FLYNN_HPSCI_00000500, 00007542.
80. Michael G. Flynn, Email message to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production,
FLYNN_HPSCI_ 0QQQ0500, 00007542.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86 .
87.
88 .
U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).
Barack Obama, "FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment," The White
House, Dec. 29, 2016.
U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232. District of Columbia).
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
58
j kJ rjECTuTI
102. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017.
103. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017.
104. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct 20, 2017.
105. HPSCI, Staff meeting with Bil) Priestap, FBI Assistant Director, Head of the Counterintelligence Division, Oct 31, 2017.
106. U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (l:18-cr-32, District of Columbia).
107. DOJ, "Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United
States Political System," Feb. 16, 2018.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
59
top Gccnnfr
(U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia
Key Question f/2: Did the Russian active measures include links between Russia and individ¬
uals associated with political campaigns or any other U.S. persons?
(U) A key focus of the Committee's
investigation was whether Russian active
measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election
(see Chapter 3) "include[d] links between
Russia and individuals associated with
political campaigns or any other U.S.
persons/' 1 The first part of this chapter
reflects the Committee's answer to that
question with respect to the Trump
campaign. The second part of this chapter
addresses the Clinton campaign.
(U) The "links" between individuals
associated with the campaigns and Russia
have often been publicly described as
inquiries into whether there was "collusion"
between individuals associated with either
candidate Trump or Clinton and the Russian
government. One challenge with describing
potential "links" with the Russian
government as "collusion" is that the term
"collusion" may mean different things to
different people, as exemplified in witness
testimony before the Committee.
Particularly in light of Special Counsel
Robert Mueller’s continuing criminal
investigation—which has a different focus
and the Committee agreed not to impede—
it is important to note that the term
"collusion" does not, by itself, describe a
criminal offense. Unlike the closely-related
concept of "conspiracy," there is no
applicable statute that sets out the
elements of "collusion.” "Collusion" is
therefore an ambiguous term, not a precise
legal one.
Trump Campaign
(U) The Committee cast a wide net,
generally asking each witnesses whether
they had evidence of any "collusion,"
"coordination," or "conspiracy" between
Russia and candidate Trump or any of his
associates. The Committee also
investigated potential Trump campaign links
with Russia, focusing on credible allegations
within the scope of the agreed-upon
parameters. Matters investigated by the
Committee include allegations pertaining to:
• candidate Trump's business
dealings;
« the campaign's policy positions and
personnel;
* involvement in or knowledge about
the publication of stolen emails; and
♦ meetings with Russians.
(U) In the course of witness interviews,
reviews of document productions, and
• investigative efforts extending well over a
year, the Committee did not find any
evidence of collusion, conspiracy, or
coordination between the Trump campaign
and the Russians. While the Committee
found that several of the contacts between
Trump associates and Russians—or their
proxies, including WikiLeaks—were ill-
top ocenrr/j
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
60
advised, the Committee did not determine
that Trump or anyone associated with him
assisted Russia's active measures campaign.
DIRECT EVIDENCE OF COLLUSION,
CONSPIRACY, OR COORDINATION
(U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none
of the interviewed witnesses provided
evidence of collusion, coordination, or
conspiracy detween the Trump campaign
and the Russian government,
(U) The Committee interviewed high-
ranking current and former government
officials, along with numerous Trump
campaign members. Trump administration
officials, and other Trump associates. None
of the witnesses testified they had evidence
of collusion between the campaign and
anyone affiliated with the Russian
government. In most of the Committee's
witness interviews, the witness was asked
directly for any evidence of "collusion,
coordination or conspiracy" with any
element of the Russian government to
influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S.
presidential election. This question was
asked with respect to the witness' own
actions; the actions of candidate Trump; the
actions of anyone officially affiliated with
the campaign; or the actions of anyone
unofficially affiliated with the campaign,
defined as including "wannabes," 2 "hangers-
on,"'"' and "people who represented
themselves as being part of the campaign."'’
Each witness was given wide latitude in
answering these questions, but none
produced any evidence. For example,
Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor Jared
Kushner stated categorically' that the Trump
campaign "did not collude, cooperate,
whatever other ‘C words you used, with
any foreign governments." 5
(U) Several former government officials
testified that, even though there was no
evidence of collusion between Trump
campaign associates and the Russian
government, they were aware of contacts
and interactions of potential concern. For
example, former CIA Director John Brennan
stated in open session, "I encountered and
am aware of information and intelligence
that revested contacts and interactions
between Russian officials and U.S. persons
involved in the Trump campaign that t was
concerneo about because of known Russian
efforts to suborn such individuals, and it
raised questions in my mind... whether or
not the Russians were able to gain the
cooperation of those individuals."' Brennan
continued, however, "I don't know 'whether
or not such collusion... existed.'"'
(U) Similarly, former DNi James Clapper
stated that he was aware of the same
information to which Brennan referred,
"that my dashboard warning lights were on
just because of that," s However,
reaffirming his prior public statements, he
told the Committee that, "1 didn't have any
evidence—l don't care how you want io
caveat it—of collusion." 3
BUSINESS DEALINGS
(U) Finding #26: The Committee found no
evidence that President Trump's pre-
campaign business dealings formed the
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
61
basis for collusion during the campaign.
<U) As a political outsider who had
never run for office, Donald Trump did not
have a political record to analyze, criticize,
or rely upon during the 2016 campaign.
Therefore, his long and varied business
career garnered significant attention from
supporters, opponents, and opposition
researchers alike. Eventually, as described
in the second half of this chapter, candidate
Trump's pre-campaign business dealings
with Russians became a subject of
significant opposition research.
(U) As noted above, the Committee's
investigation was focused on the time
period of the 2016 election. Trump's pre-
campaign dealings were within scope only
to the extent they formed the basis for, or
were otherwise linked to. Improper conduct
during the elections, As one of the
Committee Members said during an
interview, the key question was if any
business “relationships, whether directly or
indirectly or just by some other means, had
the effect that there was a preexisting
relationship with Russia, and that that
preexisting relationship may have in some
way inspired the Trump campaign to have a
contact with the Russian Government to
coordinate, collude, or conspire to help
them win the election over Hillary
Clinton." 10
I 1(1
(U) The Committee focused only on any
potential financial improprieties relating to
\ *• ill it i# 1 • i • f M •
the election* In particular, the Committee
H • - i ■
examined the Miss Universe pageant in
Moscow in 2013; the Trump Organization's
unsuccessful efforts to build a Trump Tower
in Moscow in late 2015 and early 2016; and
other assorted claims of Russian financial
ties to the Trump family, The Committee
did not uncover any evidence that any of
those matters formed the basis for
collusion, coordination, or conspiracy
between Trump or his associates and the
Russian government during the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.
(U) Miss Universe 2013: Before he was
a political candidate, Trump owned the Miss
Universe Organization. The decision to hold
the 2013 Miss Universe annual pageant in
Moscow was a unanimous one made by
representatives of the Trump Organization
and NBC—the event's broadcaster—with
approval of the president of the Miss
Universe organization. 11 Michael Cohen, an
attorney and former Executive Vico
President of the Trump Organization, told
the Committee 50 percent of the fees
earned for the pageant went to NBC. u "fOl
f the $12.2 million in foreign income that
[the Miss 1 Universe pageant) earned [in
2013], a substantial portion of it was
attributable to the Moscow event." 13
(U) The 2013 pageant's hosts were Aras
and Emin Agalarov, father and son of a
wealthy Azerbaijani-Russian family in
Moscow. The Againrovs' company. Crocus
Group, owned the venue where the pageant
was held.’' 1 The Agalarovs and Crocus
Group wanted to host the event in Moscow
because they wanted to have the pageant in
their company's building, Crocus City Hall,
and it was a way to promote Emin's music
ropQccn
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSe OF REPRESENTATIVES
62
career, who performed at the pageant/"
The Agalarovs have connections with senior
individuals and elements of the Russian
government, 115 and Aras received the Order
of Honor from Vladimir Putin.'' 7 The
decision to hold the pageant in Moscow
originated from an "off-the-cuff" discussion
between Emin Agalarov, his manager, and a
representative from the Miss Universe
pageant/ 4
UNCLASSIFIED
EMIN AGALAROV AT THE 2013 MISS
UNIVERSE PAGEANT IN MOSCOW
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) The Agalarovs first met Trump in
person in 2013 in connection with the Miss
USA pageant in Las Vegas . 3,5 The Agalarovs
and Trump signed the contract to hold the
pageant in Moscow during the weekend of
the Miss USA pageant in January 2013. 3 ' 7 At
the conclusion of the 2013 Miss USA
pageant. Trump and the Agalarovs
announced on stage that the Miss Universe
pageant that year would be held in
Moscow/ 1 In a June 18,2013 tweet, Trump
publicly asked, "Do you think Putin will be
going to The Miss Universe Pageant in
November in Moscow — if so, will he
become my new best friend?" 77
(U) Leading up to the Miss Universe
pageant, the issue of President Rutin
possibly attending came "up a number of
times" among those planning the pageant/ 4
Emin's manager Robert Goldstone and the
head of the pageant organization had
"casual" conversations with one another,
but every time Goldstone asked Emin about
it, Emin replied the pageant would have had
to go through "official channels" to make
the request, indicating that the event was
not officially related to the Russian
government. 2 '’ At the time, according to
Goldstone, Emin cast doubt on whether
President Putin would attend, stating "if this
was in America, would Barack Obama
attend? Probably not. It's a beauty
pageant. But there is a chance, maybe, of
some kind of meeting."' 4 Before the
pageant, however, President Putin's press
secretary called and told Trump and others
that President Putin would not attend the
pageant and he did not.' 6
{U} While in Moscow, Trump, along
with his head of security, attended the
pageant and several pageant-related
events. 27 For example, Trump attended an
event hosted by the Agalarovs at a well-
known restaurant with local businessmen."
(U) Although there were allegations in
the Steele dossier that Trump engaged in
illicit activities with prostitutes in the
presidential suite at the Ritz-Carlton hotel,
the .Committee found no evidence to
support these allegations. Trump's former
head of security, testified that
; ROPERTY CF THE U-S- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
*
a
I
63
TOP SECRET/;
although somebody during a meeting in
Moscowf^^^Jdid not know who—
"mentioned sending women to [Trump's]
room/BH res P°nded "absolutely not,
we don't do that.'"' 9 HU told the
Committee he advised Trump of the
comment, and they both laughed about it.
also testified he walked Trump to
his room that night, remained for a few
minutes, and did not observe anybody enter
the room. 30
(U) Trump Tower Moscow: While in
Russia for the Miss Universe pageant,
Trump met with the Agalarovs and
discussed a possible joint real estate
development in Moscow/' 1 The proposed
project was a Trump Tower in Moscow
adjacent to the Agalarov-owned Crocus City
Hall; according to Donald Trump Jr., "it
fizzled out" after a few months. 32
(U) Trump Organization lawyer Michael
Cohen was not Involved in those original
discussions regarding Trump Tower
Moscow. In approximately September
2015, he received a separate proposal for
Trump Tower Moscow from a businessman
named 39 According to Cohen,
the concept of the project was that "[t]he
Trump Organization would lend its name
and management skills, but It was not going
to borrow any money and it would not have
any resulting debt for the purchase of the
land and the building of the facility." 34
Cohen worked on this idea with and
his company, the Bayrock Group, a real
estate consultancy that had previously
worked with the Trump Organization.
has a unique and colorful background, and
described for the Committee his path from
Wall Street banker to white-collar criminal
to government informant. 35
(U) After signing a letter of intent with
a local developer in October 2015, 3f> Cohen
andHI exchanged a number of emails
and text messages in late 2015 detailing
their attempts to move the project forward.
For instance, in December 2015,^^Jtried
to get Cohen and candidate Trump to travel
to Russia to work on the project. 37
(U) Several of^^H communications
with Cohen involved an attempt to broker a
meeting or other ties between candidate
Trump and President Putin, and purported
to convey Russian government interest in
the project 33 Perhaps most notably,
told Cohen in a November 3, 2015, email,
"(b)uddy our boy can become President of
the USA and we can engineer it." 39 m
continued that if "Putin gets on stage with
Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump
Moscow,... Donald owns the republican
nomination." 10 This assertion apparently
arose from^^H rather grandiose theory
that cementing a deal with a hostile U.S.
adversary would increase candidate
Trump's foreign policy bona tides. 43
(U}^H testified that his
communications with Cohen regarding
President Putin were "mere puffery,"
designed to elicit a response from the
Trump Organization to move the project
along. 1 * 2 explained that "(ujntil the
bank writes the check, it's all salesmanship
and promotion to try to get many, many,
TOMCCnCT/,
ft* oron » j)
PROPER r Y OF THE U.S. I (OUSE OF REPHliHliN I A DVES
64
many parties towards the center to try to
get the deal done. ' 4 '' Cohen similarly
characterized^^! as "a salesman" who
"uses very colorful language." 44
(U) When the project started
proceeding too siowiy for the Trump
Organization/'' Cohen andd began to
exchange acrimonious text messages. ’ 0 As
part of those text messages JK told
Cohen that President Putin's people were
backing the deal, including "this is thru
Putins [sic] administration, and nothing gets
done there without approval from the top,"
as well as meetings in Russia with
"Ministers" and "Putins [sic] top
administration people." 47 also
mentioned Dmitry Peskov (President Putin's
spokesman) would "most likely” be
included.'"
(U) Cohen thus attempted to reach out
to members of the Russian government in
an attempt to make the project proceed,
but apparently did not have any direct
points of contact. For example, Cohen sent
an email to a general press mailbox at the
Kremlin in an effort to reach Peskov. 43
Cohen's message notes that he has been
working with a loca! partner to build a
Trump Tower in Moscow-and that
communications have stalled with the loca!
partner.The email further seeks contact
with Peskov so they may "discuss the
specifics as well as arrang[e] meetings with
the appropriate individuals." 41 Based on the
documents produced to the Committee, it
does not appear Cohen ever received a
response from anyone affiliated with the
Russian government.
testimony likewise made
dear that neither President Putin nor any
element of the Russian government was
actually directly involved in the project. For
instance, in one exchange, testified he
was offering the Trump Organization access
to one of acquaintances. This
acquaintance was an acquaintance of
someone else who is "partners on a real
estate development with a friend of
Putin's."" testified that he was
unaware of "any direct meetings with any
IRussian] government officials" in
connection with the Trump Tower Moscow
project.'* In addition, neither candidate
Trump nor Cohen traveled to Russia in
support or the deal. 5 " 4
(U)H was unequivocal in his
testimony that none of the Russians
affiliated with the Trump Tower Moscow-
project had any communications with him
"in which {hej wjas] asked to do something
on behalf of the Russian government that
[he] knew was on behalf of the Russian
Government" with respect to the U.S,
election."" None of those communications
"were intended for^!^^ to take action to
have a communication with or take some
action to influence the 2016 Presidential
election." 40 The Committee therefore
assesses tha^^l was attempting to
leverage political contacts for business
purposes, rather than the other way
around.
(U) It appears the Trump Tower
Moscow project failed in January 2016. E/
PROPERTY OF PriE U-S. ViOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
65
Trump Jr. testified that, as of early June
201G, he believed the Trump Tower
Moscow project was dormant. 18 The
project failed because "[t]he due diligence
did not come through" and the Trump
Organization's representative "lost
confidence in the licensee, and (he]
abandoned the project." 51 ’ In fact, the
Trump Organization did not have a
confirmed site, so the deal never reached
the point where the company was
discussing financing arrangements for the
project. 60 The Committee determined that
the Trump Tower Moscow project did not
progress beyond an early developmental
phase, and that this potential licensing deal
was not related to the Trump campaign. 01 -
(U) Other Alleged Financial Dealings: In
addition to the Miss Universe and Trump
Tower Moscow projects, a number of
witnesses were asked about Trump family
financial dealings, sometimes stretching
back decades. 1 "* For example, Trump Jr. was
asked about Russians: buying units in
Trump Tower in 1984 (when he was seven
years old); 63 buying properties in southern
Florida for which the Trump brand was a
licensor; 6 ' 1 being involved in the Trump
International Hotel in Toronto for which the
Trump Organization was the brand and not
the developer; 65 and having unspecified
involvement in a licensing project for the
Trump Ocean Club in Panama. 66 The
Committee does not have any evidence that
there is a nexus between these activities
and the 2016 campaign, or information that
contradicts representations made in a
March 8, 2017 letter from Trump's lawyers
regarding his Russia-related financial
dealings over the previous ten years. 67
POLICY POSITIONS
(U) During the campaign, candidate
Trump and several of his campaign advisors
expressed policy views towards Russia quite
different than those espoused by much of
the Republican foreign policy establishment,
including previous Republican nominee Mitt
Romney, who labeled Russia "our number
one geopolitical foe" during the 2012
election, In fact, a significant number of
Republican foreign policy experts made
statements during the campaign that they
would not work for the Trump campaign.
As a result, the campaign relied on many
lesser-known—or in some cases unknown-
advisors on foreign policy issues.
(U) Additionally, a pfank of the 2016
Republican platform pertaining to the
Ukraine has been the subject of substantial
controversy. The question for the
Committee was whether candidate Trump's
policy positions—and the campaign's
involvement in the debate over the Ukraine
platform piank—reflected legitimate policy
positions, or something more nefarious.
The Committee found no evidence that the
policy positions of the Trump campaign
were the result of collusion, coordination,
or conspiracy with the Russians. In the
words ofTrump campaign
policy official involved in the platform issue,
"Itjhere was no coordination or thought for
coordination. The idea to have better
relations with Russia was a Mr. Trump idea
i l/
hJOruUiiJ
PROPERTY or THE U.S. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
that l thought was reasonable to support." '
(U) Finding #27: The Republican national
security establishment's opposition to
candidate Trump created opportunities for
two less-experienced individuals with pro-
Russia views to serve as campa ign
advisors: George Papadopoufos and Carter
Page.
(U) The Republican foreign policy
establishment was critical of candidate
Trump, who had to turn elsewhere for
support. On March 2,2016,122 self-
described "GOP National Security Leaders"
signed an “Open Letter to Donald Trump"
refusing tG support then-candidate Trump. 15
The next day, Trump announced Senator
Jeff Sessions as chairman of his National
Security Advisory Committee (NSAC). A few
weeks later, following continuing media
criticism of his failure to publicly name a
foreign policy team, 70 candidate Trump
•
named five foreign policy advisors in a
March 21. 2016 meeting with The
Washington Post editorial board: Walid
Phares, Carter Page, George Papadopoulos,
Joe Schmitz, and Keith Kellogg.”
(U) The opposition to Trump's
candidacy by the vast majority of the
conservative national security
establishment paved the way for lesser-
known individuals, such as the then 28-year-
old Papadopoulos, to join the Trump
campaign. Page was another unknown
brought into the periphery of the Trump
campaign to fill the vacuum left by more
experienced national security specialists
who were unwilling to advise candidate
• rump. There is no evidence that anyone
on the Trump campaign was aware of
Page's past ties to Russian intelligence
services—or Papadopoulos' more recent
contacts with a Russian-connected
professor—when these two individuals
were included among the advisors that
were publicly announced on March 21. In
fact, as Kushner candidly put it, "we put
together that list because we were getting a
lot of pressure from the media to put out a
list of foreign policy advisers." 77
UNCLASSIFIED
GOP National Security Leaders
Open Letter to Donald Trump
SI ATTAINT tlY FOKMER NATIONAL StCURMY OFFICIALS
IS; unjfft mc’[isezvol i&.«nux rcj^-tal security
ctxita JY.fcijP policy A ftcpt&thcr; A/cxnAi'D^rry from
rtrrhsjd m Hemp: W £!t*Jh Wr r '-Tried ixt
niiKinil yirjr^ v.iLTit.Sesc PrwKicntisrsi-ur them
cr.'xj^al tctsicn d*-r^ -.tore luvi of enu, ihre^&h
ya.vrt5« cs; fjblurrt Lnr/v> the personal owaiibrs pre- red cf j
l 3 nrt>drni Sii-.cs
of «tS \oi< fr* Doe&! Tryimp
Sxrtz The Nr^Ycrk Times
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) These five advisors were
subsequently incorporated into the NSAC,
which was part of the campaign's D.C.-
based policy shop. 71 The NSAC was chaired
by Senator Sessions and directed by J.D.
Gordon, a retired Navy officer and former
Department of Defense spokesman/' 1 Some
members of the NSAC met with candidate
Trump in Washington, D.C. on March 31,
2016. Page did not attend. Each advisor in
attendance, including Papadopoulos,
briefed the group on a topic of their choice.
Papadopoulos spoke about Russia.
t or i
PROPERTY OF THc U.S. HOUSE CP REPRESENTATIVES
However, in the opinion of one advisor,
Walid Phares, the primary purpose of the
meeting was about optics rather than
substance: "the meeting was about the
picture and to send the message that: I have
a foreign policy team." 75
UNCLASSIFIED
NSAC MEETING WITH
CANDIATE TRUMP
Ta ilor
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Page was, according to NSAC
director Gordon, "very loosely affiliated
with the campaign and had really no roles
or responsibilities." 71 ’ The Committee
assesses that Page played no major role In
the campaign, and had no meaningful
access to senior leadership.
(U) Page did not attend the March 31,
2016, NSAC meeting with then-candidate
Trump, and has never met him. 77 Although
members of the NSAC occasionally gathered
for meals in the Washington, D.C. area, they
never again met as a group with candidate
Trump. 78 Kushner provided a blunt
assessment of the role, or lack thereof,
played by the individuals on the initial list of
publicly-announced foreign policy advisors:
"PI he amount of interaction they had with
the actual campaign or influence they had
on anything that happened in the campaign
was virtually nonexistent." 70 Gordon
testified to the Committee that he agreed
with the assertion that the NSAC was
minimally influential in the context of the
broader campaign. 110
(U) Finding #28: The change in the
Republican Party platform regarding
Ukraine resulted in a stronger position
against Russia, not a weaker one, and
there is no evidence that Paul Manafort
was involved.
(U) It has been widely reported that the
2016 Republican Party platform was
weakened with respect to Ukraine, perhaps
as a favor to Russia or some other nefarious
reason. After reviewing the Republican
Party platform amendment process,
Interviewing those involved, and reviewing
document productions, the Committee
determined that the original plank was
strengthened, rather than weakened—and
there is no evidence that language
advocating for the provisions of "lethal
defensive weapons" was improperly
removed.
(U) On July 11,2016, the Republican
National Committee Platform Committee
met to discuss and debate amendments to
the platform. As drafted, the platform
referenced "a resurgent Russia occupying
parts of Ukraine," but included no language
about support to Kiev {see inset).
' _ 1_. 7~ J of Texas, a member of the National
Security/Military Platform Subcommittee,
offered an amendment that would "support
WOPEHTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF KGPRESENTATIVnS
maintaining {and, if warranted, increasing}
sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's
sovereignry and territory integrity are fully
restored/' 31 ^^proposed
amendment further called on the United
States to provide lethal defensive weapons
to Ukraine's armed forces and greater
coordination with NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] on defense
planning/'* 2
| UNCLASSIFIED |
Original RNC Plank
(U) in the international arena, weakness invites
aggression, me resets of the [Obama* Administra¬
tion's unilateral approach to disarmament are
alreecy dear: An emboldened China in the South !
Chins See, a resurgent Russia occupying parts of j
Ukraine and threatening neighbors from the Baltic j
to the Caucasus, an aggressive Islamist terrorist j
I network in Middle Easu All our adversaries heard J
i the message In the [Obama] Administration's cut¬
backs: America is weaker and retreating.
' UNCLASSIFIED
(U] Much of amendment was
adopted, but—following debate among the
delegates—the final version called for the
United States to provide "appropriate
assistance" rather than "tethai defensive
weapons." 83 The Committee assesses that
"appropriate assistance" provided flexibility,
and could encompass lethal defensive
weapons as well as humanitarian aid,
medical supplies, and meals-ready-to eat.
in any event, even without the words
"lethal defensive weapons," the final draft
of the platform "was tougher against
Russia" than the original after incorporating
ail but three words c
amendment. 8 "*
UNCLASSIFIED
Final RNC Plank
(U) Wd support maintaining and, ff warranted,
increasing sanctiors, together with our aflies,
against Russia unlass and until Ukraine's sover¬
eignty and territorial integrity are fuHy restored.
We also support providing appropriate ^ssis^anco
to the armed forces Ukraine and greater coordi¬
nation with NATO defense planning.
UNCLASSIFIED
i
(li) The Committee also investigated
what role, if any, Paul Manafort played in
the Trump campaign's response to
Denman's amendment. Manafort, a
veteran of numerous Republican
campaigns. 83 had long represented the
government of Ukraine, the pro-Russian
former president of Ukraine Viktor
Yanukovich, and Yanukovich's Party of
Regions. 8 ® In late March 2016, candidate
Trump hired Mana fort to-lead "delegate-
corralling efforts at the Republican National
Convention."* 7 Then-campaign manager
testified that, when
Manafort was hired, no
attempt to vet him and was entirely
unaware of Mana fort's past work in
Ukraine. 6 ® In May 2016, Manafort was
promoted to campaign chairman and, after
*
fired the next month,
"evolvefdj" into the role of de facto
campaign manager. 8 '
(U) Manafort left the campaign in
August 2016 following news reports that he
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEMTATTvES
had received $12,7 million In secret
payments for his work on behalf of
Yanukovich's Party of Regions; news
reporting also alleged that Manafort and his
aide Rick Gates had "directly orchestrated a
covert Washington lobbying operation" on
behalf of the party—while failing to register
as foreign agents. 50 Campaign press
secretary Hope Hicks recalled that, after
receiving press inquiries about Manafort's
"professional history," a major story broke
on the evening of August 14, 2016. 03
According to Hicks, 'Trump had made a
decision to make a change in leadership on
the campaign outside of Paul's issues that
were being publicly reported," but those
issues "certainly contributed to expediting
and intensifying the way in which his role
changed, and then ultimately he was fired
at the end of that week." lV Trump directed
his son-in-law Jared Kushner to ensure
Manafort departed the campaign on August
19, which he did.'** As Kushner put it, "|tl
here was a tot of news that was out there,
and the decision was that it was time for
UNCLASSIFIED
PAUL MANAFORT RESIGNS
FROM TRUMP CAMPAIGN
U* itffi.i'l- t.k ■!*■/ t'*-- |-H* J. 4 tilu t*
\f It
Cruiser
UNCLASSIFIED
him to resign." 0 ' 5
-.it
(U) Given Manafort's past work m
1 ‘ l 'I '*i v f| 1 J i
Ukraine, If the Ukraine plank change was
made as a favor to the Russian government,
it seems likely that then-campaign chairman
Manafort would have known about it-
However, campaign records produced to
the Committee show that Manafort had no
role in, or contemporaneous knowledge of,
the platform change. On July 30, 2016,
Manafort sent an emaii, copying Gates, to
Rick Dearborn, then a senior campaign
policy official and Sessions' chief of staff: "l
gather that there was a change In the
platform that removed arming Ukraine. I
don't know anything about this change.
Who pushed for it and why was It clone
(U} in response, Dearborn generated a
memorandum, dated August i, 2016,
outlining a detailed sequence of events that
ftC
occurred between July 10 and 12, 2016.
As part of that memo, J.D. Gordon created a
timeline that noted candidate Trump's
policy statements—including at a March 31,
2016. national security meeting—served as
the basis for the modification of Denman's
amendment, Gordon's timeline made it
dear that the change was initiated by
campaign staffers at the convention—not
by Manafort or senior officials. Although
Page expressed support after the feet, the
Committee did not find any evidence that
he actively participated in the modification
of Denman's "red line amendment
providing lethal assistance to Ukraine.'"*
PUBLICATION OF STOLEN EMAILS
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTftTtVFS
(U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that
Trump associates were involved in the
theft or publication of Clinton campaign-
related emails, although Trump associates
had numerous ill-advised contacts with
WikiLeaks.
(U) There is no evidence that Trump or
anyone associated with him played a role in
the hacking of emails from the DNC and
Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta,
among other entities and individuals,
detailed in Chapter 2. As also discussed in
Chapter 2, the Committee concurs with the
IC's assessment that WikiLeaks was one of
the vehicles for the public dissemination of
emails stolen by Russians. As noted in
Chapter 3. on October 7,2016, the
Department of Homeland Security and
Office of the Director of National
Intelligence released a public statement
that "[t]he U.S. Intelligence Community is
confident that the Russian Government
directed the recent compromises of e-mails
from US persons and institutions, including
US political organizations."" The statement
also specifically tied WikiLeaks to the
Russian*directed disclosures.
(U) Trump campaign communications
made ampie use of the publicly available
emails, which were reported by virtually ali
major media outlets. Regarding WikiLeaks,
Trump Jr. testified that "[alt the time, 1
looked at them as essentially a media
outlet" and an "opportunistic organization"
that would have also put out negative
information on Trump if it had it. 100 For
Senator Sessions, reference to WikiLeaks
material in campaign statements was the
m
product of deliberation: "And so, 1
remember making a decision that it [a trove
of hacked emails] was in the public domain,
and it would be silly not to use it. So I used
it although I could understand somebody
eise not wanting to For campaign press
secretary Hope Hicks, use of emails
published by WikiLeaks was uncontroversial
because such information was available in
the public domain. 101
UNCLASSIFIED
WIKILEAKS RELEASES CLINTON EMAILS
^ WikiLsak? Jt 4 .11*4 **I|M iClli*
'► ,W- W'—-
PM'
-■*- *■ T - —- >- - * Mm • i"v c* - f ■ *■ -r 1 ( ^ ■ -
U._~* V **■
UNCLASSIFIED
(U)Similarly, candidate Trump stated at
a rally on October 10,2016—three days
after the release of Podesta's emails began
and the 1C pubiiciy tied WikiLeaks'
dissemination to "Russia's senior-most
officials"—that "I love WikiLeaks. ,JlB Trump
had earlier encouraged the Russians to "find
the 30,000 emails that are missing" from
Hillary Clinton's private server. 10 ' (These
emails, which were the frequent subject of
campaign talking points, should not be
TOP SECRET/
l/NO FOR
PROPERTY OF THE If.S, HOUSE CP REPRESENTATIVES
top sccnny
/jv
worop.p
conflated with the DNC emails. The
Committee did not receive evidence that the
emails from Clinton's private server were
stolen by the Russians—or anyone else.)" 1 '
(U) Particularly in light of candidate
Trump's expressed enthusiasm for WikiLeaks,
the Committee examined the relationship
between his associates and the stolen emails.
The Committee did not find any evidence that
Trump associates were involved in the
publication of emails by WikiLeaks and other
outlets—or had access to such emails or other
stolen information prior to their becoming
publicly available. 106
(U) The Committee did find that multiple
Trump associates went beyond mere praise
and established linos of communication with
WikiLeaks during the campaign. Such contacts
were imprudent in light of WikiLeaks' role in
disseminating stolen emails in line with
Russian interests—and CIA Director Mike
Pompeo's post-election characterization of
WikiLeaks as a hostile non-state intelligence
service that "overwhelmingly focuses on the
United States, while seeking support from anti
-democratic countries and organizations" such
as the Russian military intelligence service
(GRU). 107
(U) George Papadopoulos: Foreign policy
advisor Papadopoulos was told by Russian-
linked academic Joseph Mifsud in April 2016
that the Russians had "dirt" on Clinton in the
form of "emails of Clinton." 1 ' 5 * However, the
Committee found no evidence that
Papadopoulos obtained these emails or that
the Trump campaign had a role in facilitating
the Russian government’s dissemination of
stolen data. Nor did any witness shed light on
the provenance of the emails, or clarify that
Mifsud was referring to emails actually stolen
by the Russians (as opposed to, for example,
emails missing from Clinton's private server.)
The Committee also found no evidence that
Papadopoulos told anyone affiliated with the
Trump campaign about Mifsud's claims that
the Russians had "dirt" on candidate Clinton.
(U) Michael Flynn: On July 15, 2016,
retired Lieutenant General and Trump
national security advisor Michael Flynn
forwarded an email to communications
advisorH^^min an attempt to connect
a friend from the military with the campaign's
social media operation. Flynn included the
following editorial comment: "There are a
number of things happening (and will happen)
this election via cyber operations (by both
hacktivists, nation-states and the DNC)." 103
This statement does not necessarily indicate
non-pubiic knowledge, and could have instead
reflected commentary on then-current public
events—including the mid-June attribution of
the DNC hack to Russia by the security firm
CrowdStrike, and the subsequent claim of
credit by the then-unknown persona "Guccifer
2.0." (See Chapter 2.)
(U) Donald Trump Jr.: During the course
of the Committee's interview with Trump Jr., a
news report from CNN appeared online
claiming he was given a pre-release
notification of a WikiLeaks release of Podesta
emails. 110 The article appeared at 1:01 p.m.,
while Trump Jr. was still being interviewed by
the Committee behind closed doors, which
concluded at 5:51 p.m. 111 CNN's Initial report
i
I
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
I
72
claimed Trump Jr. received an email on
September 4, 2016, alerting him to an
upcoming release of hacked emails.
(U) The email in question was from an
individual named who
sent a lengthy email to a number of
individuals associated with the Trump
Organization, including Trump Jr., providing
access to hacked DNC emails. 112 The email
was actually dated September 14, 2016, the
day after WikiLeaks published a tranche of
Podesta emails, and thus did not
substantiate allegations of prior knowledge
of the release. 113 CNN subsequently issued
a correction, noting the error. 114
(U) When asked about the email by the
Committee, Trump Jr. testified that he did
not have any recollection of the email,
stating that he "get[s] stuff from people that
-you know, people put my email address
online every few months, and I get a bunch
of people that do the same thing and then
they start bombarding you with stuff." 115
Trump Jr. went further to state that while
he may have met a at
some point in time, he was not sure of the
identity of this individual. 116
(U) At the outset. Trump Jr. told the
Committee that, although he was not aware
of any coordination "between the Trump
campaign and WikiLeaks to disseminate
information acquired from the Podesta
email or the DNC server," 117 he did
exchange Twitter direct messages with
WikiLeaks beginning on September 20,
2016, and October 3, 2016. 118 WikiLeaks
initiated both exchanges . 119 Trump Jr.
testified that he was not aware of the
reasons why WikiLeaks decided to reach out
to him directly, but hypothesized that such
direct messaging was likely due to the fact
that he "was retweeting a bunch of their
stuff..." and that he has "a relatively
formidable social media platform." 120
(U) In the first exchange, on September
20, 2016, WikiLeaks sent a direct message
to Trump Jr. to alert him to a "PAC run anti-
Trump site" that was about to launch.
WikiLeaks "guessed the password" and sent
it to Trump Jr. and asked for comments. 121
Trump Jr. responded the next day, "[o]ff the
record I don't know who that is but I'll ask
around." 122 Trump Jr. subsequently logged
into the site using the WikiLeaks-supplied
password, which had also been made
publicly available. 123
(U) Following that exchange. Trump Jr.
emailed some Trump campaign officials, to
include Kellyanne Conway, Steve Bannon,
and Jared Kushner to advise them of the
contact and seek their advice. 124 In a follow
-up email, Trump Jr. noted the WikiLeaks
message intimated "some connection we
[the Trump campaign] should be aware
of." 125 The Committee did not receive any
documents or information that reflected a
response to Trump Jr.'s email, although
Hope Hicks recalled that—after being
forwarded the email by Kushner—she
"might have expressed concern to
somebody about putting passwords in
unknown websites, just as a general
practice, not specific to WikiLeaks." 126
(U) On October 3, WikiLeaks passed
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
73
along a story reporting Clinton's comments
about Julian Assange and noted "[i]t'd be
great if you guys could comment on/push
this story." 12 ' Trump Jr, responded about
90 minutes later; "Already did that earlier
today, It's amazing what she can get away
with!’ 1 Trump Jr, then wrote: "What's
behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading
about?" 1 ' ' Trump Jr. was seeking
Information on what was purported to be,
another future leak of Podesta-related
emails." 3 There was no response.
{U} After October 3, 2016, Trump Jr.
received numerous messages from
WikiLeaks that:
♦ suggest a website link to use if the
campaign refers to WikiLeaks In a
tweet and suggests having
supporters search through the
leaked Podesta emails, noting
WikiLeaks "just released" "Part A" of
those emails; 1 * 1
• seek then-candidate Trump's tax
returns and suggests leaking them to
"improve the perception of
(WikiLeaks'] impartiality"; 1 *'’
♦ suggest challenging the results
should Trump lose the election; 1 "'
• describe an election-night message
of "[w]ow" and noting Obama
administration wit! delete records as
they leave; 1 *' 1
■ suggest the President-elect push
Australia to make Julian Assange
that country's ambassador to the
United States; 13 *
* forward what appears to be a video
with the caption "Fake News"; 13 '' and
* on the date the news of the June 9,
2016, Trump Tower meeting broke,
seek copies of Trump Jr.'s emails.'
With respect to the latter, Trump Jr.
published those emails himself on
his Twitter account.
(U) Trump Jr. testified that he did not
reply to any of these messages, nor did he
have any communications with WikiLeaks
before September 20 or after October 3,
2016. 113 He testified that the direct
message exchanges discussed above "is a
complete record of any communications
[he] had with WikiLeaks." 139
(U) Cambridge Analytical In addition to
Trump Jr.'s communications with WikiLeaks,
Cambridge Analytica, a British firm the
Trump campaign used for data analytics,
reached out to Julian Assange in an effort to
confirm whether WikiLeaks possessed the
"missing" emails deleted from Clinton's
private server. 1,1,1 That contact occurred in
approximately June 2016 , l “ l between an
employee of Cambridge Analytica and the
speaker's bureau (a separate third party)
representing Assange.' 42 WikiLeaks replied
through the bureau that "they did not wish
to take a telephone call or otherwise
engage with us [Cambridge Analytica]."'"'
{U} i rump campaign digital director
testified that he did not
participate in, nor was he aware of,
Cambridge Analytica's attempted outreach
to Assange. 14, ‘ The Chief Executive Officer
PROPERTY OF THE U S II OUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(CEO) of Cambridge Analytics confirmed in
his testimony that he "did not share this
with anyone on the Trump campaign." 1 " 5 In
fact, the CEO testified that the outreach
occurred before the company was even
retained by the Trump campaign.’' 4S
(U) Roger Stone: Roger Stone has had a
series of business relationships with Donald
Trump dating back to at least 1981, and
served as a paid campaign advisor for
several months in 2015. 147 During
testimony to the Committee, Stone
addressed three public statements
suggesting he might have important
information about, and potentially advance
knowledge of, disclosures during the 2016
campaign: (1) an August 2016 Twitter
message regarding Clinton campaign
chairman John Podesta, (2) an August 2016
public speech about purported contacts
with Julian Assange, and (3) the March 2017
acknowledgement of pre-election direct
communications with Guccifer 2.0.
(U) Stone denied that he "knew in
advance about and predicted the hacking
of... Podesta's email," notwithstanding his
cryptic statement in an August 21, 2016,
Twitter message—"Trust me, it will soon be
Podesta's time in the barrel"—that
predated by several weeks the initial public
release of Podesta's hacked emails. us
Stone noted that his Tweet "makes no
mention whatsoever of Mr. Podesta's
email." 1 " 3 Furthermore, it was posted "at a
time that my boyhood friend and colleague,
Paul Manafort, had just resigned from the
Trump campaign over allegations regarding
his business activities in Ukraine. I thought
it manifestly unfair that John Podesta not be
held to the same standard" regarding his
alleged business activities. 1 ' 0 In October
2017, John Podesta's brother Tony resigned
from the lobbying firm the brothers co¬
founded amid revelations about the
Podesta Group's role in pro-Ukraine
lobbying efforts that also involved Manafort
and his associate Rick Gates.""
(U) Stone also addressed his August
2016 public statement that "I've actually
communicated with Julian Assange. I
believe the next tranche of his documents
pertain to the Clinton Foundation, but
there's no telling what the October surprise
may be." 152 In his testimony to the
Committee, Stone sought to "clarify that by
saying the communication I refer to is
through a journalist who I ask [sicl to
confirm wh3t Assange has tweeted, himself,
on July 21st, that he has the Clinton emails
and that he will publish them." 153 He
subsequently identified the intermediary,
but denied any access to non-public
information. 154 Stone further disputed,
under oath, that he "had advance
knowledge of the source or actual content
of the WikiLeaks disclosures." 155
(U) In his testimony, Stone described a
series of direct messages exchanged with
Guccifer 2.0 in August and September
2016—which he first publicly disclosed in
March 2017—as "innocuous," and denied
taking action in response to Guccifer 2.0's
messages. 1 "'’ He subsequently provided
additional messages with WikiLeaks
ref*
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATTvES
TOMKonny
extending from October 2016 to August
2017. 157
(U) Despite these multiple contacts, the
Committee did not find any evidence
contradicting Stone's claim that "(a)ny
information ... disseminated via social
media regarding the timing of the release of
the DNC data or others was from publicly
available sources" and "he in no way
conspired, colluded, or coordinated with
any agent of the Russian state." 153
MEETINGS WITH RUSSIANS
(U) The Committee examined meetings
between Trump campaign associates and
Russians, to include both official and
unofficial representatives. The Russians
found willing interlocutors in foreign policy
advisors|^Bancl Papadopoulos. These
advisors, however, were peripheral figures,
and neither was in a position to influence
Trump or his campaign. The Russians
engaged Trump associates via official
channels and—more notably—used
apparent cut-outs and intermediaries to
make contact with senior officials.
However, questionable contacts like the
Trump Tower meeting resulted in collusion,
conspiracy, or coordination with the Russian
government.
(U) Finding #30:^m[|m did not travel
to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the
Trump campaign, but the Committee is
concerned about his seemingly incomplete
accounts of his activity in Moscow.
(U) ^^^traveled to Moscow in early
July 2016 to deliver a commencement
speech at the New Economic School—the
first American to do so since thon-President
Barack Obama in 2009. At the time,
served as a foreign policy advisor for the
Trump campaign. The Trump campaign
made it clear to that the trip was not
on behalf of the Trump campaign, a point
acknowledged in his testimony to the
Committee. 1S? J.D. Gordon, the NSAC
director, strongly advised against the trip,
calling it "a bad idea." 160 However, Trump
campaign manager
authorized |Bto make the trip "out side
of (his) role with the DJT (Donald J. Trump)
for President campaign," 161
mentioned the upcoming trip to Sessions at
one of the occasional NSAC meals, 16,1
although Sessions did not recall the
interaction. 1<B
(U) On July 9, 201G, while in Russia,
m sent an "executive summary" of
"Feedback From Russia" that stated in part
"Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES
[New Economic School) Board Member
Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the
event. In a private conversation,
Dvorkovich expressed strong support for
Mr. Trump and a desire to work together
toward devising better solutions in response
to the vast range of current international
problems. Based on feedback from a
diverse array of other sources close to the
Russian Presidential Administration, it was
readily apparent that this sentiment is
widely held at all levels of government.” 16/1
i ^^Padmlltecf to briefly greeting
Dvorkovich before or after one of their
76
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
speeches, but minimized the interaction in
testimony before the Committee. 1115
(U) Ultimately, K failed to dearly
explain whom he meant when he referred
to sources dose to Russian government in
his executive summary. He denied having
any private meetings with any senior
Russian officials during his July 2016 trip,
and stated that he mostly met with
"scholars." 16 * The Steele dossier, a
document compiled by former British
intelligence officer Christopher Steele,
alleges that while in Moscow in July 2016,
Page secretly met with Igor Sechin, CEO of
Russian state oil company Rosneft, and Igor
Diveykin, a senior Russian intelligence
official.* 07 Further, the Steele dossier claims
that Sechin offered Page a brokerage fee in
connection with the sale of 19 percent of
Rosneft in exchange for the lifting of
sanctions. 1 * 5
UNCLASSIFIED
CHRISTOPHER STEELE, THE MAN
BEHIND THE TRUMP DOSSIER
UNCLASSIFIED
(UJ Since the allegation of meeting with
Sechin and Diveykin was first widely
reported in September 2016, H has
repeatedly and consistently denied meeting
either Sechin or Diveykin, including under
tje
oath in testimony to the Committees The
Committee has no information that
confirms the Steele dossier's assertions
regarding the purported meetings in
Moscow, much less an offer by Sechin to
f° r sucJl 3 r0 *- * n 3 Potentially lucrative
transaction. After returning from Moscow,
3 "leave of absence'' from the
Trump campaign, and played no role in the
170
transition or administration.
{U) Finding #31: George Papadopoulos 1
attempts to leverage his Russian contacts
to facilitate meetings between the Trump
campaign and Russians was unsuccessful.
{U} Papadopoulos made minor
contributions totheTrump campaign as s
foreign policy advisor. He briefly served as a
Trump campaign surrogate, a roie cut short
in May 2016 when he publicly insulted UK
Prime Minister David Cameron.’ 71 He also—
in an apparent effort to increase his
standing within the Trump campaign—tried
to insert himself into any’number of
international engagements. As described
below, his particular focus was trying to
broker meetings with foreign officials, but
he often acted on his own without the
official backing of the Trump campaign.
(U) On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos
sent an email to several members of the
policy team pitching a "[mleeting with
Russian leadership—including Putin''—and
also volunteered to travel to meet the "next
prime minister of Vietnam" alongside
rvlifsud (whom he had first met just ten days
PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
r arerc T /
before but nonetheless described as a
"good friend of mine"). 1 ''' Campaign co¬
chair and chief policy advisorlBIHH
responded that "we probably should not go
forward with any meetings with the
Russians until we have had occasion to sit
with our NATO allies, especially France,
Germany and Great Britain." 1 ' 1 In the same
exchange, Papadopoulos then immediately
switched gears, indicating that "[i)f we need
any assistance with setting up meetings
here in London or Paris, I have some good
contacts that can open doors immediately
to the leadership." 174
(U] During the NSAC meeting with
Trump on March 31, 2016—the only time
Papadopoulos is known to have engaged
directly with the candidate—Senator
Sessions told the team that they were not
authorized to speak for the campaign. 17S In
his words "[t]hls committee was not... a
group of people authorized to speak for
[candidate) Trump, and they absolutely
weren't authorized to go around the world
pretending to represent him." 170 That
sentiment was, according to Sessions, "a
good statement to make quite clear." 177
(U) When Papadopoulos offered that he
could engage, and possibly travel to, Russia
on behalf of the campaign, his suggestion
was swiftly rebuffed by Sessions, who
testified that "I felt like—and I'm the
chairman of this group—I should not do
anything that indicated to Mr.
Papadopoulos that he was authorized to go
to Russia or anyplace else to represent the
Trump campaign and do some sort of
negotiations. So I pushed back pretty
sharply on that." 178 Sessions' account of his
response has been corroborated by another
attendee,^^^^|B- aIso
attended and similarly recalled that when
Papadopoulos raised the issue of obtaining
contacts with the Russian government on
behalf of the campaign, Senator Sessions
interrupted and began "talking about the
Logan Act," which criminalizes unauthorized
negotiations with foreign governments. 1 *’
(U) Although the Committee has no
information to indicate that Papadopoulos
was successful in setting up any meetings
between the Trump campaign and the
Russian government, he worked with
campaign chief executive Steve Bannon to
broker a September 2016 meeting between
candidate Trump and Egyptian president
Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. 1E1 Trump was
apparently pleased with the meeting, which
he described in an interview as "very
productive," describing el-Sisi as "a fantastic
guy." 382
(U) While on a trip to Athens, Greece in
May 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to
Manafort stating that he expected to soon
receive "an official invitation for Mr. Trump
to visit Greece sometime this summer
should his schedule allow." 180 In the same
email to Manafort, Papadopoulos also
forwarded a meeting Invitation from Ivan
Timofeev, Director or Programs for the
9
Russian International Affairs Council, and
claimed that "Russia has been eager to
meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and
have been reaching out to me to discuss. I
i/
i3?5T
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
78
thought it would be prudent to send to
you.
it
'M
(U) As of May 2016, Manafort had not
yet been elevated to campaign chairman,
but had a long track record of work abroad.
Manafort forwarded Papadopoulos' email
to his business and campaign deputy
m noting that "[w]e need someone to
communicate that D[onald] T[rump] is not
doing these trips " 15S Manafort and^^
3greed to assign a response of a "general
Setter” to "our correspondence
coordinator" the person responsible for
responding to all mail of non¬
importance.
{U) In June 2016, Papadopoulos sought
a paid position and reimbursement for
expenses from ~ a Sess < ons
aide, who along with ran
the Trump campaign's D.C. policy shop—for
an upcoming trip "to DC for a high level
meeting [with] the director of the Israel
National Security Council" and past trips to
"the UK, Israel and Greece over the past
month engaging in some senior level
meetings... ” 1S7 m^forwarded the
message to Gordon
Mashburn then replied as follows: "He cost
us a lot more in having to deal with what he
said about [then-UK prime minister David]
Cameron 2 months ago... he got no
approval for the travel and did it on his own
initiative .... Let him eat the cost and
maybe he will learn to play nice with the
team, not go off on his own.
would never have approved
his going Off on world travels at campaign
expense without asking permission first."
iss
mam re p ,iea t°
word: "agreed."^
with one
(U) |^mresponded to
Papadopoulos that he could take the
meeting, but he "should do that as a private
citizen." 1 *' Making the point explicit,
m wrote: "You're not authorized to
meet with him by [sic] the campaign, nor
can you reflect the views of the campaign
on security issues in that meeting." 13 '
{U} Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared
Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a
June 9,2016, meeting at Trump Tower
where they expected to receive—but did
not ultimately obtain—derogatory
information on candidate Clinton from
Russian sources.
(U) In July 2017, the Committee became
aware of a June 9,2016, meeting in Trump
Tower, which became a key focus of the
investigation. The Committee's findings
were informed by interviews with six of the
eight participants in the meeting.
(U) Although they did not attend the
meeting, the Agalarovs were the driving
force to arrange it As previously noted, the
Agaiarovs and Goldstone hod gotten to
know businessman Donald Trump when the
Agalarovs worked with Trump to host the
Miss Universe pageant at the Agalarovs'
building, the Crocus City Hall, in Moscow in
2013. 132 The Agalarovs also had discussions
with Donald Trump in 2013 to facilitate the
possible development of a Trump Tower in
Moscow. 1 * 3 The 2013 Miss Universe
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
73
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MEETING AT TRUMP TOWER
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UNCLASSIFIED
pageant formed the basis of a casual
friendship between the Trumps and the
Agalarovs.™ Trump appeared in one of
Emin Agalarovs's music videos with the
2013 pageant winner, 1 Si and Trump
maintained a friendly correspondence with
Aras Agalarov— including during the busy
2016 campaign. 196
(U) Events, leading to the meeting were
set in motion by a June 3, 2016, email from
Goldston® to Trump Jr v stating: "Emin just
called and asked me to contact you with
something very interesting. The Crown
prosecutor of Russia (possibly referring to
Hussion Prosecutor General Vuri Chaika]
met with his father Aras this morning and in
their meeting offered to provide the Trump
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
campaign with some official documents and
information that would incriminate Hillary
and her dealings with Russia and would be
very useful to your fatner. This is obviously
very high level and sensitive information but
is part of Russia and its government's
support for Mr. Trump - helped along by
41 P ^
Arasand Emin.""' Trump Jr. replied to
Goldsione's June 3 request by indicating "if
it's what you say i love it especially in the
summer." 163
(U) This exchange indicates that Trump
Jr. was open to discussing derogatory,
information from Russian government
sources that could be useful to candidate
Trump. Goldstone proposed to deliver
information concerning Hillary Clinton via a
Russian government attorney. 195 Trump Jr.
indicated that he had invited Kushner and
Manafort," underscoring his belief in the
importance of the information^^
with connections to the
Agalarov family, was one of the individuals
who attended the June 9 meeting at Trump
Tower. The Committee discovered that the
participants of the June 9 meeting did not
all have the same understanding as to the
reasons for the meeting, with
testifying that he thought it was odd that all
three senior Trump campaign officials would
be taking a meeting on the Magnitsky Act, a
U.S. human rights law that imposes certain
sanctions on Russian interests. Accordingly,
called a close
associate of Emin Agalarov based in the
United States, to inquire about the purpose
of the meeting. explained that
he believed the scheduled meeting at
Trump Tower was about providing negative
information on candidate Clinton to the
Trump campaign. 201
(U) Based on Trump Jr.'s testimony and
the documentary evidence received by the
Committee, there is no evidence to support
that there were any prior communications
between the Trump campaign and the other
attendees: Russian lawyer
Natalis Veselnitskaya; Russian-American
lobbyist and former Soviet intelligence
officer or Russian-
American who served
as a Russian interpreter. Furthermore, the
Committee found no evidence that Trump
Jr. knew the identities of these individuals
before the meeting, 2 ^ 2 or that he discussed
it with candidate Trump beforehand. 2 "
(U)The Committee interviewed all
attendees other than Manafort, due to the
Special Counsel's ongoing investigation, and
Veselnitskaya, who is a Russian national
located overseas without a valid visa to
enter the United States. Despite the pretext
for the meeting, every person with direct
knowledge of what occurred confirmed that
there was no mention of derogatory or
incriminating information directly relating to
Hillary Clinton during the June 9 meeting.
Goldstone testified that he had no evidence
that the Russian government supported or
favored Donald Trump, and admitted to
embellishing the contents of the email
solely for the purpose of gaining a response
from Trump Jr., namely by using inaccurate
rtTFoECKCJ
PROPERTY Or TrlE U.S. MOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
81
T0P3l!Cft[!T/
/w oroRW
information. 204
(U) Veselnitskaya, Samochornov,
Kaveladze, and Akhmetshin mot for lunch
before the Trump Tower meeting. 205 During
lunch, there was a discussion regarding the
Trump Tower meeting. Veselnitskaya
shared an approximately lOpage document
in Russian to provide the lunch attendees
with a synopsis of what would be discussed
at the meeting, a summary that contained
much of the same information as a similar
document reportedly shared with Russian
prosecutor general Yuri Chaika. 200 Based on
this discussion, the lunch attendees
believed the Trump Tower meeting was
about the Magnitsky Act. 207 The lunch
attendees then met Goldstone at Trump
Tower shortly before the meeting. 208 They
proceeded to the 25th Floor where they
met Trump Jr., and he led the group to a
conference room. 203
(U) The June 9 meeting lasted as little
as 20 minutes/ 10 Kaveladze testified that
he believed Trump Jr. started the meeting
and then turned it over to Veselnitskaya. 21 '
Interviewed meeting attendees agreed that
Veselnitskaya presented information
concerning the Magnitsky Act and the Ziff
Brothers, including their alleged role in
evading taxes in Russia and political
contributions to the DNC and/or Clinton
campaign/' 2 Several attendees also
recalled discussion of Russian adoptions,
which the Russian government suspended
in retaliation for the Magnitsky Act. 213
(U) Goldstone further testified that
Kushner, Manafort, and Trump Jr. seemed
visibly uninterested in the Magnitsky Act
briefing provided by Veselnitskaya. 21 ' 1
4
Manafort, according to Goldstone, "never
looked up from his cell phone from the
t
moment we began the meeting until the
moment we ended." 215 Manafort and
Kushner complained to one another via text
message during the meeting that the
meeting was a "waste of time." 210 Kushner
asked his assistants to call and give him and
excuse to leave, which one of them did
shortly after the text. 217 At the end of the
meeting, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr.
for the "bait-and-switch talk about
something which we knew nothing about,
which was, again, Russian adoption and the
Magnitsky Act." 218
(U) Kaveladze testified that he received
two calls from Aras Agalarov after the
meeting. During the second call, Kaveladze
explained that the meeting was a "complete
loss of time and about nothing," 210 Aras
Agalarov and Kaveladze did not discuss the
"dirt" on Hillary Clinton/ 20 Kaveladze also
sent an email to his daughter after the
meeting indicating that the "meeting was
boring. The Russians did not have any bad
info [ojn Hillary" 221 —a reference back to his
conversation with Beniaminov, which he
had apparently relayed to his daughter. The
Committee received no testimony or
documentary evidence indicating that the
purpose of the meeting was to discuss
WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, the hacking of
DNC servers, and/or the John Podesta
emails / 22
(U) No witness, including the attendees.
?
wr
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
82
testified that candidate Trump was aware of
ine meeting prior to its public exposure in
June 2017. Steve Bannon, who had been
previously quoted as saying '[t]he chances
that Don Jr. did not walk [the meeting
participants] up to his father's office is
zero," conceded under oath that he had no
evidence to support that claim.' 1 " The
Committee also investigated a public
statement made by candidate Trump during
a speech after the final Republican primary
contests on June 7, 2016, the same day as
Trump Jr. exchanged emails with Goldstone
regarding meeting attendees and
logistics. 2 * 4 According to campaign press
secretary Hope Hicks, Trump's publicly
stated intent "to give a major speech ...
next week.., discussing all of the things
that have taken place with the Clintons" did
not reflect knowledge about the upcoming
meeting; instead, it referred to a planned
speech "that was an outline of the book
Clinton Cash," and was ultimately delivered
approximately two weeks later after being
delayed by a domestic terrorist attack/ 23
(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly
met with a Russian government official at
the 2016 National Rifle Association annual
meeting, but the Committee found no
evidence that the two discussed the U.S.
presidential election.
{U} In the weeks leading up to the
National Rifle Association's (NRA) 2016
annual meeting, there were a series of
♦
emails sent to a member of the campaign
discussing Russian interest in the campaign
35 it related to the NRA meeting. Despite
the emails' rhetoric about setting up a 'back
channel" between the United 5tates and
Russian governments, the relevant
testimony obtained in the Committee's
interviews showed these email inquiries
resulted in a brief meeting between Trump
Jr. and a Russian government official that
centered on shooting and hunting. It did
not focus on the U.S. presidential election.
(U) From May 19-22,2016, the NRA held
its annual meeting and exhibits in Louisville,
Kentucky." 3 In an interview with the
Committee, Trump Jr, testified he received
an invitation from ''[vjaricus people at the
NRA" to attend the 2016 meeting/" In
addition to Trump Jr.'s invitation, there
were several emails sent to
seeking to establish a connection at the NRA
meeting between an emissary of the
Russian government and candidate Trump.
(U) In the first email, dated May 16,
2016, a business executive emailed
ith the possibility of candidate
Trump meeting with Alexander Torshin, the
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, the
country's central bank The email
mentions an "overture to Mr. Trump from
President Putin/"'' responds he
will be "[w}orking on this first thing in the
am.
«230
(U)m forwarded the email to
Manafort, Gates, and Kushner, noting the
"interesting request / ,2J1 ^m|email
highlighted the entrepreneur's request that
Torshin "meet with a high level official in
our campaign" during the NRA meeting to
discuss "3n offer he (Torshin] claims to be
iQP IL
*w«
=RCPERTY OF THE U.S. H0U3S OF REPRESENTATIVES
83
r e f^S CCKCT/
carrying from President Putin to meet with
DJT." in response to that email, Kushner
wrote: "Pass on this. A lot of people come
claiming to carry messages. Very few we
are able to verify. For now I think we
decline such meetings," as well as "[b]e
careful." 73 '' replied to the
executive seeking the meeting: "I've asked
about a mtg but we are not able to
accommodate it at that event in KY." 733
(U) In addition to the emails discussing
a possible meeting with Torshin, on May 10,
2016, who had previously
approachec^^mi about advising a
prospective Trump transition, 234 sent
an e| mail about meeting with
Russians at the NRA event. 735 The email
discusses
purported "back-
channel to President Putin's Kremlin," that
"Russia is quietly but actively seeking a
dialogue with the U.S. that isn't forthcoming
under the current administration," and.that
"the Kremlin believes that the only
possibility of a true re-set in this
relationship would be with a new
Republican White House." 736
(U) The email goes on to note that
"President Putin's emissary" will be at the
NRA convention and hopes to make contact
with candidate Trump and present Mrs.
Trump with a gift/ 32 The email discussed
Putin's desire to build a relationship with
candidate Trump, to include extending an
invitation to the Kremlin. The email also
askedto "talk through what has
transpired and Sen. Sessions' advice on how
to proceed." 2 ' 6 When asked about this
email in his Interview before the
Committee, Attorney General Sessions
testified he was not aware of this email. 239
testified that he may have met
monce, and did not remember
replying to his email. 7 ' 10
(U) Although the campaign declined to
hold a meeting, Trump Jr. was introduced to
t
Torshin, at the request of an acquaintance,
at a restaurant where they were dining
separately/ 41 During their brief
introduction, they spoke about "stuff as it
related to shooting and hunting ...
exchanged casual hellos" but did not
exchange contact information. 2 ' 12 In his
brief exchange with Torshin and a
subsequent exchange with Torshin's
assistant, Maria Batina, Trump Jr. testified
he did not recall any discussion of the
upcoming U.S. presidential election. 213 No
other witness provided a contrary
recollection to the Committee.
•*
(U) The Committee reviewed several
emails discussing a meeting with Russians at
the NRA meeting, an attempt to establish a
back channel of communication between
the U.S. and Russian governments, and a
*
possible meeting between candidate Trump
and President Putin. However, the
Committee found that all of those email
exchanges resulted in just one, brief
meeting between Mr. Torshin and the
candidate's son that did not include any
discussion related to the U.S. election/' 14
(U) Finding #34: The Committee found no
evidence that meetings between Trump
associates—including Jeff Sessions—and
84
official representatives of the Russian
government—including Ambassador
Kislyak—reflected collusion, coordination,
or conspiracy with the Russian
government.
(U) Meetings between U.S. senators
and foreign government officials are
considered a routine part of the job.
However, there have been multiple media
articles raising concerns about contacts with
former Russian Ambassador to the United
States Sergey Kislyak, particularly those
involving then-Senator Sessions.
(U) Mayflower Hotel Speech: In April
2016, Senator Sessions, an early endorser of
Trump and later a key figure during the
transition, attended a foreign policy speech
by Trump at the Mayflower Hotel in
Washington, D.C. 245 Kushner also attended
and recalled meeting 20 to 25 guests,
including Ambassador Kislyak for the first
time. Kushner stated that the
conversation between him and Ambassador
Kislyak mainly consisted of pleasantries, and
concluded with an offer for Kushner to visit
the Russian Embassy for lunch, which
Kushner never attended. 247
(U) Attorney General Sessions similarly
described a pre-speech reception of maybe
24 people; immediately following the
speech, he went to a media stakeout to
answer questions about the speech. 248
Attorney General Sessions recalled "no ...
discussions with the [Russian] Ambassador
or any other representative from the
Russian Government or their surrogate" at
the Mayflower. 249
(U) Republican National Convention: In
July 2016, then-Senator Sessions attended
the Republican National Convention in
Cleveland, Ohio. Because he used his
campaign funds to pay for his travel and
lodging while in Ohio, his schedule focused
primarily on his Senate campaign-related
events. 250 For the five days that Sessions
was in Cleveland, he attended numerous
Trump campaign-related events. 251
(U) Over 50 ambassadors to the United
States also attended a reception associated
with the 2016 Republican Convention. 252
Sessions addressed this group of
ambassadors, as the keynote speaker, at the
Heritage Foundation's Embassy Row
Ambassador's Buffett Lunch. 253 According
to Sessions, his interaction with
Ambassador Kislyak following that speech
was brief, unexpected, and occurred in the
presence of several other people. 254
255
(U) J.D. Gordon testified about briefly
encountering Kislyak twice at convention
events in July 2016, including a brief
conversation that occurred during a
networking event that was also attended by
|recalled seeing Gordon and
chatting casually with Kislyak at the same
event. 256 The Committee found no evidence
that these brief public interactions related
to the hacking of emails or collusion,
coordination, or conspiracy between the
Trump campaign and Russia.
(U) Senate Office Meeting: On
September 8, 2016, Senator Sessions met
worcri
w
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
85
T C P- 3 'ee ftg
e r oRr
Ambassador Kisiyak In his Senate office/' 1 * 2
As a Senator, such meetings In his Capitol
Hill office are common. Notes of the
meeting taken by Sessions' staff, and
provided to the Committee, verified that the
approximately 30-minute meeting was
official in nature and not related to any role
that Senator Sessions held with the Trump
-■} CQ
campaign/ - Sessions testified that the
conversation mainly revolved around
Ukraine, and the two “had a little testy
conversation" about Ukraine given Sessions'
support for the Ukrainian cause. 259 The
Committee's investigation did not uncover
anything improper about Senator Sessions'
meetings with the Russian ambassador.
Finding f/35: Possible Russian efforts to set
up a "back channel" with Trump associates
after the election suggest the absence of
collusion during the campaign, since the
communication associated with collusion
would have rendered such a "back
channel" unnecessary.
(U) The Committee investigated
meetings during the post-election transition
period between Trump associates and
Russians—with a focus on individuals who
may have been acting as unofficial
representatives of Moscow. In December
2016, Kushner met with the head of Russian
bank VEB, Sergei Gorkov, at the urging of
Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak, with
whom Kushner and Flynn had met earlier in
the month. 260 Kushner took the meeting
partly because he had been told Gorkov
could provide "insight into what Putin's
thoughts were on a potential new
relationship" between Russia and the
United States/ 1 ’ 1 Kushner testified that the
meeting primarily entailed Gorkov telling
Kushner about VEB, with which Kushner was
entirely unfamiliar, and "that was really the
extent of it." 262 Gorkov gave Kushner two
gifts, which Kushner registered with the
transition. 263
(U) In January 2017, businessman and
former Navy officer was
introduced through Emirati associates to
Russian investor Kirill Dmitriev in the
Seychelles/ 64 [|H had no official or
unofficial role In the transition, but had met
twice with Bannon at Trump Tower/ 65
HI testified that his meeting with
Dmitriev lasted 20-30 minutes and focused
on "trade matters," and "how the United
States and Russia should be working
together to defeat Islamic terrorism." 20 ''
stated that he and Dmitriev did not
discuss sanctions, the Russian government's
"desire to have a relationship with the
Trump administration," or "any channel of
communications between the United States
and Russia." 267 further stated that he
had had “no communications or dealings
with [Dmitriev] or any of his colleagues
before or after that encounter last
January." 263
(U)The Committee did not find
evidence that Kushner or||| did
anything inappropriate during or following
their meetings with Gorkov and Dmitriev,
To the extent that one or both meetings
reflected art unsuccessful attempt by
intermediaries of the Russian government
TOP Q £ C ftLT/ji
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
86
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to set up a "back channel" to the incoming
Trump administration that purpose was not
shared with or accepted by Kushner or
^K~and potentially reflected an
absence of such channels during the
campaign." 69 Kushner, who was connected
to Gorkov by Kislyak, asserted that "the fact
that we [we]re going through the normal
channels during the transition hopefully
serves to show that there were no existing
channels through the campaign." Similarly,
noted his meeting with Dmitriev
"didn't happen until... more than 2
months after the election. So if there was all
this collusion [before the election], why
would there even need to be any other
followup meetings?" 270
Clinton Campaign
(U) Using a series of intermediaries, the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and
Hillary for America (Clinton campaign) paid
a research firm to conduct opposition
research on candidate Trump and his ties
with Russia. As part of this effort, research
from numerous purported Russian sources
was obtained and provided to the Clinton
campaign, thereby constituting indirect, but
substantial, links "between Russia and
individuals associated with political
campaigns" relevant to the 2016 U.S.
election.
(U) Fusion GPS (Fusion) is the trade
name of a Washington, D.C.-based
company. Bean LLC, that conducts research
primarily on behalf of corporate clients . 271
According to longtime Wall Street Journal
reporter and Fusion co-founder§-_“3 'i
Fusion "specialize^] in finding
records and reading things and digesting
large volumes of information." 272 Fusion's
general practice is to "do engagements on a
30-day basis, and at the end of the 30 days
we write a report about what we found....
And if you think what we told you was
interesting and you want more, we can sign
up again." 273 Founded and led by former
journalists, 274 Fusion maintains relationships
with numerous reporters, and provides
information to news outlets on behalf of
clients that include law firms, media
organizations, and lobbying
organizations. 275
(U) As described below. Fusion was
who represented the DNC and the
Clinton campaign. Fusion was paid to
conduct opposition research on candidate
Trump. Fusion subsequently hired
Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor to
obtain information from sources purported
to be current and former Russian
government officials. The information
Steele collected was reported back to the
Clinton campaign via Fusion and|^H 276
(U) Finding ##36: Prior to conducting
opposition research targeting candidate
Trump's business dealings, Fusion GPS
conducted research benefitting Russian
interests.
(U) Prior to conducting opposition
research targeting candidate Trump's
TOP SZG
i\e
/FuOrOOiM
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
87
business dealings, Fusion conducted
research benefiliing Russian interests. 227
Specifically, in 2013, Fusion was retained by
a law firm to assist with representation of a
Russian defendant in a civil forfeiture case
arising out of alleged money laundering
activities uncovered by the late Sergei
Magnitsky (whose name was subsequently
given to the U.S. human rights law, the
Magnitsky Act)/ 73 |H^^|acknowledged
that the Kremlin’s interests in the case were
aligned with his client and against the U.S.
government.
(U) Russian lawyer Natalia
Veselnitskaya hired the law firm for which
Simpson was working, and that firm
retained the services of Russian-American
lobbyist Rinat Akhmetshin, both of whom
attended a meeting at Trump Tower on June
9, 2016, described in the first part of this
chapter. 280 During the litigation,
Veselnitskaya received, via the law Arm,
memoranda summarizing
research/ 81 Certain topics—including the
Ziff Brothers (a venture capital firm
specializing in capital investment)—were
the subject of both (1) memoranda
Veselnitskaya received and
(2) the presentation Veselnitskaya made to
Trump campaign officials. 282
acknowledged being with Veselnitskaya at a
court hearing in New York on the morning
of June 9, 2016, prior to her meeting at
Trump Tower. 263 He further recalled having
drinks and dinner with her and others,
including Akhmetshin, in Washington, D.C. a
day or two later. 2,4 However, he denied
discussing the Trump Tower meeting with
her before or after it occurred, and claimed
not to have learned about it until 2017. 281 '
(U) Finding «37: The
hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton
campaign and the Democratic National
Committee to research candidate Trump's
Russia ties.
is longtime counsel to the DNC/ 5,J
I^H^^Balso represented the Clinton
campaign, from which it received $5.6
million in 2015 and 2016. 2S7 Pursuant to
that representation, during the 2016
campaign, "[tjhere was an expectation that
would hire the consultants,
including research consultants, necessary to
enable us to provide services to the
campaign.
,.286
(U) In approximately March or April
2016, 269 Fusion principals and
approachec^^l "and indicated
that they might be a good fit for doing work
to support the legal efforts"
clients. 293 flUiestified that Fusion "had
been retained ... by a wealthy Republican .
.. to do research on then candidate Trump .
.. and thought that if I was going to be
•
looking to hire a consultant to help me
advise the campaign on issues relating to
Trump, that they would be a good fit." 293
^^Qwas looking for a consultant to, among
other things, sort through the multitude of
public records pertaining to Trump's
business dealings . 272 Although he had not
previously worked with Fusion, he chose to
ivr ocA-nct//i
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
88
hire the company based on its familiarity
with Trump's dealings, including "his
business holdings, his financial holdings, and
the kinds of litigation he had been involved
in." 293 m further testified that "[t}hey
were recommended .,. [and] thought
highly of in the community." 29 ' 1
(U) The Committee determined the
"wealthy Republican" who funded Fusion's
initial Trump Research
ln September 2015,
the Beacon retained Fusion to conduct
opposition research on Trump. 255
leadership have publicly stated they "had no
knowledge of or connection to the Steeie
dossier, did not pay for the dossier, and
never had contact with, knowledge of, or
provided payment for any work performed
by Steele." 295
testified that—based on a careful
review of the relevant documents—he had
identified "zero overlap in the work
product" between the dossier and what
Fusion providec^^^l 1 , 297
(U)|^Jsought and received "budget
approval to be able to spend money in
order for me to retain consultants," from
Clinton campaign manager
but did not specifically identify Fusion to
^^|. 293 Fusion's Simpson was "definitely
aware fhatj|^^^^B represented the
DNC and that they were the client in this
matter" based on a general understanding
that^l^^l' represents the DNC. 299
Fusion's expenses, including the hiring of
Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor,
were passed on to ana
ultimately to the Clinton campaign and
DNC. 301 In total. Fusion paid Steele (and
chargedapproximately
$160,000; Steele's efforts were part of a
larger opposition research project for which
paid Fusion over $1 million. 302
(U)m| testified that Fusion began
its opposition research work by "review[ing)
what we had learned over the previous
months," presumably including
"information about candidate Trump's
business ties in Russia," although had
not been aware of Russia-specific research
a
at the time he engaged Fusion. J Fusion
"began to develop more specific lines of
inquiry," and eventually hired Steele, whom
had known since approximately
2009. 304
signed off on the decision to hire Steeie as a
sub-contractor in June 2016—around the
same time he learned that Fusion was
beginning to focus its opposition research
on Trump's ties to Russia—but was not
aware of Steele's identity until July 2016. 305
(U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims
to have obtained his dossier information
second- and third-hand from purported
high-placed Russian sources, such as
government officials with links to the
Kremlin and intelligence services.
(U) Between June and November 2016,
Steele produced sixteen reports for Fusion,
which comprise what has become known as
the Steele dossier, "concerning Russian
efforts to influence the US Presidential
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
election and links between Russia and
Donald Trump." 300 Steele did not travel to
Russia to compile these reports.’ 0 '' Instead,
Simpson stated that "[Steele] hire[d] people
who can travel and talk to people and find
out what's going on." 30 ' 1
(U) Of the separate claims the
Committee identified within the dossier,
almost ail are attributable to Russian or
Russia-based sources, such as: a "senior
Russian government figure," a "senior
Russian leadership figure," an "official close
to [thej Russian Presidential
Administration," a "Kremlin insider," a
"former top Russian officer," a "senior
Russian financial official," a "senior Russian
Foreign Ministry figure," a "Kremlin official
involved in U.S. relations," and a "former
top level Russian intelligence officer still
active inside the Kremlin." 30 ' 3
[U) The Committee is concerned with
the degree to which the Kremlin may have
sought to influence information that was
ultimately provided to Steele—through the
potential provision of disinformation or
otherwise—consistent with its ongoing
efforts "to undermine public faith in the US
democratic process ... ” 310 In addition, the
vast majority of witnesses the Committee
interviewed, including^|, did not know
the Identity of Steele's sou rces. 3 ’ 1 Steele
declined to testify before the Committee,
and the two witnesses who claimed to
know some of Steele's sources—Simpson
and a former U.S.
Department of State official—declined to
identify them. 31 *
(U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's
information from Russian sources was
provided directly to Fusion GPS and
and indirectly to the Clinton
campaign.
314
(U) Fusion began receiving written
reports from Steeie in June 2016. 313 At the
same time, Fusion provided updates—
approximately weekly and usually orally—to
recalled
receiving some of the information later
included in the dossier "maybe late June,
early July." 115 exchanges with Fusion
were not one-way communications: he
specifically recalled directing follow-up
work on information gathered by Steele. 330
Ellas recalled personally being briefed by
Steele on his findings during a late
September or early October meeting at
office and
formed the impression that "the Fusion
folks thought it was important that Mr.
«
Steele hear from me directly that I was
aware of his work and was appreciative ." 31 '
The Committee requested
records related to this meeting, but the firm
was not able to locate any. s,s
(U) led regular briefings that
contained Steele's Information for senior
Clinton campaign staff, which included
Clinton campaign managerand
campaign chairman John Podesta. 313 m
also began "relaying ... information
received from Fusion GPS to the DNC...
around... convention time." 33 ’ 1
PROPERTY OF THE U.5. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1. H FSO,' i n te^I rgs n ce Com mtftee Otalftna n* ft a n ft ng M e mb^r tsxa bfeh Para meters for Russia f n veahgar. on*" gnos/
i nt g'• "■ ~ahou sa .a&v/nfews * d Ji umgnbineleass*?Dccu t n;lD=757. Mar* 11, 2017.
2. H P5CJ, Executive Session Jnterutsw cf I efferso n B. Sessions* Nov* 30 P 2017.
3. HP$t], &cscutfv& Session Interview of Donald Trum p* X Bee. 6, 2017; M P$G, Executive Session interview sf Jefferson S.
Sessions, Nov. 30,2017.
4. HP$D* Executive Session Intefi&hv of Jefferson B. 5>£ssie:rts r Nov. 30,2017.
5. H PSC 1 Executive 5e ssl on In teiv;ew of: a red K u s n na r t Ju fy 2$, 2 di ?.
6. HPSO* *3ugsten Acirve jvi eaiures During the 2016 Elects n Campa ign/ May 23,2017.
7. HP3Ci, + Russian Active Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign/ May 23* 20l?
B. HP$C\ Executive Session interview ot James Clipper, Ju 4 y 17,2017,
S-. HP5C 1 * Executive Session Interview cf James Capper r iuty 17,2017.
10. HP5CX Executive Session interview of Donald Tnirftfr Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.
IX HRSCi* Executive Session interview oi Michael Cohen, Oct- 24* 2017.
17., dP$Q r Executive Session Inten/itrwof Michael Cohen. Get 24,2017.
13. Morgan, lewis & Sotkiua CLP, Utter from Sheri A. Dillor ^rtd Wllllsm F* Nelscn io President Donald J. Trump, Mar. B,
2017,
14. H PSD. Execu rive Soss \ on Iniervi ew of M xtia el Co n e n, Coil 24, 2GI7*
15. HPSG f Executive Session Interview cjf Ike tewstedze* Nnw 1 T 7017.
16. H P SO* Execu dv e Ses si o n lmerviaw of 1 k e Ka va Sad i e r Hou. 2,2017
17. HPSQ, Executive Session Interview of Ron {xvkterone Dec. IS, 2017.
IS. HPSC* Executive Session Interview of ftac Gladstone. Dec. IB, 2017,
IS, HPSO. Executive Session Interview cf Rob GoldsTone* Dec. IS, 2017; HPSCh Executive Session Interview of Mtcheel C^
hen,Get*24 2017.
20. H PEG, Ex&cli □ vo S^s si on I ntervitiw of l ke Kavc I a & zfc , H ov. 2,2017.
2X HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Rob So Id stone, Dec. 16,2017.
2?_ Twitter, ^realOo^ddlYump* Xme IS* 2013,£;1? PM
2 3, HPSQ, E>:sc u tlve Ses si on 1 n ‘ e rview of Rob Sold stone, Dec. lB t 20! 7*
24. HPSQ, Executive Session Interview of Rob Gold^tone, Dec 13,2017.
25. HpSO, Executive Session inter vi^iv of Rob Golds tone, Dec l& r 2017.
26. HPSC, E<ecoiive Session inreervievv of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 13, 2017.
27. HPSD, Exetuuve Session Inl&rview of Keith Schiller, Nov. 7 f 2017; HPSCJ, Execj^v* Season Interview of Roc Golds!one,
Dec. 1% 2017.
2$. H FSO, Executive Session Interview of Rob Goldstone, Dac 1 &, 2017.
29, HPSD, ExecutiveSeiston Interviews* KailbSchtilsr, 7,2017.
3G. HPSD, Lsacutive S^^sion Interview of KeRh SchtllEf. Nov. 7,2017.
31. HP5G, Executive Session inren^ew oi Rob Golds!one, Dec 16. 2G17.
32. HPSG. Executive S^i^icm Interview cf Donald Trump* >r. r 6, 2017
33. II PSD f Exouubv e Se ss i on htemaw of M: chaoi Cohc n, Gzz. 24,2017.
3-. HP5Q, Executive Session Intenraew m Michael Cohen, Oct. 2~, 2017,
36. hpSD, Execudve loss Ion interview dfmf, Dec 20* 201 ?-
3 6. HPSCI r Exec utive Se s s ion 1 nterview o f Micbael Coho n* G cl 24 f 2017.
37. H FSO r Execu tive Seision I nterwew of re^i^ 5ete r, Dec. 2 0,2 017,
33. Text Message Exchange Between Michael Cohen ana F^Dc Sac^r r D^i 29-31,2015. jFSHRG0112-30]
39, Email fr&n) felix Satef to Michael Ccren, ,f Re :Putin/Tfun\3 / No 1 /; 3> 2015 [M0C-H-0C2552]
40. Ema5 from Felix Sater to Mkhae) Cohort, fl Re;Putin/Trurrw 1 ,J Nov 3 r 2015. [MDC I1-CC0692]
41- HPSC, Exhcu trie S&s^ion Interview 20* 2D17.
42. HP5G* Executive Session Interview Doc. 2ft, 2017
43. HPSG, Executfve Sessi on Interview c f* Dec, 2fj ,, 1017.
44. H fi $G. Ex^cutiv e S »ssi o n Interview of SV1 icha el Co h e n F Coi 24 ± Zfll 1 .
45 . h PSCl Exec u tiv e Sessi on 1 n:erview cf M l cha el toh e n, G cl 24 r 2017 .
46. Text fvtessage Exdiange Be barsen Machael Cohen an ri Hi bt Sater, Dec, 30-31* ZOlX "R5HRD0112-30] HP5Q r Execurive
Session Interview of Felix Sai^r, Dec. 20, 2017.
47. T^X Message frem Felix Sater to fWfehael Cohen* Dec. 30,2015. [F5HR00U4-7.5]
4S. Text ?4c553ge frem Felix Sater to Ml-thael Cohen* Dec. 20,2015. [FSHRO0125]
43, Email f fom Michael Cghen tc into@prprsi3^EOv*nj* 'Trump Tower-Masccvu/ l^n, 14, ZG15. fMDC-K-CCC590j
SO* Email from Michael Cohen to :nfo@prpr^ss_gQv.ru, Trump Towor-Moscow/ J^an. 14* 2016. fMGC-FUOOO3S0]
51. Small ft cm M i chae t Cohen \o info it prpres^. gov, ru. Trvm p To wer- Mosc OW, v la n. 14* 2016. [M DC - H ^ G DOES 3}
52. HPSO, Executive Session Intend of feil« Sat^r, Pst, 20,2017*
.or jtLiUIlJ
?ROFS?TY Or TH- U.£. HOUSE OF RSPRESFrrr^77V=5
53. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec, 20, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen,
Oct. 24,2017.
54. HP50, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct 24, 2017.
55. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec 20, 2017*
56. HP SCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec 20, 2017.
57. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Qtl. 24, 2017*
53* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr,, Dec 6, 2017.
59* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017.
60. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017.
61. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017,
62. HP SO, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr,, Dec. 6, 2017.
63. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr*, Dec G, 2017,
64. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec* 6, 2017.
65. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec 6, 2017.
66* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec* 6,2017.
67* Morgan, Lewis Sc BocMus LLP, Letter from Sheri A. Dillon and William F, Nelson to President Donald J. Trump, Mar. 3,
2017*
68. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
69. Eliot Cohen, Bryan McGrath, et ai, "Open Letter On Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders," War on the
Rocks, Mar* 2, 2016,
70. Daniel W. Dresner, "Why can't Donald Trump dose the deal with any foreign policy advisers?,' 1 Washington Post, Mar. 9,
2016*
71* Missy Ryan 2 nd Steven Mufson, "One of Trump's foreign policy advisers i$ a 2009 college grad who lists Model UN as a
credential," V/ashlngton Post, Mar, 22, 2016.
72, HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017.
73, HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017
74* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017*
75* HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Waiid Phares, Dec* 8,2017,
76, HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
77. HPSG, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov, 2, 2017.
78. HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov, 2 t 2017*
79, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017*
30, HPSCI, £ xecutiva Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.
SI H PSD, Executive Session Interview of , Dec, 5* 2017; - RNC National Security/Military
Platform Subcommittee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated* [DENMAN 000012]
82* — RNC National Security/Military Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated.
000012 ]
S3. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017,
84* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017*
85* HPSG, Executive Session interview Jan. 17,2013.
86. U.S, v. Paul J. Msnafort, Jr,, and Richard W. Gates Hi, "Superseding Indictment" {l;18-cr-S3, Eastern District of Virginia),
Feb, 22, 2018,
87. HPSCI, Executive Session interview Jam 17, 2013; Alexander Burns and Maggie Haberman,
"Donald Trump Hires Paul Manafortto Lead Delegate Effort," The New York Times , Mar* 23, 2016.
38* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jan* 17, 2013*
39. HPSCI, Executive Session interview Jan. 17, 2013; HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Hope
Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018.
90, Andrew E, Kramer, Mike Mclntire, and Barry Meier, "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump's Campaign
Chief," The New York Time s, Aug* 14,2016; Jeff Horowitz and Chad Day, "Trump advisers waged covert influence cam¬
paign," Associated press, Aug. 19, 2016.
91* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks* Feb* 27, 2018.
92* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27,2018*
93. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb* 27, 2018.
94. H P5CI, Executive Session Interview of Ja red Kushner, j u ly 25,2017*
95. Email from Paul Manafort "Arming Ukraine," July 30, 2016. [Sessions production; 2016-07-30—Arming
Ukraine)
96. Email t0 J ac ^ "Fwd: Ukraine/' Aug. 1, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-08-01 —Fwd; Ukraine];
Memorandum "GOP Platform; National Security, Ukraine Amendment^Sequence of Events/' Aug,
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1, 2016. [Scions production: 01—Fwd; Ukraine— ATTACHMEffT MEMO—Ukraine Am endive" (IK pci]
37. Memo from J.D. Gordon "GOP Platform; fiaricmal Security, Ukraine A mend meal—Sequence of Events/ Aug. 1* 2016*
[OJTFP00004693} EmaTfrom Jahn Hemerrivay to j affray D. Gordon, <t tlkr£i!ft£—Revised Format/* Aug. I r 20l6.
[QJT FP0ODO46S2-93U
3S. H PSC I, Te $tfmcmy of Zz~z?r Pa g®, Nov. 2 , 2017.
99. DHS and O DMI, Jc tn t Sictem en c from the Pep onm+n r oft tome fan d Seturir/ and Ojfce of me Dirt aor of iVo Coco: /n ref/fr
£TtT!C$ or) £}gctiCfl Security, h fins://v/vy 1 .^ .dhs, rcy/n= v* s/20 1 n/I gl/ g?/ i rurtT-^STgTn g i-*i g aarfcfr. er.t-hnrr. e: ■ e r*3-sa£*= r_ItyJj_QcT
c free- d i re etc r- nan c r ■? , Oct. 7, 2916,
100. HPSCi, Executive Ses^cn Interview of Donald Trump, Jr-, Dec. 6,2017,
101. H?*SCi, Executive Session Interview of Jefferson 3, Sessions, Nov, 30,2017.
202. H?SCJ, Executive Sassicn interufew of Hop^ Hicka. Fsh, 27,201S-
203. Mark Hench, “Trump: 'Wove WikiLeaks/ 4 ' Tbs ml Ccl 10,2016.
104. Ashley Parker and Dawd t. Singer, 1 'Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hilary CEngcm's Missing Ema&s/ flfew /ark
Tiroes, July 27, 2016.
105. HP SCI, Execute Session Interview of Matth-sw F. Tafr, CrL 6. 2017.
IDS. HF5CI* Executive Ses fxi interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27,201S; HP5CI, ExBCtmveSession interview cf Trump, Jr.,
Dec, 6,2017- HPSO, Executive Session Interviewcf Jefferson 2. Sessions, Kcw. SO. 2017.
207. DA, "Director Pompen Delivers Remarks at CS1S/ hr? s:/Awvy.cja-£ov,lnws-^fc ‘rr.atfori/ji.pq acnes-ts?r":ri -r+y/lCl
accachcs-tc a = monv rcc m ceo»da.*ive js- remcis him! , Apr. 13, 2017.
108- U-S. v, George Papad^wulos^^atement of the Gffsnj£ JT (l:17-cr-l82» District cf Columbia J, Oct. S, 2017.
10$. Fmaif from Michael FlpiJl to flflU J uly 15,2016, [FLYNN HP5CI 0000203^513-
110- Manu Raj Hr and Jeremy Herb, 't rn2l1 pointed Trump campaign to WikiLeaks HacuTiiants/ CNN r Den 6, 2017-
ill. HP5CL Execn^g^gsMggrHi=w of Dona-d in,—Jr,, Dec 6,2017,
111- Email from^^^HH^HtO Donald J, Trump, etaL f "Trump: Another WikiLeaks DNC Upload/ Sept, 14,2016.
[TRUMP_GR^^S0Dgl?
113, Email from Donald J, Trumo, «t aL “Trump: Another WikiLeaks DNC Up load/ 1 Sept. 14,2016.
[TRUM P_0
H4* Oliver Darcy, 4 CNH corrects story on email to Trumps about WUa Leaks/ CN'fv, Dec 3, 2017,
115. HPSCl; Executive Session Interview of Donald Trumps Jn, Dec. 6,2D17.
lib- HPSC* r Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, } t. t Dec $, 2017.
117* H?5CT, Executive Session Interview of Donsid Trump, n\ t Dec. 6,2017.
US. Direct Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Sept 20, 2016,11S& PM; Direct P^essage from Ccoz.rf Trun?.p Jr. to
WikiLeaks, Sept, 21,201 5+ 11:50 AM; Direct Messas- from WikiLeaks to Dc^aid T amp Jr„ Oct. 3 f 2016,1:25 PM; Direct
Message from Doneki “rump K, to WikiLeaks, Oct, 5, 7016,3:01 PM,; Direct Messap from Donald Trump Jr. tc Wik¬
iLeaks, Oct. 3,2016,3:03 PM, [DJTiK012£5 56J
HfJ. Direct Message frnm WikiLeaks to Dpnald Trvmp Jr., Sept. 20, 2016,11:55 PM; {/reit Message from WiVi Leaks to Don el p
Truntp Jr., Oct, 3 t 2015,1:25 PM.
120, HFSCI, Executive Sesscn Interview cf Dons*d Tnimp, Jr., Dec. 6, 2917, J> 107.
121. Direct Iron Wrldljeeks to Donald T rump Jr.. Sept. 20,2016, il;59 PM* [DJTJRQL255j
122* Direct Message from Donald Trump Jr, to V/Mteafes* Sept. 21, 2016 f 11:50 AM. [DiTJR0126bj
123. hPSG, Execurve SeSsiCn Interview of 0On eld Trump, if., Dec. S, 2017*
124* Email from Donald Trump ir. to JCeflyanne Conway, el sL* M V7iki!eal(S/ Sept. 2± r 2016. [TR JMPQRG_11_C9D0Q07J
U5* Email from Donald Trump Jr ta Kellyanne Convey, et a!., "WJkileaks/ Sspt* 21* 2015, [TRUMPaSGJ 1^09990071
126, fr/SCL Exectnlve Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27,2018*
127* Direct Message from aks to Donald Trump Jr., QcL 3,1016, L:2S PM iDJOR 01166-66]
123. Direct Message from L^r.dd Trump Jr. to WikiLeaks, Od- 3, 2016, 3;01 PM- ;OJT)ROI266]
IIS* 0>ect Message from Dcrtafd Trump Jr, to WTdLeafes, Oa* 3,2016, 3:03 9l,t ;DjTJR02266|
130. HPSCI, Lxccutrvt: Se^slcn Interview of Donald Trump- i% Dec* 6,2017*
131* Ofred; Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Jr*. Oct* 12, 2016,8:31 AM, iDJTJR01267]
152. Dfrect Message from WSelLeaJcs to Donald Trump ir. r Oct. 21j 2016,5:46-9=54 AM [DJTJR01267-59]
133 Direct Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Jr,* TJov. 8, 2016, S;35 PM. ^GrTJR0l269-7Gl
134. DVect Message from VTTviL^aks to Donald Trump Ir., ffov* 9, 2016,12:49 1251 AM. :OJTJR01270)
135* Direct Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Jr., Dec. 16, 201S, 11:3S{Q!TjRDl2yiJ
136* Direct Message from WTdLeaks fo Donald Trump Jr., Apr. 26* 2017,12:01 AM. JDJT1501272]
137. Direct Message from Wiidleaksio Donald Trump fr*, ;uiy 11, 2017, S:29 AM. iDHjR3127B-74]
138. hPSCJ, Exficrutivs Session Intefvfgwof Donald ^rymp* Jr*, D^C* 6, 2017,
139. HP5CL Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr*, Due. 6, 2017.
140* KPSCl Executh fc 3 Sssscn Interview of A!=xer*der Idx, f-ec. 14,2C17.
PROPERTY OF THE L- S. HOUSE OF RRPRESS^TATr/ES
141 email firari AEexander fifes to Pe:er Schwe lier, et &\. t Re: Remember ne? 1 have an idea to win/' Au§, 26, 2015.
[CA000G377]
142. MPSCt, Executive Session Interview of Alexander Nr*, D^t. 14,20S.7.
143, HPSCi, Executive Session Interview of Atefcande^jxJ^c 14,201?.
144 HFSCI, Executive Session Interview ofet, 2s, 2017.
145 HPSCl, Executive Session Interview cr Alexander Nix, Deo, 14,2017.
146, WSO t Bcerutiwe Seioro^ Interviewer Alexander Noe, Dec, 14,2017,
147. HPSCl, Executive Session Interview of Roger Stone, Sept. 25, 2017.
143, HPSCl, ExecutiveSfesiisn Interview^Rogfi/ Sione,Sirot. 26,2017.
149. hpscj. Executive Session Interview of RogerStone, Sept, 26, 2017.
150. HPSCl, Executive Sesscn Interview of Roger Stofie t . SepL 26, 2017,
151. Kenneth P. Vcgel "Under Mueller Scrutiny, Democratic Donor Tony Pcdestn Resits ^rom lobbying Firm,' The He w York
Times, Crr. 30,2027; HF5CL Executive Sessions Interview of John Fcdasta, Jtme 27, 2017: U.S. v, Paul!, Menafcr*. ir., sr.d
Richard v. r , Cates Ell, Trvd!cTment v <l:17-cr-291. District of Colombia), Oct- 30,2017 (describing rote of ''Company A" and
‘ Company R'}.
152. HPSCl, Executive Session Imerview of Roger Stone, Sept, 26, 2017,
153. H?SC!, Executive Session Interaev/ of Roger Ston^, SepL 26,2017.
154 letter frem Robert C 8u$chel to The HongrebH K. Michael Conatv-y, Tte; Fallen// Up to Appearance of Roger Stone or
September 26,2017,and Supplement to May9 F 2017 Request to Produce Documents*' Do. 13,2017.
155. HPSCi, Executive Senior Inter-* l*vt oJ Roger Stgrre* Sant. 26, 2017
156 Andrew r-lske* ""Roger stone, Ymrop confidant acknowledges Innocuous' Twitter conv^rsstiqo vrih D.‘JC hackers/
Washington Times, Mar. ID, 2Q17; HrSG, Executive Session Interview of Roger Stone, Sepi, 2h, 20X7.
157, LetSfif fjem Robert C, Boschel to The Honorable K, Michael Conaway"Re: Fellow Up to Appearance of Roger Stone or-
September 26,2917* arid Supplement to May 9,2017 Request To Produce Documents^ Oct, 23, 2€17,
153 - Leuer from Robert d Buschel tc The Honorable K. Mochael Conaway ^Re: fellow up to Appearance of PiOgcr Sterne on
September 26, 2017, and Supplem ent to May 9, 2017 Request to Produce Documents* Otr, 13,7017,
159. HPSG, Testimony of 2 r 2017
3 GO. hpsg r Executive Session interview ot JeffreySordcn, July26,2017,
162 FmaT fujsrri Carter Page to Jeffry D, Gordon et sL *fte: Corrjr.encement Address, Class of 2016, rrew Evcromk School
.MtSj, Jeiy 7, 2916. (D^?F0QQG3$92; H?5G, HxecumeSB^sfsrc interview ^Jeffrey-Cordon, July 26, 20l7.
162. HPSQ t TestflTHWY Of 2, 2017.
163. HPSCi, Executive Session interview of Jefferson B.s-ssicns, ?isv, 3D, 7017
164 6 m si I from Carter Page :o Jeffrey D. Gordon, Tora Dshl arid 77alld Pharos, feedback from - Executive Summary/
July 8, 2GI6, [DnFPCO£CE4023-24]
165. HPSCC Ts^timo^y or Carter Page. Nov, 2 T 2017; Josh fiogin, ‘Trump's Russia adviser speaks oof, calls socosaiforii
'compete garbage"* Washington Post, S&pti 26, 2926.
166. HPSCE Testimony of Carter Rage. Nov, 2* 2017.
167 HPSQ, Russia Active Measures in 1 m station. Mar. 20, 2017; HPSCl, Tfesiimcny of Caaur Pege, Nov. 2,2017.
.168, HP5D. 'Russia Active Measures Investigation/ Mar* 7.G, 2017,
169 HP5G r Tesrirricny o ; Cartar Page, Mov. 2. 2017;Josh Rc^ln, "Trump's Russia *di/iser speals out, calls accusations
^nnplets gamage/^ iv^/ir/i^ron Posi^Sep. 2^ 2D16*
2/0. HPSCl, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2.2017*
1/1, Sbarcrfi ufraniere, Mark Mai 2 ettf r 3 ad Matt Apuzao, “How the Russia Inquiry Be^n; ACoraoaign Aide, Driaks and Talk of
PoEErica! Dirt," Washington post, De^ 30,2017; Err al from jcan Mashbum 10 ftlck Dearbom 0rid Jeffrey C* Gordon, 'He
Travel re!mbursement {*teceived em aT3 from Michael Gfessner) / Jure 2 4 2 0i& [ UTTFPDOCfflS 14'
172. tmail from George Papadopoubs 3l. T "Re: MeetiriEWfth Rushan leadership—m Hu ding
Putin/ Ma^^g^DrrFPOOOlom-12]
173. Email Ceo^ PfipadopobElB aH Meeting v.-tlh Russian leadership—induding Pirrin/ Mar. 24.
2916. [DJTFFOGOlGlllj
174. &n3!lfrc.*n^e-2^ge PsoadopnuIoste^U^Upt aL, Meeting with E?u5sian te«dership—includtng Putin/ Mar. 24
2016, {DUF PK3O101 Hj
175. HPSCl. Executive Session interview of JeSarsod B. Sessions, Nov, 30,1017,
176. HPSCl, Fiecutive Session Interview cf Jefferson B. Nov. 2d f 2017.
V77. H?SG + E^scufiva Session interview of iefferson 6. Sessions, tjov, 30,2017*
17S. HPSCl,ExvcvtiveS«5K>a Interview oi Eons^ Nov.30,2017,
179. HPSCl, E>^uutive S^A^rtn E f 2017,
130, HPSCi, C'lctutlva Sess'icn Interview of ?r,, Dec, 12,2017.
131, ibaron LsFrania.% Mark V.gzretti, and Matt 4cuz20, ’Howthe Ryjssa Inqu^Seg^n; A -Campaign Aide^ C'lrks and Ts'ko;
FROPcrt'T/ OF THE HOUSE OF EEFRE3ENTATA'HS
Politick Dirt/* Washington Post, Dec 30^017^JPSCi Executive Session Interview of 8,2017, pp. 7B-
3P; Email from Goor^a Papadapouios Nov. 13,1016 O made the Introduction between Mr
Trump [a]ml president Sisl toad primely on Utc (runt tho ruG'on to on my woi* etc") [UJTfPOCOWSfl]
182- Lou Dobbs, Interview with Donald Trump, Fpx8v£tae&& t $QpL 22, 2016,
183* Email from George Papatfojjoulos to Paul ManafOrt^Fwa/ May. 21, 2016. (GAT-HPSCI-000002531
184. Email from George;PapadapeutostoPaulManafart, "Fwd/ J May*21* 2016. [GA7HPSG-OO0OQ2 58-59]
185. Email from Paul Manaforr to^^^^H'Fwd/' M *Y- 21, 2016. [OAT-HF5C1-0000)2 53]
136* Gimall from Paul Mam foil loHHHnta:* May. 21, 2D16; [GAH4P5aoaxx>253]
167. Email from George PavndQ&SwQsiQKm Dearborn, “Travel rmmbur sen tent (received email from Michael (Staner)/'
June 24,7P1£[DJTFP£0022S15^£^^^^
168. Email JeJfray D. Gordon, TWO: Travel reimbursement (received email hem
Michael 6l assner)/*June 24,2016. [DJTFF000 22915]
139- Email Jeffry D. Gordon, * mq : Travel reimbursement {recuivod umnii from
Mlclwl G l a syne i)/June 24 ^ 2016. IDJTFP 0002 2915]
ISO, Email George Pap adopautos, "Ret Travel reimbursement (received email from Michael Gtessner)/*
June 24, 2 016- [DJTFP0002 291Bj
191. Email from Gaocgu Papadopoufos, "fio: Travel reimbiir&tfVtent trect^tod email from Michael Glassier)/'
June 24,2ofl^^^^^R;2918]
192. HPSCI. Executive Session Interview oi Rob Goldstar^ Dec. is, 2017; Executive Session interview of Donald Trump, Jr*,
Dec. 6,2017; Email fromto Rob GcMstone, rt F W-Message-from '26-Copier-Exec/ Apr- 2b, 2016 (passing
along handwritten response from candidate Trump to email from Aras Agalarov) (EG 00 00331
193* HPSCi, ExocuHvtr Session I ntary tew of Rob Golds tone, Dec. 13, 2017.
194. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump. Jr-* Doc G, 2037.
J%* HPSCI, lixg cytivtf Section Interv iew of Roll GoldiloiW, Due, 18,2017.
196* Email [REDACTED], "from the of (fee of Donald J, Trump/" Mar, IS, 2016 (passing along hand*
written responsHfOjr^annioatt? Trump to typewritten note from Aras Agalarov] [DJTJR004G3-03!; Email from Rhone
Graff to Rob Go Id stone, ¥ FW-Message^rom 'IG-Copler-Exec/" Apr* 25, 2016 (passing along handwritten response from
candidate Trump to enroll from Aras Agglargv] [RG0DQD33]
197* Email from Dob Collisions to DonoJcJ Trump Jr-- *Ro; Re; ftus&b - Clinton private and confl don rial/' June 3, 2016,
fQjmi>M64I
193. Email from Donald Trump Jr to Rob Gold stone* "Re: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential/" June 3.2016,
[OJTJR0MS4I
199 Email from Rob GoStfitOfie to Donald Trump Jr*, T?t*; Russia - Clinton - private and confidential," Jurtu 7, 2016*
fDjTJR00467]
200. Emol/ from Donald Trump Jr to Rob Golds lorn;, Tte; Russia - Clinton - private and conjlduMfal/* June 7, 2016.
(D/TJR0O469]
201. HPSCh Executive Session Interview of Ike Revetedse* Nov, 2, 2017
202* HPSG, Executive Session Interview ot Donald Trump, Jr,, Dec. 6, 2017*
2D3* HP5C!| Executive Session Interview of DontfldTrump* Jr*> Dec- b> 2037*
204* HPSCI. Exucuiivu Sfasiion Interview of ftobGoldstene, Dec* 18,2017*
205, HPSO, Executive Session Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin, Nov IS, 2037; HPSCI Executive Session interview of Anatoli
Semochornov, Nov* 2S, 2017,
20$. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Ike Kaveladte, Nov, 2, 2017; Sharon la F ranis re and And rev; E* Kramer- diking
Points Brought to Trump Tower Mauling Worn Shared With Krumlln/' Ttie Now Yo/k Tims 4 Oct 27, 2017. toud on pub¬
lic reportfng- VewdnlUfatyu previously shared a version of the memo or talking points with Yuri Chaika*
20? HFSG* Executive Session Interview ike Kaveladze, Nov. 3, 2017; HPSCI- Executive Session interview oi Kln<fr Akhmet-
stun, Nov* 13, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session trrtersfiswof Anatoil Samothornoy, f^ov. 2S, 2017,
7*0S* H?SO, Executi ve Seiston Interview of Ike Kaveladze, Nov* 2, 2017*
2D9. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trunvpjr,, Dec- 6,2017.
210, HPSCI, Exocutwo Snssfrm Interviev; of Anatoli Siimoch&mov, Nov- 2Z* 2017,
211 HPSCI, Executive Susiiort inPsr>/(Bwof Ike Kavebdie, Nov* 2, 2017.
212. HPSCr, Executive Session interview of Ike KavofadZftj Wov. 2^ 2017; HPSO, Cstcutivif Session Interview ol E>onald Trump,
Jr*, Dec* 6,2017; HPSCfr Execub've Session Interview of Anatoh Somochornov, Nov* 2S, 2017; HPSCk Executive Session
tnteiviiswof Rinat Akhmetshin, Mov. 13,2017; HPSCI, Est-cutivs Suiiion InteAriew of Rob Goldstorte. Dec* IE, 20^7
213* HPSCI, Exmilive Session Inlorvlcv/of Ifrc- Kavdacfre, Alov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, CKecunvt> Sasslan |jvcor\4^w of Donald Trump,
Jr,, Di:c* $ t 2Q17; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Ami toll Samochornov, Nov. 28, 2017i. HPSCI Executive Session
Interview of red Kushoe f t July 2S f 2017,
214, HPSCJf Executive Session Interview of Rob Gordstonu, Dec* 18 f 2017.
PROPERTY OF THE U,5, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
215. HPSO, Fxetutive Session Jr.Tervf£'.v of Rob Gold stone, Dec. 13. 2017.
216. "sxt Message Exchange Between fared Kushnerz^d Paul Manefort, June 9,2DI6. fNHPSC00DG014S]
217. HpsCL Executive Session Interview of jo rod Kusfuier* July 25* 2017.
218. ! I PSO, Btecutfve Sasscon Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dei. 6, 2017.
219. HPSCl, Executive Session Intervtevv of Ike Kavefadie. Nov, 2,2017.
220. HP5G, Executive Session Interview of Iks Kavefadis* Nsv. 2, 2017.
221 . Ema il frcm ike Kauefrdfee to A. <ave-adte K "He: how are yoc," iune 14 , 7016 . [HiC-KAv__ 06 Q 2 C]
722. KF3Q, Executive Session Interview of Rob Goldstone, Den 13,2017.
225. HP SCI, Executive Ssss^Dn interview of Stephen Bannon* Jan. 16,2013.
224. i^yan T^sgire Beckwith, "Sead Donald Trump's Subdued Victory Speech After Winning r*evw Jersey/ Tffrfi* iuna S. 2017;
email from Dona'c Trump Jr to Rob.Go!dstone, *R&: Russia - Clnton - private anid confidential/' June 7,2016.
;BJTJRfiG469].
22 S HPSCl, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27 r 2018 : "full transcript: Donald Trump NVC speed's on slakes O'
the etectioV PO£/nt( 7 ,iun* 22 , 2 CI 3 .
225. ftftA* “2016 MRA Annual Meetings & Exhibits Fiji! Event Schedule, “ huo y.// ww w. "r?am. gr z / m od fe r 1641 / ti-a u. r - _■ e n: -
s:h'5<j'j*=.pi3f undated.
227 hPSOr Executive Sestic n irtt&Fvtew ,-T O nnald Trump* Jr., Ogc. 6, 2D17,
22S. Email from
non: 2016-Q5
22S. Email from
tiom 2016,
250, Email ro;
tior: 2GI6435-16-Se
251. Email from
Russian backdoor overture and dinner invite/ May 16,7016.[Sessions groduc-
r overture and dlrmsr : nvrte (3S)]
rI Russian baeftdeor overture and drone rrovrte/ May 16, 2 016, IS&ssions produc-
2^ Russia backdoor overture and dinner invite (26J)
"Hu safer tisclicccr overture and dinner invite/ May 16* 2016. [Sessions produo-
r overture and timreir *rwks (36)]
c Pea* MenjnorT, er ah, "Twd: Russian backdoor overture end dinner invite/ May 17,2016.
[Sessions production: 2Q16 -F5-1? -fwd Rus sian backdoor coverture end dinner invite [2S;j
232* Email from Jared Kushner t<
LSDOOQOGU
233. Email fren
qitesLj
"Re: Russian backdoor overture and dinner Invite/' May 17, 2016.
Ro: KY Request/ May 18,2016. {5oss.cns ?rodaction: 2015-05-13-^ KV Re-
sn* 17,2018.
"Kremlin CormEctran/ May 10, 2016. [RG0C1D78]
^KremlinConnection/ Mey 10, 2016. 1RD000D76]
^Kremlin Connection," May 10, 2016. [RD00007B]
"Kremlin Connection/ May 10, 2018. (RD C0007G1
P < _ ^i^ *j D v, 30 r 2017,
an. 17.201S-
234. T?5Ch EVg oitiv
235. Ernst! from
236. tms’d from
737. EmsI! from
233. Email firom
233. KP5CI, Executive Session interview oUfi
240* HPSCl, Exficulfve Session Interview
241. hp$q, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Cen. 6, 2017.
242. nPSO. executive Session intsrvisv/ of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec 6^2017.
243. HPSO, ExecutiveSesstar InteLTviejV of Donald Trump* jr,, Dec 6,2017.
2^4. H?SCI, Executive Session Intsr^sw of Donald Trump, Jr., Dac 6, 2017.
24$. HPSCl, Executive Sess' r on Inte^iew of Jefferson B* Sessions, Nov. 30, 2017,
245. HPSO, Ececutfve Session Inisivfew of is red Ktishncr, JuV 25,2017.
247. HPSCf* Executive Session Interview of Parsd Kushner, July 25,2017.
24S. HP$Q, Executive Sesston Inter^ew of Jefferson 6. Sessions, Nov, 30. 2017,
245. HPSCE, Executive Session Intsnne^r of isffsrson S. Sessions, Nov. 30^ _
250. radersi Election CornrniiS^oc. 'HilJar/ for America Tisburserren\s 2615-2016, wwiv.f=c=0‘tf; rt JS5
Sihsdde/ J u ly 16,2035. [2015-07-16- Jntitled (15}-ATTACH M EWSchedule with Drop By (5^:ons
"reduction)]
251. *JB5Schedule/July 15,2016^ {Session* Production: 2036-07-16'Untitled (153-ATTACHiVENl JB$Convention Sihedute
with Drco
25L HPSCl, Executive Session Intsrvimvef Jeffrey 6ordcn F July 26,2017; Ccurtney Orrrac, "D-S. Senator Bob Corker Speaks at
Ciobsl Cleveland's Global Partners in Diplomacy Event/ G 'c ba Ic^eve fend .or>?. Jan. 31* 2017.
253. s iBS Schedule/ Jdy 16,2015. [Sessions Production: 2Q 15^7-16-Untitled (ISJ^TTACHMWT J&S Gcnvontion Schedule
vtrflh Drop ByJ
254. HPSCl, Executive Session In^ertriawof Jefforson a S&ssior-s, Mcv. 30, 2017, p, S6 i^l J^et him, as I recall r^, rn-^re
v/as an encounter after i made a speech at the RepuMrcan Ccnventign. (dMn T t—didn’t kno w he wss go\r,g lo b; there* i
spoke to a number of ambassadors artd other people and v/as standing in front of ohe podium and he and i chatted a
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297. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview ct 12, 2017 *
298. HPSG, Executive Session interview 2017*
299. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 14, 2017*
300. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 14, 2017*
301. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of13, 2017,
302. HPSCJ, Executive Session Interview of^MB^BBNov* 14, 2017- Mark Hosenball, "'Ex-British spy $168,000 for Trump
dossier, U*5*firm discloses," Reuters, Nov. 1, 2017.
303. HPSCI, Executive Session interview Nov. 14, 2017.
304. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview Nov, 14, 2017.
305. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of^^^BBDet. 13,2017*
306. Gubarev et ah v, Drbis et al„ Defense, (Claim No, HQ1 700413, Queen's Bench Division), Apr. 3, 2017,
307. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov* I4 t 2017 (stating that, as a known ^former undercover British
Intelligence officer who worked In M oscow/' Steele w ould not have been able to travel to Russia safely).
303, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov* 14,2017.
309, Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia/' BuziFeed News, Jan,
10, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session interview of David I Kramer," Dec* 19,2017,
310, ODN1, Assessing Russian Activities in Recent US, Elections, Jan. 6, 2017,
311, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview Dec. 13,2017*
312, Letter from Robert M, Weinberg to K. Michael Conaway and Adam Schiff, Aug. 21, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Inter¬
view of Glenn Simpson, Nov. 14, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer, Dec. 19,2017* The Com¬
mittee issued a subpoena to Kramer, but Kramer still refused to identify Steele's sources. HPSG, Executive Session Inter¬
view of David J. Kramer, Jan. 10, 2018; Letter from Lawrence 5* Robbins to Representative Devin Nunes and Represent**
tive Adam Schlff, "Re: December 27, 2017, Subpoena Issued to David Kramer," Jan* 10, 2018.
313, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Glenn Simpson/' Nov* 14, 2017.
314* HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec, 13, 2017.
315. HPSO, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec* 13,2017.
316. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec, 13,2017.
317. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13,2017.
318. Email for Katherine Ruemmler to HPSG Staff, "RE: Production," Jan. 24, 2018.
319. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec* 21,2017.
320. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017; HPSG, Executive Session interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec,
21, 2017; Jennifer Palmieri, "The Clinton campaign warned you about Russia. 0ut nobody listened to us/' Washington
Past , Mar* 24, 2017*
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) C hapter 5 - Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks
Key Question M: What possible leaks of classified information took place related to the In¬
telligence Community's assessment of these matters?
(U) Leaks o( classified information are
criminal acts, and have the potential to
damage U.S. national security interests, at
home and abroad. 1 even more concerning
is that the lives of 1C employees or assets
may be placed in danger due to unauthor¬
ized disclosures of classified information,
finally, when leaks of classified information
come from congressional sources, such
leaks jeopardize the effective oversight role
Congress plays over the 1C. Therefore, as
part of the Committee's investigation, the
Committee reviewed leaks related to the
classified ICA on the Russian active
measures campaign targeting the 20:16 U.S.
presidential election, focusing primarily on
leaks that occurred between the IC'S estab¬
lishment of the CIA Director's fusion cell |
and the publication of the ICA
in January 2017.
(U) On January 6, 2017, the DNI re¬
leased the unclassified ICA. The ICA states
that Russia conducted its active measures
campaign for the dual purposes of (1) sow¬
ing discord in and undermining the U.S.
presidential election process, and (2} help¬
ing elect Donald J. Trump by denigrating
Secretary Hillary Clinton/ Unfortunately,
the public release! of the unclassified version
of the ICA was not the first time that the
public had seen the IC's various assessments
related to the Russian active measures cam¬
paign. Although outside the scope of this
chapter, leaks related to the Russian active
measures were already happening in 2015
and 2016. For example, there were press
reports regarding the hack of the DNC, as
well as the potential hacks of pro-Trump
and Republican groups 2 Du ring this time,
the Committee carried out a healthy dia¬
logue, which included briefings, with the 1C
1 ' i " 1 i
related to these matters as part of its over¬
sight responsibilities/
(U} In addition, this chapter covers
leaks of information about 1C assessments
ihat were likely classified at the time this
information found its way into the press,
especially in light of the fact that the leaks
reportedly came from government sources.
This chapter does not make any determina¬
tion as to the accuracy or analytic integrity
of the Information leaked to the press and
subsequently produced in the ICA.
(U) Finding #40: Leaks of classified infor¬
mation regarding Russian intentions to sow
discord in the U.S. presidential election be¬
gan prior to the election day—November 8,
2016.
(U)The leaks related to Russian inten¬
tions to sow discord in the U,S. presidential
election took place prior to the November 8,
2016 election, and notably, after the IC's
establishment of the fusion cell!'_:
PROPERTY OF Trie U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A. >»» *
later on October 7,2016, the U.S. govern¬
ment formally accused Russia of hacking
political institutions, but did not attribute a
A
specific hack to the Russians.”
(U) At the time of these leaks, the infor-
mation contained within them was still clas¬
sified. These leaks of classified information
endangered U.S. national security by reveal¬
ing key information about U.S. Intelligence
capabilities to its adversaries, including as¬
sessments on adversary intentions. The
Committee finds the timing of these leaks
particularly concerning. These leaks hap¬
pened during the early stages of the IC's on¬
going assessment of Russian active
measures, thus permitting adversaries to
not only potentially discover U.S. intelli¬
gence capabilities, but also provided adver-
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
100
saries, including the Russians, the oppor¬
tunity to thwart or manipulate the ICs on¬
going assessment.
(U) Finding 841: Leaks of classified infor¬
mation alleging Russian indentions to help
elect candidate Trump increased dramati¬
cally after the election day—November 8,
2016.
5, 2016, the administration had not
acknowledged any attempt by Moscow to
influence the election in favor of candidate
Trump,
(TS/NF)Ttty However, four days later on Decem¬
ber 9, Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima, and
Greg Miller of The Washington Post repon.-
ed that the CIA concluded a new assess¬
ment that Russia intervened in the 2016
U.S. presidential election to help candidate
Trump win the presidency, rather than for
the sole purpose of undermining confidence
in the U.S. electoral system. 16
PROPERTY Of THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
101
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET CIA ASSESSMENT SAYS
RUSSIA WAS TRYING TO HELP
TRUMP WIN WHITE HOUSE
rs* ; V *=3 irn C«mx^Cc -=zi*ciM ■/>
Avtiiia
Soc rzr. T.*k tibvscg&R Pryj.
UNCLASSIFIED
(C/NF) (uj In addition, on December 10,2016,
John Walcott of Reuters reported that a U.S.
official familiar with the IC's findings stated
that as the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign
progressed, Russian government officials
devoted increasing attention to assisting
candidate Trump's efforts to win the dec
PRC-PERT/ OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TOP SECRET/
MOFQRN
TOP SECRET/
NOFGR
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Intelligence Community Assessment.
(U) It is important to note that Evan Pe¬
rez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bern¬
stein of CNN reported on January 12,2016,
that President-elect Trump was briefed on
classified information indicating that the
Russians have compromising personal or
financial information that the Russians
could use against President-eleetTrump. 33
The Committee's investigation revealed that
President-elect Trump was indeed briefed
on the contents of the Steele dossier and
when questioned by the Committee, former
Director of National Intelligence James Clap¬
per admitted that he confirmed the exist¬
ence of the dossier to the media. 40
(TS/NF) in reviewing the various leaks both
before and after November 8,2016, a trend
becomes evident—prior to the election,
leaks of potentially classified information
focused on Russia's attempts to sow discord
with the U.S. presidential election. I
(U} Finding #42; The leaks prior to the clas¬
sified Intelligence Community Assess¬
ment's publication, particularly leaks oc¬
curring after the U.S. presidential election,
correlate to specific language found in the
(U) During this review, the Committee
found that leaks of potentially classified in¬
formation permeated throughout the media
both before and after the November 8,
2016, U.S. presidential election.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
104
PROPERTY OF TFH US, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
l S
^L
Artfdc
Quotes in Article that Mirror ICA
■—• -■* -ml
"Secret CTA assnssmont says Russia was trying to '"Tne CIA has concluded In a secret assessment that
*
i Russia intervened in the 2016 election to help Don *
ntd Trump win the presidency, mthci than just to
I
i undermine confidence in the US* efecLoral system,
■ according to officials briefed on the manor"
help Trump win White House'"
* Date: December 9, 2036
* Outlet: The Washington Post
Final ICA Findings
Page 1: "We further assess Putin and the Russian Govern¬
ment developed a char preference for President-Elect
Trump”
"Tt Is Live assessment of the intelligence community
i
that Russia's goal hare was to favor one candidate
over the other, to hetp Trump get elected/ said a
senior US. official briefed on an intelligence presen*
tatton madn to U5. senators. 'That's the consensus
view/"
; Page 1: 'Nonetheless* Putin publicly indicated i\preference
{for President-elect Trump's stated policy to work with ftus*
[ sia, and pro-Kremlin figures spoke highly about what they
saw as his Russia*friendly positions on Syria and U3;raino.
Putin publicly contrasted the President-elect's approach to
i Russia with Secretary Clinton's 'aggressive rhetoric " 1
"Russian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump in election, '"We now have high con hide nee that they hacked Use Page 3: "Russia collected on some ftepubllcan^fflriated
US. Says"
* Pate: Deedniher D, 20^G
* Outlet: The New York Times
i UN.C and the H.N.C, and conspicuously released no , targets but did not conduct o comparable disclosure cam*
documents'from the Republican organlratfoth one paign*
senior ad ministration official said, referring to the
Russians/'
Page ?: "We assess with high confidence that tin
'A.P.Yh 28/ Is believed to have crest* DCLeaks.com, and WiffiTuaks to
cri two outlets on the internet, Guccifer 2.0 and in cyber operati oris public*
I DCLcaks, to make Democratic documents public, f iy and in exclusive* to media outlets.
(VI an y of th e do a j men t s w e re a I no p ravt cl ed to WI k * ,
iLeate, which released them over many weeks be-
Fore the Nov. 0 election "
!
I
i
K
i
PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE Qf= REr RE 5GSTAT P/E5
^ - v'
1 -” '
— 7 -
*^T t TV^ v “
- .„>■■■— 14 .
1 ! > *'■ ■ ■ - J J - * J ^
Article
■ I i ■ - • ■ — ! »■
"U.S. Officials! Putin Personally Involved in u*$. Election
Hack”
« Date: December 15, 2016
* Outlet: NBC News
/ill!
"Intel analysis shows Putin approved election hacking
■ Date: December 15,2016
4 Outlet: CNN
"Report: Putin, Russia Tried to Help Trump By
'Discrediting' Clinton"
* Date: January (l 2.017
• Outlet: NBC New
Quotes in Article that Mirror ICA
"Two senior officials with d I reel access to the
information say new Intelligence shows that
Putin personally directed how Hacked material
f from Democrats was leaked and otherwise used*
; The intelligence came from diplomatic sources
( and spies working for U.S. allies, the officials
[said."
! "Putin's objectives were multifaceted, a high-
level Intelligence souico told NRC News. What
begun m ti 'vendetta' against Hillary Clinton
| morphed into an effort to show corruption in
; American politics and to 'split off key American
1
| allies by creating the image that (other coun*
: tries] couldn't depend on the U.S. to be a credi*
bit* global leader anymore/ the official said.'"
Final ICA Findings
Page 1: "We assess with high confidence thrat Husslan Pres¬
ident Vladimir Putin ordered an Influence campaign In
201b Dimed at the US presidential election.. **
Page 1: Tulin most likely wanted to discredit Secrewry
Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for
inciting moss protests against his regime in kite 2011 and
early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments
he almost certainty sow as disparaging him.**
I Page l: "In trying to influence tha US election, we assess
the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to
undermine the USded liberal democratic order, the pm*
motion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders
view os a threat to Russia and Putin's regime."
at
The intelligence community has assessed that
in order lor this operation to hove been execut¬
ed, K couJd not hove boon dono without the
| highest levels of the government, including the
\ President himself,'
Page 2: "We assess that influence campaigns are approved
at the highest levels of the Russian Government—
particularly those that would he politically sensitive/
"The unclassified report does not identify who , Page 3: "We assess with high confidence thu
transmitted the information or how* A senior
official with direct knowledge, however, told
NBC News Thursday that the U.S. has identified
the Russian actors who turned over stolen Dent ■ \
ocralir. material to WikiLeaks."
layed material it acquired from the DNC and senior Demo
ernrte officials w WikiLeaks."
(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classi¬
fied information have damaged national
security and potentially endangered lives.
(If) Finding #44: Former Director of Nation¬
al Intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN
national security analyst, provided incon¬
sistent testimony to the Committee about
his contacts with the media, including CNN.
(U) When initially asked about leaks
related to the ICA in July 2017, former DNI
Clapper flatly denied "discussling] the dossi¬
er [compiled by Steele) or any other intelli¬
gence related to Russia hacking of the 2016
election with journalists/'"'' Clapper subse¬
quently acknowledged discussing the
"dossier with CNN journalist Jake Tapper,"
and admitted that he might have spoken
with other journalists about the same top-
ic. s= Clapper’s discussion with Tapper took
place in early January 2017, around the time
1C leaders briefed President Obama and
President-electTrump, on ''the Christopher
Steele information/ 7 a two-page summary
of which was "enclosed in" the highly-
classified version of the ICA." 47
(U) On January 10, 2017, CNN published
an article by Tapper and others, which
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
107
claimed that "classified documents present- ty analyst.* 1
ed last week to President Obama and Presi¬
dent-elect Trump included allegations...
about Mr. Trump" that were (1) "presented
in 3 two-page synopsis... appended to a
report on Russian interference in the 2015
election" and (2) derived from "memos
compiled by a former British intelligence
operative/" 16 Those claims were sourced to
'‘multiple U.S. officials with direct
knowledge of the briefings." 46 The next day.
Clapper issued a statement describing a call
with President-elect Trump in which dapper
"expressed my profound dismay at the leaks
that have been appearing the in press" and
"emphasfeed.,. that I do not 1 believe the
leaks came from within the 1C*" 30
(U) The Committee assesses that leaks
to CNN about the dossier were especially
significant, since CNN's report "that a two-
page synopsis of the report was given to
President Obama and Trump" was the prox¬
imate cause of BuzzFeed Mews' decision to
publish the dossier for the first time just a
few hours later." Until that point, the dos¬
sier had been "circulating among elected
official, intelligence agents, and journalists,*'
but remained unpublished. Ji As the accom¬
panying article explained, "(njow BuzzFeed
News is publishing the full document so that
Americans can make up their own minds
about allegations about the president-elect
that have circulated at the highest levels of
c m
government."
(UJ In approximately early August 2017,
shortly after his testimony to the Commit¬
tee, Clapper joined CNN as a national securi-
FROPER7Y OF THE U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
108
1. Espionage Act of 2917 (codifeo as amended at 18 U.S.C 73>7SS],
2. GO M1 r Ass essing Russ ion A cinrittes attd Sotentio ns in Recent tSS BezUo,n$ T Jart.fi, 7017.
3. Ellen ftskasnima, "Russian (Se , .=entm£nt Hackers Penetrated DriC r Stale Oppa^ rton Research on Trump," Washington
Post, June 14, 2015; Joseph Menn r ^!ark I losenball, ana John Walcott, '’Hackers Targeted Trump Campaign, Rep util, can
Pa try Groups: Sources/' ftetrrers; Aug, 13,2015.
\> M PSO. Staff B ri efir.g on Cyber Taf gerii g of pgIrtica I Pa rtt£5, June 14, 2 Q LG; H Starr 3 Flaring g o Wi k\ Lea ks a r d Hac long
of Campaign Systems, Aug, 3, 2025; HrSCh Member Sriefrng on Russian Cyber Activities, 6, 2016; G^ngaf 8
Briefing, Russian Cyber Act^nies," SepL o, 2016,
! 1. DH5 and 0DN1, Ticint Statement from the Department cf Horr.eEa nd Security and Orf^e of the Director of Katiofial intel¬
ligence on Election Security," Oct. 7,2016.
12.
13,
14,
15,
16, Adam Errtous, Ellen Nakashlma* and Greg wilier, "SecretOA Assessment Says Russia Was Trying to Help Trump Win
While Housed Washington Post. Den 9, 2016.
17.
IS.
19.
20 .
21 .
22 .
23-
24.
25-
26.
77.
2S.
23.
30.
31.
John Walcott “^ussra intervened to help Trump win election: tntel^ence officiate,* Dec, 10,2015.
PROPERTY OF THE U,S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
109
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him," CNN News, Jan. 12, 2016.
HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017.
HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017.
HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Regarding his communication with Tapper about the
dossier, Clapper stated: "I don't know exactly the sequence there, but It was pretty close to when we briefed it and when
It was out all over the place. The media had it by the way. We were kind of behind the power curve, because the media,
many media outlets that I understood had that, had the dossier for some time, as did people on the Hill."
HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Former CIA Director Brennan testified publicly that
the dossier was "not In any way used as a basis for the Intelligence Community Assessment." HPSCI, Russian Active
Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign, May 23, 2017. However, NSA Director Rogers clarified that, in late Decem¬
ber 2016, a two-page summary of the Steele dossier was "added" as an "Appendix to the ICA draft," and that his consid¬
eration of the Appendix was "part of the overall ICA review/approval Process." Letter from Michael S. Rogers to the Hon¬
orable Devin Nunes, Mar. 5, 2018. See also Evan Perez, "Biden confirms Obama, VP were briefed on unsubstantiated
claims against Trump," CNN, Jan. 12, 2018.
Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017; Twitter, (SJcnnbrk, Jan. 10, 2017, 2:13 PM (reflecting the story's initial publication
time).
Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Car) Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to
compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12,2017.
ODNl, "DNI Clapper Statement on Conversation with President-elect Trump," Jan. 11, 2017.
Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, ‘These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan.
10, 2017.
Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 10, 2017
("originally posted ... at 6:20 p.m.).
Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, ‘These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan.
10, 2017.
Transcript, "President Trump Takes Working Vacation; Analysts Examine President's Recent Poll Numbers," CNN, Aug. 7,
2017 ("Joining us now to talk more about this is CNN's new national security analyst, James Clapper.").
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
110
(U) Chapter 6 - Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts
(U) During the course of the Com¬
mittee's investigation into Russian active
measures targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden¬
tial election, the Committee identified sev¬
eral issues within its jurisdiction that re¬
quired additional attention and oversight
outside of the broader investigation.
Sufficiency of "Unmasking’" Procedures
<UJ In March 2017, the Committee be¬
came aware of senior Obama Administra¬
tion officials' requests for U.S. parson identi¬
ties related to President-elect Trump's tran¬
sition team. These U.S. person identities
were previously redacted in 1C reporting.
The Committee initiated its investigation of
the process for requesting [dentines, collo¬
quially referred to as "unmasking," to deter¬
mine the sufficiency of existing policies and
procedures related to the release of U.S.
person identities. As a result, the Com¬
mittee recognized gaps in the "unmasking"
processes, including the lack of IC-wide
standards related to the justification for re¬
questing U.S. person identity information.
Therefore, the Committee's findings related
to these processes necessitated an immedi¬
ate change in policy.
(U)The Committee believed that the JC
should use specific procedures related to
the "unmasking" of U.S. person identities in
1C reporting, including additional review re¬
quirements for "unmasking" presidential
tra nsltion team officials during a presiden¬
ts transition. 1 The Committee felt that a
change in policy was necessary for the 1C to
protect U.S. person privacy and the sanctity
of the peaceful transition of presidential ad¬
ministrations, all while resulting in no oper¬
ational impact. As part of negotiations of
the FISA Amendments Act of 2017, DNI
Coats and the White House agreed to devel¬
op a new IC-wide policy for handling
‘'unmasking'" requests. Therefore, on Janu¬
ary 11, 2013, DNI Coats signed intelligence
Community Policy Guidance 107.1 (see Ap¬
pendix D), which includes requirements for:
« 1C element heads or designee approval
for requests for U.S. person identity in¬
formation;
« Documentation for names or tides of
individuals who will receive the U.S. per¬
son identify information;
♦ A fact-based justification for each U.S.
person identity request; and
• 1C element General Counsel concurrence
for U.S. person identity requests that
relate to Presidential transition team
members prior to those identifies being
approved for release.
(U) Using a series of intermediaries, the
DNC and Hillary for America {Clinton cam¬
paign) paid a research firm to conduct op¬
position research on candidate Trump and
his ties with Russia. Fusion GPS (Fusion) is
the trade name of a Washington, Q.C.-based
company that conducts research primarily
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
111
on behalf of corporate clients/ tvlarc Elias,
chair of Perkins Cote's election law practice
who represented the DNC and the Clinton
campaign, hired Fusion in spring 2016 and
paid Fusion $1 million to conduct opposition
research on candidate Trump. Fusion sub¬
sequently hired former British Secret Intelli¬
gence Service officer Christopher Steele for
$160,000 to obtain information on candi¬
date Trump via a Russia-based primary sub¬
source and numerous sub-sub-sources net¬
work who were purported to be current and
former Russian government officials. The
information Steele collected was reported
back through a series of memos to Fusion
and Perkins Coie. Steele produced sixteen
memos, which comprise what has become
known as the Steele dossier; 1 * 3
(L>) By the end of September 2016—in
addition to Fusion and Perkins Coie—Steele
provided the information m the Steele dos¬
sier to the DOJ, Department of State, nu¬
merous press outlets, and the FBI. [
(UJ After uncovering this information,
the Committee voted to publicly release two
memos, one written by the Majority on Jan¬
uary 18, 2018 (see Appendix E) and another
written by the Minority on January 29, 2018
(see Appendix F). In addition to the Com¬
mittee's oversight of this matter, the Senate
Judiciary Committee identified the same
issues in a criminal referral sent by Chair¬
man Grassley and Senator Graham to the
DOJ on January 4, 2018, describing Christo¬
pher Steele's exploits in detail (see Appen¬
dix G).
(U) Ongoing lines of effort include (1)
continued oversight of DOJ and FBI (see Ap¬
pendix H for relevant correspondence); (2)
inquiries into the State Department's han¬
dling of information from Steele, including
the dossier;'’ and (3) post-election anti-
Trump research by Steele and/or Fusion
GPS.'
1 H.R_ 4J78. § 207, US ,r ' Cong.
2. HFSCi, " Executive Session interview ot GLsnn $1 rrtpsor.," fJ ov. X% t 2017*
3 The dossteo however, has. coropositfon. 7!-e version published by BvzzFteti does not necess^rrJy ervp^ly corre¬
spond Mith documents provid-a to other parties.
PROPSJVFY CF THE= US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
4* - crmer State Dep3 ft me nc official h a s sta ted pu b! i riy the t, ot-er a pence of a p p r cod m a te?y two year s, n e
□rcvid&d ever JJ 1Q0 of Steeled reports with the Russia experts at the State Department/ ircludir.g Assistant Secretary of
Sl^te '/ictoriA Nutend. tn. Septe^be 2G16, Winer was personally bfteted by on tha dossier, and shared a two-page
summary with Nuland, who ensured that Secretary of Stale lohrt Kerry was m^de aware of Steele's Inforcnatfo::, Adds-
^cnaHy, eceived from CSnturt associate HHM^^^^Hnforma^on collected by an individual named^gj
Snearer which “alleged the Rushans had cam promising information cm Trump of a sexual and financial nature.' Winer
snared with information with Steele, who provided it to the FBI, '-'Devin Nunes
ts mvMfegating me. Here's the truth.,' Washingicn Post, Fab. B, 201S; Susan 3. Glosser, ^Victoria Hu land: The Fu p l Tran-
script." PQUTtCO, Feb. 5,20 JS; Appendix G, Trie Committee believes that arfdihcnaj Stere Department officials were
aware of Steele's efforts In 2016,
5. cu rren ^y tea d s; 'a res ear ch a nd i nvc- strgatc ry a dvisofy 1 ’ ca' led the Penn Gu. a reef Gro u p l PQS ), Is a
former employee of The Daschte Group. LLS. Senate Select Committee on lnteiPger.ee £S5G], and FSJ; white at SSCI, he
serv&d a* th-e "chief author' of "Ire Committee Study of the Central intelligence Agency's Detention and Interaction
Program." The Perm Quarter Group, 'Gur Leadership/ jh e f - cc m / tea m / teg d ?Hj p; nttss:/7
■A'\Wf, 1 1 r<ed n.com/n/fl anie . ■ ones . hi late March 2017, Jones met with FBI regarding ?GG r which he described si
■
expos ins fa re ip influence in Western dGctians/^J(|to-d FBI that PQG wss being funded by ? :o 10 wealthy donors
located primarily in Mew York and California, who provided approximately $50 rhiltion. ^^^further stated that PQG had
secured the services of Steele, his associateand Fusion GfS to continue eaposiog Russian interference in
the 2015 ILS, Presidential elecficru planned to share The Information he Obtained with policymakers on Capitol Hill
and with the press, and 3Iso offered to provide PQG's entire holdings to the FBL H>*302, Mar, 23, 2017.
PRCP=H^r of THe US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTWIVES
113
f U) Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations
Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe
(U) For at least the last decade, Russia
has aggressively engaged in an information
war against the West The Kremlin takes
advantage of the openness, freedom of ex¬
pression, and respect for legal norms en¬
joyed in Western democracies by con-
ducnngtargeted, multi-faceted influence
operations against its adversaries, Each in¬
fluence campaign is unique to the populace,
media environment, and internal dynamic
of the country being targeted.
(U) The factors that make Russian oper¬
ations effective also make them difficult to
counter. Nonetheless, countries through¬
out the West are taking a variety of actions
to impede, counter, and where possible,
eliminate Russian influence operations.
{U} The vast majority of Russian tactics
Share a common denominator: proliferation
through mass media. Therefore, this chap¬
ter's recommendations primarily focus on
ways to degrade the impact of nefarious
media activities and make them more diffv
cuit to conduct.
(U} Recommendation #1: European govern¬
ments, non-governmental organizations,
businesses, think tanks, and academia
should strengthen legal and regulatory en¬
vironments, promote media pluralism,
build professional media associations, and
improve the financial sustainability of le¬
gitimate news outlets.
(U) Russia exploits free media spaces
and open democracies through a network of
Russian state-owned news outlets and me¬
dia platforms. Those platforms amplify pro-
Russian views in Russian-funded and local
media, provoke doubt and disagreement,
and propagate false news stories, in many
Eastern European end Baltic countries, local,
independent media outlets often operate
with extremely limited resources, limiting
their ability to acquire and produce high-
quality content. In contrast, the high pro¬
duction value of Russia-owned content pre¬
sents an attractive alternative. Russian in¬
telligence services or their agents of influ¬
ence also purchase, invest in, or partner
with existing TV and radio channels, provid¬
ing editorialized content for redistribution.
Furthermore, Russian propaganda is occa¬
sionally re-broadcast by legitimate news
outlets.
(U) Strengthening legal and regulatory
environments, promoting media pluralism,
building professions 1 media associations,
and improving the financial sustainability of
legitimate news outlets will help to: in¬
crease access to legitimate news reporting,
improve production quality and financial
sustainability of local media, and profes¬
sionalize journalists.
(U) Countries that contain sizable Rus¬
sian-speaking popuiations are more vulnera¬
ble to the effects of media-enabled Russian
information operations. As described
PROPERTY Of THE US. HOUSE OFEEFRESErn AT SY5S
114
above, for many of these populations, Rus¬
sian media saturates local markets, provid¬
ing few alternatives for news and entertain¬
ment and non-Russian editorial viewpoints
(U) For countries with large Russian-
speaking populations, strengthening legiti¬
mate Russian-language broadcasters and
independent media outlets that disseminate
fact-based content would provide both bal¬
ance to the media space and more viewing
options for residents of these countries.
(U) Recommendation #2: European govern¬
ments, non-governmental organizations,
businesses, think tanks, and academia
should implement and encourage multi¬
pronged, country-wide efforts by both pub¬
lic and private entities to combat Russian
propaganda, technical, and cyber opera¬
tions.
(U) Russia utilizes a whole-of-
government approach in its information op¬
erations, mobilizing a variety of tools to
achieve its goals. From hacking of govern¬
ment networks, think tanks, and universities
to spreading propaganda via social media,
Russia’s tentacles are many and far reach¬
ing.
{U) It is therefore imperative that West¬
ern nations implement country-wide efforts
to educate its populations and inoculate
their governments, media outlets, and other
organizations from Russian influence cam¬
paigns. To do this, Western nations should
A
encourage increased partnership between
public and private entities in order to com¬
bat Russian information, technical, and
cyber operations.
(U) Recommendation #3: European govern¬
ments, non-governmental organizations,
businesses, think tanks, and academia
should implement more stringent cyber
security practices, such as multifactor au¬
thentication and encryption of sensitive
data, as well as educating workforces on
basic cyber security topics and best practic¬
es.
(U) In the last decade, Russian cyber
operations have targeted governments, mil¬
itaries, industrial control systems, business¬
es, think tanks, and universities worldwide.
While Russian intelligence services can em¬
ploy extremely sophisticated means for
gaining access to sensitive data, often sim¬
ple tactics such as spear phishing can prove
just as effective.
(U) Given that cyber operations are rel¬
atively low risk/high reward, difficult to
attribute, and even harder to consistently
combat, it is likely that Russia will continue
to utilize this tactic in its influence cam¬
paigns. Network defenses have to be right
100% of the time; a cyber intruder-only has
to be right once. Therefore, it is imperative
that governments, NGOs, businesses, think
tanks, and academia invest more resources
i
in cyber security defenses, implement more
stringent cyber security practices, and con¬
duct regular workforce education and train¬
ing on these topics.
(U) Recommendation #4: European govern-
PROFcRTY of the US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
115
merits should look to long-term solutfons
to lessen economic dependence on Russia.
(U) Russia utilizes economic ties to its
advantage. Economic vulnerability - such as
reliance on Russia for trade or energy - can
be leveraged to change behavior, send a
message of displeasure, or Inflict punish¬
ment. This is especially true for smaller
countries within Russia's periphery, such as
Moldova, where Russia is among their larg¬
est trading partners. Yet even large, eco¬
nomically secure countries like Germany
depend on Russia for a large percentage of
its energy needs.
{U) The United States should look for
opportunities to lessen European countries'
economic dependence on Russia. Exploring
alternative sources of energy and diversify¬
ing trade relationships would diminish one
of Russia's tools for imposing Influence on
its neighbors.
Russia Attacks the United States & America
Reacts
(U) The Committee's findings concern¬
ing the Russian government's malign influ¬
ence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presi¬
dential election are largely consistent with
the facts outlined in the ICA. The Russian
*
effort was multifaceted, persistent, and
effective in sowing division. The effort in¬
cluded cyber operations (hacking), the use
of social media, the creation of automated
accounts and fake cyber personas, the use
of third party intermediaries, and state-run
media.
(U) Evidence reviewed by the Com¬
mittee also showsthat the Russian govern¬
ment and its proxies used social media to
advance Russia's malign interests. While
PROPERTY OF THE U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
116
these efforts were limited - some even
came after Election Day-they were effec¬
tive at sowing divisions within American so¬
ciety and promoting false information.
{UJ America's reaction to the Russian
active measures campaign consisted of a
tv hole of government response, with vari¬
ous activities conducted by the iC, law en¬
forcement, and policy makers. Despite ar¬
guably the best of intentions in addressing
the Russian cyber menace before and dur¬
ing the 2016 election cycle, the Executive
Branch's response fell short of deterring the
Russians from conducting such activity in
the future.
(U) After analyzing the Executive
Branch's responses to the active measure
campaign, the Committee identified various
gaps in current law and policy that must be
addressee in order to haip protect U.5. elec¬
tion systems and increase the efficacy of
#
victim notifications in the future. In addi¬
tion, the Executive Branch must diligently
inform U.S. presidential campaigns in the
future of counterintelligence threats, to the
extent consistent with national security and
law enforcement equities.
(U) Recommendation #5: Congress should
identify options available to the private
sector and federal government that would
address the social media vulnerabilities ex¬
ploited by the Russian government.
{U) The exploitation of social media
platforms by the Russian government for
maiign purposes demonstrated 5 'significant
vulnerability. The response of social media
platforms to this threat should be examined
closely and evaluated against ongoing
threats. Furthermore, social media
platforms should consider implementing
methods to help counter malign foreign ac¬
tivity.
(U} Recommendation # 6 : Congress should
consider updating the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to cover malicious interna¬
tional cyber actors.
(U) As part of the Committee's initial
FISA Amendments Act reauthorization dis¬
cussions in 201 ?, the Committee sought to
address the changing threat environment as
it relates to malicious cyber activity
thresting the U.S. national security. Given
the difficulty in attributing a specific cyber
actor, the lines between independent hack¬
er and government cyber operator are often
blurred. U,S. adversaries are consistently
■*
attempting to obfuscate their identity and
location in order to evade detection. Unfor¬
tunately! current national security authori¬
ties are inadequate to counter the growing
cyber threat
PROPERTY OF THE. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESS [NATIVES
117
(U) Unfortunately, the proposed addi¬
tion to the FISA "foreign power" definition
did not make it into the final version of the
FISA Amendments Act of 2017 given con¬
cerns thatsuch a designation would dilute
the key distinction between two different
legal purposes: intelligence collection and
law enforcement. This concern, while un¬
derstandable, fails to take into account the
changing threat environment, as evidenced
by Russian cyber actors, such as the internet
Research Agency, that attempted to meddle
in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.
(U) The Committee renews its call for
Congress to update the definition of
"foreign power" and "agent of foreign pow¬
er" in FISA to account for entities engaged
in international malicious cyber activity that
threatens the national defense or security
of the United States. Adding this new entity
to the definition of "foreign power" would
permit the 1C to target international cyber
groups without having to connect that
11 '!' f V>v f i j
group to a foreign government or terrorist
111 A * Lj ' * l
organisation, so long as the cyber entity is
jfiW'i;' / 1
threaftng U-S. national security or defense.
Such an addition provides the 1C with much
needed flexibility and will help keep the
United States ahead of its adversaries.
(U} Recommendation #7: The Federal Bu¬
reau of Investigation should improve
cyberattack victim notification.
(U) When = state-sponsored cyberattack
is directed against U.S. critical infrastructure
or systems related to national elections, it is
essential for the appropriate federal officials
to work quickly to both understand the na¬
ture of the threat and aid the victim's de¬
fense.
(U) Although the FBI maintained an on¬
going dialogue with the DNC related to the
Russian intrusions, the engagement re¬
mained at the-working level. These interac¬
tions continued for months, despite no signs
of effective mediation to the problem. In
J Director Comey testified that, had he
known at the time the seriousness of the
problem, he would have "walked over
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
US
there" himself.
(U) On the other side of the notification
process, the Committee found that
cyberattack victim organizations did not al¬
ways grasp the information conveyed by the
FBI, even when that information was rea¬
sonably clear. As a result of both govern¬
ment- and private-sector failures, Russian
intelligence agencies were afforded critical
time on breached systems. During this
time, extensive amounts of data were sto¬
len for later use as part of Russia's malign
influence campaign.
{U) While the DNC failed to handle the
Intrusions with the level of seriousness it
deserved—given the severity and national
security implications of the particular intru¬
sion sets—the FBI should have engaged
more vigorously at the senior management
level. The FBI cannot, and should not, force
a victim o? a malicious cyber evert to take
specific remedial measures. However, the
FBI should update its internai processes to
make it clear that if a victim is neither will¬
ing nor able to take remedial measures in
the event or a significant national security
cyber event, FBI leadership should contact
the victim and engage at the leadership lev¬
el,
{UJ One way to implement these proce¬
dures is to provide specific guidance to FBI
agents conducting victim notifications as to
the circumstances under which the agent
should elevate the situation. Additionally, if
the cyber intrusion is attributed to a foreign
government entity and the victim is a politi¬
cal party or campaign, FBI senior manage¬
ment should be responsible for victim en¬
gagement immediately.
(U) The Committee therefore recom¬
mends that notifications associated with
state-sponsored cyberattacks should be
conoucted as soon as possible, and at the
highest levels of the victim organization. If
intelligence sources and methods are
threatened by dissemination of information,
the (C shoulo work with the Department of
Homeland Security {DHS) to provide specific
i
recommendations on what actions can be
taken by system owners to defend their net¬
works from the state-actor. The DHS and 1C
should designate personnel and resources
to carry out this task and should establish a
triage system to prioritize tasking during
periods of high demand,
(U) Recommendation #8: Threats identified
by the Intelligence Community to state and
focal elections infrastructure should be im¬
mediately briefed to appropriate state and
local officials. When threats are identified,
the federal government should conduct an
expedited declassification review to ensure
that the threat information can reach ail
PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
119
necessary state and focal officials in a time¬
ly manner.
(U) The Committee found insufficient
information sharing between the federal
government and state election officials in
2016 regarding cybersecurity threats to fed¬
eral elections. The Committee has attempt¬
ed to address this deficiency in the FY 2018
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA).
(U) Section 502 of the House-passed IAA
would require the Director of National Intel¬
ligence {DNI), in coordination with the Un¬
dersecretary of Homeland Security for Intel¬
ligence and Analysis and the FBI Director, to
post on the internet an advisory report on
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecuri¬
ty threats to election campaigns for federal
offices.
(U) The provision also allows the FBI
and DHS to make available additional infor¬
mation to appropriate representatives of
any campaign for federal office if those
agencies determine that such campaign is
subject to a heightened foreign counterin¬
telligence or cybersecurity threat.
(U) The Committee has seen some re¬
cent improvement in this area on a general
level. In February 2018, the Office of the
Director of National intelligence, FBI, and
DHS held a classified briefing for election
officials of all 50 states.
(U) Recommendation #9: The Secretary of
Homeland Security should provide certain
designated state and local election officials
appropriate security clearances to enable
those officials to respond to election-
related threats..
(U) Even if all parties recognize the in¬
terest in sharing information, the classifica¬
tion—or even the knowledge of the exist¬
ence—of a threat may impair timeiy sharing
with state and local election officials. Con¬
sistent with the need to protect sources and
methods, the Secretary of Homeland Securi¬
ty should provide certain state and local
election officials with necessary security
clearances in order to share information.
(U) The Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence-passed FY 2018 IAA also
attempted to address this issue. Specifical¬
ly, Section 402 of the IAA would require the
DNI to support the Under Secretary of
Homeland Security for Intelligence and
Analysis and any other DHS official in spon¬
soring a security clearance up to the top se¬
cret level for each eligible chief election offi¬
cial of a state. In addition, the DNI may is¬
sue interim clearances to a chief election
official for the purposes of receiving appro¬
priate classified information regarding cy-
bersecurity threats to election systems.
(UJ Recommendation #10: Significant
threats to U.S. elections identified by the
Intelligence Community, including
cyberattacks directed at political organiza¬
tions, should be immediately reported to
the congressional intelligence committees.
(UJ The House and Senate Intelligence
Committees should be informed whenever
the 1C determines with medium confidence
PROPBftrr OF THE U-S. HOUSE GF RSPFcESFNTATIVES
120
that a significant cyber intrusion or active
measures campaign by foreign 2Ciors is in¬
tended to influence an upcoming election
for any federal office. Accordingly, the
Committee recommends that the FBI Direc¬
tor, the DM1, and the Secretary of Homeland
Security jointly provide a briefing to the
Congressional intelligence committees no
later than 14 days after a determination of a
significant cyber intrusion.
(UJ Recommendation #11: Congress should
encourage the adoption of National Insti¬
tute of Standards and Technology cyber
security standards, such as those adopted
f
by the Elections Assistance Commission, by
providing federal resources to state and
local governments to facilitate such adop¬
tion. Funds should be tied to the adoption
and certification of elections systems to
appropriate standards.
| It 1 " f I i # |
u 1 i'j 1 i / 'i§ *
(U) Election systems are owned and op-
* i 1
era ted by state and local governments.
Their acquisition and installation is costly
and recapitalization is infrequent.
(U) The federal government largely op¬
erates within the limits of establishing vol¬
untary standards through NIST, providing
technical assistance and sharing threat in¬
formation.
(U) NIST is working with state and local
election officials to develop further en¬
hancements to election agencies' system
security.
(UJ the adoption of new standards may
involve system replacement, particularly for
aging systems. To encourage adoption and
in recognition of the federal government's
responsibility to protect the nation against
foreign threats, the Congress should consid¬
er providing significantly more resources to
state and local governments. These invest¬
ments could be lied to appropriate en¬
hancements in election system security.
(U) Recommendation #12: Congress should
consider additional funding for the Nation¬
al Institute of Standards and Technology to
enable better outreach to state and local
governments.
{UJ With additional resources, NIST
could host more frequent engagements
around the United States to promote the
adoption of new standards and to provide
more technical support to state and local
officials, furthermore, separately identify¬
ing the budget for this activity within the
NIST would further convey the importance
of this effort and allow Congress tc more
closely track progress.
(U) Recommendation #13: Congress should
consider a one-time grant to state and local
election agencies to conduct a risk assess¬
ment of those agencies' computer systems.
{UJ Because voting is administered at
the state and local level, even for federal
candidate elections, there is a patchwork of
electronic voting systems. In addition,
those varied systems are not subject to con¬
sistent maintenance and replacement re¬
gimes.
(U) Congress should consider allocating
FRCPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESB'fTATVVSS
funds to be transferred to state and local
election agencies to conduct a risk assess¬
ment of their systems. Doing this would,
the Committee believes, further demon¬
strate the need for the implementation of
the NIST cyber security standards for elec¬
tion agencies.
(Li) Recommendation #14: Congress should
consider strengthening the Kelp America
Vote Act of 2002 to ensure that both state¬
wide voter registration and tabulation sys¬
tems are better protected from foreign
cyber threats.
(U) As noted above, DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson designated U.S. election systems as
critical infrastructure on January 6, 2017,
which was one day after the release of the
classified ICA and the same day as the re¬
lease of the unclassified version. By labeling
election systems as critical infrastructure,
DHS can ''prioritize cybersecurity assis¬
tance" for those who request it, as well as
provide election systems the same interna¬
tional legal protections afforded to other
critical infrastructure. Implementation of
such a designation takes time. As of Sep¬
tember 1,2017, the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission reported that the election criti¬
cal infrastructure subsector plans were pro¬
gressing, in hopes of finalization in time for
the 2018 elections. The Committee ap¬
plauds this designation because it helps ad¬
dress the threats to the nation's voting in¬
frastructure.
(U) However, as articulated in recent
news.reports, even with election systems
designated as critical infrastructure, the DHS
"risk and vulnerability" assessments take
time and resources, and there appears to be
a lengthy wait list. Therefore, in preparing
for the 2018 midterm elections, DHS should
continue to work with the states on priori¬
tizing these assessments for election sys¬
tems - and other stakeholders must do
more.
(U) Recommendation #15: The Department
PROPERTY OF Trie ‘J.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
122
of Homeland Security should provide the
owner or operator- of any electronic elec¬
tion infrastructure affected by any signifi¬
cant foreign cyber intrusion with a briefing
and include steps that may be taken to
mitigate such intrusions.
(U) The Committee found that commer¬
cial providers of electronic election infra¬
structure were not informed of f oreign
cyber intrusions to their systems. While the
1C and federal government may be aware of
malicious cyber activity targeting election
systems, the information is of little value if
appropriate threat information cannot be
shared with the owners and operators of
affected systems. Accordingly, the Com¬
mittee recommends that DHS provide a
briefing and mitigation steps to the owner
or operator of election infrastructure sys¬
tems targeting by a foreign cyber intrusion.
(U) In addition, DHS has offered state
and local governments a network monitor¬
ing tool that alerts election system opera¬
tors about known foreign threats using in¬
formation obtained by the 1C Not all states
have adopted this tool.
(U) Recommendation #1$: State and local
governments should be encouraged to es¬
tablish redundancies that are not depend¬
ent on current elections infrastructure,
such as a mechanism that retains individu¬
al vote records, ensuring the integrity of
the vote in the event of a compromise of
voting infrastructure due to a foreign
cyberattack. An example of such a redun¬
dancy is a contemporaneously created pa¬
per record reflecting the voter's selections.
(U)The vulnerability of state and local
election infrastructure has been well docu¬
mented. These systems, which are not fre¬
quently updated or replaced, are not devel¬
oped to defend against state-sponsored
cyber threats. The fact that voting ma¬
chines themselves, as well as tabulation sys¬
tems, are not directly connected to the in¬
ternet does not offer adequate security.
Rather, it can create a false sense of securi¬
ty-
[U) To heip protect the integrity of the
process, state and local election authorities
should consider building in additional re¬
dundancies to ensure an audit trail in the
event of a compromise of the electronic
voting systems. An example of this is a con¬
temporaneously printed record of votes
that is securely stored at the polling place
and transported to the relevant election
oFfice at the end of Election Day. Tne Com¬
mittee is miraful of the reason most juris¬
dictions replaced the paper ballot, but
building in a redundancy using a paper rec¬
ord of a vote will help guard against the po¬
tential for manipulation of voting results in
the event of a breach of the electronic
voting machines.
{U] Recommendation #17: While ft is im¬
portant to implement lessons learned from
the Executive Branch's response. Congress
should not hamper the Executive Branch's
ability to use discretion in responding to a
PROPERTY or IKE U S. HOUSE OF REPRESE^ATTVES
123
particular foreign threat.
(U) The Executive Branch's response to
the 2016 Russian active measures campaign
was neither timely nor effective. As dis¬
cussed above, the Executive Branch did not
publicly attribute Russian attempts to hack
into various political institutions or compro¬
mise emails of U.S, people until October 7,
2016—roughly one month before the 2016
U.S, presidential election. The Executive
Branch also waited to issue sanctions
against Russia, expel Russian diplomats, and
close Russian diplomatic facilities until De¬
cember 29 , 2016. further, DHS did not des¬
ignate U.S. election systems as critical infra¬
structure until January 6,2017, which was
two months after the 2016 U.S. presidential
election. While the previous administration
made attempts in diplomatic channels to
dissuade Russia from its ongoing activities,
such attempts apparently feil on deaf ears.
(U) However, despite the fact that the
Executive Branch's remedial actions were
arguably too iittie too lats, any efforts by
Congress to introduce certain legislative
"solutions" are misguided. The President is
the primary recipient of the intelligence
produced by the 1C, as well as the individual
constitutionally empowered to command
the armed forces of the United States. As
such, if a foreign government conducts ac¬
tive measures targeting U.S. elections in the
future, the Executive Branch should have
the ability to craft a response based on the
intelligence known at the time of the inter¬
ference end, If necessary, the readiness of
U.S. military forces. These are variables that
the Congress cannot possibly anticipate in
drafting potential legislation. Therefore,
despite potential calls from both Democrats
and Republicans to legislate the threshold
necessary to trigger attribution or reaction
by the President in the wake of foreign hos¬
tilities, the Committee urges Congress not
:o hamper the Executive Branch's role in
responding to foreign threats.
(UJ Recommendation #18: Congress should
consider repealing the Logan Act.
(U) Congress passed the Logan Act and
President Adams signed it into law on Janu¬
ary 30, 1799. Broadly stated, the Logan Act
prohibits U.S. citizens to influence any for¬
eign government vis-a-vis any disputes that
government may have with the United
States, it provides a punishment of a fine
and three years’ imprisonment.
(U) Over the course of the Act's more-
than-200-year history, there has never been
a conviction for its violation, and there have
only been a handful of indictments that nev¬
er reached trial.
(U) Despite its demonstrated disuse,
the law has gained occasional congressional
interest, in 197S, Senator Ted Kennedy un¬
successfully sought to remove the Logan
Act. In 1980, Congressman and former
House intelligence Committee Chairman,
Anthony Beiienson, introduced legislation to
repeal the Logan Act, staling that the prima¬
ry use of the Logan Act was to provide for
"periodic tails for prosecution motivated by
PROPERTY Of IRE U.S. ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
124
opposition to the cause being expressed in¬
stead of actual concern about treason." In
1994, Congress updated the Logan Act by
changing the $5,000 fine to "shall be fined
under this title."
(U) Due to the lack of prosecutions un¬
der the Logan Act and despite the various
apparent violations since its passage, Con¬
gress should evaluate the law's utility and
consider repealing it.
(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presi¬
dential campaigns should receive unclassi¬
fied counterintelligence briefings at an ap¬
propriate time prior to a nomination con¬
vention.
(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential
election campaign, candidate Trump and
candidate Clinton did not receive a classified
intelligence briefing until after their respec¬
tive nomination conventions. Since 1952,
the sitting President typically offers the U.S.
presidential candidates classified briefings
as a matter of courtesy, bui only after the
nomination conventions. However, the
Committee's investigation found that a
counterintelligence briefing before the
nomination convention, even at the unclas¬
sified level, would be a significant benefit to
the candidates and enhance the integrity of
the campaign.
(U) U.S. presidential campaigns are a
significant target of interest to America's
foreign adversaries. It should be expected
that various foreign intelligence services will
conduct offensive operations to penetrate
such campaigns in the hopes of influencing
U.S. policy and discourse. Therefore, it is
critical that the 1C educate presidential cam¬
paigns on counterintelligence issues as an
important protection measure for campaign
operations.
(U) For example, at an appropriate
time, the 1C could host unclassified counter-
intelligence training sessions for each cam¬
paign. Such training would assist the candi¬
dates and campaign leadership in under¬
standing the severity of this issue, and
should cover a range of topics, including:
• (U) The intelligence collection pro¬
cess;
• (U) Reasons why foreign intelli¬
gence services, generally, would
want to penetrate a U.S. presidential
campaign;
• (U) How to better secure campaign
communications and practice good
cyber operational security; and
• (U) Hypothetical examples of suspi¬
cious behavior that may warrant
questioning or the dismissal of cam¬
paign staff.
(U) Recommendation #20: When con¬
sistent with national security, the Intelli¬
gence Community should immediately in¬
form U.S. presidential candidates when it
discovers a legitimate counterintelligence
threat to the campaign, and promptly noti¬
fy Congress.
(U) The Committee is not aware of any
TOP SECRET/
NOFORN
PROPER TV OF THE U.S. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
125
notification to candidate Trump that the
U-S. government conducted couniej’intexi¬
gence investigations of people associated
airertiy or indirectly with the campaign.
While the Committee understands and ap¬
preciates the IC’s reasons for not disclosing
such information to protect classified
sources and methods, the FBI should have
provided candidate Trump some sort of no¬
tification, even if it is general and at the un¬
classified level, that the 1C is concerned that
a potential counterintelligence threat exists
to the campaign.
(U) The DN1 should issue an ICD to pro¬
vide guidance on how and when the 1C
should notify a U,S, presidential campaign
of a legitimate counterintelligence threat.
Similar to victim notifications in the cyber
context, when the 1C has an individual under
an active counterintelligence investigation
and the 1C becomes aware of that individu¬
al's affiliation with a U.5. presidential cam¬
paign, the 1C should have a responsibility to
notify the candidate, when consistent with
national security. There may be instances
where such notifications are not consistent
with national security, such as if the candi¬
date himself or herself is under a counterin¬
telligence investigation.
(U) Further, given the sensitivities asso¬
ciated with counterintelligence investiga¬
tions, if the 1C decides that campaign notifi¬
cation is required, the 1C should promptly
notify Congress of the campaign notifica¬
tion, including the classified details under¬
pinning the counterintelligence threat. De¬
pending cn the sensitivity, such notifications
can be made to the leadership of the House
and Senate, as well as the chair and ranking
Members of the House and Senate intelli¬
gence committees - known as the Gang of
3 .
{U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of
Congress should consider requiring ail staff
to receive an annuat counterintelligence
awareness briefing.
(U) As with presidential campaigns,
congressional staff members are targets for
foreign intelligence collection. The fC
should coordinate, and Congress should
consider requiring, an annuel counterintelli¬
gence briefing for staff.
(U) The briefing should be unclassified,
cover both physical and cyber threat aware¬
ness, and should emphasize that ail staff are
targets for foreign intelligence services. The
Committee's investigation of the 2016 elec¬
tion demonstrated that many campaign
staff members were unaware of their status
as a potential target for foreign intelligence
services. Congressional staff may a iso be
unaware of the counterintelligence risks as¬
sociated with their positions. Increasing the
awareness of staff—even in an unclassified
setting—that they are potential targets
would enable them to take precautions
measures and be better prepared to coun¬
ter the threat.
Campaign Links to Russia
(U) Recommendation tf22: Political cam¬
paigns and law enforcement should ensure
PROPERTY CF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
126
that their counterintelligence defenses ap¬
propriately account for the rale of cut-outs
and intermediaries.
(U) Russian attempts to influence the
American political process, including via in¬
termediaries and cut-outs, did not end on
Election Day. The universe of pre- and post¬
election contacts between Russian interme¬
diaries and Trump associates described in’
Chapter 4 suggest a sophisticated effort to
target unwitting Americans by leveraging
existing relationships, interests, and oppor¬
tunities. 3 Therefore, both U.S. government
entities and campaigns in particular must
strengthen their defenses against such sub¬
versive tactics, beginning with expanding
counterintelligence education and training.
{U) The 1C should work to provide as
much information to campaigns and law
enforcement agencies about foreign intelli¬
gence agencies' efforts to target them. The
Committee is mindful that sensitive coun¬
terintelligence issues often involve some of
the most highly classified secrets the U,S.
government has, but the iC should work to
provide some basic training at the unclassi¬
fied level about foreign adversaries' use of
intermediaries.
(U) Recommendation #23: Congress
should consider amending current cam¬
paign finance laws to further increase 1
transparency regarding services provided
by foreign persons or entities.
(U)The Committee is concerned that
current campaign finance reporting is in¬
sufficiently transparent. For example, the
DNC and Hillary for America used Perkins
Coie, which they billed as “legal services" or
"legal and compliance consulting, 1 ’ to fi¬
nance opposition research by Fusion GPS,
which in turn utilized Christopher Steele, a
foreign person, to compile the dossier that
he created for use against candidate
Trump. 4
(U) Under current federal election law,
foreigners are prohibited from making con¬
tributions or donations in connection with
any campaign in the United States.' Howev¬
er, ft is not illegal to contract with a foreign
person or foreign entity for services, indud-
■ t
ing conducting opposition research on a U.S.
campaign, so tong as the service was paid
for at the market rate.
(Uj In light of the use of foreign people
and foreign companies for sen/ices oy the
2016 U.S. presidential election campaigns,
the Committee encourages Congress, in
consultation with the Federal Election Com¬
mission (FEC), to consider whether Congress
should amend campaign finance laws to re¬
quire greater transparency when U.S. cam¬
paigns obtain services from foreign persons
or entities. Congress should consider
whether U.S. campaigns that contract with a
foreign person or entity for services should
immediately disclose to the FEC a contract
with a foreign person or foreign entity, as
well as a lengthy summary of the types of
services provided by the foreign person or
entity.
encneRTY of the us . house of representatives
127
Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks
{U) Based on the extraordinary number
of leaks of classified information over the
past year, it is apparent that government
officials are not afraid of the criminal penal¬
ties for such unauthorized and illegal con- •
duct,
(U) This leaves the Committee with an
impression that criminal statutes related to
leaks of classified information are not strong
enough to deter potential criminal acts of
leaking classified information.
(U) Recommendation #24: Each compo¬
nent of the Intelligence Community should
update its guidance regarding media con¬
tacts to ensure the guidance applies to eve¬
ry employee, including senior officials,
(U) The Committee found significant
leaks of classified information around the
time of the ICA. The Committee believes
many of those leaks were likely from senior
officials within the 1C. This recommendation
is similar to a provision of the FY 2013 Intel¬
ligence Authorization Act that expired in
early 2014. That provision required a notifi¬
cation to the congressional intelligence
committees in the event of an authorized
disclosure of classified information to the
media or anybody else who had the intent
to make the information public. 0 The pur¬
pose of the law was to ensure that congres¬
sional intelligence committees were in¬
formed on a timely basis -when there was a
disclosure of classified information to the
media, and the statute specifically carved
out disclosures made under the Freedom of
Information Act, in litigation or administra¬
tive proceedings, under executive orders, or
to any federal employee with an active se¬
curity clearance and a need to know.
(U) Recommendation #25: Congress
should consider legislation to increase the
penalties for unauthorized disclosures of
classified information.
(U) To date, based on publicly available
information, there have not been any prose¬
cutions of leaks pertaining to the Russian
active measures campaign. As evidenced by
the lack of leak prosecutions, difficulties
often arise in finding a culprit behind leaks
of classified information. However, when
the Executive Branch is successful in identi¬
fying an alleged leaker, there should be no
bar to prosecuting that individual. While
prosecutors may utilize multiple criminal
statutes to prosecute individuals who leak
or mishandle national defense information,
the construct of the Espionage Act does not
lend itself in favor of prosecution and as a
sufficient deterrent from individuals break¬
ing the lav/ for their own political purposes.
Therefore, Congress should consider legisla¬
tion to clearly articulate stronger penalties
forthose individuals who make unauthor¬
ized disclosures of classified information to
the media.
(U) For example, enactment of Con¬
gressman Chris Stewart's bill - H.R. 3448,
the Classified Information Protection Act —
would strengthen the Espionage Act. Unlike
PROPERTY OF THE U.5. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
128
current unauthorized disclosure statutes
which, fay virtue of their complexity, create
difficulties in building cases, H.R. 3448 dear¬
ly prohibits any current or former individual
who had lawful access to classified infor¬
mation from knowingly providing such infor¬
mation to a person who is not authorized to
access the information. If someone is found
guilty under this proposal, the leaker will be
finea, imprisoned for up to three years, or
both. This legislation originally passed both
chambers of Congress in 2000, but Presi¬
dent Clinton vetoed the bill. Given the pro¬
liferation of leaks, it is essential for Congress
to examine amending the Espionage Act to
strengthen our Saws needed to protect clas
sified information.
(U) Furthermore, given the significant
number of ieaks and instances of mishan¬
dling classified information coming from
within the 1C in the past several years, Con¬
gress should consider ways to strengthen
the protection of classified information.
This legislation could include requiring the
head of a federal agency to suspend the se¬
curity clearance of an individual who inten¬
tionally or recklessly fails to comply with
security procedures for handling classified
information. The legislation could also pro¬
vide for the ability of an agency's inspector
General to make recommendations to the
President related to potential violations of
security procedures by senior agency offi¬
cials. Finally, the legislation should consider
mandating annual training for all individuals
with access to classified information on se¬
curity procedures for handling classified in¬
formation.
{U} Recommendation #26: The Executive
Branch should consider instituting manda¬
tory polygraphs for ail non-confirmed po¬
litical appointees that have top secret
clearances.
(U) Despite employees in the executive
Branch having extraordinary access to a sig¬
nificant amount of highly classified infor¬
mation there are very few processes in
place to ensure that these individuals han¬
dle such information appropriately.
*- i
IU> The DNI is responsible for policies
and procedures governing 'eligibility for ac¬
cess to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position made by any agen¬
cy." However, pursuant to 1CD 704, the DNI
delegated the authority to grant access to
an 1C element's Sensitive Compartmenteti
Information (SCI) and other controlled ac¬
cess program information to the heads of
such element. As it relates to the admin¬
istration of polygraphs curing personnel se¬
curity vetting, the DNI issued Intelligence
Community Policy Guidance (1CPG) 704.6.
(U) 1CPG 704.6 provides basic instruc¬
tion as to the types of polygraphs and cir¬
cumstances by which polygraphs should be
administered. White 1C elements should
have discretion in terms of the timing and
circumstances by -which to conduct SIPs,
every employee not subject to Senate-
confirmation thai is granted access to TOP
SECRET classified information should be
PROPERTY OF THE J.S. HOUSS OF RF PRESENTATTVFS
I
r
12S
subject to at least a counterintelligence
scope polygraph (CSP). As a result, the DNI
should revise ICD 704 and ICPG 704.6 to
specifically reflect this requirement.
1. 50 U.S.C. § 1804.
2. SO U.S.C. § 1801.
3. HPSCI, "Russian Active Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign," May 23,2017, pp, 31-32,
4. Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley v. Democratic National Committee and Hillary for America,
"Complaint," Federal Election Commission, www, ca m pa i an 1 ega 1 ce n t e r. org /doc u m e nt/fe ocom p i a i n t - h i 11 a ry-a merica- d n c-
failure-disdose. Oct, 25, 2017.
5. 52 US.C § 30121; 11 CFR 110.20.
6. Pub, L No. 112-277, § 504 (2013),
PROPERTY OP THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
130
(U) Appendix A - Scope and Methodology
(U) On January 25, 2017, Chairman
Nunes anc Ranking Member Schiff released
a joint statement detailing the Committee's
inquiry into the Russian active measures
campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden¬
tial election. 1 The final parameters of the
Russia investigation were agreec to by
Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member
$cbiff on March 1, 2017. 2 The review's key
questions were: {1} what Russian cyber ac¬
tivity and other active measures were di-
m
reefed against the United States and its al¬
lies; (2) did the Russian active measures in¬
clude links between Russia and individuals
associated with political campaigns or any
other U.S. persons; (3} what was the U.S.
government response to these Russian ac¬
tive measures and what do we need to do
to protect ourselves and our allies in the
future; and (4) what possible leaks of classi¬
fied information took place related to the
Intelligence Community's assessment of
these metters?The Committee remained
focused on investigating the answers to
these four questions and designed the in¬
vestigation's methodology around them.
(U)Tne Committee interviewed and/or
transcribed testimony from 73 witnesses,
conducted 9 open and closed hearings and
briefings, and issued 20 subpoenas. The
Committee identified witnesses to interview
by reviewing open source material, includ¬
ing news reports; official U.S. government
documents, including classified intelligence
!C source material; IC agency briefings; and
folio-wing up on leads acquired from formal
transcribed interviews with current and for¬
mer administration officials, as well as vol¬
unteers who offered pertinent testimony or
documents to the Committee. In some in-
stances, prospective witnesses were unre¬
sponsive or unwilling to be interviewed.
When appropriate. Congressman K. Michael
Conaway, in consultation with the Ranking
Member, made a recommendation to the
Committee Chairman Devin Nunes in ac¬
cordance with Rules of Procedure for the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
to issue a subpoena. 3 Subpoenas were used
to compel witnesses to appear as well as to
compel the production of pertinent docu¬
ments in compliance with the Committee’s
lawful authority, Six of the witnesses the
Committee requested to interview invoked
their 5 th amendment protections from self-
incrimination, which resulted in the Com¬
mittee not being able to obtain pertinent
;nfo r mstion from those particular individu¬
als.
(U) During the interviews, the Com¬
mittee Members and staff questioned the
witnesses about activities that generally
took place between April 2015 and January
2017. If the Committee discovered anything
that arose before April 2015 or after January
2017, the Committee made a determination
of its relevancy. If it was identified to have
an impact on the campaign or election, the
Committee defined it as relevant and includ¬
ed it within the scope. However, none of
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
131
the witnesses interviewed indicated poten¬
tial collusion that would have led the Com¬
mittee to adapt a broader scope. The Com¬
mittee also collected over 307,900 docu¬
ments and 230 hours of witness testimony.
(U) What Russian cyber activity and other
active measures were directed against the
United States and its allies?
(C//NF) fu) The Committee collected and ana¬
lyzed 1C products on Russian influence oper¬
ations 2 nd activities from the period begin¬
ning with the summer of 2015 and ending in
January 2017.' 1 The Committee did not ex¬
amine the motivation of the Russian actors,
but instead focused on what it found about
the Russian's activities. The Committee also
spent approximately 1,200 hours reviewing
the classified Intelligence Community As¬
sessment on Russian Activities and inter¬
viewed the Chief of the CIA Director's fusion
cell, which was an interagency analytic
group run by the CIA that was stood u((
to produce products focused on
Russian cyber and other influence activities
targeting the United States. The Committee
also interviewed the FBI's Section Chief for
the Bureau's Counterintelligence Analysis
Section, in addition, the Committee traveled
to Bulgaria, Cypress, Estonia, Germany, Mol¬
dova, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom to
interview these nation's foreign intelligence
services about the Russian active measures
against their governments.
(U) Did the Russian active measures in¬
clude links between Russia and Individuals
associated with political campaigns or any
other U.S. persons?
(U) The Committee investigated facts
related to the FBI's investigation through
May 2017, until the appointment of Special
Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee
avoided examining events thereafter to
avoid interfering with the Special Counsel's
investigation. The Committee also exam¬
ined allegations of collusion by investigating
the interaction between the political cam¬
paigns and Russian agents of influence dur¬
ing the 2016 election cycle. The election
cycle was defined as April 12, 2015, when
Hillary Clinton launched her campaign for
President through November 8, 2016, or
election day. To answer this question, the
Committee met with the head of Counterin¬
telligence for the DOJ to understand the
context and events surrounding the investi¬
gation into the Trump campaign. The Com¬
mittee also interviewed several officials
• •
from the FBI and DOJ to collect official testi¬
mony about the investigation. In addition,
the Committee collected and reviewed per¬
tinent FBI and DOJ documents about the
counterintelligence investigation. The Com¬
mittee also coordinated closely with the
Office of Special Counsel. For example, the
Committee shared the list of witnesses that
the Committee interviewed 3nd kept the
Special Counsel's office apprised of any
changes or developments on a monthly ba-
PROPeRTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
132
sis.
(U) What was the U.S. government re¬
sponse to these Russian active measures
and what do we need to do to protect our¬
selves and our allies in the future?
The Committee interviewed current and
former officials at the NSA, FBI, and CIA. The
Committee interviewed these witnesses
about Russia's active measures, the impact
these active measures had on U.S. intelli¬
gence relationships and alliances, as weli as
the agencies* response to these attacks, in
addition, the Committee traveled to seven
countries in Europe and met with 1C, De¬
partment of State, and foreign intelligence
service representatives to obtain other na-
tions' perspectives about the Russian active
measures, the potential impacts of these
measures, and the U.S. government and its
allies’ resconse.
■E
(U) What possible leaks of classified
information took place related to the Intel¬
ligence Community's assessment of these
matters?
(U} The Committee collected, reviewed,
and analyzed open source articles contain¬
ing leaks that occurred between the IC's es¬
tablishment of the CIA Director's fusion cell
the publication of the
classified and declassified version of the 1CA
in January 2017. in addition, the Committee
collected and analyzed laws and policies
pertaining to the release or publication of
classified information. Finally, the Com¬
mittee also compared the leaks found in the
identified articles to the classified and un¬
classified intelligence Community Assess¬
ment to determine any similarities.
1. HPSQ, “Joint Statement on Process oi B'partissn HPSCI Inquiry Into Russiars Active MeasureV Releases* Tta;..
g fe nc£. hsuSc . any, Ja ft. 2S r 2017.
2. KP5G , “ImeiIigence CommOh3uro=vi, Ra nk \ng Merrfeer Establish Paremetc f s for $ussia investfgation, -y.i
g a ope ,h rjse.gov . Msr* 1,1017
3. H P5Q, Rutes o / Pro c eduro fo r zh? Per rr. an on t Sfcfecr Cornmi irou on in td!(g an cc. Lin Had St = t as Ho u se o f ft e p re* arri a feves,
115^ Congress.
4. The 1C comprises 1 / different organization*, or 1C elements. to include the Office of Director of Matic>nal in csHigence,
the Central intelligence Agency, ths federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Intettgenee and Couni^rmteFigerice ai
the Department of energy, !h* OfiTcs of National SEeurity intelligence at the? Department qf Justice's Dru^ Entree msnt
Administration, t^e Office of and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security# the Bureau cf Inteilh
genoe and Research at the Department of State, the Office of in to’ Usance and Analysis at the Depart ment of Teesury, Air
Fore* fntei licence, Army Intelligence, Coast Guard 1nterii=enee, Defence Intel licence Agency, Marina Corps 'ntefligenc^,
Waricnai Geospa tfal-In tel I ig.-wice Agency, fte conn*' 55 a nee Office, Nation?! Security Agency, and Navy Intel IF
^ence- Fcr the purposes of tfm nevlcvr, the Committee reviewed Intelligence products from the Central inifif^ance Agen¬
cy, Federal Bureau of Investigonoft, 2 nd National Security Agency because these agerxies were tee 1C partners for oonv
muniiy^ids aisess.-nertt of Ruiiian Measures.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE PR ESE'JT ATTV ES
133
{U} Appendix B- Russia Investigation Parameters
HPSCI INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS
■SCOPE OF ETVESTi CATION
m-P ARTISAN’ INQUIRY INTO RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES
TOPIC
An cxam m apoo iito Russian cyber activity and other active measures direct at Oic U.S.
election.
PURPOSE
■+
fflhtil problem tin?you trjnzin svhe?
One of HPSCrshighest priorities is oversight ox tlic Imslli pence Community’s activities to
counter Raisin aggression! mcltiding the cyber-attacks directed against ifee Coiled States la the
Iasi yeer. Aipangf this oversight, responsibility, the Cormmitee isundaiftkkij* abi-pmiisan
iavcstigacon inio tites* activities direct ai ihs 2016 election and the underlying intelligence
used to draft ^Intelligence Community Assessment* u R\iSsi[m Acivbdcs md Intentions in
Recent OS Election 17 The Investigation will hdp us better understand Russian active measures
against the Uni led States and our allies inform efforts to prevent simile episodes in the
future! both hcru and abroad
££7iir frjwLu 1 inte r? ^ #mc£ii£-Tre?
The intended audience is die Members of Hi 3 SCI and—to the crxtc^t permitted by classification
-<±n<\ sectsrily ndcs—the brooder Hons; of Rejuxsenbuives and the Airvriciin people.
IVhfti are the key qitestwm yen wk to £my>tar*
■ What Bmsiian cyber activity 2nd other active measures 'were directed against tfieUmied
Stales and its allies?
* Whfii couaieriistdtigiriice concerns exist related to Russia and. tht 2 &id U.S. elections,
including miy intelligence regarding links between Russia individuals ^sedated with
political esnpaigus?
t Whs: was theUfjn response u> th™ Rushan act:ve measures and wiiar impact:: any.
did the Russian activity have on Ladingsnee rclatxojiships anti tmdnxons] alliances'?
• What possfolc leaks of classified informatioa took plate rented to the Intelligence
Community's ssscssmenl of these makers?
What is ywr intended outcome pnotfrteffs)?
The Comm [lice intends to complete a report at the highest claSsdEcation necessary' to answer the
key quesdoais and. where possible, teponfe) ni low classification bvds nele^bte to the House
of Representatives an d the pub! ic t as tnzsop?i±t^
-ROPERTY OF THE U_3. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
134
4 - .
I
I
1
I
I
i
I
I
\
I
What intended impact will there he for budget, legislation, or press?
The inquiry and report may uncover vulnerabilities within the Intelligence Community and/or
USG agencies or institutions. If so, the Committee may identify avenues of improvement that
would be reflected in IAA provisions, stand-alone legislation, IC budget adjustments, and/or
further areas to focus RPSCl's oversight efforts.
The Committee also expects that there will be significant interest from the press, given the
delicate political issues surrounding the topic* Staff will remain bi-partisan and focus solely on
the facts uncovered in our investigation*
What intended effect do you want those products to have? How does that fit into the
Committee *s oversight plan?
The objective is to better understand Russian active measures directed at the 201G U.S. election,
and to better position the IC and the broader USG to respond to and defend against the threat.
SCOPE
What are the boundaries of your review? Please consider time, substance, agency> and range
of activities*
Time*
The Committee will focus primarily on Russian uclivc measures deployed during die 2015-2017
timeframe, but may pursue activities germane to the investigation that took place outside this
window.
Substance:
• IVhat: Tlie Committee wi \\ invest(gate Russtan activitics aimed at USG agencics, political
parties, NGQs, individu als, and private industry, as appropriate*
The investigation will also assess whether there is any
intelligence that identifies insider threat or Cl concerns* including whether Russian
activity involved any USPs, including those on or associated with campaigns.
o The investigation will also consider what USG officials believe to be the impact
to US, intelligence of both Russian active measures related to the election and the
associated recent disclosures.
How: The Committee will, investigate the methods by which Russia targeted the
aforementioned groups.
V/hy: The investigation will consider Russian leadership plans and intentions, including
whether and in what ways Russia intended to influence U S, policy or undermine U.S.
political systems and democratic institutions.
USG response: The Com mittee will examine how the U.S. government responded to
Russian active measures.|~_. ,, ~~Y
~| It will also-i nclude an a ssess ment of the proc es s used to generate the IC 1 s
report and any deviations from standard practices in the IC’s report.
*
4
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
135
and an accounting of whether a person or persons in the iC or
the White House leaked information on the report prior to its dissemination to the Gang
of Eight, Congress, or the public.
o The report will also assess whether intelligence relating to US. persons was
collected and disseminated in accordance with applicable laws and policies.
* Rvcommendations: Several recommendations are likely to come out of this investigation.
Agencies:
* The Committee expects to be in contact with CIA, NS A, DHS, FBI, DrA, and ODNl.
However, The Committee will pursue ail avenues of inquiry, which may include agencies
not listed here.
* The Committee will also engage current and former IC and USG personnel, private
industry, and any other parties with knowledge relevant to the investigation.
* The Committee will examine the process by which the Intelligence Community
Assessment, 'Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” was created and
the intelligence underlying the assessment to determine whether the IC comported with
all relevant Intelligence Community Directives and security precautions when
researching, writing, analyzing, and releasing their product, and whether the assessments
meet a reasonable standard of credibility as determined by the investigatory team. The
Committee will focus on evaluating the ICs work on the Assessment with regard to IC
rules and procedures, but not create a new or separate assessment of Russian acti vities.
Given the above, and competing priorities, when do you expect to complete the project?
The Committee expects the invest!gallon to take several months, at least, and the drafting of a
report and any declassification review to take additional lime thereafter. Above all, the
Investigation will prioritize comprehensiveness over completion by a particular dale, while still
seeking to move as quickly as possible to ensure the report is timely and useful.
What if/any political or jurisdictional issues exist?
The inquiry's subject matter carries political sensitivities. Nevertheless, staff will proceed in a bi¬
partisan and objective manner, both in conducting the inquiry and In drafting the report.
* The Committee's investigation will not interfere with any ongoing criminal or
counterintelligence investigations. Staff will, however, seek relevant law enforcement or
counterintelligence information consistent with the Committee's oversight jurisdiction
and investigative responsibilities. The objective of seeking such Information will be to
assess whether any collusion occurred between Russians and USPs, and the leaks of
classified information.
* The investigation could implicate the work of the agencies within the jurisdiction of
Homeland Security, Judiciary, Oversight, and Foreign Affairs Committees. However,
because the investigation will focus on an active measures campaign by a foreign
ad versary p the in vest i gat i on c lead y ties withi n the j u ri s d ict i on of HPSCi, Add i ti on al ly,
House Rule 10 provides that HPSCI shaft study the sources and methods of the 1C on an
"exclusive basis." r S
3
PROPERTY OF THE U S HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
136
r
What if/a ay cotnparnnentation }&$(*& exist?
Staff end Mcrirrb^ conducting the investigBlien will need access to Orag of Light material, T tits
nscessfiaies a seivuIL nimble group, urd will require special amm^ssments for proper storage of
comportmented information 31 HE 3 SCI.
— « #
METHODOLOGY
WIH it ft* bipartisan? Who wiit 6e involved?
This Investigation is bi-jEitisaiL Gang of Eight access will be required for the investigatory team-
- Lend :f-j (Majority)
J (Minority)
Counsel:!
1 L-
■(Majority)*^
p(M3noiiiyJ
i (Majority)
(Minority)
| (Bi-partisan fellow) ■
* Investigators
* Advise
* Technical Advisor
What information do you anticipate wiU be necessary to achieve your purpose?
0 Access io and custody of aJ 1 underlying intelligence used, to create the Intelligence
Community Assessment, *'Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US ElectionsT
This includes repotting cuireuily only available to the Gang of Eight and ihcir Staff
Directors.
* Access to and custody of other relevant reporting on Russian active measures, 23 it relates
cd the timeframe and topfoti described id the Scope of Investigation, as needed.
* Interviews with li SG and no n-b SO indhiduals with knowledge o f R ussian active
measures, Including those in the Intel licence Community, private industry, NGOs,
pQli Ileal prices atu^br other groups.]
Committee -nay abo wish to engage cyber experts from our National Labs, both resident
at HP SCI and outside the committee.
* Access to docmuffils and information regarding Jaw enforcement and coudtctinSfilligeacs
investigations, coosistcn t with the Co omit tree 7 s oversight jurisdiction and investigative
responsibilities, as further described above.
What rotes wilt Members play? At Vfftaf points will they be brought in $0 provide feedback or
guide tbs project? What Committee events a fay be necessary?
* 'fbe investigation Is of highest intcresr to HPSCI Members, They will need Eo be updated
on the status of the mve^tigulicn »i regular jnLervnis, likely through oTp ■jjlisun
investigatory team memos and Majority* xid Miiroriiy-specsBe channels, as necessary.
* Mem beta may also be ime rented i 11 j oirtiug imerv lews j f they an* o f Ingh j a teresi.
* As needed, the Committee will hold hearings, both open and closed, on elements nf the
invcstigailfir-.
H-
-FrTi f* rrrnP^ ^
FSaPEFtTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
137
How wilt you gather information (what types of dotmaent requests do you plan la suandt; who
da you plan to interview; where do you intend to travel) ?
* The Committee has already requested nom the ODN1 access to and cuaody of aJJ
imdij^ejicc rcporimg included in the Iniclligocc Conminnhy assessment, ^Rujsfen
Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections/'
* The Coraminec will submit farther requests for documents, and for interviews* as the
inquiry pmeceds.
* The Committee will interview current and former USG pc^onnd, industry peiSnuitd*
those who work or worked in NGOs and/or political perries tuid others as the Committee
deems appropriate*
« The Committee wifi also seek exiting *C infcnnaikm on Russ tan activity against U.S.
fillies during their elections.
How willyou file, organize, md retain all of the infortunium received? Have you factored in
sufficient tone for declassification renew, if necessary? flow will that occur!
* The Committee vviii need to flceonnftadatc doemnem review and storage jti HPSC:—
particularly as i: relumes to compartmented infomaiion. Tor Com mi lies wit! also need to
Victor in the time it mey lake ugeaefes to reswmd to document access requests,
declass it! cation reviews, and/or making available tudjvjduak for interviews with the
investigatory team or 3TVSCI Members,
* The Commiuix sterThavc already sci-^ digital folders on the HPSC1 classified system .
:o hold ah relevant ooa-Gang of Eight planning atid scoping documents, with the proper
permissions based m responsibilities tmd Majoritjv'Vimoriiy status.
TIMELINE
Provide specific, intended dead fines for each phase of your revir* {data gathering analysis,
writing, cv ordinal ion/editing, publish ing.
The Committee will pureus a phased* bialdkig-blocks approach to the mvestijffiiofl, vriiile
prioritizing comprehensi veness above completion by a fixed end date. Tkt strict jring of the
investigation into Phases* end the consequen: priorifettion of specifically identified investigative
activities or research, wit! nor be construed to limit staffs ability to gather or anzlyzo rckvara
infonnatim
ffre Committee expects each pkssc will take ivocks to months to complete.
+ Phase I will focus on mitial t general knowledge acquisition ^boul the Russia active
measure campaign, thcTU.S, response, comtcrintclEgettCtaonoenis* and the other key 1
questions identified above*
o Pho5^ i will include reading wzd tumlyring intcl l itticv reporting relevant to the
Russia cyber Threat, rndlKiing nil underlying trtGeUigtnce used ;o produce the
Intelligence Cammimfty Assessment, ^Russian Activities rmd intentions m Ro^ni
US Elections."
o Phase ! also will include meetings with USG and industry personnel generally
knowledgeable about the tricar: mcctiDgs vdtb USG personnel knowledgeable
about Uie ICTs analytic process; and meetings with former USG
S
PROPERTY CP THE 11$. HOUSE GF REPRESENTATIVES
1
luwwicdgcablc about USG posture against the Russia target^ to include
countcrintdligoticcL
o Phase 1 also will include witness testimony* following investigative leads, and
document production relative in the IC Asses&uenU toumerimeUigence concerns,
the USG response, tint! leak Alfeguiinns.
o Tiiroiglunii rha$£ 1, die Committee will pursue document acquisition and
schedule interviews necessary' to conduct Phase 2 .
t +
« Phase 2 wilt build on die baseline Jsraowled^e acquired in Phase 1 through 2 focused and
spcciff e invc siigaiion.
o Phase 2 will include a detailed analysis of the intelligence production process, and
conclusions m Ibc Intelligence Conimunir/ Assessment, ^Russian Activities and
Intentions in Recent OS Elections !r to assess whether the IC comported with all
relevant In let licence Community Directives and security precautions when
researching, writing, analyzing, mu! releasing their assessment,
g PEta&e 2 wilt include interviews with specific USG ami mdusiry personnel
knowledgeable about the specific loples discussed in the IC's report and the
process used to compile* review, nod disseminate the ICs ttgwn.
o PIinto 2 miiy include dclnsicd inlcrvlcws mul iintily at s rcgardhig the Ros^inn ru;tivc
measures campaign; the U.$» respond; coLimettnudllgpncc concents; the impact
of lUmian active measures on U.& aides; arid whether the IC or the White Utilise
leaked information on the report prior lo it* dfsaemlfinlinn to ilpe Gang of Eight,
Congress, orihu public,
► Phase 3 will locus on writing, coordinating* editing,* tinnamiulnfj for dec bass flea (ion
review (if accessary), and releasing the Committee's reports at appropriate classification
levels.
* Throughout oil three phases, the Committee will engage Members for any feedback nnd
in corporate lh«t feedback into our process*
4 * * *
Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Committees Rules of Ihoeedun^ 115th Congress, we hereby jointly
agree to the scope of investigation described above.
Date: February 27,2017
6
PROPERTY Of THE U.S. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
139
(U) Appendix C - Russia's Media Propaganda Apparatus
(U) Rossiya Segodnyo
(U) Created by Putin in 2013, Rossiya
4
Segodnya is Russia's overarching state me¬
dia company, Rossiya Sogodnya acts as an
umbrella for outlets like RT and Sputnik.
"Rossiya Segodnya" is translated as "Russia
Today," but it is different from the television
channel with the same name. According to
Russian press reporting, in September 2014,
Moscow tripled Rossiya Segodnya's budget
to 6.48 billion rubies and increased RT's
2015 budget by 41 percent to 15.38 billion
rubles, which is equivalent to roughly $600
million.
(U) Russia Today {RT}
fU] This 24-hour worldwide television
(TV) and online network was created fn
2005 to promote Russia's image abroad and
to show foreigners world events from a Rus¬
sian perspective. Nominally independent
but Kremlin-controlled and funded, Russia
Russia Today was rebranded RT in 2008.
(If) RT employs 2,000 staff to provide
coverage in Russian, English, Arabic, French,
German, and Spanish in 100 countries and
on the Internet from its studios In Moscow
and Washington DC- RTs central slogan,
"Question More, 11 is indicative of its over¬
arching goal to urge viewers to doubt even/-
thing they see in Western media and from
its leaders.
(U) Sputnik
[U) A Russian state-owned network of
media platforms producing radio, social me¬
dia, and news content, Sputnik was created
in 2014 to act as Russia's multimedia hub.
Sputnik is based in 28 countries and oper¬
ates in 33 different languages, broadcasting
pro-Russian messaging and disinformation.
A recent GAO study found that Sputnik-pro¬
motes anti-West narratives and undermines
*
support for democracy.^ ’ ^
(U) Russia Beyond the Head fines
(U) less ideologically hostile than RT
and Sputnik- Russia Beyond the Headlines
fRBTH) pays for printed inserts in many
leading European newspapers and targets
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Spain,
and the UK. Comparatively less anti-
American in tone, RBTH provides another
avenue for Russian propaganda to reach
wide audiences in these European coun¬
tries.
I
FRCP HR rtf OF THE J S HOUSE Or REPRESENTATIVES
TOP CCCnCT/
fNoror.jjj
2, GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, May 2017.
PROPERTY OF THE U,S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(U) Appendix E - HPSCI Majority Memo about FISA Abuses
IJN CLASSIFIED
January IS, IS
To; HFSCI Majority Members
From: HR SC I Mnjori [y Stiff
Subject; Foieitju TTtLdfijpjnca EurveiUuitsa AUt Abw£& cl Department of .lastice md the
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Purpose
This. m&riofjrtdttui provides Members an update art tigjufKfljit thets pkirtg to tb=
Committee’s ongoing. investigation into the Department iA Justice (DQJ) and federal Buroau of
Inv^stigatioa (FBI) and their use of lb; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (H$A) ditriQQiAs
*201 C* presidential election cyde. Our findings vdiich arc detailed bdow, 1) miss conue-ms with
the kgulnascy and legality of certain DOJ and FBT interactions ^itfi the Foreign hiielllgecce
Surveillance Coi-id (FISC), and 2) lepr^em a ttcublins breakdown oPftgal processes estaMisfcsd
DO piQtecl the .American people from abuses related to the ITS A process.
Invest! carton Cud ate
On October 21,2016, DOJ and FBI *QUghl and received a FISA prcbfible cause order
(rcA under Title VII) aahori/in^ electrocite surveillance oc Carter ?ig< from the FISC, ts a
iJ-S. ci tizen who s erveJ <isa vo! ranee r * dvisor to the 1 Tramp presidential campaign Cc nrif£mt
with requirements under FIS A, the application had to bo first trerr.i fisc by the Director or Deputy
Director of the FBT. It then required the approval oCth- Attorney l^eptny Attorney
General (DA Gy. or lhe Senate-confirmed A^juant Attorney General for the National Secant y
Division.
Hie FBI iTid DOJ obtained one initial FHA warrant large Ling Carter Rage and three FfSA
renewals trem the FISC As required by statute (50 U, S_C. § L5Co(d;U))* a PIS A order or.
Anaexicaa citizen uiust be renewed by the FttSC every IX* day? and renewal requites a
srp=mite lindim^ nf probable cause. Thcii-Dircc-or James Cam ey signed tfcrce FISA Application?
in quest ion su behalf of \kt FBI airi Deputy Director Andrew McCabe signed 0 "-a. Thcn-DAG
bally Ysfccs* then-Acting DAG Dan* Boeuie* acd DAG Rod Roseunein each signed tmo ur more
FISA applications on he half of DOJ.
Due tn foe sensitive nautrt of ferdgLi Mlis^not acfrviry, FISA submissions (including
restate) held re die FISC ore Lkssifiad, As such, the public^ confidence in the integrity of the
FT$A proeesi depends <m the court's ability to hold die government to the highest sTnndwd
partteulariy ^ i: re lair- to suTvoii’crcc of American citi&titft. However. the FISC’* rtgor in
protecting the rights of Americans, which in nmfjTesd by 9€-day renewals of surveillance
orders, is necessarily dependant or iha govcmarenTH prcdoctioxi to the court of ail material and
relevant facts. This should in elude trformaiioz potent) ally favorable to the target of the 7Tf>A
L"?fCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE ITS- HOUSE: QF RErRESOTTATlVES
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UNCLASSIFIED
application that is known by the government- In the case of Carter Pago, the government bad at
least four independent opportunities before the FISC to accurately provide m accounting of the
relevant facts. However* our findings indicate that, as described below, material and relevant
information was omitted.
t) The “dossier” compiled by Christopher Steele (Steele dossier) on behalf of the
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Hillary Clinton campaign formed an
essential part of the Carter Page FISA application. Steele was a longtime FBI source who
was paid over 5160,000 by the DNC and Clinton campaign, via the law firm Perkins Coie
and research firm Fusion GPS, to obtain derogatory information on Donald Trump’s lies
to Russia.
■p
a) Neither the initial application in October 2016* nor any of the renewals, disclose or
reference the role of the DNC, Clinton campaign, or any party/campaign in funding
Steele's efforts* even though the political origins of the Steele dossier were then
known to senior DO.T and FBI officials,
b) The initial FISA application notes Steele was working fora named U.S, person* but
docs not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson, who was paid'by a U S, law
Firm (Perkins Coie) representing the DNC (even though it was known by DOT at the
time that political actors wore involved with the Steele dossier). Die application docs
not m cut ion Siedc was ultimately working on behalf of—and paid by—the DNC and
Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately authorized payment to Steele for the
same information,
2) The Carter Page FISA application also cited extensively a September 23, 2fM6, Yahoo
News article by Michael Isikafif, which focuses on Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow.
This article does not corroborate the Steele dossier because it is derived from information
leaked by Steele himself to Yahoo News. The Page FISA application incorrectly assesses
that Sieejc did not directly provide information to Yahoo News. Steele has admitted in
British court filings that he met with Yahoo News- and several other outlets - in
September 2016 at the direction of Fusion GPS. Perkins Coie was aware of Steele’s
t
initial media contacts because they hosted at least one meeting in Washington D.C in
2016 with Steele and Fusion GPS where this matter was discussed.
a) Steele was suspended and then terminated as an FBI source for what the FBI defines
as the mosL serious of violations—an unauthorized disclosure to the media of his
relationship with the FBI in an October 30, 2016* Mother Jones article by David
Com. Steele should have been terminated for his previous undisclosed contacts with
Yahoo and other outlets in September—before the Pago application was submitted to
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE US, HOUSE OF REP R E S EM TATI V E S
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ur
UNCLASSIFIED
ihc FISC in October—but Steele improperly concealed from and lied to the FBI about
those contacts.
b) Steele’s numerous encounters with the media violated the cardinal rule of source
handling—maintaining confidentiality—and demonstrated that Steele had become a
less than reliable source for the FBI.
3) Before and after Steele was terminated as a source, he maintained contact with DOJ via
then-Associate Deputy Attorney General Bruce Ohr. a senior DOJ official who worked
closely with Deputy Attorneys General Yates and later Rosenstcin. Shortly after the
election, the FBI began interviewing Ohr, documenting his communications with Steele.
For example, in September 2016, Steele admitted to Ohr his feelings against then-
candidate Trump when Steele said he ‘Svns desperate that Donald Trump not get
elected and was passionate about him not being president’’ This clear evidence of
Steele's bias was recorded by Ohr at the time and subsequently in official FBI Hies—but
not reflected in any of the Page FISA applications.
a) During this same time period, Ohr’s wife was employed by Fusion GPS to assist in
tile cultivation of opposition research on Trump. Ohr later provided die FBI with all
of his wife’s opposition research, paid for by the DNC and Clinton campaign via
Fusion GPS. The Ohrs’ relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS was inexplicably
concealed from the FISC.
4) According to the head of the FBI’s counterintelligence division, Assistant Director Bill
Priestap, corroboration of the Steele dossier was in its “infancy*’ at the time of the initial
Page FISA application. After Steele was terminated, a sourco validation report conducted
by an independent unit within FBI assessed Steele’s reporting as only minimally
corroborated. Yet, in early January 2017, Director Comey briefed President-elect Trump
on a summary of the Steele dossier, even though it was—according to his June 2017
testimony—“salacious and unverified.” While the FISA application relied on Steele’s
past record of credible reporting oil other unrelated mailers, it ignored or concealed his
anti-Trump financial and ideological motivations. Furthermore, Deputy Director
McCabe testified before the Committee in December 2017 that no surveillance warrant
would have been sought from the FISC without the Steele dossier information.
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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UNCLASSIFIED
5) The Page FISA application also mentions information regarding fellow Trump campaign
advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidence of any cooperation or conspiracy
between Page and Papadopoulos. The Papadopoulos information triggered the opening
of an FBI counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016 by FBI agent Pete Strzok.
Strzok was reassigned by the Special Counsel's Office to FBI Human Resources for
improper text messages with his mistress, FBI Attorney Lisa Page (no known relation to
Carter Page), where they both demonstrated a clear bias against Trump and in favor of
Clinton, whom Strzok had also investigated. The Strzok/Lisa Page texts also relied
extensive discussions about the investigation, orchestrating leaks to the media, and
include a meeting with Deputy Director McCabe to discuss an “insurance' 1 policy against
President Trump’s election.
i
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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{U) Appendix F - HPSC1 Minority Memo about FISA Abuses
TO: AH Members of Hie House of Representatives
FROM: HP SC] Minority
DATE: January 29* 20 IB
RE: Correcting die Record -The Ituisiit Investigations
The HPSCI Majority's mavc tc release 10 the House of Representatives Us jUtegabocs &ga:r*$t the
Federal Bureau of love si igsiloa (FBI) ard the Department of Justice (DOJ) :ss transparent cftbrl
to undermine those agencies, lfc:c Special Counsel zzd Congress' investigations, St also risks
public exposure of sensitive seureea and methods for na purpose.
FBI and DOJ officials did not ^r.busc 1 the Foreign tolrilt&cnceSOTcillm* Act (FISA) process,
omit materia] TntV>mxat[oys» or subvert this vftaj tool to spy on the Trump campaign.
in fact, DOJ and ti7C FBI would have been remiss in their duly lo protect the country had they nor
sough: a FISA warrant and ^peated to egraJud temporary survcHbu^oe of Carter Page,
someone iho F3T assessed u> be an nger*; of she Rcsska SoveranccL DOJ met the tigor*
transparency. and ev identia ry basis needed 13 meet FISA's probable cause requirement by
demcnstniting:
o comcuiporaneons evidence 0f Russia's elrc:ion mterffecerate:
o co nc emln g R u^sj an imb and outreach t a Tram p c am pri go o ft! ciiU;
o Page'£ rustary with Russi an intc llig cncc; tad
o P-ge’s iu -: p tc i o cj tc titties b 2016* i nd tding m Moscow.
The L’cmnriTtec's Minority has therefore prepared this memorandum to conca the record:
* Christopher Slcda'a- raw inkllfficccc reportiog did mrt laforoi the FBra decision to
initiate 1 is counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016* In fact* the FBFs closely-
held mresitgaiUre team only received Steele’s reporting in nrtd-Scptembcr - mere than seven
weeks later. The FBI - and, subsequently* the Special Counsel's - investigation i^jd links
between the Russian government end Trump t&mpoisa assembles has been based on
troubling law enforcement and intelligence mformstkm unrelated to the “dossier/ 5
BQ«Ts October 3J, 2016 FISA applicjfloti nud three subsequent rrarwnh corefalty
outlined for the Court o multi-pronged miUmnle for surveying Page, who, ct the tirpoof
the tot application, wns m longer vriih the Trump camprion. DOJ detailed Page's past
relationships With Rossis spies or.d Interaction *ritn Russian officials during the 2016
campaianOOJ riled multiple sources to support the rase tor
sorvcluing Page—’bul m?iz only narrow itacof ttiflmnatIon from Steele's sources about
Page's specific ectlvitits in 2016* chiefly his suspeefed July 2G16 meeting in Moscow with
Rissuui oHrcinlsJ
L In fact.
iho FBI Jmm iewed pjge in March 2016 about Ids contact vath Russian intelligence, the very
month candidate Donald Trump nnnred tiim a foreign policy adviser*
As DO/ informed 1 ha Court in subsequent renewals.
5reeled reporting about Page's Moscovr ntefidD^a
. DOJ’s
applications Si net oshMwiEe rely on Steeled reporting, melting cny “satodous 11 alle^ttoi*-*
Redactions match
p revio usly released
version—no
additional
1
redactions taken
PROPERTY Or THE U.S. HOUSE OF R F PR FSSWTAT.'/ES
146
about Trump, and the FBI never |inid 5 luck far this re parting. While captaining why Die FBI
viewed Steak's reporting and a on rets as reliable end credible, DOJ also disclosed;
o Steele^ prior relationship with the FBI;
o t h c fa ct a f o nd rcas on far h is t c rm I not Ian ns a so m vet; and
o i h c bs*c ss cd po I (Ika I motivaten of t I io se who hi 3rd h i m.
o T l« Com ml I lee (VEnj o n ty * s inem oranUunt, yy| if eh d ni w s sel tet I v ply on h \ gb ty se ns I five
classified iDfarmnrtoDr tn eludes or her tfbioritom and mis rep res emu lions dim era
contradicted by the utterly mg classified documents, which ihe vest majors of Members of
the Committee and the House have not hod the opportunity to review ■ and whidi Chairman
Nunes chose not lo read himself. 1
Background
On Junu&ry 18, 201B, ihe Committee Majority, dunng an unrelated business meeting forced a
surprise vole lo rdctvac to the full House a profoundly misleading memorandum alleging serious
abuses by the FBI and DOL Majority staff drafted ihcdpcurmnU in secret on behalf of Chairman
Devin Nunes (and reportedly with guidance ami input from Rep, Trey Dowdy), ackI ibM rushed
a party-line vole without pnor notice*
This was by design. The overwhelming majority or Commiltee Members never received DOJ
authorial ion to access the underlying classified information, and therefore could not judge lira
vcnicity of Chainmm Nuiiics' claims* Due to sensitive sources and incOjoct^- DOJ provided access
only to ihs Coromltleifis Chair mid Running Member (or respective designees), mi limited 5lafT*
to facilitate the Cnrrmdhcc's investigation Into Rujfia's coven emupaign lo influence the 20 ifi
US, elections. 3 As DQI lias confirmed publicly, it did not authorize; the Wonder release of this
information within Congress or to the public, and Chairman Nunes refused to allow DOJ nod lhe
Flirt to review his document uiuit He permitted the FBI Director to sec it for the first time m
HPSCl'a secure spaces tala on Sunday, January 2B - 10 day* after disclosure tpihc Housed
FBI’s Cou uteri ntfcHkcnec Inycstyqiiflon
3n its October 2016 FISA application end subsequent renewals, DOJ accurately informed the
Court ito i hc FBI initiated its eptmicrirn dligcneo invealigation on July 31, 20 id, nfter reviving
mfbnnafionGeorge Papadopcoilos reveal*
^ni who took interest m PapudopciiTo? m a Tmrpp"
campaign foreign patfcyjuiYiser, informed him in late April 2016 rhm Russia I
Papadgpouks ,, s disclosure,
moreover, occurred tigainst Jhtf backdrop of Russia's nggr«fivo covorl enropaiga !o InlTucntt
our elections* which file FBI vvra already monitoring. Wo would kter I coin in Pnjradopoutas's
plen that tfvoI ilto wforroulkm the Russians could assist bynnonymmisly releasing were thousands
of Hillary Clinton^ emmta 3
■4
DOJ ttrfd the Court the truth. lls icpprscrnl.ilioii v,us cortsiilcal will) Ihc i-EJl 'a underlying ,
iuvcMlfiUlivo recent, which cumin and Conner icnitrf official* Inter corfehowtwl in extensive
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
147
Ccmrmnea testimony. Christ opher Steele s reporting, which he begon to sbore with on FBf scent
!' J thro jgb the en d o f October2016, played no rale !n lautf£hing the
FBI’s counterintelligence Investigation into Russian Laltrftrtnce ard lints to the Trump
campaign. In feci, Stye's reponing did n&i no^b the ccunierimtUigCjicc team investigating
Russia at FBI headquarters until mid-SepicmbcF 2016^ more tbfri seven weeks after the FBI
opened its invest) gaiion. because die prop's existence was so closely held wilhm the FBI* By
then, the FBI had already opened Eub*jRqi:xries into|
campaign!
i Individuals linked to dre Trump
and (brrosr campaign fbnrign palsy advisor Carter Page,
As Co mmittee icsltmony bears out, the rB! would hivecom inucd ?i* mvesilgmk!^ including
cgdnsJU^intfividinils, even if it bad never received informaium from Steely never applied
for a FISA warrant ro^Jnsr Page, or if the FISC had rejected the application^
OQJ J $ FISA Ann Heal ton and. Renewals
The initial ttantint spoliation and subsequent renewals received independent scrutiny nr,d
approval by four different federal judges, three of wham trarc appointed by President Geerpc W.
Bush end e^by President Ronald Rcpgan. DOJ first applied to the FISC on October 21,2016
for a warrant to pearl! the FBI to initiate electronic surveillance and physical search of Page for
9 D days, consistent wjOi FISA req vtre r p enU, The Cetirf approved three reflffWHls — in early
January 2017, early April 2017 t and late June 2017- which authorized the FBI to maroiain
SOTveillance art Page until laic September 2017, Senior DOJ end FBI officials appointed by the
Obama end Tramp Administnuions^ including acting Attorney General Dana Boente and Deputy 1
Attorney General RodRi>5 znstem, certified the applications with the Court
FISA was not used to spy on Trump or his campaign* As the Trump campaign and Page have
acknowledged, Page ended bis formal affjlhii&n with lb; csropeigp months QOJ applied
for a waronL DOJ, moreover, submitted die irufial application leg* than throe weeks before the
election* even though ihe FBPs invest! gad on had beer* ongoing since the end of July 2015.
DOJ's warrant request was based on compelling evidence and prcbcblc cause to believe Page was
knowingly assisting clandestine Russian intelligence Ktiridcs in the ITS.;
Page*s Conneciions fo Russian Government and Intelligence Ofnetek; The FBI had on
irufepsrateflt basis for invest ?ec tin g Pang’s ma ft various and actions during the cam pit pp.
I runs«bn. and following the inauguration * As DOJ described jo detail to the Court, Faga hud
an extensive rec ord
* ^f* 5 prior io jotrina the Trump eampoign* He rc&rdsd In Morrow from 2004-
2007 and pursued business deals with Russia's staic-qwncd energy company Gazprom—
As cariy ss| |, a Russian inteiHgcoccoElcer|
rvc rui tm e n L Page showed I
Uqgpfcfl Page for
3
PROPERTY OF THE ULS HOUSE Or REPRESENTATIVES
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Redactions match previously released version--no additional redactions taken
*
Page rem oiotd an the radar of Russian imeifigenEc and the FBI. Li 2G1S, prosecutor
indicia tluce othtr Rushan spies, two of whom targeted Page fur r&cimunent The FBI also
interviewed multiple times about his ftosslun intelligence contacts. Including in March
2016, 11 The FBFs cccccvti about knowledge of Page's octi villas therefore ]eng predate
the PSPs receipt of Steele's inform aiton*
*
Poge f s Suspirioiis Activity Caring the 2ftl 6 Campaign: The FISA applications also ddat
Page's suspicious activity after joining the Tn rmp campaign in March 2Qi 5. ^ ~ \ ^ '*!
; _____ _ ____ _ J Era-Veled Iq Moscow xu July 2016* during
w fuch he gave & university commencement sidresa — an honor uiusJly reserved ft* well-
known luminaries-.
o 1th in ibis jpwiGc suti-scefum of (he applications that DQJ rpiers to Scdt’j
reporting on Fags arcd i%h alleged coordination nyiib Russian ofBdah. Steele's
information nboul Pago was consisted with die PSPs assessment of Russian
intelligence efforts to recruit him md his'Connections io Russia persons of interest.
o In particular, Stale's sources rcponeti Thai Pog^ met separately while in Russia %\ith
Igor Sechin, a dose associate of Vladimir Putin end executive chairraan of Rosneft,
Russia's 5i3lc-owTicd oil company, end Igor Dlvyekin, askuoi Kremlin officiaL Sechin
allegedly discussed the prospect of future US.-Rus$i& energy cooperation a^4 *tai
associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions unci nit Russia J* DSvyekJn
allegedly disclosed Id Pago thnl the Kremlin possessed compromising ififormotion on
Clinton C^mpromai") and noted possibility of its being released to Candidate
rtt 1 * campaign,* 11 {Nm $: "C&mildaic $1* refers to candidate TjumpJThis closely
tracks %vh =1 oihar R ush an eoatacis iroe infcrmlag ar^rher Tramp foreign pQ\ky
adviser, Gccrgc Fcpadopottios.
« In subsequent FISA rewsvaii, DOJ provided additional information obtained through
multiple independent; sources ihitt eomjhDnsted Steefe^ reporting.
This Lnfpnusticis ecnuodlcis Fagc's November 2 t 2017 leatSmonvf© she Committee, in which
ha initially denied any wh meetings jtnd thru was forced 10 odmii specking with
a
m
THE U.S. I JGU5E OF REPRESEfcTFATIVES
iWj
149
TOP*
Dvorkovich tm-sting with Rosneft's SeeJmMtcd investor rctetrsns chief, Andccy
Baranav*
» T lie Co u rt^p n roved s u rvc ill aucc of Pag tail owe d FI11 to co Licet valuable in I el f *ge a cc*
Tilt; RSA rraews's demonstrate ihn uin FE! collected ftnpaiidjit tovcsfig&tivt* iriformaTkm
ond leads by ccndueimg Court-apF^^eclw^eithrice. For Instance]
Page's efforts ao
sworn testimony to our Committee
alsoeojirnuheims
DQJ*a Tran spare nev about ChriLvtoreheT Sleets
Fas* from ^omitting" materlat facia about Stedt, us the Majority claims,^ DOJ reputedly
Informed theCourt about Steele’s background* credibility, and potential bias* DOJ
explained in detail Steele's phut rdali unship with and coir.pcitsEtiOfi from the FBI; his
c red \ bill tv, report mg history. and source network; ihc fact of and reason for his tormina* ion as a
source te late October 2016; atid the lively pottlical motivations of those hired Steele.
* DOJ wajc trntupnre n rsvif h Court aban t Stce!e's s o u re trtg: Thc Committec MajonD'j
which bed earii zt accused Obnmn AdminismtiOft officials of improper “unmasking faults
DOJ for not jgwsKog Its n^rtits of Specific U.S* persons and etitirfes tn the F(SA application
and subsequentrenewal*. In fact, DOJ appropriately upheld its forigstaidinj* practice of
pro Bering U, S* citizen information by purposefully not “unmasking' 1 US- person and entity
twines* unless they were themselves ihc subcect of ft counterfeit el licence invcsitgafiori* DOJ
instead used gen ere identifiers the! provided the Court with mere than salScicnl mfcnnnticn
to ondtrtUmtl the political context of Steele's research* in art extensive expLuwlrarito the
Court, DOJ discloses tbit Steele
Vi? rjppjncncfef/ £y art fr/£ff/0ra/ £.1.5! li'fip Irrdk&fixiiQ So^rcs *f[Sfede} 2 ‘ shot a
£/£~$OSftJ fffwj7fwr* J terf hired th± ItknHfkd U.$, Person m CQtidtz: research regarding
C&xdfrtate dt ’£* tits to Ruxsfo* (Iht identified US, Person md Source 3f fxrve a fong*
standing btafness ratoUonship) Jhs afzfMPiJ US, person hired Sonnet Pf to conditcl this
research* 7f>a fift miffed U.S. Person never advised Senate 81 as 10 'he teoitvoUon behind the
research fcic Candidate 8} s Iks to Ruzxo. V-c FBf <pc at foies ;ho: theJi'erMRzd U.S. Ptrmn
Ivor likely f&ifan't for infannUfon then Id bejissd to diztzrrdit O sndftfitfc ttJ S COmOtliVtl, *
p
Contmry to the Majority's assertion iltal DOJ fads lo nwntton Lh=i Sieve’s research ^*as
commissioned by ^potifical actors'" :a**obfrfo demsatory inforTnaJiooofiDcnald Tntrnp’s
tics to RussiaT*' DOJ in fact Informed !he Court accuratcTy that Slcde waa hired by
•Q? GlCRZT fi
lyurORi^!
mOPERTT OF THE U,S HCOSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
150
politically-motivated US. persomand entities aati that hi* research nppca red in fended
for use ^ to tltremlii*' Trumprampufgn.
1>0J explained the FBI 1 ! r cese treble bush for finding Steele credible: The applications
correcily described Si celt as | ~
). The gpplkaiiprti sl&> reviewed Steele's multi-year
history °fcredible repenine on Russia 2 nd ci'^ex matters, including infonailion DOJ used in
criminal proceedings 77 Senior FBI and DOJ ciTidab have reputedly ufUirccd lo the
Committee Ibt reliability and credibility of Slide’s spotting, nn assessment el so reflected is
die FOTs underlying scuxctdoeumciils. 21 The FBI hiss undertaken 5 rigorous-process 10 vet
allegations irem Steetek reporting, including with regard to Pz&z?'
• The FBI properly notified she FISC after It remitted Steele ^to source for ninkfog
untinihorked disclosure) to Hie medio* Tfre Majority rites m> evidence that the FBI, prior
10 Filing its initial October 2U 2016 application, actually knew or should fcave known o Party
allegedly inappropriate media contacts by Steele, Nor du lliey cite evidence ihci Sickle
disclosed to Yahoo! details included in die FISA warrant, since the British Court filings to
which they refer do nos eddress wbnt Stcclc may have said to Ych&of.
DOJ iofbnncd the Court b iia renewals that ihe FBI acted promptly to tom i wile Stock after
learning from Mm (after DOJ filed the first warrant application) That he hid cliscusrcd his
work wilh n madia cutlet in fate October, The January 2DIB renewal further wptflfoed io the
Crnrn that Sleek sold ifcc FBI dial he made Ms unauthorized media disclosure becouse of hb
frustration at Director Ccjmcyk public jmacuoccmcnt shortly before the election tlia* the FBI
reopened its investigation iflio candidate Clinton’s emMl use*
DOJ never pM Seecle for ibe “dossier* 1 : The Majority assorts thanks FBJ had "sqxiraitly
cuthorreed payment" to Steele for ht£ research on Trump but neglect so mention that
payment was cancelled and never mpda* As the FBI’s record & m d Commit ree testimony
confuros, although the F3I in itially considered cmapensmloQl _ _ £
^ | Stcde ultimately never received pay in cut from Ike FBI for
atny “dosslcHVrcksfvd ieforrantfon^ DOJ accura tely in formed the Court thsl Steele hnd
been an FBI confidential human source for which he vas ^compensated
I _ ',. „_ | by the FBP - paying for previously-shared inferrearion of value
unrelated to she FBI's Russia investigation,^
Additional Omissions. grrera, and Dlslortiptis in the Majority^ Memnraqdum
" * ' ' - «i
* DOJ appropriately provided lire Court with a comprehensive explanation of Russia's
election interference? including evidence Ibot Russia courted another Trump campaign
advisor* Fapadopmrics, and thatRtUHSm agents previewed their back amt
dissemination of stolen emails* Tn claiming that there ts “no evidence of any coop mi ion or
conspiracy between B&gc and Psp^dopoulos,*^ iht Majority misstates the reason Y/hy DOJ
specifically expired Russia's coLcnmg P^psdopoulos. Papadopouic^s mTeiaaion with
Russian agents, coupled with real-time evidence of Russian dcaiort irasference^ provided
the Ccort with n broader ccwiicxt in which :o c^-katc Russia's cfandeiime activities
Page's history 1 alleged conlaci with Ru55 ; on officials. Moreover, since only ik^c j ‘ ^
e
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
151
_no evidence of o separate conspiracy between him and
'spadapoulos ^vas required. PCM would hftvc h«n ovyligcnt in umillingvllul information
ahotil Popadopoutosand Russia's concerted efforts-
In its Court filings, DQJ mzdt proper use of news coverage. Tbc Majority falsely claims
rhst the FISA materials ‘TcIIcd heavily 11 on a September 23,10TS FaftopfNewa article by
Michael TsikolTand that this article “does not corroborate the Steele Dossier bccausc il fa
derived fram infoirmrtion leaked by Steele himself." ^ Tn fee!, DOJ referenced IsskcfTs
snide, alongside another article the Majority fail* lit mention, not lo provide separate
corroboration for Steele's reporting* but msiearf to inform the Court of page's public darns!
of his suspected meetin gs in Moscow which Page also ecfrosd in a September 23* 2016 let ter
to Co mey. |.,
The Majority’s reference to Bmee Ohr fa misleading. Thf Sfajority mlschnjBCteriz^s
Bruce Ofc’s role, overstates the significance of his Interactions v/ilh Srccle. and misleads
about due limefranre of Ohr s commtiriccibi with the FBI. in ktc November 2016, Oiir
informed the FBI of his prior pmfessiodd tvtotioaship with Stade end information dm
Stede shared with him (including Steele's concern about Tnirup being compromised by
Russia). He also described his wife's contract werk with Fusion GPS, the Him that hired
Stcsle separately. This occurred weeks drier the election end more then a month flRtr ihfl
Court approved initiol FISA op plication. The Majority describes Bruce Ohr as s senior
DOJ official who Averted closely with the Deputy Attorney General, Votes and Inter
Roscnatcm,” \n order 10 imply that Chr y <ves somehow involved in the FISA process, bill there
is no indication ibis is Efcc c£sc.
Bruce Ohn's 0 weti-mpecied career professional whose portfolio La drugs and organized
crime, not eotmterifiielUgefice. There is rro evidence Lhfti he would have known cbout ihc
Psge FISA applications md ihdf contents. The Majority's assertions, moreover, txc
irrelevant in determining llss veracity of Steele's reporting, By lha time Ohr. debritfe wnh the
FBI, it had already terminated Steele as a source and was independently corroborating
Steele's reporting about Page's activities- Bruce Ohr took the iniiiaiive to inform lirc FBI of
what he knew, and the Majority dots him a grave disssmce by suggesting ho is part of some
malign conspiracy.
Finally, IktcrStrzok and JLba Page 1 * test rocisagcs arc irrelevant to the FISA
application. Tie Majority gratuitouslyincludes reference to Simok and Pago os the cud of
their rttemrtraraJoni, In an effort lo imply that political bios infected ihe f BTs investigation
□r.d QQTs FISA applications. In fact, neither Stezck nor Page served as efriaftts cn lhe
applications, which Were the product ofextensive and senior DOJ and FEI review.* 7 In
demonizing both earner professionals, ike Majority accuses Them of'Virec os mating teaks 10
Lbs media." — a serious char^; »mi!s inCQRVari'eR: lext meJESJ^CA, in whkh they Critiqued n
wide range of other afTicirjs wd cerdidLties from bcih parties: docs not disclose tha* FBI
Deputy Director McCrtbc lertificd to the Committee fet he had no idzz what Page sad
Strrok wereicfcmny to in tbcii l, tnsunn« polky" tcslsp 1 end r^orcs Slrzok's
aci^owledgsd role in preparing o publle declaration, by then Director Comey, abcul fermer
Secretary* ClinLjo^’s^ajUrenT* careJas^nass" irthardfing classified informarion-^wfuch greatly
damaged Clmic^s public teputmion in the days jusi prior to the presidential eleci!cn_
7
~ro>r\
T^^nrr/,
^ROPESTY OF THE U.S_ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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Tnn rirrnirr/
1 LcUo to J1P5CI CWmtan D«in Nrnio. Aaltouii Attorney Ccrura! Stephen QijiJ, Deptfljncnl cfJuiiice,
Juuury24,
1 Letter io IfPSCl Chalmum D<vtn Nunes, Aftpmry General Stephen Ocpsuiincri. of JuiJicr,
January 24, 2011 O0J dUd ccnfirmnd ]r> writing ■* Mftlttffiy $nif DOI urul FBTs term* ofrcvicui
Ihe DepEtiTcnem hAs tfrSCrs oversight requeu by jilfowms ftpetfedin ctmcrs gf
Ibe rftsreri&l mrn Appropriaic assure facility under i he general stipulation iha! {!) 1 lie Cbalr(t»r fib
delegate) &nd ifct Ranking Member (or MsdcEqjuk} an J two mfTnebi xiilli appropriate itturlly
tkaraoses hr uirpHttl to rstitw oa brtoirof ilit Commute, C^titaitfteiievfmY peXe phce in u reading
room scl up ill Ihc Department, end (3) that ihc documi-s no; leave ihc physical control of the Etepurtinmi,
and (5) that the review eppertumtica bz blpanhmi ifl rtaiure- Though \vt originally ratpuSaed that no ntric*
be uhco, tn neXoo'iv'RdsJ^t.oj'o by ilie Cmurailtectind recognizing that rite volutct of document
had terrcmrd with time, Ihc Dcportnvcm evcmuaily altavvcd boiw la be taVerj to fyejtftnle HPSCl's review.
Also, Initial rtvftwi ofThe material include {sic] sjtan briefings by Department officials lopm ike mtfcrial
\n EcntextamS Id provide sgtficaddJttoca] mfannaAiocL
Em&i] from Stephen Boyd id HPSCI Minority SpfT, Janunry l&, 30 E$ {tmphflii.i supplied).
1 Uttej to I4PSC1 OittimWi Devin Nune*. Auidtiilt Attorney Cenend Slepkcn Boyd, Peptflfltcni of Justice,
Jimimry 24.201S,
1 Papadopoutefa Qm\xt 5 t 2017 piUy plea add* further JeMnft m this Initial tip, by clarifying to a Kuulrm r$em
mid Papnctopcultn trim w Thry [the Ruisbms] have dm tmlwr’ 1 ; “The Ru^toliihod emails of Clinton": ’they Ime
(limiauid* pfemillV' US tv George ttopnAopovlQi (JM7*cM£2, District of Cnfu Tib to), p, 7>
7 Untfor the Special Ctnuiiel’j direction, Rynn and PupmlopauJtM have both pleaded guilty ii> lying to fttfcrul
tmestlptofS cjid [ire co&pcPtTAg with ihc Special Ortutsd'a wltrEo MannFan ejidlib I^AgoIrnc dOt,
fomicrTajrppdrpyly cafitpnJen rnaJinger Rick Gxt% have bam Indicttd m multiplecoima nmd art tw^klns etJuJ,
Set U.SL v. MteJmt T. Ffytm (1:17^-232, 0 k Met vt Com mb??); US ^ PeuiJ, Manafon, Jru ond fiidwrd IK
Cotes Ilf (h I7<r-20J, Obiritt of Columbia^ tf.S. a, Gctrgti Pc^ljpout&i {1:17-tM B2 k Dbtritt of Columbia).
n DcpDJimcntofJLiilkVt Foreign Intelligence S'-rvcilbnce Court Applicailan* CMebrr2ti 20ld t p.lS. RepraloJ in
suWqwni renewal cpptlceiioM
11 Dcpurtnwtit of JuJilte* foreign IntelUgeiwc Sorttillsuicc Court Applkallon, June 2? f 20l7 t pp. 2(p2 \
8
PROPERTY OF THE ILS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
153
___ ihc FBI mi brafidtr Intelligence Gm^rjmi/lWgk
ccniiOciice iiijt”rr;irnE Vrjtt i&c K^t iso £3 rtittmt ai i eo la a eevert (ckteifcrmce campaign in inf! irsiec thE
2S1G elect icei. including laai HLj'ien in m :ren« 2 rears"‘eonftjircmiYcd ±c OKC“cnd WiluLnb subscc k jct>%
l£s3tcd in JcN 20!6 “a-trove 1 ’of DMC trali Dcfrarttfosl ofiutfice. Femign tadF£efK£ SurveBbftee Cojrt
Application Catcher 21, 1QI&, pp. 6-7. Repented lh- 3 updated flew ifiFMTna'ion tfi sc^j«;jRrL rrnfi^vsl
appl %d?, icfi= D epiitmcitf cf Itta ifae, Fcnr^ TftTcHigMKe Server! : 3 : Cc urt Applicali do. June 25.20 f 7, sjk 2v-21 *
1 Oc^nirrtnlof i:sl!Ct, Forrign InteH^c-cc Survetfliirr Court Applies! iai\ lers 35,201 ?. pp. 36 . 46 , A&.
Dcpaftpeni of JnsJkt, JvuelH$rx* SujwUiece Court AppJScdloix. Jlt: 29 r 20?7, p, ftk
K HPSCl Mq^^MBnerarjduiP, Foreig ;1 /d f rf%Mee 5- rvclitesff Ac! Abuses *t iht OeparftflVr/JiA'its ecrsrf
Federfl/ 0 /ftr w jF ^ff rtfefr 1st;; ray l B r 2038. np_ 2*4 {cr’ax^br "cantoris" af feL Tegardxg S'cdc
*rd his ecttviuct, fro/n the P^cFlSAsppISoalioas),
** Glenn SecpGe.
" Christopher Steele,
J ?cfrhx Cose IX?.
:J ttattld Tre^pi
J Dcjanmni of Juatfoe, iriklligaace Surrcijtsm Catm AppficElwca, Oci-sbcrRl, 201^ pp* E5-'c. r. S.
Repented bs WJKequcotTCwrail epplf salens-
a 'HPSCI Mstafy MemeiSidqnv Fortfsz Jdir/f&ciKS $wv£i!te*K&*ki Abuses <Z ite Dtp&zfifi r 0 /vfetflSSr enaf
/fte ArimoJ Bxrrsst 0 //.TTarigo/foT. Jasxaj £5,20IS, c*. 2.
” Dffpwtr&eai af Jualcp, Fcecfgn Imdligtfiat SurvelC^ce Co^r. Apptezikm, Ckr_*er 2!. 2c 16 . p. 15, fiMtzoce 3.
Rsptaiftd Co ichi^juont rer.es*at applisstT^ii.
n fettrifiew of Araircw M-Citc (FOl CHrp:[y DircclOt.V Ho^ PCOAuCsT SelectGfcamilWfc e't btrlli^trct^
Dtcoip&cr i9.2Cn, p> 45, lOO; til£rvi^ cf Sally VotciifooTJer D*Tft^ Affooej Gohiorol), Ho^k PzurmtL: Ee!ki
C jTuninec on Ir^clligenes, Kov^rpbcr 3, 2017, p. J 6; tesEcview sfuh Jaha Caifei {ttitttt Ant-.T^y Gastral
{fee WfiLfaittl Searityj, Ko^ew FitmaoccE Select Comfin'r^e on July, 203", p. 2> +
iTUervtew of Andrew M<Cab=^03 Dcpjry Dl^cror), Hoieye Pern^^t Select Coaur.fr.te m Jrtt«Ili£rr«,
December 1%2£:X& LOO-107, \ 15.
72 fa&evigwoTFEH Ag<nz. ^<ntec Pcrrn^xot Sekei C^^iiree cs InieiEijonos, Deoen.ber^O, 017 E p, HI
J> Oipamr.eiucf-ustfce, Fairiga InlelfeiceeSuTvelSJtacfeCourt Appiiczlian.October 2J, 203fvpp, 15-id.rL S,
Repealed :a ^db^uonE opplte^kaitf,
H^SCI MtniitSEdnTC, FereSgr inteiUgffisz Sxnpegfaxs AfZ .ibiutr &ih*t Qtp&vr^Ti of J&Jtt ard
t : \? Frdtrd B^fsn of AhoijjgafNifi. ient^ri- IS, 20IS, p, 4 (TF-* FISA app!;caiwn (rsfitloE» nlbxntaJiDa
rtcirtiln^ fdlew Trurnr* ra,T^i^> advl^rCjorge Pip^fcpculo?, bet there it r-Ocridowe of any eopperahrs cr
coj^prrccjr ber^en Page zrd PipadopocteT)
l - !1PSC1 Ni»jcn?/ Fof&zrr kutti&ObfrSzrvtAlhr-r** Ac* AbuttfZmlks Q&srtestftt dfJusFcr zrd
;h* Fedtrd S,v£}» t>f ifttcSJr^ciinsi, Jteiiiry IS, 2D IS. p, 2_ Nri'-hcf Ii^cojT nor T^Aoof sjc spec; fimlly IderjirHed tn
Sbe FISA MaEerrilE, in hcetbg wjCiI ht FBI'S |cctrii prxticeof c» rtferrti^hg U S, per^tJS,
** Ocpartrt^onl ofJtmrce, Forrijr* InEcitis^'ice Suzv eBhree Coun Applrcetfc^ C^nbcr 2!^ lO^G w p. 25; D-rparrTijm
5 _ rJuske, foreign Intdil^cace S'^rV'etflzrr-a Coufi AppL'^Eui, fftdiuy |l r 2017, p. J1: Cansr Fage, Leixur D F31
^ recto r iCenne y. Sept crater 2y, 231G. «
PROPERTY OF THE U S, HOUSE OF REPRESEFfTATIVES
* SBtemcurcf Aodrsw <r! =Cabe [FBI D'rcdc^ Heist Pcsrc^m SslJfC Oe^SJCitt« ?n CntelligeEre.
Oe^Uf t9 r 2€i7, p, IS?.
, jp igcft g
T7|
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
155
(U) Appendix G - Senate judiciary Memo about Steele Referral
TO? SECRET/ / NOFO W
{UNCLASSIFIED when separated from etfechment)
Hiram Starrs Smart
VTA ELECTRONIC TRANS VOSS (ON
The HooomWc Rod J. Rasennnn
Deputy Attorney General
U,S. Depertmem of Justice
950 PamjylvmJa A'.emue, MW
Washington, DC 20530
The Boocahle Christopher A. Wray
Ptmctur
Federal Bureau of Invtsil^don
93 5 Pemnsyivania Avscue, NW
WtahmgtGCL DC 20535
Dear Dcpcny AttOEtey General Rosetvstonsnd {Xraeisjf W*ay:
Attached fmd t deified metooreEdimi related to curtnin cammtmicEiicTis between
Christopher Steel* *ad multiple U.S, ncwscsiikts r^gartHctgthe sorted *TrttEp dossil Ihsi Mr,
Sleek compiled cu behalf of Fcsimi GPS fa: the C lie ton Campaign «Ed the Dcn<ximk Nfifiioiusl
Committee and eha provided to the FBI
8ocd an the tcitxTmrion contained theresa, we arc mpcafuUy referring Mr. Steele to you lb?
mvcstigaSlan of potential violations of tl U.S.C. § tOC!* for statements tbe Committee has reason to
bdleve Mr, Stock nusdc nrgErdicg hb db*-rihuiittn cf information toettairsd & i!« dAsslaf,
Thfick, ycu fbr you? prompt aaenGoo to iMs toipqfterit mutter. IFyou have my quest'otu*
please ccTTitazi Patrick Davis cr DcLv^a Ley of CbnLTTtan Or9sjIcy*fl Itafl s3 {202) 224-5225*
Steccrely*
Committee mi the hsSidary
Eudomre: Ai staled.
TOP SECRET/ (NOFP RN
(LTOCIASSIFIED when separaled from atfccehmtm?
PROPERTY OF THE IAS. hC'JSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
156
THF
I
I
Anon*? Oc&enJ Rojcmuin wvd Director Wny
Jimmy *l k 20!K
Pag* 2 of 2
cc: The Honorable Dionne Feintlcin
Ranking Member
Committee on the Judiciary
The Honorable Rjeherd Burr
Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
The Honorable Made Werner
Vice Chairman
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
I
The Honorable DevioNunce
Chairman
House Pemtanenl Select Committee on Intelligence
The Honorable Adorn SchifT
Ranking Member
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
157
MEMORANDUM
FROM: Charles TL Grassiev, Chairman, U.S* Scrxie Committee on (he Judiciary
T. tnJscy 0. Graham, Chairman Subcommittee m Crime and Tejremm*
U. 5. Senate Committee on ibc Judiciary
TO: The Hocwrabte Rod J. Roscnstem, Deputy Attorney General* U.$*
Department of Justice
The Hoonnibit: Christopher A. \Vray, Director, Federal Barest of
ta vestige an
RE: Refrrnu. cf Chrisio pher S loci e for Po icDtisI ViaJar: cm efl ® U. S .C §1001
£U) As yen know, ibifticj Drftfoh Inldligeftcc Officer Christopher Steelc was hired by the
private firm Furs bn GPS b June 201ft 13 father mfcratfion obovT '’links benv^ti Russia aad
[ibethprescfemial casditb^c] OonaJd IrumpS 1 Pursuant to that harness eira^cmenL Mr. Steele
prepared a series of documents syfcd ss tfttelii§ei&e reports, SfriM ofwhich fflisr complied
bto a ''dossier' : nrd published by ita^/Wf/ia January 201 ?.* On the face of the dossier, :i
appears that Mr. S$ee*e gathered muoh of his mformaiioii from Rician government <c times
inside Russia. 1 According to (he Saw fi-m Ptiiins Coia, Mr, Secies dossrer-rcUf cd efforts were
funded through Fusion GPS by ihat lew firm on behalf of the Democratic National Comovucc
aM the Clinton Campaign. *
(U) In response to repeating fey the iV<xshtn%im Pass nbtnjt Mr. Steele** ratatianshi p Vrith
the FBI relating lo this ponim dossier project, the ludbisty Comaucte* begtn raising a series of
qiwstiO-is to the FBI oral the Justice Department abcu; these matters ns pen of the Committee^
coostitetiend oversight respoosfbilmesf
CLT> The F33 has since provided the Committee access to ebssiffcd documents relevant lo
the FBI’s relationship with Mr. Steele sod v-hether tic FBI relied on his dossier wort- As
explained in greater detail bdovv, what iiubmiaticn tn those closes tied documents ts evaluated b
fight of sworn stmemanti by Mr. Siecle is British litigation, it &pp££rs lhai either Mr Sieefc lied
to the FBI or th£ British court, ct ihat declassified dxumcnis reviewed by the Corrjruuco
contain mmtmlly false statements.
’ (U) Deduce* Giib^rcr u M r QrbZ: Sxii*±M U'gcnc* Lifcita* dftiCtejfo&pktrSfttf^ Chum Ha.
tlQSTDQOJl5, QtfCfe’J Bexscb CAp. 4, HJIl), cenr $ (HeJcsaJla "Sfcrck S££«Eteoi T] [Ar^dLasniT A],
3 lU> fJ st pan. JO: KaiBod^\ Mki&Si erd Mart Thu*p.cpnrrj Alirgt Tne»p Hoz C<^p Tits
10.20IT)
7 {uy id
*(11) .to u 2 J sai, Devlin E^rrcq *%c K.asaliod £ tkKkrm**. Gta AV'C feJfxr rbal L&J
to RiitHa tfeujjVr, T:r^ WAsiitv^rns Pt,isT (Ox 2J t 2G17> +
- (U) Tan i^rf RmitPd S Kddanus, f 2/ Ortce FAaoctf/o Rru ak
Fhra^p THE- A^ASNiNiOtLis Ft^T (FdL 2?^ 20171.
1
Tor jICRLT/j 1
■ ?i - 0vC ’ r ; ^
TROPFSTV OF WE US. HOUSE OF RePI<ESENTATIVES
158
(U) In retpnme fo the Committee's inquiries, the Chairman cml Ranking Member
received a briefing on March 15,2017, Dura ihen* Director Jtmes B, Comey* Jr*
briefing nddns««l the Rutttio MVCttigjiliDfi, \}k lOTa relationship wxUi Mr,
SteeK wad the FBI's reliance on Mr. Steeled dyesitr in two applications if riled for surveillance
under ihc Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FtfiA). Then* on March 57, 2017, theChuinnrut
arid Ranking Member were provided copi es or die two retevnnt FiS A applications, which
requested authority to conduct surveillance of Carter Faye. Doth relied heavily on Mr. Slack's
dossier claims arid boih fipplicall om uw granted by the Foreigo Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FJSC)* In December of 2017* ihe Chainvuin, Ranking Member; and Subcommittee
Chnirnian Graham were flowed to review a torn! of four FISA applications rely mg oo the
dossier to seek strive! tace of Mr. Cana Page, ns well as tin mams other FBI documents
reiaung to Mr. Steele,
(U) Similarly. in June 2017, forma FBI Director Comcy testified publicly before the
Serna e Select Committee cm Intelligence Owlw h&d briefed President*Fleet Trump on the
dossf or allegations In Jim wiry 2017, whkh Mr, Conley described os “sdaeiour and
“unverified"®
cvjkctl id the Mmch 20H briefing why the FBI relied on ihc dossier in tht
FISA applications abwmr mcsmtigrui cunobomliDfi—wtd m light of die liighly political rmidves
&wrcmlin^; its cnsaUorv—tlitn-Directoi Comey slated thru the FBI included ihc dossier
allegations shout Ccoier Page In Ihc FISA npplicnticms because Mr. Steele himself was
tonM tiered tt liable due to hb pn*t work with rite Ourcau-
^U^ndoed, the documents we have njvievvad show that the FBI lock important
investigative steps largely based on Mr. Steele's information—and relying lienYtly on bis
credibility, Specifically, cm October 21,2016, the FBI OJed its first wrurttU application untlcu
PISA fc; Cencr Pegu. This inula) application relics in pen on EMegec past Riissum anempts to
recruit Page yaws ago. That ponton is less than five rsges. Hie bulk of Out application consists
DfullcgfliH>a5 agtunsi Pugc thal were disclosed so the FBI by Mr. Steele trnd ara also outlined in
the Sleek dossier, The application appears it? contain no additional information tenroboraemg
the dossier allegations against Mr Page, although It does eric to a news ankle thru appears in be
secured to Mr, Steeled dopier ns welt
fr £\J j Slfllsmert of j|Mt9 fck G&niey. Jr., Heaifia of lie UJK. Sen Seiner Coxirk on fnlel%mw flux; t 4 20! T|
l
TOP SECRET
NOFORN
PROPERTY OF THE U S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
159
TOP SECRET )
/NOFOR
|TT*£ FBI discussed thereliability of this unverified mkrTrairen provided byMr.
Sitclc in fooijxxcs 5 aad 15 of Ui? USA wamtst appUcaiioiL First ibe FBI raced re a vaguely
limited extent the pel ideal origins of the dossier. fn fgoutde 8 Ibe FBI £3ic-d thru ihc dossier
Information was compiled porswret to indirection of a tow ten who h^d hired an "identified
U.S. penorf—now knottn es Oinm Simpson tJ Fusion QFS^-^to terd^t f^sc^reh regarding
[Trump'si tics to Russia The FBI farther “*p«uiaic[cl]" that Ml Simpsor* 'hsts likely looking
for information Ihei ccdd be used lo discredit [Tnsmp's] careprign " The application Med to
disdosc that the :dcntttic3 of Mr, Simpson's ultimate efforts were ihc Clmirnt cunpaijn und ’Ik
DNC.
FBI ;tatoi to Lie HSC lhai "tased an [Steele's] previous repairing h friary
with [Slccfej provided reliable infnmvuign to the FBL the F£! bdtffVCs
[Steele si reporting re be credible/' in start, it appears the FBI relied cn scanned ly
LmwnobtrroictS mfamaiiQQ* fumlcd by end obtained for Secretary Cliaeifs preridciutal
campaign, in order to conduct surveillance of «n associate of the opposing presidentiaj candidate.
It did so bused on Mr, Sleek 3 pcrsocnl eredjfccJ iv* and presumably having frith in hb process of
obtaining the infcnnsifcn*
(I?) But there is substantial evidence surest ing Ih&t Mr. Sredc materially misled the FBi
aJboui a ter asp ec: oFhis dossier effort one wtJch beam on his credibility
lb the October 2016 FiSA^plieoimn, and In each of vta drnre renewals* niter
relaying Stede's dossier ollc^arions against Cirxr Page, the FBI simc-s: * ISt«ftifoM ifceTBJ
that hc/sbeonh' piavrded !bii information to ihc business aft j qciak IFarinn G5*$l and the
ESI " 7 (emphasisadded). Indeed the FISA rcnewu!ap^fieationitt January 2017 notes ihci
Steele hod received 1
F et the FIBA applications rq:c tbc exist axe of a news enicle doled September
23 1 .2016, winch in partkoloi remained some cf the same dossier information dxmi Mr. Pig:
compiled by Mr. Sicde and on which the FBI retied in its application^ While rst explicitly
slBEeth this b presumably ihe crticle by MIdhid rrikuff of Yeh&v tiled ^U,S- Inlet
Officials Prebs Tiu Between Trump Adviser c?A Kremlin,'' After noting \hsi Mr. Steele had
claimed lathe FBi he had only provided ihfr iaicnnarioa Iq the FS! cr£ Mr. Simpson- the
appfrcaikm attcirrpu u? explsin nw'&y &< UKonsbtency between Me. Side’s asscetion to th^ FBI
and the existence of dte ankle, apparendy re shidd Mr. SrecleVs credibih^ orr which it srilS
relied for the renewal request lire app^cadcn to the FISC .said: "*Cvivan thaMh? infomtllbn
canlrixnM in the September 23 d news allele generally matches ibt Likrreali ai; about Ps^c ih*t
[Stcefc] discovered doing hix ( ?ier research,I
*iK FSt JUi f4ikd to pravtk the CctjTl^* -hs 102?^ ^cjnoiting iLi wf Mr. Serer^svem-a^ tD the
FBI, so the Ccwwiiccc d relying tm dw acciray cftisc FSfs F15C tJwse st^snnenK.
3
PROPERTY OF TF!F U S HOUSE* OF REPRESENTATIVES
160
—_ _ _ ___ . ^ 77ie FBI dim not bclitvt lhat [Slrcic] directly provided this
mfoiTOlion i& the press' 1 {emphasis added).
foy ith>:c 9 of ils January 2CO 7 cppliuiriixi (t> renew to PISA wamui! Ibf Mr.
Page. to FBI 2gak addressed Mr. Stede'scredibility. A i tot lime, to FBI rated that it had
suspended its rekooosiap with Mr, Sltfle id October 2016 because of Steeds "tmmithonzBd
disclosure of infqnoziira L& to pres** Tha FBI relayed toi $tesk been byihervd by die
FBI's ftotifjeaii&ft io Congress in October 2016 sbous to rrap^cmg of to Clinton investigHiioiv
to B5 aresuti ^{SfeetcJ mdeptoeruly ?jid to prior admoiusnmeiil Sttn to FBI to
speak mfy m\h to FBI on this maher, mewed to tuning dlsauscd herein * dossier
dkgatioos against fage] !d zn identified nows argpmi?jaimn/‘ However* to FBI continued in
cite to Mr. Sietk’a psst work ss evidence offe reliability, end staled tot t4 to kcidenl toi led
to to H5l sutspertdir^ its refetoarfiip wish {Mr. Si«k{ occumd ahe? [Mr. StcdcJ pro^-kted" to
FB1 with to dossier information described id the application. The FBI finther asserted in
IboLDore 19 tot ii dhi rart believe that Stcdc directly gave InfoniiclioD to yahoo jVfH r 3 fhfifc
^Wished the September 25 News Article*
doamxfttotl in the FISA renewals, the FBI still '■ccn'rd to bdic^cd Mr
Stetle^&nie^telns tail be bad only provided to dossier information in to FBI and Fusion—
snd not to to medi^—prior w Ms October media coatsci toi resulted in to FBI suspending the
rd&iicmahijx Accordingly, to FBI still deemed to infomratioa he provided pries to the October
disclosure to be rrfolfe After all, to FBI already believed Mr- Siedk wns retkble, he had
previously told to FBI be hajinoi shared the mforre^tion with to prtsj - nod lyln^ to to FBI ii
£ crime. In dcfrouiraj Mtr. Steele's cnrdibiliiy lolhe FISC to FBI hsd potoi an innocuous
expisnnlioft foe toScpsnibeu 25 ankle* based on the assumplipn tot Mr, Sleek had told to
FBI to innii afcpa His contarlB. The FBI then voutod for him tvdec more, uriog the
rationale, In aubsa^sami Replications tiled w-itfuhe Foreign Inttltiffncc Sunrciltanct
Court in April and Juce 2017,
(U) However. public reports, co\srt Slings, End informfliion obTalnzri by the Committee
during witness iulcroc-As in to course of its ongoing javestJgoimo indicate thoi Mr, Steele no*
cnly provided dossier inform atinn lo to FBI, bn aka to numerous oictiia otunm^tions prior !o
to end of bis relationship with the FBI in October 20I6P
(U) )e> Stock's sworn court filings in liiigcBon In London, he cjhniaed toi he “^gavcofl
the record briefings id 4 sipeII mtitvbn of jOtumlrsts about to preelection rnemoiflilfk [i«., ihe
dossier] in lata sumnieraurumn 2016/^ In auotor swxtrr filing in fci css£, Mr. Siiaete ttutor
* (U)£*r s^tele Stevesi It Zt«pc=xw w fer FttfCpt Icfcrir^an Pmo-iS» CFR
ball t E, Gi^anjv At r. oncf Va. HQi 71>2D413,
Ocsto’s Bscdi JS. 7% [HmawJki 5<aUrsirn 2 "J T<rr. and
S Heldemm. fery Fcttttt foirisri^v'^rte C&T^^rir^f Tra^.Soj.Tjer, TIE
V/ai f 0KGTa\ POST (Fst^ 2|. 2D IS^i5or; Traser^. Cl Foe 3 ch- C<Etn. <*; cmy.
r (U> StceLc Stattmcm I - paix. 22.
4
PROPERTY OF THE U S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
■
stated iha5 joumafea &dri New York Times* the Washington Post* Yahcm Ncwb* ihe New
Yorker, and CNN - were ^briefed si the end of Sep ft m her 20(6 byfSftd*} Fysjan ai
Fusion's srtsmKticn_ +T 0 The filing rimher states chat Mr* StctJe J ‘subsequently parikipsted in
Anther rneetjngs a: Fijian's insttuciion wfcfc Fu^cfv md the Nrw York Times* the Washing! dr
P ost, and Yahoo New, sroich took place raid-Qcsober 2016/* 11 Accord Jug to ihcse court fdmgs*
Ttjhc bricSngs involved ihe disctosuKOf Jimflrf tnTcttigcncc regarding tadicariofts of Russian
interference in the US election process t ht possible c<M>fdm£ftcn of members ofTnuop*$
campaign icnmacd Russian govemroem oflScialsT^ fn hb interview with the Committee.
GCcrm Simpson of Fusion GPS ccafinnrd this &£ccuni by Mr, Steele sod his ecmptti y as filed In
the British coon. 1 '
he fim of these filings was publicly reported in the lf*S. madia in April of
20l7~yet the FBI did not subsequently disclose ;o the FISC this evidence >uggesUngthai Mr
Steele had 3 led to the FBI. Instep the appUcadoti still retied primarily cn tas credit Etny prior *>
the October media modem.
FBI received similar [afoonatioo from a JtsUee Department
official times Oftr* wcej maintained contorts w*th Mr. Simpson zmd Mr, Steele about (her
dossier wrck* whose wife also waited for Fission GPS on the Russia jproject. In mi interview
with the FBI on November 22,2015, Mr. Obr siKed that Mr* Simpson gave ihe I
ft
same interview Mr, Steele w^s “desperate to see that Mr* Tnurrp was net elccied
president/* None of ahtictfonnatfon provided by Mr. Ohr in his itttenriews wfeh the FBI was
included in the Fl&A ttr^wzi applications, despite its relevance to whether Mr. Steele tei lied lo
the FBI about his eoflEsets with dw media as vreii ss Its brosder relevance to his credibility end
hb stated political motive.
1 xifttra, 13. {fmpftuti iJixJ).
[A Tbt £ib£ (±sa described hr ccdb lomsci rau-ted ^ iIre FETs scjpcrtt *on of K?
7*nE5?5r!j7rtriS}i Mr. Sjrric, jtaric^: *'Io oddi-Sior. and zz 2 ±j c yufca'i rnDDdka ra 'e'* OvUSx* 201 G Freese!
rWcretiiTt HricTrJiLmofiit fjrca Mother Jm* 5 irv Si>p=—
15
>nTl «*«««■ ‘Tjjpjcrtpt, Oa FjJj iritb tbeSea C^otzl ^ She JEdftiiry El205-07.
hmowov; 2 x 2019
£cRHQ2{Pe& 12,20(F)
ftr *=T3~jOT (Not* 22,2D 1ST
-30PER7Y OF THE U,5* HOUSE OF REPRESENTAnvSS
a62
Sffltf
f HIOPOKN
$
! Mr, Slcclc lied fo foe FBI ulxjyt htf mcdm cOniocU nrkviinl for m
least hw First* it it relevant to hb credibility a* n mjutcc, panic ulajrly ^i^cn the lock of
corroborjiinn for fab dnimj, m tot at the lime they were included in the FtSA ppplicdAikmv
Second, it is relevant [q i lie rduibitiiy of hrs mforrnation-gofotring effort*.
(U) Mr. Sltxlc conduct'd h\% work for FuiionGPS compiling the "pnNdrciion
meniorwuhT "(l)]mram June and uarfy November 2C16 " pt in dm British litigation, Mr. Suselu
acknowledged briefingjounvi lists ebom \ht dossier memoranda "fa foie summer/nmumn
20I6,*' 15 Urtsiwpjfaiogly, durfag the summer of 2016, reports of m least some of foe dossier
:d legations began circulating ozneng rcpancre end people involved jn Russian issues.^ Mi
Stedc also admitted in the British ihigaitot) to briefing journalists from itvc JftaMigran F&v,
Yahoo Ht swi, foe to Ibrfctr, and CAW fa September of 20)6*® Simply pul, foe men? people
i
who ecmleniporKncously knew that Mr. Specie waa com pi ling h is dossier, the more JtMy it was
vulnerable 10 itUEnipu!mioit + In foci, in foe British IhigaliDo* which involve? a posi-elcciien
dossier meraomuduni, Mr, Steele mfotitisd font he received and included in it imsoiiciU4 —and
unverified—allegations/* Thai filing implies that he similarly received unsolidted inidligence
on these matters prior to the election aj weil, stating that Mr. Steele "continued to receipt
unsolicitedfattfHgettte cm the matters covered by the prc^clcvlion memoranda after dvr US
Presidential election " a
(U) One memorandum by Mr, Streic lhal was net publis hed by ff uzr/h 1 */ is dated Octo ber
19 , 2 Q 16 . The report all^ ^iHHUjU^^ Well
M t, Stctlfs mtmnjtavJS^S^KnnscIJmpS this report from Jon
ES Suae Deportment/* ilai the report wiia the second In u seric^mHhijnh^epori wits
th at came fr om n foreign tub-scutcc who 'Is in tocontact
friend uffocClinrciw, whopped ti itHHH B istroublingenough
foul foe Uimoti Uornpcngn funded Mr. Stctfe r « work, but ihullhes* Clinicn touOCtatc* were
contemporaneously feeding Mr Steele ailegn items auks additional concern* about hta
credibility.
17 (If) Sit* ft StaivmEjvi 1 ci pw P,
** 1U) SEcdc Stoivrncnt t ■: fwrn, W
tf (Lf) Ahlunpifoln Tr&aKTfat On Fik vrhhthc Sen, Canuti, an fop Jttjldtfy (Nfr. AhXflieuhJn InCamcd fo*
Commtia= ihutfai began hsa^i^ ft om Journal in* about iht before k wiy p^tl/ihed, ccMjihoti^'j it wto iJi^
nurjner af2D15>.
15 [U> Stcc^k Sttuerr^ftt 2 u\ pcn, 19 (flnptum atkkilj,
#l fU) Surk Stsjcmesil I a p«m IS wxi 20c
r * w SiaeIc StakdEfi 2 at ^ rScet nci Kthrly adughi, K >tt5 merely tcceSfr^.n
6
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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RFI’RCSEMTATIVEP
163
Steele then apparently passed this report to the FBI.
fc:np!y put. Mr. S.'cdc Told the FBI be had col shored the Carter Pigo dc^sicr
infon^^^^WxTtd his client end the F3L The Department repealed ihn! china id d* FISC. Vet
Mr. Steele acknowlodged in swnm fifing* that he did brief Yahoo j\V*vj end other media
organizations about the dossier around the liras of the publication of the Yahoo A f ei rs article thst
seems to be based cn the dossier.
(U) On September 23,2016, Yahoo Hwi published its art-tfegritted**U.S. Intel
Officials Probe Tics BemcnTnwrp Adviser aad Kremlin," 1 * ThattcrticJc described claims
about meetings between Caret Page and Russians, iocludirg Igor Sechin Mr. Srcftln is
described in the article as “a longtime Putin associate and former Russian deputy prime minister^
under sanction by the Treasury Department in response to Russia's sedans in the Ukraine.’*' The
ankle attributes the information te»"s well-placed Western intelligence source," who reportedly
said lhAt**fc]i their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions vrilh
Page/' 25 This information also appears in multiple ^racroomrrda 4 * ihst nrske up the dossier. 24
(U) in sum, aiound Inc same rime Yahoo tieirs published ris article containing dossier
infonnniior) about Carter Page, Mr. St tele and Fusioo GPS had briefed Yahoo &Vwj and ether
news outlets abcut information conraintd in the dossier.
_[ifcese fads appear to directly contradict the FBI’s assertions in its initial
application for the Page PISA warrant, as well as subsequent renewal application*. The FBI
repeatedly represented to the court that Mr. Steele raid the FBI he did n at have unauthorized
contacts with the press cbotii the dossier prior tc October 2016. The FISA applications make
these claims specifically m the context of the September 2016 FsAca Kevn elide. Bui Mr.
Stock has admitted—publicly before s court of law—that he dl4 have such contacts with'ihe
press at this time, zrd his former business partner Mr. Simpson hw confirmed i! to the
Committee. Thus, the FISA eppJ leal tons are either materially false in claiming that Mr. Steele
said he did not prov ide dossier information to the pros prior to October 2016, or Mr. Steele
m3de materially false statements to the FBI when fcc claimed he only provided the dossier
information to hi* busmen partner and the FBI.
Bj: this care. Mr. Steele’s apparent deception seems to have pc«d significant,
material consequences on the FBPs investigative dec iso res and representations to the court. Mr.
Steele's information formed s significant portion af ihc FBI's warrant application, and the FISA
application relied more heavily on Steele's credibility than cn any independent verification or
corroboration for his claims. Thus die basis for tbc wwrrmi authoricug survciJI&Dcc on a U.S.
citizen rests largely on Mr. Steele's credibility. The Department of justice h=s a responsibility ro
23 AO Mkb*! lstkefT. US Intel Ofjktvi: ProSe 7>r? Si C*m Trans AdrUir owl Krtxlia. Y»foa Ntwv (5ept. 2i.
roic).
? *(U)W
* <U) U
* tU) ftttfir.gtr c 1. st, BtTzJtHrt
7
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
164
TQ. n scoter/
m/mo roar.
determine whether Mr. Steele provided false information lu the I’BI and whether the Fill's
representations to die court were in emir.
(U) Accordingly, we are refer ring Christopher Steele to the Department of Justice for
investigation of potential violaiion(s) of 18 U.S.C. 5 1001.
8
/waron w
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
s
t
\
5
UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT A
f QP S g &R W //
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
165
IN THE HIGH COURT Of JUSTICE
QUEEN'9 BENCH DIVISION
\
i &&lriifia>ttQ17000413
-k mw
BETWEEN:-
( 1 ) ALEKSEJ GUBAREV $60 ,Q?
(23 WE82JLLA B.V. rW
(3) WSBZ3UA LIMITED
lA) XBT HOLDINGS 5.A,
Gal maw
-and"
( 1 ) QRB 15 BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE LIMITED
(2J CHRISTOPHER STEELE
Defendants
DEFENCE
ti Clerics 5ns to jt tfcs PsrtjoJsn G& i~ *rr*3D
introduction
t. Save thst It is Emitted Orel lh» Second ard ThErt? C&Vnar^s arta testing
lnlna 3 truc v *^e companies £ased in St© Netf^ands and Cy^pjs raperihrely, nc
admlss ans cra&ada as to psfsgtapfts l aod 2 ,
2 Pa 3 -S aco edjn&sd
3, Ofbto was kxrtiad in 5003 by tto Second DefsndanJ &nd Burrows
4 , Tfoo SeeofW Defendant erd Cfetotopiw Series fofrea^y santor fend
experienced Cccwm servants in ihft Rr^jgn end CsmjrrOfrwesEfli C 55 ^*
5, Andrew Wood GCMG was 14 b Brtdsft Ajn&assodoi lo fcetv*sen 1595 end
2000, Ha Is an Associate Peltow cJ ins Russia end Eu/acta PrcsfafVfiO st the Roys3
EftstiEuifl for intentions! Aftecna el Cha Ha h on A^cdate oE O rbto.
l
PROPERTY OF THF US. HOUSE OF RRPRESEr-rTATPoES
167
6 . Fusion GPS f Rested)is a consulsncy bssed In Washington DC ruioerch.
nbz&?c inSe$*genee &i*i due difgtfics service a a?
7 Prior to ->s ever ,is in bsua m this cass ihe Defendants Jtq- a ¥rorX : 3£
niatonsfrp with Fustoo ore* a rumbcr c'ysiis,
& Ai o 3 “j;srtci &r&i Putkxi wsc to an ofrfgalion fx;l {a dr^^ow) ta [K-ti
psrti^a ocnfdeafcLal totetTgtfroe mflter'ai provided tn 11 by Uia Ccferdants Ln the
course c? ffias «*2.r5dnQ nHaisonsh^) v^ w r^ tfta sgf&Emerrtcnhe Defendant.
7hc pre-efeetten memoranda
9* jtrai and early November 2C!S Obis was on^agsa ay Fustoct ic prepare a
Eftf:es cd confldsnSal rttscscivnda co hntnitt^oc^ nonce-rng RLiasfen eftorta to
indlusrjca ;ha US Fro&/ffcrtfcal efecGcfl pracssa 4<id Brtita btfvrcsto Russia ar«f Do^a*d
Trump,
'-0 The Defendants produced sitioat iraitteKaiitia. Thse^i va, be referred \o for
GQnv&fucrrCe as Tfta piBHetecSOfi msr*m<Kte' h ftetfng bee* propered before Cte
201$ US ftwsfctaufel tilectkUL Vm Isit coo wto produced Li the tetter pan af
Ocfctiw? «.016, N-eftc wore p^dwaf h FfMftfbtr 201S, Jtora cf tha pr^Qlodic?n
memorsnda conlstaed Any n^Ercrco to. cf intelBsanca about Lbe Qaknanta.
11. As en Assacssia cf Qrtss* s# PixittM Wood w» fcvtfire cl the Second DefemSanrs
Ih^ganeQ gathering for [f>c pre*efeeC , cr5 nx!morAnda
Snnctor Jchr* McCain
12. Ssrvsl&r -tefin McCain b the CheL^cf Lha US Snrsato Amwd Serves Committee and
s member af ttia US Senate Commf^w on Hcmctaraf Seo*rry ana <Soronri>&rEl
Affairs.
13. Dov£ KranwMs a former US S®9 Depa/vnonl civil sarvar:: and was US Afi&ssafH
Sfccrot^ry is/ Slila far Doms^acy, Rlghia, and Labor imr* 2COS to 2D09- ^
te ths Ss'tfsr Dlrscsor far Hl'TOh RJghis £Jtd Hyman Fr^dsfi^ si Sefsbr WcCa^i's
[rislirixafcr rntero^Jona! Lasdsnh'ix
K ARef iro r^odfort of Donald Tramp 3* the 45*' Prosfdent cf 3^ Untied States ors a
Nowmbi? 20lS, Str Andros Vtcod A!r Kmmar and Sera^f McCe^ fit fs^ii
of tbe'r o^cussto^ S3r Ancre^ afrargetJ fer die Second D^tr^ni to rnee^ Mr
Kramer* sa Lhe r&proserttstiva o-f Senator f^cCa^ In o^" to &bo* ^Vr> lha p.*e-
^ledJco m^-n^rarxJLa on a coofidenSai basis,
JL
TO P 5PgR?T
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPSF 5 EI'.TATiVrS
168
15. The rr^ti’jg fcor.*.«eeri the Secood CXandivil end Mr Kreiw* toe*. ptoce on 2B
Novwnbor 2018 to SLoey. Mr Krc/oer told the Second OofcrxirrT. toa! the Intciflgenca
be had SBtoensd rased tesu» of poter.^a. notonai security cnpori^nca
18. An arrangemcnl wsa then msdo upcn Mr Kramers return to WGSfcif#on lot Fusion
to provide Sen. 5.^cCsf/i wfch hard cooiea tf the pre-olecbcn cttmonjrxta on a
oo/iWonLa) bes^s vai Mr Kramer.
t7. Oft boteif o? Sot McCain. Mr Krwr.sr rsqucsiec to bo prodded wCtft any turner
Intelllgar^a £2?hGrsd by tn* Oeteftrtants Ebsu: ateood Russ&r 'rferistorca in (he US
P/osidcr&Ei e&clion.
The confidential Do comber momDfondum
18. Tha Ds!ar4£5U5 cenUnuod to reoeiva ir^r^liod meUloonce cn toe rraEana covsrwJ
by itve pre^lecSjcn memoranda after tfcs US Presidential etectSor. and tha condition
of the assignment for Fusion
19. Altar receiving vcme such jnttflisenoa the Second Defendant prepared the
confidant Docombor memotandjm. referred lo at paragraph 8.1. on ftte cwm
inlfefiv© cr. cr ewnd f3 December 2019.
20. The Defoodarls oonsktored, xxmsssy. tel cno raw Sfrieifigence n toa December
mBmorandiim-
a. *£a d ccnaideraOte importance to relation to aBsgecJ Russian interference to
too US PrcskJsnliai &aetior:
f>. had (rripitcabons for tha naSona" secuniy of '.ho US e?vd toe UK; end
c. wooded to be analysed and fuS^r rTrrafigaledfvcrifted.
21. AccordfogV toe Second Defendant pro/5dd & ccpy of toe Deoerrfcsr msmwandUFn
to:
a. A sentor UK government nabocii security oflteto! aclng In fis cMrctel csps&ty.
on a ccnfiecrrtinl basis in teed copy form: end
b. Folios, by snerp hared cttu'J veto sn inatn>cocn to Fusion to pcovkte a hare
ccpy to Sen. McCeto viu Mr Krarrsr.
Liability for tha publication complained cf
22. SnvtJ that it is admitted toe! too worts ccmp^3=r»ccJ of cod Eel o»*i tocrsln u^/o
contained to toe conWerJlal December nemorarkium. paragraph 6 6bdnC.
m
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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE CF REPRESENTATIVES
169
23. II Is defied thjii in b'veif naliral sod meaning, Et (her proper context. the
vrcrite compiatoed of bore or vvero capable of tesftng tfte.mser.r^ ptedsd at
paragraph 7.
Z4. Read n oortfaxl «ho naiunil bt :2 cnnifiaiy meaning of Cvo wants ccrrpGinod of u«3-s
lh5l tf^T3 vmno grounds to tnves&geriQ ufcihei- the Osimancs had been coe^n&d by
Russia. into hscjtng the computers U 2 ^d by tf» US Democrat Party tead&fs&p.
Irensrrtiftng viruses, parting bu*$, stealing dote and ocr-di^cUrxj f\5s»:^g operettas
25. Ss ve insofar as k is admitted ebovg pareQrj-ph 3.1 js dar.'ed.
2$. The first sentence of paragraph 8.2 & noted Thtj is undorsianoabto. The ocr.toni* of
(he Drcerribsr memorandum wire h'rgnry wr.sitivo and the Defendants CfCy
(Bssemtoatod ccpiw cl U In sbict cutficiafise fia ataroGsa.
27. The remainder of paragraph 3 2 is. ?n the* pramisas. denied in ks enfk«y.
23. Siib-porsgrgphs 3-2.1, 3.2,2 end 8.2.4 are admitted,
29. As to **£>-paragraph £.2.3:
a. fn fe? e? IK'S sub-p^s^raph refers Jo Ihg pre-e!ecSon rwncranda;
L Tha first »ntenco is too va^?e lor mo O-afendanto to pfesd to in sr.y
mfiantngftil way:
11- Tho second sentence is deleft
b. in so 1st sp u retore tc thn cortfdGnial December framesndinr:
i. Ths first asntewa fe again too vaguo to- the Dctadax;ia tn ptood »in
any mearrfngfu} way. The December memorandum vvss provided to
(he rec-pteaU i^orlAed above so met that tho Infonrstta in II vros
known to (he IMsd States and United Kingdom governments hI a
high level by person wKfi ff»poo&&2ty for natta^ sec^rty:
It. The second senfence is cterdcd.
30. The first sentenos d sub-paragraph 9.2.5 is noted. The Defendants dk} not,
prc»v!(ta &ny of the p«*«tec5csn memoranda to me^a of^r, 2 atcr<s orjoumafels. ter
did (hay aulhwce anyone to do go. Ngc did tosy provldo lira confiden53t December
trsrrvwandum to media Of$antea^ons or JournaRsCs. ter cad they eutbcrfzo eny&ne to
do so.
31. The second sentence of sub-paragraph 3.2.5 b cfentod.
4
joron
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PROPERTY OF THE U S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
170
.12. Save thnl it to odmlttod that iha Second Defendant gtivo oH Hkj fuconJ briefingi. to □
smnH number of Joumnlata flboul INj prn-olocljon momoftindo vi inte
aummof/eulunm 2010, su^parograpti 0.2.G la (tonJoth
33. Paragraph &3 c admliiod but Habflty for such publication resides with BuzzFecd.
34. No odnfeedons ora mado paragraph 5.4.
35. Paragraph B.5 ta dsraod. The Defendants ana r,c>Mi&bto for pubtteelion by Sunrwd
Qualified privilege
35. further or in the oilomaUvo. Uxj confidcnlial December memo jb nil um y/Bs published
by the Defendants. as ptaatfed ct paragraph 21 above, la good f&Wi, oo an ocotmJon
of qualified priv^ego.
37. In the dfcumatenecs out cul obovo Uvi Dafco&niln wore un%tor n duty to puoa tho
Inlormollon In llw Docomtw; memorandum to ih* fipnlo; UK Government nanorval
weurity offldo) end Sea )4cCrth ot> thai It woa known to tho Vo )led Kingdom *utd
UnHml SJotoa govD/nrnonli ut u high tovyt by persons wkh r&eponnlbfflly for ncllonsu
tocurtfy. The«o raciptonia hod o cofrosporvJiog duly <v inta/ost to monlvo U In fhoir
copouilloii iw eortoi rvpttuwntaltattof thvuo yovornmnnla with «uch rflnporafelSlfttt.
313. Tho Inddeotiii pvWfcoHonn to Fuiten urwJ Mr Kramer worn rca&crtnblo oo o meant) of
bdr*glng fete uonsttlvo rfecumoM iricurOty to tho dttoatton of Son. MoCuln.
»
39 Tho DofemJcmto dkl not pubttrh tho Do cc mb or mamorwvJufTi to uny of the wikt
rariptonlo wRh the Intention il 4houW bo ropub’Wiod to tho world at itiqjc nor did they
ask any of thorn to ropublish the Dooernbor trusmora/idu/n to otlwtrs. ff any of Iho
roriplonlD did eo with tho roadl that It v«s pubHRhod to the \wrtd e»I targo too
Defondorls, In the Clrwm&toOOCIS, retain tha protection of quoIHknl privilege.
Haar.
40. Li relation to paragraph 9, rt Is admitted that publication of .the words comprstnod o?
by BuzzFced for Bny subse-queol Entemel rcpubflcallon of thooo words by third
partes) was lively to causa re nous harm to the reputation oJ Uvo Find Claimant. Save
es aforesaid, paragraph 9 is ncq admitted. In particular, li not admired ihsi lha
publication of tho wds complaIn&d of by Buzz Feed (or any such subsequent
ropubltootion) has caused e<wtous financial Iodb to any of tho cWiante or that It b
l kely to do so In firtirro. Tho Ctacmonls a/o ro<pif<nDd to provo tha exhuonoe and extent
of ony pout rmncidl to*s erte/or any llkoly fvfwo finonefol tow cam«xj hy tho
puWlcaftY) of Ihn vrordfl compfo'mid of.
S
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
171
TXTr^CVTKc
/wuFum
HI. Paragraph 10 is notec. II is ncc acnKted that tho tew of ssch of tto ! , ir-sd*eiicr.s in 3v>
Euroocen Union H which the**cras comptelned cl wore published wcs sr.d la. so f*f
as ma'.gria?, Vjs ssma as the lavr cf Engtertc snej Wefes.
42. tn j&atoci to percjrw-ph f 1:
a. Paragraphs 23 and 24 dOqtb ara r^poalDd and cub-par&arofh 11,1 Is coated:
b. Sub-paregraph11.2 ia ©dmiiied but H is defied that the Qetendsnta pgtrshsp
or coorod *ta pubfcctoa of fba worcs ccm pained of oxiremefy widely;
c. Sub-peisgraph 11 3 is nel admitted;
43. The fers; sentence paragraph *2 is not flxfcrdtoo.
•W. Lrs redden la tho second 6fiA!ins& of psra^apfc 12. II s dcn'&d that tha CleSnsarCt
er$ cntlJod to cisim dsmegss. whelhe' assisted or otherwise, against the
Defendants as opposed to Buzzrsed.
45. In ro&txyi to par3^phs Ifcl and 12.2, II is sdrrtiU&d that the Defendants drd nor
confect the Ciarrants p/for to the pubSkaEcn of *swis ccmpiainfei d by
BuzzFsed. In nghl of the rosters pleaded sbeva irra Cefeodonts hod ro reason to
contact Su* Ctobreott In refetfon tc the pufcScattoo or tha December memmndum cy
BuszFoed.
46. Paragraph 12.3 U denied. The First Second and Third Cfeimsr,*s sen! a latter bafcra
acton to the Oefervaarte on 23 January 20*7. The Defendants acknowledged recall
of fcg ?o£or before fiction through a tetter from \hssr former ectfertora. SchSlngs. cn 30
January 2017. Tfn Defendants then pravkted a debiltod response to ine tetter before
acboo four days later on 3 February 20T7. The Defendants poUtiad out tr*ci the
Claimants* fcUs< before RClion cW col meei the raqtirerrrsnis contstr-ed fn the Pre~
Action Protocol for Dc^smctior.. tn paflJcula* Olfi Jailor te'oea action*
a. staled that McOorroon v/Ji 6 Emery vwre hstructed try of vte
Second end Third Cte fondants. btft did red pnowce iho osroas or any dciflTa cf
tnodo 'aflEsfesf. Nor cid ft slate another McDermott W5I & Erosry wore
Instructed by e.o Fcir^h CSafrnsnl;
b. <£d not Identify the oasttcuter p^caocr^e) tftst s*«re the subj&a of Cte
pooapoeSfw C 3 :n:, conimxy to paragraph 3.2 of the Fre^AcCoo Proleori
Dofamalcn:
c. d«d not kienSfy the meantog thal lha Rsi fo Thi-d Clalnwtb sttrtsutec La fts
«ords complair-ad of, center/ to paragraph 3.3 cf the Pm-Accon Phoiycci fix
OEfemciicn.
Th.e Defencfanfe theroforo requested Ihe Oaimante to provide ihe necessary
inform seen in order k> etiabte the Defendarrta to prtivkte a fefi reeponso to tne
6
PROPERTY CF THE U.S. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
V» I ■» I
172
I UK SULKt!/
/IMUhUKIM
proposed clrrm Notwithstandncj the fee! thal the Defondanls provided a dotailed
response to the Claimants’ latter be*o;o action written 11 days of that teller being ser.t,
end notwithstanding trie numerous deficiencies in Uto lotler before acuon, on 3
Febniary 2017 the Claimants Issued and served proceedings on the Defendants. In
the circumstances, tbo Claimants' decision lo issue proceedings less than two '//oaks
aflor the teller beforo action v/ns precipitous, incompatib.'e wth the overriding
objective in tho Civ.l Proceduro Rules, und breochod tho roquirornon'o of trio Pro-
action Protocol fur Dufurnutton.
47 it is denied that The Clotmmls are entitled to an injunction against the Defendants us
pleaded n paragraph 13 of the Particulars of C''H:m or oi all.
GAVIN MILLAR Q.C.
EDWARD CRAVEN
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
I ho Defendants fcoliavo that the facts set out m meso Particulars of Claim are true.
Sign9d:
Position:
Christopher Steel©
Director. Orbis Business Intelliganoo Lid
Date: 03 April 2017
7
THH7Sn7WM v’
ro r :> curve i /
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
173
UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT B
morom,
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IWTH£ HIGH CQUfiT OP JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Claim nCr.HQ17D00413
BETWEEN
111 ALEKSEU GUBAREV
(2) WE B2 ILL A B.V.
(3) WERZILLA LIMITED
(«l) XBT HOLDING S.A
Cta I mania
(ir>d
o Rm BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE LIMITED
(2) CHR!$TOPH£P ST&ELE
Pbtooflani*
DEFENDANTS* RESPONSE TO CLAIMANTS' REQUEST FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO QPR PART 15
UrnUr p4rntjrftpfta 7 find fl
0/: *A! utf mftiQtvti turns Airman ?v*i to an obligation not to tfizdoao to t/m
(Mftwn cortfttotjfliaf fcr»fu%{WO rwdob-V fa tt by (hi? DvfiwdiU&i in tin p ciutV7,o
ctffftV vrothlnn ifttoVonihlp wltfxxA fto ognoGrttonf o/frto ftfttnnfontx *
msm$23.
1. Whotftftr flioflftd doty of c^nfidofitiOHy w sjikI to nnw* by ^orurecs or m
oquliy.
2. IF by cortnicL stnto wheffior ttra duly tiroa© undsr (□) □ ennerd ciwtrad ut
rotofow; or lb) *pscMlc cont/sda <ol»1lno to tfit sswofle
3. to either svoni Mato whether any contacts) re&od on v^re wouon or ora?; if
oral, jteftotj when and botv/e-on whom lfatjiy macto.
RESPONSE
Tbs' duty *rms both by ccnlrapt and in Oqsity. A vyrtttflfT
a^probrnorri was condudad babi-tefl tfto Rfsl Dfrfehdanl SOd a raprasentoliva of
Rwton tri J armory 2010 to ra^bon to Wdrtt conducted by FiiBkm for Lltfi Rnt
OtrfericUinL Fi^rlharmor^. Foal an wo* erwfira of tha contideriljalfly of IrHaftg^nco
report* Ovough U>a course & business with tha Deteffidant© ar-d* to rafalton to
the d^cto3uru of iha memoranda to Mr KraTher, tba Stfrrand OeferYte/it anb
FuiJoo ban had specific tfsaus^one In which toa ccnfiiS&tffeSfcy of IN
memoranda tei boon graptmstteis and Fusion vre* Iravuded ii> tofexm Mi
Kraraa^ of Ifteir confldaobaUV*
REQUEST
■ t*
HVC
PROPERTY OF THE U S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
175
H OrO 'ftH
4. S!sle whether me ai*eged 4icy not so disease such intef-gertce io Iffetf parted*
u&htwl ma p^or agreement cf fra Defendants m D>3 course of me working
reiatorship extended to dlscfesura by Fusion to their p*n clients (io Tna clter-ts
who had com.T.issJcyvad tho intevigcnco -nntenat: scs paragraph 5 of Ihc
Defence},
fS5£Q£S£
in nsteGon to the prc-atecton men»crarxi& the- d«.-ty not to tfi!sdo<so .THsToanco to
third jbe^es without too prior agreement of Ovs Defendants did net extei*? So
d-sctositfs by Fusion to ifc ijenTs), aRbeugh Ihe Oerendgots undertfend Bwl
coptea cf the mcrr.ara.ida wena no* flincfcsgd by Fusion to its cfiar.tfs).
ln./i3aiion to ihe December mesnotB&durn, Itris vybs nst prepared pjretfsni to
a ay ccnl/cct os stated el paragraph IB cf iha Defence. Tf e fluty no? to disetese
thk tafiefigence report to ttt?^ parties without tt» prior agreement of 0>s
Cefcr.dzntB Iherefere did erxizrxi to drscioscre by Fu*(cn to ito c^err^s;
Bm&SL
5, Stato whether tho Defendants owed any fecfprocai duty c* conScence to Fuser
snfi/or Fuse’s c&rfa in rnlaTon to iha Ir.Uftgenca they prowfad.
^sppHse
Sine© A »/3o not prcd»^ced ptswiiU to the enjopcmcrsi wrih Fusion described &\
paragraph 9 pF tha Ooteneo. tho Dcfoncscts did not pw«o any cKgatton
confidence to Fusion ond/cr Fusion's dtontfr) in rofstion to the trfelfigenc*
coniftinod in the December meTtocandum.
ftFOUgST
e. State wither Fusion‘$ client, inscfar a$ tfsefosure to v?ss pen^ftaed (ses
Request 4), were under any duty to Ite Dsfemtenb, snd'oc Fuston net to (a) us e
and/or {0) dketosa IM tntaL^ra. sre* t K 50, g^ti Bks partaters as to how ihai
duty & aieged to srS£3.
R5SPOMS5
The rwponea to quostoi 4 above s repeated. The Dc ; endunts understood that
the arrangement beN^ssn Fusion and its ciisnife) was that intetSgence wou#
nol be drsekwed. As a*pTai-*d absva. the December r^ernor^ndu^ was not
produced p^syari to the enpa^ernerjt rEferred to at paragraph 9 o? the
Dafenoo find tDGratora dlscicEoia o? Decernb^ namnnar^Lir. to their
eEen^s) witfl not pemvited.
Under paragraphs 9 and to
Of jvoe end ee/fy Wove^bsr 2G1 d Orfc^s urss e/^pasfSd by Fusion to prepare
c aw.ts of cQrJxfcnl& m&rcfsncfa based go L<stefisencO“ cortc emteg Rustic tffcrti to
ififhepcc the Lt5 FrosxtevCal ertc^oo pc COM end bof^eon Russia znd Oon s-*3
Tnimp".
REQUEST
2-
R?*C
TOP GECnCT/j
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
175
TOKEGRgT/
NOFORM
7, Pwtvso irtamtfy (soo prvmorivpn 6 tw nno Pofama) Fu&tfln h o dinp^fij m roipiton to iwt
partculor {rrfPfcuratnl.
RESPONSE
TM roquft&i is ooithof reasonably nocutsft/y nor pJ&povBfHi&lo to enflWe iho
Cfflimanlft to propofo tncar own.caso nos \o understand tho case limy haw lo meei
OF *Tho DoferHtarUz produced sixteen svzJ] (iK-mot aorta. Those wfl to rulcrred to for
corrfBrJsfgti £3 7h& p&-e faction /n&fnpromfd* having boon jseparetf JteAtfff (ns 20 TS
US FrssAfofltetf etectton. Tho tetf ono wjs ^rcxfucstf tff Ifcfr teifley o? October 20 fa
Atone rvttra produced Jft Nc\>xxr>bcr 201 a Atowo of pranateciitin memoranda
cowatofrd wyrtfojwcs fo, or foto*^grwK© adcuf, tf?o CtokmuttsT*
EE3LIE&E
Q f In vtow erf ihn sswlton ihsl no irwnonmda v^o pradurjcd in Now*mtK*r 2010 ,
p h aft £0 fllfllfl ttift ruilufa d tfi* enQagoro&iU Ln Gariy November 20 IS a& ra terror!
(o In paragraph 9, uorf v^athor Uvta onfl eg citron t wan ooffc/roed and whoi
inltiftgoncc a ratalod to,
MMgOMae
Thu nHiuru tit the PtKondanEV tmpujifirnofit by Fuaton dW not ohunpa <tuir# U»
potion bufw«f) thu pfoparartoti of Vhj tool pRHihidkm rnemer«iwk*i> an 20
Ociobar ?0l0 onn thn ttato ol tfto US PtMckwooi oNwifon Hk»rVfW rineo th*
Dclon&mLa dkl rwl rocetoo any retoVBrtt lrrtotigBiK*v concerning Rwhin offotiu
to bthicrjica Ih* US Pmikianbal oltfellon ihgow and fimku biftiwnn RmsU mid
DonnW Trump during Hite pefi<xJ P no rrwrnomndi were produced pu/euttfti lo
thaoog&aomenl nftor H) Geiotror 2010,
Under perncfpph^ 12 on ri 13
OF “Sunafcr John McGoJn Is l/ro Cu air of (ter US 5d0£to Asmtt S&v^ooo CoTimftto?
and a member of Uro Us Scnolo Comtrvtm on Homokmo Boom^y ar>tf G&mmjTKttdal
Affairs* £rrd 'Cyvx/ Krvoior a farmer US Sfpm p&p&hwMt cM? sanafi^ dnrf kv^5 US
Amstanl SwtfBty tit Sim ft* Omotttcy, Huaw* Rights. &{>d L&bor fwm ZQSB tc
2QQ9> Ho 15 tfio Sonror Ok&etor tef ritman Rjgfys and Himm ftwto eJ Sznotz?
Mcdrn‘3 tnunatQ itt m&rmtimof \j02Gw i $h t p*<
nmuzsi
3. Fleese confTfm (as pamgrpph 200(0 Ihe Ualnnca ^ge^ls) IMl Scaler
McCaim and R* KiBnifif ar^ afltegtpd (P) io bays hoan acting Jn tiwo effi^ai
C^pacItSop: ano (bj onFy In rolaUim lo ibosa cap^tfes h Ihe course c: tb&
matloni ptoQdcd in paragraeba 14 lo 17 snd 2)b; ond P IS not, tdBnljfy any o'Jw
capadly In vrfisch tltay were acting ofxi ^'hcc and tor whol pwtpcibo(fty
RESPOMSe
■ 3>
PROPERTY OP 7 HE U.S. HOUSE OF REP ft ESEN TAT t VES
The Def&ra^ts beievsd lhaS Senator V.zZzx) and Mr Kramer wans esi ?>3 only
in their cartes caoecztios end were no: Wormed of eny other cs sadly cr
cupose ifi v&kti they were esSnp. There were no groins that fed Cha
Dofomfents Jo suspect thaf Senator McCin and Mr Kramer wore not ad&ng In
• Choir officii capacffces at any too up to ond sioredkng the pjbtatan cf lhe
December rnsmcrBra*j?n Iq M* ferra*.
Under paragraph 14
Of “As a casuj cf &asz CKssvsstans Sir Andrew errsr^-jd for the Secern Bef&ufMt lo
PKoi Hr Kramer, zs tfw rcpr?$sntaifr$ cf Sor^ior KtcCsin. In ordsr to nkn {fro
pr&elecUon monomnds cn a confide nUst basis'
QE flgSI
10. Slelo whatss mearJ hy’on a ccnfejans^ basis', hdicating precisely use or
usqb Senator fctcCato waiters penr.^cd lo maKe cl the pre-siectfen
mom cy and a end vrf^ther these uses wti epecif>ed to Senator UcCaii and Mr
Kramer.
RESPONSE
The Defendant* understood that the content cf tire memoranda 'anaufcf be
trealad h iha stricter conndencG and wouij only be used by $arabt f^cCirin fen
hte official Capacity fo* tine sore purpose cl analysing, (nvOTtSgsfcng end vs*ifying
frielr contenb to ersbie si>ch action to be taken 35 necessary tor the opposes
erf protaefng US national meatfly. The Second Defender^ arproeely Vlkrmod
Mr Kramer ts^i the pro-ete&ioft ntsmenanoe were only to be used far this
exclusive pi*qjosa before he showed Mr Kramer any of the msmctarsls. Mr
Kramer wes not at this lime pnrAted w&h copjM of Iho memoranda thin had
been prepared «s al that data, on* •#$$shown copies.
Under paragraph 13
<y *Tho £>0/5nc3r-fs corfcnt/etf fo fTOwiVe indigenes cn tfro melton
covered by iha pre^oc^cn msrnor&r.tfn a*ar the US PrszfdandS otocto* and fhe
corK&sdon oltfe as&Qrsnenl forFu&Ofi*.
QSS&&SL
ll.PJeaea stele vrttstfrw $iich ytresi^enca was acuvsty sought by >ba Second
Ocfonfeni or marety received {es presinfiy pleaded}.
RESPONSE
Such Intd^encc was fart adh-ely sought*, ft rros merely rece?red.
Under paragraph *9
. £
RPC
WOrwrlf^
PROPERTY OF THE ULS. HOUSE CF REPRESENTATIVES
Topoccnny
fmororuii
Q1 *A!tOf fVCV'Wd QUftHi rMClt WiQtttyUflGQ ite iffl&O/l(f DotCfitfaM prQfMrGtf tfti
lg nfidonttat OoLiurjtw /wmofarnfan totivtod to n! wtrawajtf] 8.1 t m o^n Mlttotm
on or ttrtkmd f 3 Dtuxtmbtir WW
marni
12 Plnane Halo wWKfHtf Iho woftfo Vn lib own fnillaUvu' mean mat too DacemtioT
memorondum wn/1 not [flj t/OulUi), or provided to Fucutm pumuafll to any
uonirrici If noi, pUjado uprc fy Wil> coni md to question
a&££GN££
Hie December meiTK>randjrn wssnoi create os prawEd&d to Futiton put a Liam i ft
orvy ccntoact
Under pan)grtjpft2a
Of 'The Qefsncto^is consftfemat cottekA^ ifiat tos i<tw toto/fajoneo in tho Qtic&nbpt
rr&miy-fc\durn, 3 tms of cor i&'jsfv&fe mpoflorxQ in min&on to Rus&irt
t^iar/jinjrrc& h ttm US Frosktsnti^i otycftpo; £ 3 . fmd i^ytic&lions [or tbs fiBtion&t s&xrity
cT !ho U$ and (be? UK and a rteedeo ip be firtgfy'Sed end /urffrer inv,?tojiA/JTnTtecP
egsussi
13 Rougo frliiis wbatoar lha Saoond Dofondani <MiV to&ch&d fftte c^ncHiaton on
bohEJlf of ItoFtfrt DoramJani or wfioirwr Christopher Burrows an Iter Si; Andrew
ur^ro party to hJa iitisossmenf.
B.6SPPMSE
T>id Defend mnlif umobviiM thni the pra-oioetton momoramto nnd sny
r,uh?.nqimm rokttort inteulgaaeo wfitori Ihoy rt^^cxJ atinuto bo dtteto^xf to toe
ifldMttonIs rof<Vft>d to a\ pir»gmph 21 of Qv> Doforwo wtw rcuadwd foUcviVjg
fttyjftffife CtoClWfclOttft bfllVWton Ihfr Second QfcfCKXJkvrt un0 {1} Ch/^topho?
Bufiuwn of (hit RnU Ootorttfortti (fi} f*lr And/tM Wend fwfio hftd tipofcflfl with
Snnntor McCain); £W) Cav'd Kramor (who vra> ncllnn wi Debutf of Swx>to f
MnCato) fuxJ (*v) urn VK oaitoEtol r-ccumy lofurrod to Qi ponujrup^i 2 Ubj
of Ihu Defence Mr Burred chonjO irm CiKomfnfii tt tis»wmrmtfli iho
rofovoni iimo, TM Oofeixtoms DonoWwod mi ifio lMui» warn out ovidonOy
ro^avonl to tim fiolkjiiol tecurlly of tbo US, UK «nd ihtvH n'^oe thol
nut«jm;oOTit Dug onto robing to Him aiutfi ouejJH to bu disdo^cd to too
iitolvtouate lofosmti 10 ol pangraph 21 nf ihe Dotouoo, tach 0/ ih n irxpvftfuate
va'tfi wtwin ttio Sooond Octortonnl dl&qwwxf too Isoye tnevod tJiVi vlaw nl too
llrno end, to tori Socood Ocfarwin^pa knov/cdjo and boJtef. conSoue to fajld
tntstow.
RFC
IHP 5 ETRn 75 |
PROPERTY OF THE U S HOUSE OF- REPRESENTATIVES
179
vlrirer p^r^graph 20- zr.d 2*
REQUEST
stole ^-stbe* she o^cefr&ar memaransuny vtzs prorctod to (oj ii^ JK
raiEor^ see^ty offibe-; andfetf ( ;o) F^sbn. a miter (cj M* Kr^n^f myd Sonakv
MoCs^i wiih :fts awrcs of tna a^s^bons ^ei ih& CIjs ^nra fBcso^otf of
r#L
RESPONSE
?r/ofn»3t5an p&rtalhlng to tftfe E^LftoS oi lb a EG-urcsfe) (rf in© tofe^genc© COHtaiOGtf
frviTin the Oecefrfeef namonsndain wns ncl rsdati&d tvhon fewas prc rated to
e';hEF !ha UK fsatfortti socu<fy cJfefa sndftr Flxcicn aad'0* Mr Kroner srcl
Seriate' McCato. Ths intaratan cc^air-d tfuun Ot© rrcaflHiSftca report
C^rtalptog tc the sie fees o4 Lhe souroeisl we * gqrt^eitnt wiSh Dff^ndfy^'
CCrtScsSUS efforts [jrt&scf fre -dentlty tf lhs &tx!rce{«}
REQUEST
*£. Rsaso stole wt&tftfir to Fuebrt caflcbvxl any expose fe'fc'fctftoe
to cccf4or4ja]ly (corral paf&gfapn 21a vrfHCh ti/pfiesEly tafeis to tor? a
eoqftde^teJ bass'}.
RESPQ)\S^
a the Seccrto Defenisnlfe st/nir^ruaijers wfrh Fysksc surround ng tf»
provtejen oi irre tostructfari fey cndp^cr^d ©ttiaa, tl wtw sapUc:^ stated Sifet lh*
^arm?narKfa v^e only Ea be poV}d3d p Mr Xr&rn^r fer to? p-jrpoEB ©f pas^-g
Iharn oc to Senator t^cCain. SdJiiei^^ ewiversaibs© t^hsisn Lhs Secern
DaTarK< enj Fusiuci to [[ies /naUar w«cs EBOduded uSvig istXif©
■■siephcra ccm.Ti^Joa-’^ns i>jrvsg c hcz& seai*G cona^onlcs^ons, Fto Skc-t^
Defendant oxpra^sJy sr^fEKitod tTrsl Oe CecsFr^r rnenrar5r*&sri was
to lh© iymo strict rafctftctions ©n di^dcs^ to S&srcf perSaa as \nsra tfensalfie© in
Chft wrfen Ggn>:?Tiarut d«gcrito^cl to tfc© mspanaa io jfs^tfais t to 3 above.
Und&f paragraph 21aand b
Of '^Gsorpjingjy the Sscc-^tf D?femcforJjTDMxM o cc^ ^ Dc<w^w t n^wrer-^
fa* a o ^yitor i;K <jcv^jrfer?C iscij'iy odftciar G-fefiijg to hla capacity, Oft
3 oGnftS§M&i to hartf ccj?y f&s?; $fi d h fuztift. by 6r>dptecd e/TH’? (rtth
(o P^£k>n 'fepnovfsfs u hsrc' co^y to a&i. AdsCi.'a Mr Jtervjf'
RHCUEST
ia F,£sa6ft =&3tG stneiher P^ctocfed fc>- Ih© Cofen[fcjils to F^rdon wss
gs^sr^Fy pttvteod to exrpf>*fi<f fem.
-e-
FRQPc^TY OF THE U^, HOUSE GF REPRESENTATIVES
pop sttM'i
RESPONSE
lolftflloonco provide,d by tho Daiondflrvte to Fusion was provkicd sccufolyand
\^?wo pravtdod oloctromcaily ft was prodded in onclplwrod form.
Urvdbr pnranrnph* 23 mid 24
Of 7f >s dciYfCd ttio\ in ih&tr nohsmi end ottfinory n\ coning, in thoir proper ooni&xi Iho
»vo rds cwnptatnod of bora or x&n oupnbto of be a my (he wearing pit: acted at
paragraph V and "Pond fn context tf& oalursJ end ordinary meaning of the 'fronts
complained of i */as that in&r& were grounds to tnYosttgate whdhss toe Claimants bed
boon coorwd by Ruttki into hurting the computers used by the US Domocrutec Party
toextorshfp, iranzjTcUirtfj wti.ich, pfo/rtf/ig tnuyi steeling dole amt corKfoctlng oliodr.g
Qptvtitkwa*
atQM£ST
17. Please Identify flip context ratiod on and cha r&adGfpj) jo whern d was allegedly
known,
SESfifiMaR
TftO readers rct£nx?d Id are lb® roadors cl loo Dotembar ftv^morandurn vjt-.o
ecceosed and read die uonia complained of via tha ertlcia that «ra& publishes
on Iho SwaFoOd 10 Jwiuory 2017,
Ttvo December memorandum waq d row tntonvgonco repon which coittoineo
informottan gathered from n confidential oource(a) about vortouj natfcyioi
security issues lhal warrarUBd further invDstigation.
Further, Iho words -ccmpiainfid -of were published by BurzFsed as part aft an
article vrtfch oirosaod evil iho oanianto of iho ctoMfor (which Included iho
DnaomtMK momofmKlum) woro *iv/ri /cnlrctT, ‘uncaotttmotT and emMlnod
'vwortflt Ht end potent My <wvt?/M»fote oik) gnl tons*. Tbo ortfrolo Added thfll.
'Buzzfood terwa roporldrs in iho US and Europo how boon InvtistigoUng (ho
ftfiogcxl fads m (ho do&st&r but have not v&ifkxJ or i&sited thorn.' The urtcfe
reported thai tha Prasweru-eteci'a oiiom&y, Michael Cohon, held said thet
allegations fn the dossier 'hw ubeotvtdy ?&$&.
In thuflo c^carootoneafl, reador* of Iho words co/Tiplainod of \me thoitjforo
iwam Ifuil (i) the aunieriia of Iho December rooroomodum dW not ropmwmt
(unci did iial purport Id repro&efil} wrifiod focis, hut woro rev* tnl 9 $igonea which
had Identified b range of a&igationa that warranted investigation (jlvon their
polontkil osuonal soevhly fmpfcfiUons; (TO perwns menllcned zn iha December
rmyrnorandu/n wono imSk-ofy lo hovo tnoan approached for comment, end
(hmofom meny of ihoso por&ooc wore liberty lo dony iho oWegnUonu contamcrf in
tho row (moJHgonoo; and (^1) while tho Oocomber rnoirwfflndumvstit peupnrod tn
good ffllth, Ils oonlant must bo cdlicdly \oowed In light of tha purpoon for and
drcumnioncoo in which the information was coHectad
.?•
npc
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES
181
Under paragraph 32
Of a ts sdntiux] ttm r tm Sgocjw DaflmdCanJ off jtsccrd ix^gs to z
&n*£ n&xb&r of f&jfnafigs atom the patt'erifon sifiTvr>&feuttntf{f
20 TS, r*b-psfnjs^h 5.2# fatfenfed"
BSSiygSI
IB. P^eass Idenhjy the fcnafl&d by Ihe Secorci Deter d*nt end tteis who?;
£T<j ho* bri^f^g ^3 done m each case and G^ogtel cf whaf wa? conveyed.
^ s ^ ME
The [currs m mittafty briofoO ei l>: end e? Sep lumber 2018 try fra Second
Qof&qdur-' and Fusion §t Fuitoa's fra unction were fraeti 0» fstew Yerts Times,
513 Wssterrjion Post Vchoo rho htav YoriCer and CNN. Tl>a Second
Defeocfent sotaequpitfy pajticg^s:*: n further n^s&igs ei Fusign's ira-rutttoo
arifr Fusion srvs the Ne^ Yarfc T3&aa» fre Waji^gScn Fott arc* Yehcc Itofta
look ixeca in n^d-Odober 1016 In each cf tho^o esses the brieTrg was
conducted v^rb^ty in person, fo «SO 0 cn H arti ££san el Pj^ZoiVfe frfcfr^ton, \n
a:a OcEct^r 20 i 6 the Second Datsndsni briefed ® ^ourraSsI fnom toolbar JOno*
by SScypsr. No cojjtea of fro pm^fedlon sneortc^nda v >er8 ever ahown or
prided to any toL&ns%i3 t?y. Of itafr the oJ, fra Etofendaafi*. Tho
briefing sTjcIved the dbdtfsu/u ct Seated te&£gw» raga^'nig intfcniicns d?
Russian ^ertefcnc# tn ifte US eiso^on poos** 3.nd flio psasibte oo-aTflnabo n
of m&mtcr^of Tftjrnpta carops^n and R^n'in «rtirra ft I cEida-B.
request
7S P ease ssis whet ts mean* by ofT tho rec&tf and, it particular yntafrs.* Si
m&arw:
Thn infomicton pit^dod wes nei id fce puttehed {bi£ tr^grij be u£E££
(pj Tho Jnformotfert rrJ^jhl be CRjbT^heo Uui 00i khe Dfc&ndanta Tn
any v^y:
( 0 } As (b]_ ind fr 3 D^fendsnis cdui3 to canencaity doocnodd, Dus not uy ns mo.
RESPO?iSn
The Seccrtd Defendant understood tmL Iba nformsTfcn pra^eo rr^hl bs lor (he
purpose cf further maMrth, bat «oukl no? ts pubfeb-etf cr The G^endarts
mpeat that no o?f the record trtefr^ loo^ p^oe cono&rnin^ fra Drcsmbo:
fifieuto^ndura, rv: coote cf sny oj the 7fc^ecc : dft menrtOKi-id^ cr DecernDer
fneTTVsmrdum worts ew ptevidsd tc jourrcSas by* or (ho eutherfas^ th*
Dsfends-^H
REQUEST
20 . Pfeasa sia ra wiisfraf L-- 5 « ienr>s \v5r3 Ks by Che ^wiststs ccr»^ 5 mi?cf.
s-
UPC
PROPERTY OF THE U.S, HOUSE OF REPRESE^TTATIVES
182
afcS£ea$£
Tho Socond OelorKfard mz load by fusion Itol U\o lurwa trad boon (ixplnmod lo
iho rckivnnt joumutal* in odvftnoo by them nod llvi Second Dofemlont
retnlorcod Iho basis on nh»cft ho v/an speaking lo wch of the (oumaiiniE ho met
In pdffian. Norto of the Journalists raised any objection.
Under paragraphs 3$ to 39
bsquesx
21«PIbs$d state \phefoer ilia OqJckvc© of quntfipd prlvitege ia rotted on by the*
Defendants if they ora Heid to be llabfo for piAIicaUon to ths wortd et Igrgo ae
distinct from the admitted pufctotlon to lha Individuals identified by pve
Defendants In Uk* Defence.
&SEQN 56
Yea.
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
The Defendants behove ttiat Ihe facts staled In LhU Rosporvso ora trua.
PoxWtorv. Legal fXrnctor. RPC; Dofimdonto' legal ropflO&onlwtivo
Unto: 16 ?Aoy 2017
*9'
RPC
ff»
de ci ult ;
PROPERTY OF THE U S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
183
Claim No. KCH7OD0413
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUE6N f S BENCH DIVISION
BETWEEN
(1) ALEK5EJ GUBAREV
(2) WE021LLA B.V.
[ 1 ] WE8ZILLA LIMfTEQ
(4) XBT HOLDING S.A.
Claimant g
arid
|1 J QRBJ5 BUSINESS INTEUfGENC E
LIMITED
(2J CHRISTOPHER STEELE
Defendants
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO
PART IS REQUEST
RPC
Tou^r Brtdgo
Sr Kalnnnne's Way
London
EtW 1AA
T: 020 306 0 G003
Rster&nee. OREM f
Solicitors Ihu DtfervJijn;3
rnw V7?m* vi
PROPERTY OF THE IXS* HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
184
I*
Appendix H Table of Contents
(U) Letter to Acting Deputy Attorney General Dana Boente (March 8,2017) 187
(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer {March 17,2017) 188
(U) Letter to FBI Director James Comey et al. (March 15,2017) 189
(U) Letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower {April 4,2017) 191
(U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions {May 9,2017) 192
(U) Letter to Acting Attorney General Mary McCord (May 9,2017) 194
(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 7, 2017) 196
(U) Letter to FBI Acting Director Andrew McCabe (May 16,2017) 197
(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 27, 2017) 199
(U) Letter to Special Counsel Mueller and FBI Acting Director McCabe (May 17,2017) 200
(U) Letter from FBI Acting Director Gregory A. Brower (July 26,2017) 202
(U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. 1,2017) 204
(U) Letter to FBI Director Christopher Wray (Sept. 1, 2017) 2116
(U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. S, 2017) 208
(IP) Letter to FBI Director Christopher Wray (Sept. 5,2017} 209
(U) letter to Attorney General Sessions and FBI Director Wray (Sept. 15,2017} 210
f
(U) Letter from Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein (Sept. 22,2017) 212
(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Sept. 26,2017) 213
(U) Letterto Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Nov, 2,2017) 21S
{U) Letterto Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 28,2017) 216
(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Jan. 4,2018) 218
(U) Letter to Former FBI Director James Comey (Nov. 8,2017) 220
(U) Letter from Former FBI Director James Comey (Feb. 1,2018) 222
■ar
(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney Genera! Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 6, 2017) 223
PROPERTY OF THP U.S HOUSF OF REPRESENTATIVES
185
(U) Appendix H fCont.)
(tf) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (March 14, 2018) 225
(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 12,2017) 227
(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Dec. 12,2017) 228
(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Jan. 19,2018) 230
(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and FBI Director Wray (Jan. 25,2018) 233
{U) Letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower (Feb. 2, 2018) 235
(U) Letter to Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd [Feb. 16,2018} 236
I
(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (March 7,2018) 237
(U) Letter to Former FBI Director James Comey (Feb. 20,2018) 238
#
(U) Letter to FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe (Feb. 20,2018) 240
(U) Letter to Attorney Genera! Jeff Sessions {March 1,2018) 242
PROPERTY of the u.s. house of representatives
186
I • I • •
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March 8, 2017
The Honorable Dana Soenie
Acting Depuiy Attorney General
United States Depanmai; of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave, XV/
Washington. D.C. 20530
Dear Acting Deputy Attorney General Eocntc.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (the Committee) is aware of
recent media reports bdicating the possible existence of Foreign Intelligence Suneiilsrxe Aci
•FISA) applications submittedby the Department of Justice {DoJ) in 2016, ar-d'or Foreign
tnldligenoe Surveillance Court (FISC) orders ct criminal wsnants pursuant to Title HI of the
Omnibus Crime Control acd Safe Streets Act of 1963 that may have authorized the collection cf
communications and/or information regarding Presidential candidate Donald J, Trump or his
associates in 2016.
For the purposes of this leittr, "associates” includes any Trump campaign surrogates,
advisors, or employees; any Trump Organization surrogates, advisors, or employees; and fajm-y.
friends, end business associates of Mr. Trump.
Accordingly, the Committee requests the following information, if it exists:
1. Any and sil ccpies of cny FIS A-app!icaiions submicced to the FISC by the CoJ in
20f6 regarding then Presidential candidate Daueld J, Trump or his associates,
2. Any and all copies of any orders issued by ibfc FISC in 2016 regarding then
Presidential candidate Donald J. Trump or his associates.
3. Any and ail copies of any wsrrani issued by a Federal J udge or Magistrate pursuant to
i tile IJ1 of ihc Omnibus Crime CcmroJ ana Safe Streets .Act of 19u8 in 20 16
re-rarding then Presidential candidate Donald J. Trump or his assoewfes.
We seek copies of the foregoing documents, if they crisi, ro later than March 13,2017.
Sincerely*
Devin Nunes
Chairman
Copy to: The Honorable is.mas Comey. Dimeter, Federal Bureau of Investigation
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF TrlE U.S. HOUSE OF R EF RESENTATiVhS
im
tLS. Department of Justice
O flies of Legislative Affairs
- i»- - ■ M -■ *= 5 *^■
Office erf the Assistant Attoni sy General Weiskington, D.d 20530
iVfarch 17. Id 17
The Honorable Devin Kor.es
Chairman
Pc undent Select Committee un intelligence
U.S. House of Representatives
Wash ingion, DC 20515
The HoTiomale Adam 3. Schift'
Ranking Member
Pcnnsacnt Select Committee on intelligence
U .S , Ho us e o f Repress laii ves
Washington. DC 20515
Dear Chairman Nunes hi d Congressman SchnE
Enclosed please find classified documents responsive b you r request. which we ana
providing for review only by each of you and for return lo us today. !n addition, pursuant to cur
agreement. one srdTmember for each of you* cvho has tk rcq^sUcekatrazi-ccs, also may review
the materials. In the event chat chher cf you is eoi available today :o review these nmeribls, yen
racy designate one staff m era ter with the requisite dearan a s to rev! ew item in yo ur £aea&
attorney from ;hir office will remain with liir documents at alE times and return with them to tbs
Departmeat today.
We heps that this inibflnctiotl ;s 3tdrJd. Please do nol hesitate to contact this office if
we may provide cddltionai assistant regmiing tbb or any other matter.
Sincerely,
m
\
\
I MWil ft. M>u^
\ spaniel R. Renter
Acting Assisianr Anomcy Gencnd
PROPERTY OP THE US, HOUSE OF H EPRES TATTVSS
I 1^1
Ji* ■ 'J'JFlta <.J|| '
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UNCLASSIFIED
HVC-3W. Th£ CAPIfttL
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fj 1 ; a £ ^ f r hp,p, (Si it
U.3. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wa^hinctcjm, DC £0515
(202]
Ln a, 1, Ut,h
I'l'lf It,,
Permanent Select Committee
Oiai'l. SlWM
trtr Sv JlS ,,
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on Intelligence
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March 15, 2017
The Honorable Admiral Michael Rogers
Director, National Security Agency
Fort Meade, MD 20755
The Honorable James Comcy
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535
The Honorable Mike Pompeo
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D,C. 20505
Dear Directors Rogers, Comey, and Pompco;
As you know, the Committee has been very concerned regarding the purported
unauthorized disci osures of classified information, particularly when they pertain to intelligence
collection on, or related to, U,S, persons (USP), To take a prominent example, a January 12,
2017 article in a major newspaper was Ihc first to claim that "Retired Ll* Gen. Michael T. Flynn.
[then President-Elect] Trump's choice for national security adviser-phoned Russian
Ambassador Sergey Kislyak several times on Deo, 29."
Such stories would appear to contain the unauthorised disclosure of USP identities. This
potential misuse is a key reason why the Intelligence Community (1C) has developed robust
‘'minimization procedures 11 for the prelection of USP information, including requiring the
“masking" of USP identities in most circumstances.
However, as recent news stories seem to illustrate, individuals talking to the media would
appear to have wantonly disregarded these procedures, The Committee is concerned that USP
identifiable information may have been mishandled in violation of approved minimization and
dissemination procedures pursuant to statute and/or Executive Order 12333, as amended.
'Therefore, no later than Friday* March 17, 2017, each of your agencies should pro vide the
Committee with the following:
UNCLASSIFIED
PROPERTY OF THE U.S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
189
UNCLASSIFIED
L All d d c po 1 1 c k s an d/or proecdures each agency cm p] oy $ to m a kc 3 detenu {n 31 i on 1 0
unmask-and disseminate ihc identity pfaUSP; specifically, the Committee requeirts the
approval process require to authorize such a dnaEIon within artd outside the
flgetwy* including the number of individuals v/ho een approve an unmasking in e&ch
, agency:
2. The total uumherof dissent marie tvs of any unmarked US P identities between June 2016
and January 2017, if they exist:
X \f * h cy exist, the names 0 f any urunasked USP& whose idemities were dUseminsted in
response to requests from IC agencies, law cnfbrcctecri* or senior Executive Branch
officials between June 2016 and January 2017, and that relate to Presidential candidates
Donald J* Trump tuui Hillary Rodham Clinton and Iheir assadaies In 2016F
4 . If the y ex is t* th c twin cs of any 1 C age n qi es> law e aforccmc m age tides, an d/or seni 0 r
Executive Branch officials (lint requested and/or authorized the unmasking and
tllsseminaiion of USP information relating to the specific individuals ami entities
specified in request ^3 above, ns well as the tides of till specific recipients of that
unmasked UttF informadon; iuk!
5, 1 f it exists, the suited reason, pursuant \o the relevant mlnlnitaoiton procedures feu
unmasking cacti USP identity feinting to request iQ above.
We appreciate your prompt attention to tins request. If you have any question* regarding
the foregoing, please comoei lire Committee at (7.D2) 325*4121 -
Sincerely,
Devin Nunes
Chairman
Adam B, SehlfT
Ranking Member
Cepy to:
The Honorable Michael Dempsey, Acting Director o{ National ImcJEgeirce
1 Forthe puipfrici cf thto Jj>c lude iny juirfrgniCA, wiviion, v* employees: tmy Trump
Or^irttMUVffi flrClmtoA PopnU^ki.i wiitc-yim, ndvSwn, pc emptoyc**, said fmuily. a/id bu^fi-^i AMOckaict
ol MO Trump and Xlrs t CUfirtoiL
UNCLASSIFIED
Property of the u,S, house of representatives
US Depa rtrnent of Justice
Foetal Bureau «f fovcttigatiaTi
April 4,2H 7
Honenible Devin Niuies
Ch&mw
Permsaem Select Committee oti lntdilecnsc
U.S, Ho^se of Representatives
Wa^b^tiQz* DC 2i)S*S
Adam Bp Scbi£f
Rjmlting Member
Pe^anim SilecL Gominirtes Cti !t^c][|^=£c
U.S. House of HcpfcscnUti ves
W3siirrEtfli3 . ft C 3 0515
Dcs; .Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
This roipo-ds to your teGer deted March S £* 3QI? ;o Admiral Rogers, National Seca^iy
Agency; Phector Ptsmpoo, Central Iruclli^cnrc Agency; and ftticcicr Comey. Federal Euieei: of
InecH^atba (FBI)* i^cs^ng informs; on concern i /35 rash agency's poticiea=Jid procedure*
trilling to the dissanlfi&ioii of US. peism mforra&ticm
As wc have discus^ with your staffs on jgvtis! oceasioos* we WStcOGiS sti opportunity
to brier iheContmiltet* concermn^ the FBFs policies ejjd procedures in order 10 Identify
infcnumioii held by the FBI that is of interest to ihc Committee.
'A ? e appreciate yourcontinued support Ibi (he FBI ami tU misrlacL Plezsi contact this
oiffcc is wt can be of further assistance.
Sincerely,
Gregory A. Bra^xr
As&iftaai Director
CfFxc of Onit£jcss:ojial Affairs
PROPERTY OF THE U S HOUSE Cr REPRESENTATIVES
UNCLASS IF(ED//COMMlTTEE SENSITIVE
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US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELJQCT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
May % 2017
HVCOW, Twn OJ^TOL
VtaowMaiWAOC Witt
tao!>aafcM«i
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The Honorable Jeff Sessions
U,S. Attorney General
VS. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue WAV.
Washington, D-C 20530
Deor General Sessions:
p
As part of its bipartisan investigation Lmo Russian active measures directed at the 2016 VS,
election, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requests that you produce
certain documents and other materials to the Committee run! arrange for your participation m a
voluntary r transcribed Interview at tho Committee's offices,
First we rcspcctMy ask that you produce to the Committee, by no later tlmu the close of
business on May 22 . the following:
Any documents! records, electronically stored information including e-mail,
communication* recordings, data end tangible tilings (including tart not limited to*
graphs, chartu, photographs, images and other documents) regardless of form, other limn
those widely available {<;<&, newspaper articles) that reasonably could lead to the
discovery of any fhets wlltotn the Invesijgallon's publicly-announced prummeten*
In complying with tills request, we ask that you furnish to the Committee, in imredacted form,
any md all responsive materia 1 in your oemu! or constructive possession, custody, or control or
otherwise available to you, including responsive material possessed by any third party to be
transfected to your possession and shared with the Committee, This request is also made on an
ongoing basis: if after making an initial production to the Committee you find additional
responsive mareriah you should produce that material to ehe Committee.
To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation of all
documents, records, electronically stored information, recordings, data sad tangible things
(including, but not limited to, graphs, chans, photographs, images md other documents)
regardless of form* other Elran those widely available (e.g,, newspaper articles), related to the
Committee's investigation, your interview, tmi any ancillary matters.
PROPERTYOF THE US. HOUSE OF RGFRESFNTATIVES
192
UNC LASS* na^COM^l'lES senstti ve
Should ;i becc-atc necessary go, ihg Cftmrni Etc^ m nv supplcmcnt th^ document recutst
contained in fats letter at anv time*
*-
Comrai';.^ star: wiJl \\Qtk wii you ;o anaujsjfc you: interview nt a tiiue and date sjfcequqm u>
youj pieduciion. of dccc-ienvs to the Codintrl'^e. The fncwvinw Tti&y enter say tnpio within the
publidy<tfiflottQCOd parameters oftht Coraevtetfs Investigator!, icdntftng Russian cyhor
activities directed ;fte 201#t;_5. election* pcit^hcl lirAs between Rtsshi cn-I individuals
isolated with pal i tits I camp^^s* the H,S. govern men fs response ro these Russiai: active
saeamiJttS. and i elated Leeks atdassi&ed iiiiaraaiicKi.
ShtruJiJ you hive any ideations at any liine,, plccsc contact Conr#fnittt^ siafTit (202; 225-4 t2L ] f
you cqHcscntcti by an suomoy, p*=3sc fa rased this letter *3 your artomey. aad have him or
her conEicc the Coramittaa on your bskdf.
Sincerely, v"
K_ Mitb;! Ctrc^ay
Mem ter of Congress
Adam Scfeiff
Ranking Member
*
Aitadunatti: Pa revelers tor Russia invest! cation
a
PROPERTY OF THE IIS. HOUSE OF REPRESETtfTATlVES
Tim*
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UNCLASSIFIED//C0MM1TTEE SENSITIVE
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PGflNMNENT SELECT COMMITTEE
on Intelligence
Mb^ 9,2017
iiVC*39$ t T>iu Optrcx
W^uwarori, fit 2 Q'jI&
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VIA CERTIFIED U.S. AND ELECTRONIC WAIL
Ms- Mary McCord
Acting Assistant Attorney General
U.3. Department of Justice
National Security Division
950 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D-C 20530
Dear Ms. McCord:
As part of id bipartisan investigation into Russian active measures directed tit the 2016 U.S.
election* the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requests that you produce
certain documents and oilier materials to the Committee and participate in a voluntary,
transcribed interview at die Committee’s offices,
First we respectfully ask tluit you produce to the Committee, by no later than the dose of
business on May 2X the following:
■>
Any documents, records# electrcdedly stored itiftrrrmUiun inducting e-mail,
communication, recordings, 6m and tangible things (including, bui not limited co,
graphs, chints, photographs, images and other documcnlsj'rcgardlcss of form, other than
those widely available (c.g.* newspaper articles) tout reasonably could lead to the
discovery of any facte within the investigation's publicly sumo unced parameter.
lit complying with this request, we ask (hat you furnish to the Committee, in imrcdacted ferm,
any and all responsive material in your actual or constructive possession, custody, or control or
otherwise available to you, including responsive material possessed by any third party to be
transferred to your possession and shaded with the Committee, This request is also made on an
ongoing basis: if after making an initial production to the Committee you find additional
responsive material, you should produce that material to the Committee,
To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation ef all
documents* records* electronically stored information* recordings, data and tangible things
(Including* but not limited to, graphs, charts, photographs, images and other documents)
PROPERTY OF THE U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
UNCLASS1F IFIXiCOU MfTTEE SENS1T1VB
regard'ess of form, ciccr than those widely evailable (e^,. newspaper iirticks), related to tire
CcnuniEfie’s iuvcsfieatiom your interview, ard any ucdllary marten
Should it h&cimtfc neetflaarv to do so. the C?mmtttv£ ttiay auapignuftt fbr document nsmUrst
cop biased in rhk tetter at auv time.
Cfljnnuttec staff will work wilh ;w 10 arrange your Interview, at a time and dale subsequent to
you' production of documents to the Committee. The interview my cover any topic withia die
publicty-anncimced psninjetcra of the Ccnarutiee’s Investigation, including Russian cyber
activities directed against the 2016 U.5, election, potential links between Russia and individuals
associated with political campdcns, l he U S. governments response to these Russian active
measures, find related leaks of clarified inhumation.
Should you have any questions ai any time, plz-tse contact Committee stafffat (202) 225-41 It. If
you are ^presented by art attorney, please forward this [fitter to your attorney, and have hlia at
her contact the CommiSiee on your fcebs1£
S:nccpctv,«.
" t
r.
k, Michael Conaway
Member oF Congress
Adam SchuT
Ranking Member
Attfichnaeat* Rurumsters for Russia Investigation
2
jjproBW
property or the u «. house oe representatives
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of LcEwtMtve AfBsfrji
Office o£lhc Aarislunt Attorn^ Ucwu&I Washington^ RC 2 OS SO
JUL Q 7 2017
The Honorable K* Michael Gcraaway
Penr-aacn: ScJbcc Committee on InttllifiCffiCC
U.S. HbviSd of Represent lives
WnaMngUm, DC 20515
The Honorable Attorn $ebiff
Raskhig Member
Pcnnirawnt Select Cciumuliee on Intelligent
IJ-S, H-Ousc ofRoproseo&tives
Wa^hktgieu* DC 2Q5U
Deaf Congressman Conaway and Coupes sman Schiff:
This responds to yon: letters to the Attorney General and to then-Acting Assistant
Attorney General Mary McCord ofehc National Security D1 virion, both dated May $ t 2017,
which, requested doutimentfi in oomiecUon with UwOottimiuc^KinvawliBuUan into Rimitm aciivo
mtwsmcs directed at the 201 6 US. election*
As yon know, on Mny 17, 201 / r the Department of Juulfau (Department) announced the
appointment of Robert S, Mueller !fl to setvo a 9 Slieclul Counsel to oversto the previously-
eon/In nod FBI invalidation of Ruwian government of forts to influence the 2016 presidential
electiou and roltitinl ni After. j. We ana advised that tlift Special OniniBOl \m begum to infte step* to
ftiUiil these lospoviribilitics* Under these dreumslnaccs and consistent with the Utspartmoil's
hm^slanding policy cctyurilng Ibis confidentiality and sensitivity of information id&ting to
]>euding matters, the Deportment is not prepared to rc&ponJ ftirlhcrio your revests at this time,
We appreciate dye Committee's Interests in tills matter and hope that this informed on is
hcjpihL Please dsy not hesitate to contact this office if wc may provide additional assistance
about ony oihcr matter*
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VTA CERTIFIED U-S. AND ELECTRONIC MAIL
Acting Director Andrew McCabe
FBI Headquarters
935 PennsyLven 1 ^ Avecwt, NW
Washing O.C 20535-0001
Dear Acting Director McCabe:
As pan of lu h(partis invest t^tion into Russian sense measures directed ai the 21116 U_5.
eiccticjEi. che Hou^e Formancm Select CcLTrmiires on [md tiger. :e request fcl yao rroduc-
cci^in docamfcEls and other maiertiils io ll*£ Ccnicmnee tod ssranyt for your ptrtkipqiioo in a
voluntary, transcribed interview et The Committee's offices,
*-
First we respectmlly isk That you produce to the Comzdrtee, by no Iansr than the of
b ad ness ofl Mjnr23 T the fbllcv/ing;
Assy tioctlEWDlS, records. el ectren-tally stored tafbijlieticfi rrdutiing o-mmi,
ttxmmuni cation, recordings^ dm and tangible things (ieduding, but ivot limited to^
grfcphsi charts j phQiograprti, images aad ocher decline nttj regardless of form, ruber than
these widely nvaikble {e.&, newspaper icicles} that reasonably could kad io the
discovery cf any uets within the investigations pubUdy-mtceuccod parameters.
tn eonipljmg with thte request, we ask that yon famish to the Committee, in ^redacted fonts,
any and ell responsive msTorijil in yoiif ectu&l or constructive possession, comedy, or control or
otherwise available to you, including icspsnajve rtvatetial possessed by any third pnny to be
Gt-'^bned :o yovr possession end sfrsred with the Committee. This request is also resile m 2 n
ongoing bciis: if*fter nuking an Inltinl production to the Committee veu find additional
responsive mater at, yon rbould nrodtios that miistlal to die Ccimtuaee.
*■
To the not encom pssssd by the bbove roquet, this brier also requests pmservetien of alt
4 ecu meats. records, ckcttnmcaily stored £n formation, recordings, dat&and tangible thicks
(tr^iudin^ but not Iiirrlted to, graphs, ttexs* photography im&£es s^A other documeriK}
rc^unless of iom, other than tiiose widely available tri^spaprr artidcs), reJaodto the
Ccnimilfe's mvesiigatior^ your interti^', und ajviUaiy x^Licr^
ivurum
PROPERTY OTT1IS US. HOUSE Cr REPRESENTATIVES
L'N C LAS SI F fED/fCOMMUTE E SENSITIVE
Sliuuld \t hero mu necessary to cto sa, the OmmlfW n my surcpkmtnt Hitr doco^^it request
contained Irt ihh lei ter at nnv time.
Committee staff will work wiih you to arrange your interview, at a time and date subsequent to
you* production ofdticunKms 10 the Committee, Tina Interview sooty cover any topic within the
publfcly-onnounccd pemmeiers of the Commit Ws investigation, including Russian cyber
activities directed against the 2015 U.S. election, potential Jinks between Russia and Individuals
associated tviih political campaigns, Ihs U.S. govonment’s response to these Russian active
measures, and related leaks of class] fled inform atoi.
Should you have any questions at any time, please contact Ccnuniltee staff at (202) 225-4321. If
you an: represented by an attorney, please forward (hts Letter to your attorney»and have him or
her contact the Committee on your bobali
Sincerely,
K, Michael Conaway
Member of Congress
Adam Schiff
Ran king Memo bet
AtUucJirneM! Parameters for Russia Envcstip p alion
2
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PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
US* Drpartomjt of Justice
iDfUce at LeglsLuive £\p?\m
O Rice of the A3 stebaL Attorney Gccersi Wpshtx&on, D, C. 20530
JUl 2 7 2017 *
The Hbneo&h!t K- Michael Conaway
PenDiiasaxt S?bot Committee on bieiligcaec
U.S. Hmt3& ofRe^rw^ltvcs
WasMEQtOTt DC 20S1S
The Hccorabb Adm ScHJf
KoE&og Merrier
Permanent Seket Ciinumtiee jn btelitstcce
VS. H#use afRc jp t wntatr vcs
Wjshln^cia, DC 20515
Dear CangcrssEnaiiQmswfcy srd ConcrcssTiSi Schiff:
This responds to your letter to Federal Bureau of Iir^estLgsCQa (FBI) Acting Direct
Asdiew MeCibe, daied May 2017* which reqvsitec documents b eeenretion with the
Cormtwltrtfs invriligatb)} into Russian udxve nrc*sure3 directed 2 Uhe 2016 U,S- deCtiorL
As yoa maw, cnMoy 17* 2017 the Dcpartaaertl of telice {Dcpatfeznt) anoooooed the
^rpoiitecm cf Rptet $, Moeikr )£E to ctvTve sf Special Crasd/ro orarsec Ac previously-
consisted FBI investigcnoo ofMussisi g£) vmmftfll sfilbristo influence th= 70 Id praddotial
eleetaea mid rdatedtogsas. We cm advtfcc] Ihut fo Specif CouLsd has hegoa to take seeps to
£bJ5U these respotmhiUdes. tinder these drcumsisiiccs end crasifsat with the D^ertasnt^
long* 5 ttcdSag policy itgKding the cc^nTdenUdit)’ and sensitivity omfoimVioii relating to
pcadina raatte^, the Department la not prepared to respond tbiicr to yaur isquesi ci this tim c,
We t^pcfccxMe the Grantee's bicrests to this n&nex aud iswe th^t this infaqnaHoo is
hd pfuL P lease do not tesit&z to came c thk o fric^ if we may provid e a ddiccaal existence
about ££y otte matter.
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Sarttori R- Racier
Actic§ Assistant Atrosuey GenemJ
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May 17,2017
tvlr, Rnbcri M vd I c c
Special Counsel
U.S. Decartnscm of Jusike
Washington, D.G 20530
ifr. Andrew McCabs
Acting Director
Fcdara! Bureau of fcyc^gEJion.
Washing UC-20535
Bear Mr. MtralLcr snd Andug Director McCabe:
Mr. Moelisr'fi at»pcii^:eiu 33 Special Counsel is a necessary end posttsve m ihz
Dspart^ot of Justice's iovcsiig^tion regarding Russia As pad of 0*-tl Vip^itUsn inquuy into
Russian mivc encashes, to insshidf coontejirfdHgcncc EoncEms, the Camming wiU be
conducting rigorous overdgh: to ensure *rvd die Depsitm&ft of Justices ivork, to include the
costing CouritcrifUtelli^eoce investlg^ioD regfitdieg Russia by tf*e Federal of
jives^fitiiOfR* is not impeded cr inttjrftrcd ’with in eay wsy.
Accordingly Ibe Comzninse requests that tas Dqvsrt^em o: Justice, Including ibar ederal
Bureau of investigation preserve and prudtice to ibs Committee:
(1) copicc of all documents, records, electrtricajly stoned, infcn^acon including e-mail,
c&fumcnLcsucfi. msordi a£s, daig md :en&ble flings* rcasdless Of feru* other than
iios& 'widely available (c.jl, nuwspipsr snicks} thfit reference Mir. Geajoy*$ dismiss^]
ss FBI Director that no poVnrfally rdcvnnt to the Bureau's no^erintc111 aer^ce
iuvesdgifeoTL
(2) dl docuciEDis memorializing conventions between tbc Presides end fvlr- Comsy
regjtfdifig bis todvrtfea as Director, tc include all rnemtKaraS^ coles, lt aih*a:
cocwncmsrcs^rdiiigsudi conve^elicus, Ita arc potentially reJcvgariolhe Bureau’s
coimtarii^dligctca invistigarioiL
PROPERTY CF I HE U T $_ HOUS2 CF REPfttiSENTAT r/ES
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201
US' Department of Justice
Fcdoml Buruau oflnvcstlgnlion
mtiktn&cn. D.C 2 r jttS-60Q1
July 26 , 201 ?
Honorable K, Michael Conaway
M ambur of €ong?m
Permanent tided Committee on Intelligence
US* House of RefM’esojitetives
Washington DC 20515
Iformmbfc Arinin Sehlff
Iteming Member
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U.8« House ofRepncscnietfves
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Ccmgieasnmn Conaway ;md Runkiw# Member Rchiff;
Ttii$ is in icsponsc to your letter io Acting Director McCabe and $p*cUi Counsel Robert
Mueller dated May 17> 20174 sacking all documents, records, and data, that reference
*Mr, Comey's dismissal as FBI Director dm arc <b paieianally relevant to the FBFs
ccimitriitfexigence mvostigtfiorf' ofRtmhm interference in the 2016Presidential elcodon,
As you know, Acting Attorney General Roscnstcia announced the appoinlmem of a
Special Counsel “to conduct the investigation confirmed by thw>FBI Dcrcntor Jamc3 B, Comcy
in testimony before the House PercnunetU Select Committee on Intellig&FfUc on March 20, 2017,
including: (i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government end Individuals
associated With iho campaign of Prcddcut Do nald Inunp; and (ii) rmy matters that arose or may
arise di;eutfj from live Investigation; ond (til) any other mutters within i)ic scope of 23 ChRR. 5
600 L 4(ft) " As a result, your reqaert fleck rmra^tiptwc mmcriab related to m ongoing
investigation* and, consistent vrfih long; landing Department of Justice policy, we would decline
to produce those rent crisis at this time.
in addition, yon requested all document* memuriulmng cohimmucittions between die
Pj^idtrrt nod then FBI Director Comey. We Arc advised that the Special Counsel^ Office and
the Dep&itoism of Justice have provided the Cumniiliec with access to the memoranda md
docLimenta of former FBI Director Comcy* Io light of ihflL accommodation, we believe this
requcai bits been addressed.
iw iiLkii;
PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
rtorcorablE K. Miehael CAruiv^y Monar^Hc A dsn ScbiE 7
Please contact inis office tfvr-c can <w of as^ist^ace coaceroiag otter otters.
We ££precbie your cccti rru^d £jpp£rt for tfce F8f srd its mr?iion*
Siccfe?e3y,
Gregory A- Slower
AsakanL Director
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PROPERTY OF THE U.5. HOUSE Or REPRESENTATIVES
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September ^2017
The Honorable JisJTScwdwi*
AUrtn^y General
United Sides Dcpoitoueiit of Justice
950 PfimisylveiiJa Avc* RW*
WfjsTurt^gn, D.C. 2(1530
iUectr Attorney Guuur.il Session::
Go August 2A t 2017* the House Peimaircnt Sciea Commitveu on Intelligence ( ll CtJuimiKee 14 )
served subpoenas on ihs Attorney Gewral, In bis MpHCtCy s* h ntd of the Dupaitmm of Justice
{^DOr}* and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("MV*) for production of
documents relevant to the Committee's ongoing uiYt&tigptiau ofFUujriua Intel furenee in tltclOlG
US, uresldcnUal elmUpn, including alienations of collusion between tlx? Trump ctu^fiGp and
ihc
The iaibpuciiis di reeled DOJ and F31 to produce any and all docunimts rtladrig lu the agencies’
idfltiaiuiiiip with farmer British Secret fotdli fence Service office*' Christopher Suajo tmri/oribe
50-caikd "i rump DtiwicC InoImJIrtg tbese memmMtitag FBl'rt idittionihip with Mr. Stcelo*
payments oaisdc to Mr, Steele, and efforts to tarroborate information provided by Ml Steele
end h\?i Kub-soUTCCs—whether directly or via Vision GPS* The subpoenas al^o directed DOJ and
FBI to provide copies of any Foreign ItflclJigeuec Survdilm^ Act (FISA) an plications
submitted fo the Foreign Tnsel Hgeuce Sur/dUanee Gr>urt (FTSC)—whether or cot approved by
the FISC— incatpmating information provided by Mr, Sicde, hln tfiifo-sourcco, anrifor Fusion
GPS.
Resort to compulsory process was nsosseary because of DGi*s and FBFs iipjoIBo^tl
leapoiisivencss To (be Committee's aumcrou* Ru$sMftvestf£a(lou related rtqutm avar tfict p m
sovcml months* On multiple occasions, through written requests mi direct engagement, the
Commitico \wj ittufihlbut failed (0 receive idepmvkJve ictfimtmy oj tloeiunente from DOJ and
FBI. Fpr example, to date th e CojQsnrCiec has not received a meanmgfiil response to its May !>,
3017, request to Attorney General Sessions* AdditiosaUy, 00 May 15, 20L7, the Committee sent
a tetter asking then-Acting Director Andrew McC&bc fo pjsrttoipate voluntary interview, and
produce relevant documents* Thu Committee received tic reply until W 27—more than two
numthti later—when DOT declined the interview request and indicated ihttf "the Department B
not prepared to respond furthw' to your request at tbltJ time,"
PROPERTY DF THE U.3. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Previcmsly. cm March S, tbs CcnumE&s slight fiorr< DOJ eertni* doctKsuentE* mefcdiqg relevant
?5 Sa appEcaticcts tzd 1 : ISC orders, mo or, March 17 sfloUed twa billets to review
lespansvs documents on 3 read-arLt^rerriEi basis* The Commutes ^ not provided 4 copy of
tht^c doca^tais, cm} tine Cofniniltc^te request to review them again was defied.
The subpoenas issued on AugusS ?A required production 310 later thas l2:0Cpoi cm Seeember 1,
2(117. Keiths DOJ tut FBI provided any doeunLenu by tbs deodHn^ On o*e of
August 31, teas than 24 bears before the dvtt the Corerei(tee received 2 * initial response
ftocc the DOJ Office of Lcgjs leave Affairs on behalf of bcOt pof eni FBI—
sdditio^d time to comply vddi tbe subpoenas-
TheCnmfritiM requires timely proiiftios of tire subpoenaed do$tta£5&t£ in order to execute irs
avt^sigbt responsibilities cn twaJF c: tht Amertetti public and folly tftaln&i&thc sen oca of both
DOJ ardfcFBI. There ism tegp&rjire teis fer BDTs EuJtofe c 0 jr*»edpg£u% eugagethe
Coccminec until the evo of the deadline or begin production 33 a show 02 " good fifth.
Moreover, diere is no legiibnatc basis tur BOJ 1 *reqttcsi fbr additional time to comply, became
D QJ «nd the F3I are well sware ofthe idoth£y c Hhc rc.quesTed coaaocirfE, In dcKi, as noted
abov^ ctiKstECjnsof them have Greedy been compiled acd mefe ramporarily avail &kfc for ihe
CommiltBB^ rtvlfttv, end the Razrcfcfcg requested doaunente are readily identifiable.
Nofetithstending these the Conttciuee hereby grouts an additional Lbiitseo (15) days
for full cccptiarxe and production to occur m later then 9:00 cm an September 14,2017, at
the local specified m the cngbsl sribpocne. This revised deadline vvil* ad be extended
In ibe aitenrativs, if £31 responsive dncumeriSi are ocFt produced by the revi$r:j desdllac. the
Attorney Geatni s?A the Director of the FBI shall Appear before the Committee 3*9:00 amen
September 3 4> 20! 7, la Rr cm HVC-210 01 rhe U.5. Capitol during 00 open hearing, to explain
uode: oath DDJ’a end FBPs unwiHi.rg*iass or isabilliy to comply m iuT with the subpseoas
issued on August 24.
Pieces be idv ised that, in the event that DOJ 01 FBI Jsib to srevide the docOTenls in fill Ci
leEtimony^desfidbccJ shove, ihe CoTrsnittee expcesaly reserves ItsrigJii to proceed with any acd
all svsiEefe je$&l options—ineludb?g reportins to the full House of RspctEcri^tJves a naao l uf an
to hold the Aftemiey Genes! snd Db^ctor of the FBI in cectompt of Caogc&ss. ptsssuaXttn 2
U.S*C 35192 , 394 -
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PEJWAUENt StiLEOT COMVlTTKF
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Ihc Honcrabtii Cfuiftophtr Wmy
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Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W,
Washington, DXh 20530
Dcur Director Wmy:
On AUgU?- 24 f 2CH7* the House Permanent SsttCl Cbmmittct Oft Intelligence f'CtHIirofacef)
served subpoena on the Attorney GeatjaUn hts capediy as head of the Department of Justiee
( u D0J")i and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Invearganau (*1 ; B] FT ) for production of
documents relevant to ihc Commtiieu's ongoing investigation nf Ru^iwi interference in the 7016
IJ.fr prcsideirtlnl dot lion, mdudiu# ^Legations of collusion between ihe Tnitnp campaign an C
the Russians.
The sufcm^naa directed DOJ and FBI io produce any and all doc unvote misting to the agencies*
relationship with fornix Britiih Secret Jmelligcnce Service officer Chrirtfophtc Sleek and/or the
W'culiod f Trum|> Dossier/ 1 he! udhjg hose memo fiat bdng FUF® roltillonabvp with Mr. Steele,
tiny payments made m Mr* Steely and efforts to corroborate information provided by Mr, Studc
and his sub-sources—whclhndiimiy or vk Fusion GPS. The wtitpoenssako directed TX)J snd
FBrtn p(\vjide copies of any Foreign Intelligence 5iuve<tisncc At4 (FISA) apptieatians
submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Sur/d Manet Colli* (FISC)—whether or not approved by
Uic FISC—inwvrpornting infnnnnlion provided by Mr, Steele, M& Mtivflourccs, aud/or Fu.^icm
G?fr
itesort la compulsory process wes necessary because of DQJ\s mid FBI's insufficient
responsiveness to the Committee's numerous Russia-investigation related requests over the past
sftvmtil months, On multiple ocowthms, through written mrpiests and dfreet enanEcinems. the
Committee \m sought butt failed to rtculvc respomiv v tedllmotty ot documents from DQJ and
FBI For example, to 6m the Committee has not received a meaningful response to tis May 9*
2017* request to Attorney QenenJ Stsstoas. Addhionsllyvcn May L6,2017, the Committee vcnl
q letter asking thtstt-Aeting Director Andrew McCabe to p^rtidpate voluniflry intemeWj end
produce Krl^vtqil dvemueritSw Tli^ CcmumllCve it^civcd no ritply until WWf 27—-more than two
tiMlki hter—when DO! declined rhe [ntervicw raquert ana indicated thut HbC Department Is
uol pmpii/c^i 1o reapmtd further to your irqtiest at this
*
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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSK OF ftFFRFSRWTATlVFS
206
Previously, on S* the Comminjfe sout^-t &)m DOl cerealn d<x~Jrutxjis, totGiidisg riferiol
FISA Epplicat’ocs and FISC orders, snd on Mtidt !7 ^5 allotted two bi Hefei to review
:t^ponsive dacaaieatS an a read-and-renim basis. Tfea Comaifucc v.^ net provided a copy of
those doct>rncn^* fin£ ths Cojrjtsicte^’s request 10 review i_heta a^Ato was denied.
The subpce&ns isaiKd on August 24 required produaion so bier than 12: Q Gem tm Sqfte^ter l ,
2017. Neither DOJ oor FBT provided eny documents by toe choline On the afls^on of
Aegust-U, less than 24 horn before the due dale, the Committee received an initial response
Drooi the DOJ Office 0 f Legislative Affairs requasilng—on befreLfafboth DOJ and FBIr—
additional ditto to cerrroN with due £ubpoam
The Cummins* require zhcely pjoduatofi of the subpoenaed docuiaeats to erder to eoreoito its
Oversight respEmblKtSes on bcitelf ofthe American public «id fill Ly cvaiimte dis setions of both
DOG sod chs F3 L There to no legitimate basis fbr FBPs failure to oea/ungfidly em^ge toe
Committee uati! too eve of the deadline or begin prc-iuctfort a* n show of good faitb-
Bdoccbror* ibere is no legitimate basis for FBfs request fcr additional time to comply, brar^
7)02 end ihe F33 are aware of the identity of the requested doaunoits* kdfccd, zs noted
sfeovc, u Least potrc of than have already been compiled and made temporarily avaflabte for the
Ccmnaicre^s review, and the remaining legated docemcn^ me-readily Ideoinabic.
N r otvwth£tandtog these conccrr^ the Ccerutoftec heresy p^ors an additional thirteen ( Lj) days
for Sill ccmplfeaco snd ptocfac&m, to occur n;> ieis: than 9:0f} a.in. cn September 14,2f})7,e
the locii specified to ths origins! subpoena. Thn revised deadEno will not be earjenced.
Is ihedtcruative, if all responsive decuniens 30 not pro-dveed by th; revised dc^dltoe-, the
Acotoey Genera! and the Director of die FBI shall appear berbro tbe CGmininec at 9:Q0 amw
Scptooiber 14,2017. mRoxn KVC-S IQ of the U-S. Capitol during an open he&ring, to expl-toi
usder oath DOJ*s md FBDs unwillingness ui Liability to comply in ?s\l with the subpoenas
issued on Angus 24*
PIca$e be advised that; to the event that DOJ or FBI fails ;o provide the documsnia to fall or
testimony described above, the Committee expressly m^rves ioi rtot: to proceed with a^y «d
ell avdbtoto Ecg^l options—incItKhnc reponhi^ to the fdliidoor^ of Rc|vrescrJstivcs a resolnhc-n
to hold tts Attcropy Genera} Director of the- FBI to contempt of Centres!, uursttent to 2
UL&C. B X$2> 194.
Siz^ erdy.
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The Honorable Jiff Scszi cm
Attorney Gtsemi
United Slates Department of Justice
950 PfaiiLS^Jvimid Avfc,W,W*
Washington, EXC. 20530
Dear Attorney General Sessions:
As explMncd in my Ic&tf of [September l, 2017], if die Department of Justice tails co comply in
full with the jmbpocno for production afdocunjtnte Issued by the House Pomarccai Select
Committee on ]htoUlgenc& (Committee) on August 24, 2017, tlic Committee requires that
Attorney General Jeff Session* uppcisr before the Committee on September Id, 2017 to explain
[ton Mfurc, The accompany tug nulpoetii, isEued today* U iou^jJed tu eumpliiijnce with
that requirement Should the Dqiatimeni of Justice comply in full and in a timely manner svllh
the CQrtirniiieo'a subpoena of AuguM 24,2017, then the Attorney QciwtfiVa appearance wilt net
be ceccrauy, and Urn appeiinuicc subpeerm dated Septembers, 2017, v/iM bi* withdrawn.
PROPERTY or THE U,S HOUSE OF RFPRESENTATl VES
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Scp^ber 5*2017
The Hocmabk Christopher Wray
Director
federal Bluest of lovcstigeUEka
935 Petuxsyivarie Av^N.W.
WashiTjgtcn, D,C 20530
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As eKpiS&Kjd in my letter [September 1,2017], if Ok Federal Bissau of Inve^gattem tails V>
comply iti full with the subpoena for pfcdu£t:art of docutoeDChi issued by tbs Hqie= Pen^armi
Select Cotnmifc on toll Ig^nee (Ccttzoifta*) m August 24,2 Q17, ihs Ciymnint* requires (feat
Direct Christopher Wray appear beibre the Comruittoo cm September 14* 2017 to explain that
rail lire. The aceompamdng aohpoena. issued :oday> is rotaM^d to ensure coimplknce whh that
;=qu5iemenL Should the Fedend Eureka of lsvest : giDoo ncmrply In Ml and iu a timely asuaner
with the Cornice* s scbpoeniof August^, 2017* then th£ Directs appiamnw will not be
necessary* and tbo acptarMccsotopoerv; dsted September 5*201?, wilt be wiLbfcwn-
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PROPER TV G- THE US. HOUSE CF REPRESENTATIVES
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The Hottotubki Jeff Sessions
Attorney OeneoJ
Utirted Stages Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania AVfc* N.W.
Washington, D,Ci 20530
’Hie Honorable Chiictqphtx Wmy j
Director
Pcdfcf&l Biiidiiiof IrTve^ttga^ori
935 Fctmsyh'Oiiia Ave, K.W.
Washington* D*C, 20530
Dour Attorney Otiuuai Sessions and Director Wrayr
On September 14,2017* representatives from the Deportment of Justice (‘i3Q,nj and Federal !
Bureau of lavT^gotion(*FBP s ) mlbnired the Committee that thsy wore not prop wed tfl produce
i/wy documents reGjwfiyjvc to Ilia nubpoentu issued an August 24—definite ft 13*<Iay CtflDuritia 6t
the orictnal Sqrteinher l rteadlimj that was gunted at DOJ's rcr|ttt'Kk (was particularly
concerned tq 3cam that, in the past three weeks, efforts la assemble such doconiettlfl had not
advanced beyond a prelunrafcty sf&gc.
As noted la my letter of September the Committee ccaUuura to seek an y doeumema ?cgammg
tbo osicfiC of ymir pftcticier/ retnlloiisliLp with former British See rat Intelligence Sendee officer
CMttqpTrer Steele mdJor the s^-cidlcd^rcvirup Dossier” retevam to the Committee^ ongoing
inrveat i action of Russian interference to the 2016ITS. presidential election—including
allegations of collusion between the Tjvmp and the Ruvims. Tint Gcntimittee he* £JsiO
sought any Foreign Intelligence Court Surveillance Act (FISA) explicit;eras sirbscittcd to tho
Foreign In tel I i^encc Surveillance Court (HSC) - whether or not approved by the FTBC - that
rwiy hive meorpof/ued riny Information provided by Mr.Stectv wad/or Fufiluu OPS, iv<h*tci no
documents have btcu provided.
*
Un&miioA^ly* HOJ's and last-wii'iiUtB fingfc££jmmt withthf Comraltt^^ c*guiding
iubpocnneomplitu>ee sind failure to produce <u}y documents—indiujlicg those ptsvdtiusly made
available—Iibr into u continuing ptfttem of insufficient rcspcKUiCvcncfin lei written Conunlttev
finests d^thtg brick imt 5 moniltf, Indtidlhg tor docuarcab raid to^limon)' Ciom Attorney
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PROPERTY OF THE U S HOuSH OF REPRESENTATIVES
ChsMS&l Session;, Hit Dctjuty Director Andrew McCafce, er.dt form ^Acting Assistant Airomsy
Cfccnd Mary McCord,
The Gjirunitise rstticios canumtiad to exarci^ij* its cocstfmiiQnaJ oversight responsibilities, zzd
coninvuo seeking you? <w’^ec2.lio£ ^svith these efforts, COJ snd FBi are therefore- gresied
cxtzsai&raty eran^un of eu adoftioEd seven (7) cs>^forpcodsictfcn Otat sstasSes the August
24 subpoena, to oeciir no !s££t ten 9:£f3 a.sn* on S^p member 22,20 L?. la tbe s. T iemaii%"^ £ad
[wsnan* to dtotsstnuonhi sobijoe^i^jcd on Septcsihcf < tbs Attorney and the
Dtroctartifdio FBI shall appear fer scopes bosiingat3:CKJana en September 25,3GI7, mRocm
IIVC-2J0 of the tf.Su Ccpitoi, to tcsiiiy uairr sath.
Jn die event of continued r^ru^oropliari*, ihe Committee reserves its right to pmoced mihany
and =11 available legs! opnras—indixaragTspomog to the fid* House ofRepRser^itiv=s a
itsolndon to bold thcAttorroy Qr net4 and Dilator of &s FBI :□ seniors cf Congress,
THUSttami^iU^CX §§ 152*
Sincere^
A/(c 7!%0-~
Be.vio Kda&s
Ch^Tratri
PROPERTY OF THt LLS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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The l lonimiblL* Devin Nunes
Chaiunan
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
U'S.'Housg of Representatives
Washington. DC 205 IS
Dear Chairmpn Nunc*;
_ #»
Our Legislative Affairs Office has been consulting with your stuff fo an elTuft eu
arrange for me to meet with you to <l»fcu5s tin: CommiUee'H inquiries. T understand tbal
ynu have been on foreign uwvcl this week. l wi)) be on foreign (mvcl fur the next live
diiya. I therefore request that you extend the deadline staled in your September 15 letter to
the Attorney General and the FBI Director, so that we can ammgc tu uddrcsM your
request* without nnduly damaging notional security end disrupting any ongoing criminal
investigation.
I appreciated uur brief telephone I'onvcr&atton Uni week. I know that you
understand that the executive branch's obligation to safeguard ihteltigenc* sources and
methods and protect the integrity of investigations sometimes warrants accomniodaiUn. j
This is not a novel issue, and it is not a partisan issue. Law enforcemcol <uid
nurional security mailers me kept confidential for good reasons.
Wise legislative and execute branch officials have worked together for many
deccdcs.ro defend our nation's long term interests by protecting the confidentiality of
Department nf Justice invest(gdions and preserving the Deportment's independence from
the political arena.
) hope thin lonitsfonding tiadition will continue ou our watch.
Thank you for yow continuing courtesies
Sincerely,
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
212
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D^ar Deploy Alttcr-ey General RoscEStoiB:
Thank you for yaur letter of S=p!£saber 22* 2017, As y;r.i we well aware, the House
Peznaoenl Select Co rnmlKec on ir*£dligenc& (the C ossai flee) is uniquely equipped to safeguard
in tel: igottefr souiccs and cicthcKi*. 0 i hex scca^dve b^sucii £gcr< d e$ bsrc provided the
Committee wLlh to Cocmri=ais n^ce^sary co conduct its (Pgain^ in vcsttg^&on into to 2016
pnrsdsiriiul eleetkm, tofadingmghly-ckssified inform^Eoa ofoanaidlniny sensJSvSy* The
Ccmmirtoe has to groai lengths to avoid irjzr tiering w^th cny ongoing ettCCuEiv? branch.
:nrYes%^C33, uni w stoud ready to wt?rk with you Ib Oris regard. f ebo take this opportunity To
tindersco re tot our requests for infbrmauoa are likely to be fer in ffimte and smaller in
seopt than the typical qtmBOflS judges and attorneys would ask in aiotoal probes.
U.S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PewmAH&IT StVSCT COMMITTEE
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Fiirtormore, just as the Department of justice (DOJ) end Federal Bureau of fo.v&=tigaOaEi
{FBI) have eaejtiistjoaAlubtigilicus, so too does Confess, which is jsspouelfate for <? vessels
both DOJ egJ FBL While the Ccnmjttce fans b&en very pehenr over ibisfi to sist moalhs, tot
pairenc* is cot without limit. To <btc, mcaninghil compfejico wrtfa the CorroovWciJ’a munerccs
results h&s been Tm nmrnl, and to Comiurtto bis nut received any* documents pursue to
Bui^KKnas Issued 3 month Tor wHch to deadline hss been twice aaeudal The fsci tot
certain Inform alien mny he tnifessrassins ut east DOi or FBI in & light yo-u prefer to avoid is not
suinefont grounds to deny to Committee »o^ to m^torhd^ ntevftod to its overright
responslbilidcs, Nor nre tore any lawful justifications fur such a derdd to Congress. This
flfa^eace of responsiveness Sam the world’s prcnEcr law enforcement agency is unacceptable.
forcEHrapl^ on Msich i7 p to Coccmttsee 1 *^ aKojled iwo,billets to rt^kwcocucoCTLs
lesponsivo io 4 request ror Foreign Mdligcrjcc Swvediknoc Aci (FISA) sppHcaEikns -tud
Focrign IntoUi^eacQ SmvsIIlMicc Court (F!$C) orders. TEodocnnwcra were ponded cq a rcai-
cad-rchim thi Ceeunhto9*3 fiaquaflC eo rr\ r l^v them 2 ^ am Vx’as deejed. E Qrr,
poiticularly frustEasd fay COTs lack of ocopcrRdon 10 providing doci-TCTfs to wltich the
PROPERTY OF THE US. HOUSE OF F^P^SENTATJVES
Cotrunittcc has already been §Jvcn a sees aivd additionally hive renson tv believe thni
rcifpmvjlve documents were impiopcrly wiupheld from the March production,
Witli respect to the pending subpoena the repeated loa-nduute responses by DOJ and
Fftt to generous deadlines hove been wholly in&dequate. Given the Coas* 1 ^ 3 ’ 3 obligations to the
American people, Cenarcss r # ceds answers* Therefore, I look forward to dUcussfaflf three matters
in pm sou vrilb you on Thursday.
Smstnfo,
Copies to: The Honorable Jett Session^ Attorney General
The: Honorable Christopher Way, Director, Federal Bureau oflav estimation
l
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November 2/2017
Deputy Director Rod Ros=ri£reiii
IL 3 . Departmec: of Justice
950 Peon^ylvcda Avenue, iVW
Washington, DC 20530*0031
Deputy Director RxkI Roscnstcin,
I hereby designate Congressman Trey Grady as my proxy for un in camera review of
documents mads available par die subpoenas issued to Attorney General Sessions and FBI
Director Wray dated August 24,2017 This designation is without prejudice to, end shall not
limit or waive the authority of all Members of the House Pcnracent Select Coramittte ca
Intelligence frem reviewing the documents it a later date upon request.
It k my request that this review occur by dose of business on November 2 . 2017 .
Best Regards.
A4c
Devin Nunea
—*
Chftintar.
PRCPB^TY OF THE US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Phrmanekt Select Co.^crTEe
on Intelligence
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December 2ft, 2QJ7
Hie Honorable Rod Rosxastcm
Deputy Attorney Genetal
U<$, Department Of Justice
1201 PctrooylvAnin Avo, NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
□tint tvk* Roscnsidiiu
The HousePcmunem Select Committal* on hildtigefjcc{the Committee) write*in
re&pciujc to the Department of Juaftoc’ft (DOJ) and (he federal Btircauof Investigation's (FBI)
Mum to fully produce re**xjn&ive document* end provide the t educated wjtnesaw to compliance
wfEhthe subpoenas issued over/bur months ag& t gn August 24* 2017.
Several vrocks ago, DQJ in formed the Committee that the basic tovestiptory documents
demanded by the subpoenas, FBI Form FD-302 interview wnw*ne$ p did not exist However*
shortly before my meeting with you in early December, DOJ subsequently located and produced
numerous FD-302s pertaining to the Steele dossier, thereby rendering the toitieJ leapunre
disingenuous ai best- As it turns oui; not only did documents jurist that were directly resbonsivs
to the Coramftise's subpoenas, but th&y involved senior DOJ Rnd FBI officials who were swiftly
reassigned when their roles in irmltem muter the Commute o's inveatigaticn were brought to
light Given the content and iroptwi of these supposedly newly hoovered FD-362s 3 tha
Committee is no longer able to accept your purported basusfbr DOJ's blanket refitsal to provide
responsive FBI Fmrn FD-EQ23$~^documenting tneetmp between FBI officials and FBI
confidential human sources—or anyth Leg less then foil ajid complete ccmpllunce with its
subpOWBs,
As <ne&ud( of the numerous delays and distrepmteies that hare hampered the process of
subpocast complEunoc, the Committee no lunger credits th& representations mads by DOJ andfor
the FBI rcgartJing theao manors. Accordingly, DOJ and (he FOE we instructed to promptly
produce to the Committee—no Inter thrni January 3,20 IS—ALL outstanding record n tdfiniiftud
as rertpMfcivc so the August 24 subpoenas, including but uoi limited to;
TiOi
nnssfinr
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RgPRESENTATiyES
216
• All responsive FD-1023including tlL reports that summarize asriiiigs between
FBI confidential hunun sources tnd FBI officials pertening to toe Steele dossier,
• All responsive FD-302S no: previously provided to the-Committee; and
• In sdefiden to the FD-302s ar>d E^D-1023s, ecstsia responsive analytical asd
reference documents tin were specifically identified end requested by the
Committee, and supposedly subject to hrsnlncnt producer., as of Dasember 15.
Should DOJ decide ^ withhold any respmsivc records* or portions thereof, from the
Ccnmnitree, it must, consisted* with the subpoena instructions, provide a written response, under
your signature, detailing the legal justification (br failing to coreply with valid congressional
subpoenas.
Additionally, fay ihe came deadline, please provide—u> writing—available ctetes in
Jeuu&iy 2018 for interviews with the following officials:
• Fcitmer DOJ Assoctefc Deputy AKcmey Gene**} Bruce Ohx;
• F31 Supervisory Special Agent Peter (SSA) Sczclt;
■ FBI Attorney /antes Bak e r ;
• FBI Attorney Lisa Page;
• FBI Anoniey Sally Moyer; and
• FBI Assists:: Director for Congressional Affairs Greg Browsr
A
The Committee further reminds you of these other oufcanding reqosss for inforcaton:
• Details concerning en apparent April 2017 meeting with the media inyolviflS
DOJ/FBI personnel, inducing DOJ Attorney Andrew Wdssrnai (due Deccnbci
!3) axid
• The remeiiing text mresajes between SSA Stack and Ms. Page (doe Dssemoet
IS).
i
ITS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERMANENT SELECT OOMWiTTKE
ON l NTH LUC BN G6
HVC- 30 *. The Cu-.tcjl
W^ISC^ t DC2:^3
12023 22S-4;2!
Janu£iy4*201S
The honorable Rod Rosen^iein
DipLiiy Atioracy Gec-mai
US. Bzpinxnmi of Justice
120t Pennsylvania Ave, MW
Washington, D,C 2C004
Dear Mr, Rossnslc in:
Pursuant to our phrms caB yesresday evening, l write to memorialize ih& agreement we reached
regarding oompiirsce ',vjlh tile subpoenas isued by House Pterins qctj Select Cto^Htec cn
Intel ligjetioe (tbc Coz^ittee) on August 2017, to ifcc Department of justice (DQJ) and
Federal Bureau of Investigator. (FBl} 4 as well as several ciht/ciHsteadbg requests by (he
Conrmittee for iufennarion and interviews, It is my hope Thai this sgreemen: mil arcvIda the
Cansniirtcc with all Outstanding documents and wi f nzccsstgy to complete ;*s
mvcstigstiong into ir^attens involving DCJ and FBL
As agreed, de^gnated ComminEe investigfcEons aed will ho provided access to alt rtmnimpg
investigative dbCumen!^ in unredaeted focm, fbr av:w at D QJ on Friday, January 201S. The
draumeciu to be tevkwcd toil] include all FBI Form FIM0235 and all remaining ?Bi Form FD*
302s reape nslvc; (p.tbe Committee's August 24,2GI7 sutjpP^ftS, The only ^ebc-upon
exception pcitams to a siceIc f D-302, which* due to national security interests. be shown
separately by Director TVray to myself and nay seder ircu&tig&wtf durogifae week or Jonuasy f v
2ms,
p
You tb^vr cortTrmtd ±ai there are no o£hcr extas: investigative documents ikt relate to the
Ccmfnutisc'a investigations into (a) Russian mvchx4ita£ in the 20KJ Presidential election or (t>)
DGJ/FBPs related setiocs dririag (bis time period. Thu includes FD-3G2S, FD-H523s r nud £3y
other EUVCStigetory dOvuractiTi germane to the Commirtee’a inveififijallosifc regtmbss of form
eedfor title. ]f 4 somehow, “pew" or^othof v responsive documents sire disoov^ri, ej discussed,
you will notify me o imafia tgly end allow my senior invest! gsior&.to review them shortly
thereafter.
With respect u> thje witness jjEer/bws requested by ihc Committee, you sevs agreed that ail stidti
wilfcVtt - ely T feeder BOJ Associate Demtfy Attorney Central Brcce Ofcn FBI
Supervisory Special Agect Peier Sbraok; fonaai FBI Gcneml Counsel lances Bafcer; FBI
Atromcy UsaPsge; FBI Artomcy Sally Moyeq FBI Assistant Director Gzsg Brswo-; FBI
Ajste rant Director Bill PricMsp; and FBC Special Agcni James Rybackj - will be meric avoUah^
for interviews, to be conducted hi January-
TTHruTO
r'RC^EH'Tr' CF iHE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
218
'1
Lardy, as eg tittnrraimnsapprcshrtfneiy 9,500 ten rocs&rgea herAwi F0I Supervise ty Spted
Agent Peser Snzsk arid his mispress, FBt AStontey Lisa fegw It :s myxsidcra&ttdiug fessed pa
yo-JT ceptTessncjf^om that ar-Olher search is being ccndarxed isr.d sit rcJevaCl massages will be
provided* Aoctjjfegiy, the Cflnrnitefc icqpcst* pcrfuericrtof aws® rr.essEges cy tto facer titan
clcse cf business,Thcraday, Jwteiy 11,2Q1S. Sbmkrfy, 1 unzzrstgnd thst yen* ofline is
ce^ching records faia'ted so th* details of an April 201? meeting belwsen DO? Attorney
Andrew Weissir^ (scree the senior attorney for Specif Counsd Robot Matter) rad the mttE%
which will also br provided to this Co mmi t te e by dose of business on Tfcvraday* Jsoosxy IT,
201 $.
ft was farther agreed tfcfl eJ! documents n^de svmLflhffcCo the Committee will alsu to sreifobk
lor review by the minority Ranting Member a:J dc3jg?^:^i staff*
The nuibnda we -am rctr^-u^cg ^ro vital f o the CotmnTTTscfa investigericQ of potesria! diusts
into ins L: genes end &x3>rocmcn£ sgeacdss* h audliflg cf the Christo pfaer Sleds dossier. The
ConrrJttee is ccccmely eorucemad by icdccatiocs th^t to? U.S. Gerveraattse official* who v^cm
tcvE 5 t£B±lr 3 a pre^idcmlsi campaign rdkd on unverified fa fbamJ jgn ms: was mixled hy the
opposing pdltfcal caropEi^ji and was tend on Jtesbri souracs> Going forward, if’s tnucial fhst
vt* mOTorElizo on: conversations on this Usue, and taai we'm as transparent as possible with
the Amedeo people, who deserve ansv^rs to the qiKstioaj The Cbncsteftis Efivestiga&ig.
Copies to:
The Honerafcie jeET Sessbns, AttDtTiey Gsne^2
ThoHonoribb Christophs Wray, Director Feder^ Staeau of ftTV^tigarion
4
J
PROPERTY OF THE U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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US. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PenwAKcNT Select Committee
on [wtell Oence
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VIA \jJ$» MAIL
Czmzy
Dear Mr. Comeyr
His Honorable James B.
Thank you for yourlT^itr-sjr.y before the House Penman ertt Select Ccfrrnfrsecn Intel!] gc&ec on
March 20.2017 and Mzy 4,2017 in the CommiCrc^ bipartisan invcsngEtlon into Russian active
treasures directed s! the 2016 U.S, election, In light of additional fets Jcnirad curing the
investigation, the Committee requests thfll you pErtid pate be a voluntary. Transcri bed interview at
cho Committee^ ofncca
Committers stuff wilt wodc wiii you to crt&oge yciu - InEjerview for either the wede of December 4
or December 11, irttentisw may covet any topic within the piiblictywfiotinccd parameter
ofihe Committals iir.TsTgrcm (see gnashed), inaludingltussis n cyber ficrmrlss dtreetsd
Hgamst lie 2G i 6 U.S, electics, potential 3aks tetweea Russia vqdldtM* associated with
political campaigns,, the ILS. govenunenfs response to these Russian cc^ve meesures, and
related leaks of ctesiSsd inmnnatfcm.
We rtispecUuity ask th^l you pmccco to the CotnEdtfcSv by no lEtcr ihia the cinse of business on
Ncrverubrr24, your availability for the iatorview dcring the time identified above.
This letter also rtoucso prescrvstiQtt usd praduettau of all dbouinents, rraDords, electronically
stored mfomtaticn, recordirr^s, data and tangible things (including, but not limited to, graphs,
charts photographs, hns^cs and other dccumenis) regardteas of form, ether than thoso widely
tvdaifibis (e.g,> newspaper ankles), mfeted to the Committee's uivesb'gsucm, youi interview, and
any andUaiy mutters.
Should you have any questions at apy Use, plesss contact Committee at (202) 225-4121. !f
you are rsprestmted hy on eEcntey, plesss forward sHa letter to your^morony* and b*vs him or
her contact the Commioee on your bchnll
PROPERT Y QF THE U.S . HOUSE OF FUf SENTATf^SS
- * /
Sincerely,
;<.-«■/€*> iy.
K. Michael Conaway
Member of Congress
Adam SchifT
Xankin^ Member
Attachment: Parameter for Russia Investigation
roi w* wc<t\u • /
property of tme u.s mouse of representatives
February L 20! S
United Slates House af Representatives
Pcnnaacnt Select Committee on [ntElligeace
ATTN: Ntck Clarismtc
HVC- 3 K U.S* Capital
WashingiOD, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Ciarlante:
I received your January 24 ,2018 letter, forwarding a November 8, 20\1 letter tiiat
w $3 sent to an old mailing address of mine.
I respectfully decline the invitation to a voluntary interview. I am confident you
can obtain the best information front current FBI employees. Place give my best to
Messrs. Conaway and Sehiff. I have fond recollections of our past interactions.
^ -S i*
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Sincerely ours*
James B. Comoy /
TOP CCCR lift
NOrOftM
PHOPFRTY OF THE U S. HOUfjE QF RFPRFSFNTATIVGS
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERUfiSENT SELECT COvWfcDTTUe
QV r^THLUOSAtCE
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December d, 2017
The Honorable Rod Rosensdn
Deputy Attorney Oessral
SiEXa Dcp^rtrsoril of Juanas
(201 FemsylVinia Av^NW
WssHngioa, D,C. 20&04
Pe£* &4k R^sastdft-
I am writing you as £ foDow-op to oirr recent ccnverssiisn about she pecs* start problem of
‘jnftnjfrr^rat of inform a D OC to *hs m±&$ frpm a&petttifv brerceh ast-ndes.
In ten^y2017,1 ^mtc a tetter to Ihsra-FsderEl Bureau oflnv&igBlltu (FBI) DRector Jsmcs
Cotaay expiesshg my concern teginibg the "epidejTire o f us^borized fedosuKo to tt a
presr 1 , laasy ofvrhtch potpotted to contsm cEsssifi ed iofbm£tj'on, parfeJariy the alleged Icelc
of Li <hVL Michael Flynn's m ms regsjding a cocv&tsaiioo ±at be tepcitedly bad ’svsch fcrrucf
Russian .-Woassedor 3ergal KislysL in Mey 2017, f v>tg1c snathcr lettar to the L^talligezce
COmzmtriiy inspector G^usr&l usd yes expressing & gnu/s cencetn aboel & pending articto based
on an ampnper leak* Unfonojirndy, ilis still not eke: to lbs House Ptsma&X Select
Comanttee on Lr^Uigsrjca (HFSCI) vragtherthe Dtprrteeni of Justice (D 0 J) h mvssdp^itvg
ibege matters.
in the pasi several months, r^itueroua oddide2£l leaks, some comprising pcTpcitcrily dasdffaJ
mfosTutfiGa, h&ve eppsared tn the press m eenneenjon to the oogw n -3 investigpliMi of Russian
interaction vrith die Trucjp cimpejgtL
I am particularly eoatenred dboyt the poteiiEial rcle of DOJ personal in fhefliuiimg such leaks.
HPSC1 has [e^nc41 hsi os or ahem April 1 U 2017, Egtafr behest cf tu^cmsrtar^ signed to
Special Ctmasd Robert Mudler m AniSrew thn hetd of UOJ's Critdnti
t)m^ s s Fraud Section, tup!, f&f-g v^jdt FBI agcnt% vdth a group of reporters frcoi a nz^jor
mafe orgpniitttico to disccss the oogp&ag Rubais iavesrigaikn, 1& light cf this ictferneiicrij l
request tta >tiu provide HFSCi with answers tOTiieK?KavEEg qnsiioea:
a Did £ue rneeihg bcwccn OOJ fioto* KSi o^idflls wvd icpocte=r^oasur7
b if ?g?s maerieg ooi^road..
5
. why mis it mil toitfcd to KPSC3 or other rufcvuni ov&mlaJht committees?
_ Who fraus tha DOJ m&oz FBI appro vcd tiihs mc&mg?
. Which importers aad rcpfoSctttsliveS from DOJ acd/cr FBI attended the meeting?
- Did the anaoglpfc Kid condactof the meeting follow ail Rfevaut DOJ and/or
piotocola?
- At the meeting, did my DOJ fi^d/ar FB] cL^QcLiiIfi provide wry irtfonnaliOft to thr
rcpmnm about to FBI mvetfJgaiion or c*mj0mi any irifocnjutiou piuvidcd by to
reporter^?
- Did anyone from DOJ tuid/or FEE file a com|)!aini about this mtddzg}
. (my DOJ aiwEfar F BI rc pn^semti vee take notos during to mcettof,?
- l o tMs nice ih i# the subject of a IG kv coti gttofi 7
Please pitodc armors to the Oopfttuitte*? a*> fox<x thou 5:00 p.ra, on December 1J,2017,
Copy to; The Hononiblo ?diditicl I'. Horowitz, lufepcctot Gccm), US. Depotuncsu o£ Justice
+
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PROPERTY OF THEU.S MOUSE: OF REPRESENTATIVES
224
VSt Department of
Out ce of legislative Affair;
Qfitei (tfUit AsaUtut AX£tsd>
ac: ^ic;
MAR 1 4 im
The Honorable Dcvki Nnnrs
CbekmsD
Furman, esi Seteet Cenintit£&£ on intelligence
Lf.S* Ffbuss of Representatives
Washing DC 20515
Dot Nunes:
This responds to ysur lener tnthe Deputy AiiC'sey datedDceansbe? 5,2017,
Ycnr letted expresses cone-m ste tmauifcoiizcd dis^osicra of clasMSed id&naatko. do the
medru from executive hs mt-A agencies* sun notes your particular concern ebout the pJHeouBj role
of Department of Justice (Department) paisomid in fficilrtaring such dlsdcsrtires. DepartissaL
policy does not cccndl continuation of the exist care of ongoing mvestij^tions, including
mv^sfiga&a? cf ucauixonzcd disclosures of classified infennaiioiL However, the Ltep^rtmen:
shares your concerns about uwathotized disclosures cfcksdfied infbcmaiion v investigates suck
disclosures. and proiccutcs offenders when sppopriatc, It certainly would bq helpful so any
investigation thar the Dcpartvidt may be conducting for you to share any bfoxmation you hove
abouxtfia identity of any iouividuds di any bientih of government who have disclosed classified
nfocmalKar to the media or to anyone without a oeed to kno w tiis utibaiisdnn.- TEte Depongnunt
will work with you to receive any Such inShnitEliim sanfitie arlally at your oonveuie^e.
You hive afeo asked whether a occu rred among Departmentpersonnel and
reparteis or. April L I s 2017 to ‘"discuss the ongoing Russia investigation.” The Deperuntru h
aware cf no such meeting zt which this was the topic of dticustioit On thd date, Cepartmairi
ofTidals did thces with reporters fromthe Associated Pri^ (AP) ;it thereporter’ request The
Bcp^rtipciit cfn chafe excluded Andrew WaisKm^nn, Chief of the Prsud Suction af L hz Cdminal
DKision; rtu^e FBI figentss u Dejmm-cJU ctiai tEomey; and an Assi-c-crt U_S, Attorney from the
EasSMPiSsdaofV^ginja- Four A? reporters ertectixrA An AP report ecntecteti Mi.
VVetsymma to snangtt the meeting, ersd Mr. Wei^smann did 50
jDutitfg.ihc incs^ing. the AP r^ofiers pcovLied i^formeiiun to thr Dspcutmcpt that they
had learned as a resist of their investigation of Paul Mcnttfert. They described ertiviiiis
unrelated to any role Mr. Msnaibrt may have hud with the campaign of Plunder:! Dorald j,
Trmuu and focused primarily o obis business wzetie^ (ruandal activities and relationships
with, tijrcigu indivi duals or entities. The AP reporters as keti questions cf 3vc Depain^znl
officials who declined tu comment oa tfe^quatuons. The Department undcretaatfe ihet boics
wtc tskeo dicing the meeting Based cyi the Pro^tEtenfis curivat undcisiaLidijtg; il docs not
zppe£r tf?a: DcpsitocntofncmJs impoperly disclosed *nyconfidcntiaI in&nnaticD.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSED? REPHE6EMTA7W€S
The Honorable Devin Nunes
Pngc 'rwi>
The Department baa referred 1o the Inspector General your questions os to whether
anyone fitcrt a complaint about the meeting and whether (he meeting is the subject of un
Inspector General investigation.
Please do uni hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance
regarding this ov any other matter.
cc: The Honorable Adam B. SchilT
Ranking Member
Sincerely,
Stepben K. Boyd
Assistant Attorney General
PROPERTY OF TNG U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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PmV-ANStfT Sb_ect Committee
O'J JfnHiiSBJCE
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exsite* aid tay otter repaired cacraurucsiircte} te*^er* FBI Agatf Peter Strzfc ard F8I Attorney LUs
F& 5 £* SSA Streak aad frfs, Fagc b“*e hem tfeiriGad in media reporting as sroSnr-iciml F 3 [
OEplCy&CS Tfifco beta pmdp^fid in difi FBFf c^untsrinrtJH^cC investigEicos son ceiling £hs HiJfey
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rnYCtfignionS- Ms. ?££= is a rBI Offc cf (feissl Cesrasd a&DfTOy; \rtiO m &o Time* v>\^
To Deputy Dt^lcr Andrew McCabe's office srii prided !$£*! support to both lowest^tfe^, Bgrh
SSA S'jrocfrfc Mi ska worked for Spc^taf Counsel Robrrt NfujJk? caetfe thia yeir bzxrara bd tg
qu:=dy dismused u-pen (fee (feoDvqyqf fteir«tracomEal stxli" r srnjlte oma i^££ of lEsnctDaci poftfeGy
chs^d mresagra durhg the course of bosh hs^sdjjaaons ibut wtre aifcgtsLyaiti-Tmiap nod pr>
CJiciaia.
T^S Oman rttgg posvtso&Jy a rec^csi for rht$e eoutfTULril=a£jcjts cs Dsce^lb^r 2,
3017 j ETid a gTT fl Oft December 2017 . i alio made £ rcqueSifcr thfi ocim 7 n* 3 «&?ns during my aiestbg
w££n yea on Dctsmixs 0 k 20 £7, TVts expects ~J> raadyc t=:-r«kxsd copb> &f d!
coaiTDuiucafriaE* uJ will to CvEnpulseiy process if eU such decline ni* sns not del rveicd ia Uw
CctoiiSs^ bdbra 9;O0 AM, Deoexcef 15,2017.
PXQFzKTY Or i HE US. MOUSE Or REPRESENTATIVES
U.y, Department uf Jusilr*
Gfike of Legislative Affairs
■- » #4 ■ i • _
OJ&ice of the AtdiLant Attorney Geheral
rFGs/jfrtffOtt D.C 205SO
DEC \ 2 IVS
The Hina^bte Devin Nunes
Cteiirman
Pcnnflnem Select Ctem mitten m IiHclligerjcc
U,S. liousc offtcprcscuisiivis
Wufttagt od, DC 29515
Dittr Chairman WuEca,
This respond* to the CoulMIIjk’s request ttiai tee Department of Jusifc* (Departmcni)
provide the committee wi(h copiw of text rnwKiHC eommurri wtions bctwctf l Mm\ Bureau of
luvostlgftdon {PBI> employees Peter Streak and Ltea Pago, Wy oro smlme ieiww rnd Identical
enclosure;] to a number of Coogrcsidoiml Commit won that hive tupdo Similar requests.
As you piny Jam*, uniniumfy }2 t 2016, Ulo Department <if iuDitc'* Office of Itupeulor
CJcncrxf (OlCjJ publicly umflUiicod that (he OJQ woujd review M uilty/itlara iIulfDupjartracTitcr
PB] policies or procedures vvew nor Mowed in ccamwUGn with, or in jettons? lending up to or
lolfttcd lo, tiie FBI Birectm'* public arnioUfioernwHon July 5,201th 1 mid the Director's tenoro to
Cnngpeop on October 2 IS and November 6,20 16j utvd that certain uwfccrlying iavcatigurtvc
dec E *faiu were toed c n improper consi d e ratfcma*^ M pan of tl irit re vie w, Qj t OIG obUiintd,
ijniwuj trthrrttitejjs, toxr rucsiagca fccovcen Mr, Strzok and Ms, Pegs,
Tne Department expected the doeesteuts provided herein til he provided at part of a
completed OIG report Howcrveii public reporting about the ettitKeace of the text messages
prompted Congressional Committee fbr the text raessetiges. Please find enclosed sn
inirinl disclosure c>r spproxbmtcly 375 text tacaan^Q communivudom-, dated August 1 $ } 2015 to
ttecembsr 1 1 2016, that been identified as pertinent to tes OIG itrvicw rdwuccd shave.
The enclosed documents contain mmimiil redneitous thatprotecE the privacy totcicsts of third
parties and sensiitofc tew traforccmeit lofamiDlfart, amlrcsiiGyc irrelevant itiftrasailor], The
Dcpartmtnt coatmaes to review dotnmeris rad will pro side pertin^. dcH^oncnts as they becctae
available.
3 On ifiiit te. ttici^FBT Dij<d?rf J&ppjk D. Cctsiisy imounccd thus Ihe MJi to icconwucodte^ fa tin Dcpartarsirt cf
JiljWcc <hg[ chutes EbquSdhe filed teUttogta (bfuttr SucittDEy of S^l<? Hilla^'Chnrfoa'Q wc uf u priviie oteTI
StTVCt,
£ 1K)J 010 Asnsucuccs JuidaticD of Rcvktf JuuMiy J 2. 70(7, avmJiWe az hltpiu7c fgij uVicio^v/pir^t/2017/7017*
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tbc Hosorabte De*iq
As has beer. pvttfcjy sxpgrtsd, Mi. Sfcra&k prcvtflajsjy served cji t3» mrts-Jg^rv- tca^i 'ad
by Specif Ccwawl Roben i&eTlc?, The OKt mfofiEcd thr Spcdel Cespscl cf ihe g;
(h= m c {used ts& on cc aboct July 2.7, 201?. Mr Mud !cr irurh^ii^iy ccsclud^ ft =i
Mr. Sirtok oatdd laager pprtfdpSEs h) Or; inveslig^iorL, srd he vv^3 rsa;o%xd ireoi the :e£tn.
This EOT$ordiD3ty apcc^mgiarion of pro viding i hfc ^iclc=?d docusaesis is ’jai<n^tofc
£=ts end c hugnst afi pes Cl this pert'rainrsuiter. lbsPspETEBSftt a^peL- rttsthe TpTttkOfxto
DIG C rv thi 3 U er* looks fbrMad to the ftzdj^gs urd rccojZL^eisd^d ons arbi” g 5cai tte. Jiw,
c^d Wui ttkfe *ppropitalc eetion os ^nantei.
oc; Tkit HonDsabk Adem Edtiir
Ridcug Mmber
229
I
Rm.: 17 . \r
LLSv Department of Jastks
0£ik^ cf Legislative AfSfe
Office of ihe Assisikfli A^cmsy Gen ersl Wq yhijigimx D. C 2 3518
¥
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Tiu= Honorable Devin Nunes-
Clalmum /AN 1 9 Ufi
Permanent SdecdcQ CeErc^fcc on IntdH^enee
7JS, ffouse of Reprc*ad£itvcs
Washington, DC 2G51S
Oe^r Chairman Kcn=s;
Dus responds to yiKC request to the Dccssruesm of Josiioc (Dcpsrtnsent; to provide ;be
Commute ^vith copies of text ices sage (^mnamka^orts between F-^ted Bureau of
leivcsrigsiioo (FBI) £Siploy£±£ Peter Slrzek and Liss Pa$e,
As yoti mny knew, *m Jenino? i 2 , 2616 . ibe Dcpzrtrr-inl^a Office cf Ikspccto: Goxrral
{GIG) publicly jmnousecd ibsri the DIG &odd rview ^legations that D-epenrnea: or FBI
policies cf proojduies wsrc cot followed in eennoetton wish. -or in aniens kudfcgup to w
■related id, ifoe FBI Director^ p attic mEramcersaci on My 5,2016, 1 and tbs Director's letters lo
Congress on October 2S and November 6,2016, or_d to extern underlying investigative
dedsions were based m irnpreper eOnsiti£jadnaS-^ As part of Cbat raaew, Uje DIG chained,
sjiKioe other ihircr, ^xtTr.es^cs between Mr. Strzc-jc $ad Ms* Page.
Jii December 2017. wc provided you with 52 initial pr*ducGQD of apcioxlmstcly 375 text
mtsse^e commimiCTo^ca^d August 16,20I5 to December l, 2016* In response to t h&
reinvests for Hue lexis the Dep^lmem codec ted di text messes Mr. Seizok
and Ms. Page avaite^sifociittie FBI for the perkd My* k 2015 to July 23,2017, 1 which was the
same period requ^sird by ike GIG. ltd Department beg^n reviewing those dcnrrfcsafs in an
effort TO provide ycu ibc^c merges thai ivert cither work^rrlnlcd orfbsi pokebd aqy toSigbf
into \hz politics f vkovs of ibe penScipasis.
* 4)ft tltai d«e, tbca-FBl Seeder imxs 3, Cotray amxiricw: to cfi= FBI wa* r^orodi^u it DcpiitE^ni nf
Amice na chcii':* fc? tFsd rahTirffCofomef Secreaay of Hilary Ob^’s srctdL
SCfV=f,
1 DOJ GIG AnrbouKr* dMttr, JiiSMBiy 12 . 264 ", Ei^fbbic ac hte m^o l ^ han ea* csaSIH 7 / 1317 -
1 Although The Tcqiiasi cci&itd i<=zz tiirtstrgh July2F, 2&17, r zzrz za ifxt TSesja^f Mr. Srrook fl^d
Ms. ?3?p afef Inly 1,201? srJ. ±e o«$tpf3 dier J toe 25,26 i 7, ^cnepcnonal in cr’ajc.
Tnp QFroET/
*
PROPERTY OF THE U.5. HOUSE CF REPRESavTATT'/ES
The! laccrabJe Devin N unes
Psjc pWO
Tbe Depcitoteni h not providing :ex! messages ^st wc purdy personal in nature.
Funheisrscre, the Dependent has redact from some wcik-ieLitod #ext messages pern on? ihc
T*ttt purely parsouaL 'I’he Dcpumtcm’s Aim ia withholding purely prnoa&I text messages end
redacting petso 22 l portions of woric-rrfred text mc3S8gc3 was primarily to facilitate the
Committee's access to potentially relevant text messages whheat having to cull through Urge
quantities of material unrelated to either the LTrestig&non of fanner Secretary of State Hillary
CKnion's use of a personal ernilt server of the investigaiion into Russian effort to inrerftje with
the2016Presidentialdecrion. .Also,the withholdingofpersonal infoimation :n someLnsteces
avoids unnecessary embarrassment or hnrassnsmt to third parties that could result from public
release of such iaforaiaaoo- Tkz DepartmtnL raiucred (he names of emp kjyces who *re jk>! SES-
level employees, and in same instances, redacted SES employees' immes to avoid nnw^rrarifid
attention u> those mdrvi duals when commenis were grenctous and did nor preside relevant
informalim to ongoing Congressional inquiries.
In a fcw instances, the Dcpanmeci has redected portions of unck-relaied texts that
ccrccmocher Lnvescgcrions. Fsrally^the Deperunert consulted with the Special CcsnseTs
OfHoe (SCO) 2 nd made some redactions related ro the structure, operation, and substance cf the
SCO invesriganen because it is ongoing.
To avoid eny concern cat tbs Department hzs withheld relevant informatiun, if a
Committee has specific questions atoic why a portioj&ir text W3S periaily redacted or about the
errere of persocal text messages widMd, the Department w»Q work with that Committee to
cither further describe or disclose redsc:ai iiifecrnalion. in a dosed seating. ATlhough theocigbial
sprecdsbeec conlnmcd only whzlthe Decurtmec! believed (o be worx-reJatcd text ircrsgcs,
luhscqueit reviews itkmhried some additional per flCmal text massages within that document.
Therefore, the document produced today contains a small number of fully redacted messages that
were determined to be personal nx=?S2£c3 Fubs^umt to tbdr initial inriurion in the previously
previded sp rea di h ect. The exposed docemcm also occludes ccrhunn? of information rim-
cmusdnedouly technical infhrms.tinn such as phone ambers cr email addresses ir« an effort (o
provide a more rrsdily rcvtcwsble set of document*. b the sashed, the ^Lntox'* do-cements ere
hem Mr. Strzok to Vis. Page, 2 zd (he “Outbox” documents ate from Ms. Page co Mr Strzoh
. The Department wants to bring So your attention thst the FBrs technical system for
retaining text messages stnt and recoved on FBI mch'fc devices failed (o preserve text messages
ibr Mr. Srrzek aad Ms. Page from December !4, 2016to epprcxfmnrdy to May 17,2017. The
FBI has informed us tint many FBI-provided Samsung 5 mobile devices did cot c* prose or store
text messages dua to misconfiguraiion issues related to rollouts, provisioning, and software
upgr^nles that conflicted with the FBI's ccilectco capabilities- Vhc result was that doa (to
should hive been isuionaebeally collected. and retained fox long-term Socage and retrieval was
not colkiced. This problem should have been corrected with the rollcui of the Saits-mg 7$ in
2017.
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
m
*
The Honorable Devin Nunes
11 iw
Mr. Stress Samsung 5 plume last connect*d to the storage system on June U. 2016.
He received lus new Samsung 7 obojui on or about July 2017, Ms, Page % Saining 5 pbo-e
fast connected to the storage system on December I3 t 2016. She reeded her rurw Samsung 7
phone on or about May 22.201 7 *
The Office of Inspector General pieced tuseiher the text mca;>uge& bclwccr Mr. Struck
and Ms. Page ftom Jane [S, 2036, to Decermba 1 3, 2016, using the data from Ms. Pas*’* phone
ivntl! the connection to the storage ^T«wn stopped on December 13,2016. On May 17,2017,
Ms, Page 1 * data collection reinitiated s*hcn she received her new phono.
Please let this office know if you have any questions regarding to produoiioa
.Assistant Attorney Oeucid
cc; 'lilt; HonomWo Adam Sehlff
Ranking Member
i
* AHJiuu&h FBI Idemiflfle May 23,21M7 is 0 k mxtfl dfltc ter MS, Ftg«*i fhanc, on licet ten icttimcdwi May l&,
2017. FBI hu* not yet been table to account fof UrndbcrapeiKy.
PROPERTY OP THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE PRESEN TATTVF5
232
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U.s. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PpHu/tfjENT Select OoMMiiTEE
CV frJT£LL|(=£KC£
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VUEJLECTfiDMC^Aft,
Tee Honorable tod J. tos^nstab
D^stty Attorney Genend
ILS. DcpMTJcat of 3uitroc
£50 PerjisyNtmiaAveojie* NW
Waihlnrtcn, D.C 20530
The Honorable Christopher Wtty
OsTECtor
Federal Bureau cflnve^tgsiioTt
£35 F«eisyivonia Aveun*, NW
Ws-hwct- D.C. 20535
Dear Mesas. Etc^ astern toi Wray;
For G&omits, ifco House Pcritt&iwitf Select Comirrirtoc on Intelligence has been conccn:*! a bo or
the De partm ent^ end Eh* Federal Buiaan of Investigaim's serious in* number of cases, Leei
weekend's reveLsrioos ifee; the D=pa^ot end tne F£! fe3k4 tc preserve - sud today’s medis
reporting tot the Depsrtincnt 1 s Inspector General has fbrearieslly recovered - apprcsrrmcly
fsve months often message exchanges between Special Agent Peter S^zok and FBI attorney
lisa P^gc lave tnly onplincd d»se sooccnss.
To ensure that Euy Committee inqTriiy is as thorough ani complete as possiblCi ^’£ xespec4flilly
r^ii^ that the Department and the FBI ensure docLmcots and {nformsdoo rdatcdl to the
fallowing b^cs sre preserved fe pot entia l ptn thee lion to the Cct&fiiittee;
* Any ccsimorticatioas devices t£su eti to Agesit Strsofc and Ml Page;
* Any eiTorts to reti ieve mfbnr^uo n Iron Agent S trzsk’a and Ml Page 1 a govcnnriccrt-
issued devlots;
* Arty deta on &e Sarr^ung 5 piKme issued to Agns SliaolLtaiiil on or aboutJuly 5,
1<U7;
* Airy data on the Samian^ 5 phone issued to Ml Page until on or ^bctit May 17,201 7;
PROPERTY OF THE ITS. HOUSE Or REPRESENTATIVES
* Any mfrmzatfon ^bout the aiJtgec ’'miscGnSgUretiort issi^a relied V> tallow
provisioning, Bfi d soigne upgrades that ccnfBcfcd with the FBI’s coUaatoi:
capabilities" thai caused ' E many FE> provided mobile device" nat to
^oaptaie or ston; toe messages*; End*
* Any investigation by the Dcputment or the FBI inio the circumstances related Q the
Muns to T^c^rvji the tent message
Tb$ DerrsitrT-cril and FBI should sntorprc* ‘"preservation" in the brc£ii£St possible oatttler,
including eastoiig the discondn^JtoE of say f-utc-d&lKfc or shnOar factions th*t entte rr^ted^is
after a certain period of lime, Tvls prestrvtfion request covers oil documents, reoards^
Electronics] ly stored tofcnsAtion, recordings, ditii, tuid tangible thb^5 (including, but no: tattod
to, graphs chans, photoglyphs, imsges and o£kt dgcizncais), rcgsrdkss cf form sud mcdlcx* of
storage, January L 201 & - present.
^the Committee also requests Thai you:
1. Eat cri £ e ns esonah to effbjis to iden lify aid noli fy fomer employees and centrmtecs,
swbeontmctojs and cansdsstts may have access to such d^ctamk records tin: they
arc 1C be pressed;
2. bxsretse effects to identify* rcca ver } a^d jneserv £ my ckt^rc: c records
v/hkh hove fcscR d=attod or narked fhr deletion btt| are stHi recoverable; a=d
3. If it Is the ro mbc practice of ov agency c oip toyoe or coniXEitor to destroy or otiieraise
alter such electronic record^ either hall such promises qt unpegs for the preservation of
compete and sccuisie duplicatos or copies of r-och records* suitable for production if
rttQU£Sia4 '' , 1
!
Wc would appreciate year conSnaing th^r sH folcirani doamemfe and iftformatkn arc being
preserved no later than the close of business oa Jamjar* 39* 23 JB,
Should yen have jjpesTiuns 41 sny time* pbtse cortiaci K4sH Fatol at (202) 225-4121,
cc; Michael Horewitz, inspector Gcmml, VJS* Dcp^mnzju of Justice
" Letter SOfr. &sp?iep E, 'JcjtJ, AMjtalAlTy Gen-CIcfai of LCg&ghe R*p, Lteviii KunetL CteitTUtn ILS.
Hc7j$< Fche^sCT Sp.lttl C^fiSTITMa an DndlijEccce, ltr_ 1*5,2D t &.
TV Q|- , he U.S. HOUSF OF REPRESENTATIVES
L\£. DcparSntfskt of Justice
federal Bureau
of Investigation
l
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£* V-
February 2,201
n-
)
Thz Honorable Devin Quires
Chairman
PcrmsnctU Scire: Committee Ofl SntcfSigcnce
US. House of Rcpiesemiivcs
Waskhtgton. DC 20515
Dear Mr* Chairman:
l"hank yci for your continued support of che FBL
Sincerely,
Gregory A- Braver
Assistant Ulrcc cr
Office of CcngfcssiarttL Affair
1 * The Honorable Adam Sdiift'
Ranking Member
Permanent Select Com^iineo on UtfeihfiCJicr
U.5, Housi of Representatives
Wash Ington, DC 20 S15
1
rHCPERTY OF THE LLS, HOUSE OF HEPHESENTATT* EE
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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Per&xxext S^cr Ccuunrree
cn ^Tmuasice
Febrctry IS* 201E
Step bar K. Boyd
AjSSiSUmt Atl^y General
U.S, R^Lfail^i eart cf Justin
950 Ftsnsylmsa Ave, NW
WuhScglan. D.C 20530
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Dear Mr* Boyd:
On f afaroaiy 7,2015* 1 wra:e to I be Bonucsbl* Rswasjay NL Cfcllysr, Presiding, of the Orited
Slates Forttgn Irjd-ligasce Surveillance Cccrt (FESC3, xequcstiEg th4t the Ccjcii proto* transcripts of
eny rcizysni FISC Stearins* tssoeiaced with the Lf±J F SSA application or renewals rri^tsd to
itU3 ekcBttij c sorvd lisnco 0 f Carter Peg?*
tn tar resptmsa to *2ic Ciioiintrtec Judgs Cotiyer wrst^ \„ymi evay now tfcsi th= Department of Justice
possesses (or o^S Cxrily obtain} tbfi sarsc r££pa:i=fve inhumationthe Cnzit rci^e prj^ssss, snd***h brtltr
positbnod than lb* Coart p respond qukfcfjr"
Thsrtfdre. in ec effort In taftno tile Cemmittst's ca^idg the Committee Keefes the
fcrOfl scripts of any relevant FJ5C tearing,* sssceuiedi with the mi tfei FISA epfikatiori or spbssepee^
renewals rckjxd to c&tatroaie eurvriJUiXDi ofGtte Psge, The Comi?Jtt£3 respssifjny ttquofta thai* no
Jb&t thin February 55. .101& DOJ infertT* *-hfi OKnctiare whcihfx Stick triE^zripis eal^ and, if scs picas*
provide them.
If yea hsvft Eny ipessioas, pi east? contact CKDrnia^e stiff at (££2) 22 MU'.
Hne]sniro|J J
PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESS TATTYE3
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V'S. Department oi Jn3iice
Grnce of Le^isLsdvc Afraid
Office of the dfsistznt Axtom&y Gsnsial Waskingtcm, D.C, 20550
*
MAR 0 ? 2 G 13
Tha Baanreble Dgcvia Nune
Cyim ,'
pg? ry.anen t Select CDnimrtfeo on IntcHigcncc
Ufa* House of Representative
Waafec^ia^ DC 2G515 j
Dcaz Mr. Cnainn^
This responds to j£rrr letter daicc February 16* 201S, requesting transcripts of any
relevant hearings cr tie Foreign Intelligence ScftSttfeccc Court (FfSC) associated’-^th the initial
FISA spolicEiicm or subsequent itceweb ruined- to the electtefflie surveillance oT Carter Page.
A3 is typical in fee consideration oi warrant applications ganefsily s including ^oit£snor>3 to tise
F(S€* difc FiSC consider si zhs applkmlcns bassd upas thn vtmt?en siicmissioQ s and held no
hearings* Accordingly* ro re?i|>ocdvo transcript* cxisL For your icfereoe^ we hare Ptfe.ohfrl a
Icner dsied July 29, 2QI3 fkm FISC Presiding Judge Reggie B* Wakento the Secure CotniniTtoo
sin te Judiciary tfirn-Circdrcaw Patrick!. L^y ths*£ oai timetf i at FISC rpactic* when
considering FJSA applicalktis* struck icakidjes ixjBsidttatisn ofchcejsmemt^ m ^hksbaheadng
2JQF b= required.
■
_ ■
Wc heps this infiams tiop is helpfb:. Pitots do :ex ht &to omtaci this onlcc if we
may provide additional assistance regard hg tins or aay other matter
PROPERTY OF THE U.3. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
237
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iw Honorable Jumna Corny
Dcnr Dli^ctoi Gwncy;
2SK ^£25SS*i«. •—• «*"» ■«»“'- -»“• c ““
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T htl nk you for your prompt (Uft natter. If you l»v> any quwUutS, ph»* « n,Kt
Committee sts(Y at 202-225-4121.
TOP EGCnET/j
PROPERTY Dr THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT AT WES
238
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t
1 - When aod bewy did you first eecom e awaxd of eny of tfr c k fo ntifliion contained hi ti= i
St celt dossier?
2, In vfeat fcnr.($) was fee Infom^on fee Steek dos^r presented ic yoii? By whom? 1
(Please describe each instance) *
_ t
3, Who did you ^isre this iofoirnaiian vdth? Wb:a? Ia Tvttat fbrm? (Please describe cisb
icsciricc) I
4, What official acdoris did you take as a issidi of nsecmTtg the rnSojir^Uon coGtaiced in the
Steele dossier?
i
5, D:d you convene any it* edugs with tfe= intclligenc e coonntichy and/cr 1 aw enfo rodent
coauniiKUcs £3 a result of the iafoiQiseon cosiamed in the Stock dossier?
6, When dH )w £rst l$Qlu or come to hejievs feat fee Steele dnsaieo vvss futiCed by «
Demacrax-aligjiBtf entity?
7* When did you test kam or cc.tk to believe that the StieJe dossier w&> ficideri by fee
Danocrahc Nations! Commit (PNC) imd/ci Hillary Ibr America (CHuooti csrupeign)?
S. When did you first become swsro fee Steele dossier WES used obtain &FISA ureter
on Carter Page?
9, Was President Obama briefed ca any infoEmshon eanviincd in fee dossier etlost to
jEncaiyiaom
10 r Did you discuss fee mfbrmniton txmainsd hi fee Sleek dossier w ith any reporfless or
other representatives of the media? If £t^ Vriio and \vhen?
-- "-_
239
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U S, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Permanent Select CoMMiTTfjQ
ON SNTaUQFNCG
Pebmafy 20,201S
HYC-ttft* Tue Ot’iTol
WaumOTOM, DC 2V- i«
U0?) TlW 4121
Umi Frruti'i
T liwEEtlnridi
Uwtott J r*C1 CH
*
Mr* Aodtew McCabe
federal Bureau of Invest igaitorv
935 FejTnsytvanSa Airc>NW
Waslurtfitoru D,C. 2Q>35
Dsar Mr, MeOite:
aanass^S
SSS SSd to»nohi »H- «““ A “ <"“> ‘ n "'“" , ‘ u “ 5 “ ln,! c ““
Hip.
ass^SSsr*
or fl Vttlitnww bMi*. t)w CommiitM will mltiato compulsory pieeess.
TUank you for yo ur prompt nflontimi fols miUcr. If you hove any iprastfon*. p! wa ,;onlllC,
Commutes naff at 202-22 3-1121.
PROPERTY 01- TL-ie U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
240
- ♦ When and bow did you first btooni£ of £ny cfOi^ ibfami^ion contained m the
Sleek dassift?
-i-
2. in v&at fotm(s) was the Mamiatiim iu the Stetk dossier pre^tiued u> you? By whom?
(Please describe each instance)
3. Who did yon shore this inform a ten with? Wheo? In wfȣ form? (Fls^se describe cash
instance)
4. What official actions did you take sa a nendt of receiving the infonnerica contained in ihe
Skctc dossier?
i- Did you convene aay trccerings wfdi the kielligeacs community and/er law ardbrcer^nl
ccmmumiies ss u result oi the Istfointation counted ia the Stock dossier?
6, When did yott fct learn or come m h^kve tlint the Stevie dossier was funded by a
Deroccrai-aligned endty?
7. WhtQ did you Sist lesrn or come to believe lhai ihe Steele dossier way funded by tin:
Demccralic Nab one! Committee {DNC} sad/ot HiHsry for America (Clinton campaign)?
S* When did y ou first become Aware that the 3 teak dass ter was tiSed to cbiain & FISA order
cn Carter Page?
9. 9/as Presideot Gbziua brisfed on any infcauad cn cratsbed to th a dosskr piiof to
January 5, 2017?
! 0, I>id yco discuss the information oemhrincd in the Stock dbdaicr with any reporters or
other rnepitS£amiY« of the media? If so, who and when?
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PeRi^viSKir Select CoufttfriTC
on WretLia«Hce
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The .'[cmomble XeffSes^cns
Aponicy GcritrsI
U*S. Depsisciem ofimce
950 Pconsylvenle Avec^e, JTW
WasMiigla^PC 20530-0001
Dwr Mr* Attorney General:
The Federal Bureau of lirvestSgatfcn (FBI) is charged \tffch proSecthig me American people and
enforcing ui^ in accordance with the U-S, Gonstfonim* To carry ouithia sssesriel mission,
the FBI a strict set of internal rule? andpnwdares embodied in the Domestic Invcstiiptiens
m$ Opcarticns Guide (DIOG)* The DIOG "»vas crested by ths Bureau itself end approved by ihe
QcpsrSnem of Justice (DOJ).
The iicr&dssied Ttftska af the DIOG Mijaafcle the Commisee (dated Qcaber 15 * 2011 }
detbrelcs tsoccdurcs the FBI must follow vvfccn subaHfimg eppliotboato the Fofdgtt
imelligenee Surveillance Comt (FISC) for ostierata ccrthici surveillance through the Foc&gu
iritelligencftSurvciSJ^* Ac£ (FtSA). Accoidmgtg the DGtG:
* FI SA sujwHIespgp ;s z very iotncaivemeans of udbcmflil-oa tbit mast baianoe
the cced to obtain sensitive neatofll purity uiiam&Elon against civil iibtitjts.
* When striking 1 bis b sJ ance, s v erifiesoion process bfc conducted mi ail FISA
applications,
o Ubdar tfat suBseeden *TI5A Verification of Accuracy FreceduxESj” the FBI ilstif
srikuovdedges this unpertsnet; iJr TTrc accuracy of infcmt-stiOD contsii*ed wrtiun
FISA epplitatioins is ©fi^mos: irapoitence,,., Oitly dpcEffiieoted and verified
jgfinnuglpfl may be used to support FBI spnUcEtiors (FISA] to the court [FISC] r
* Tnc DIOG provides detailed instructions for ths FBI jo follow to ecscm that infemageo
appearing in a FISA appikfitica that is presided i& ths FISC bis been thoemagBly vstlcd
and confirmed.
Former asd crareat DOJ eiuS FBI leadership have ecjrinetsd to tbs Committee tfc* navcaBed
Conn^Ittee em February 2,2913 P e copy of which h aSsdietS for your iCYfew.
l/NOFOft|
^ THE U.$L HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
242
Ill lt£jst of was* to be & cksr violation of FBI jeqewoIs* Ck Committee dkccts th* OOJ
shall, gftja j ^f than March 8,2P1S, provide answeis id the fbilcrwtcg questions:
* Were ihese pWCOis ehpEged &3er ihc 2011 v=o:cs: o allow fbr the uss of unverified
ferib c m atioii :o support FBI FISA applications to His FISC?
* If what steps has the 3CJ end/or the FBI taieo to hold tsoountabls those otrktals
who violated protocol?
I will Rmrad y ou &3t££id£ from the yic l&’j oc of these protocols, the presectsrum of raise anilfor
unverified isformation ts> the HSC in ejection with the Career p£g; wapecii ^pplicA^ccs could
caisi] vigbtio&sof the Allowing criminal stetatea;
* 18 U8C M2
- 50 USC 1809
* Ccn^iiracy
* Obstruction cf justice
* Coat&opl of Court
The FBI DIGG provides icTcmal oversight =nd ewifcob over authorised FBI tctndtioa so the
American public can he assured the Botceu is conducting its vital mission m accoxfincs w&h
law a^i cstibmhfid guidelines. However, Isa this instance, it's desu that base op^raiing gmi fem g
was vloletcd.
Conge taocal ovcraiglH is designed to hold agencies seectathbla. I trust tbsc you sfrtme thi*
view* smd will aaste the Committee's SnvtfltigjSton :mo violations of 0100 pressdotes relate^ to
the uic cf the See do dossier In FjSA srppli actions*
Sncbswe
cc: Mi steel Horowitz, EospECtor Gcccml of the Dcpsrtmsntof Justice
Thg Christopher Wray, Diractar. F steal Bureau of Investigation
Donocpw Tu^ 11 ^ Lira t«r n=: ^cjao^zruraTft/pt;
